Islam and the Bomb - Belfer Center for Science and International ...

Islam Islam and the Bomb 

Religious Justification Justification For For 

and Against Nuclear Weapons 

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen 

January 2011

Islam and the Bomb 

Religious Justification For 

and Against Nuclear Weapons 


January 2011

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 

Harvard Kennedy School 

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In Memoriam 

Kenneth A. Moskow 

Died on 19 September, 2008, on the summit of 

Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania, Africa 

A colleague and friend, a 

husband, father, son, and brother. 

Ken was the CIA’s point man on nuclear terror- 

ism after 9/11. There is no one who understood 

the nuclear terrorism threat better than Ken. 

One of Harvard’s own, he inspired all who knew 

him with his great passion, deep commitment, 

boundless energy, and zest for life. Like so many 

quiet heroes of intelligence, Ken did more to 

protect his country than anyone will ever know. 

He is sorely missed.

AUTHOR’S NOTE 

Threats cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the circumstances that give 

rise to them. Identifying and eliminating threats starts with an insider’s understanding of the 

enemy’s plans and intentions. Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu said it best: “Know your 

enemy, and know yourself, and you will fight a hundred battles without catastrophe.” 1 

When I began this project, my goal was to develop insight into the deeper thought process 

behind al-Qaeda’s nuclear intent. I expected to find evidence that their interest is strong, 

perhaps unshakable, but hinges on capability, i.e., they will use weapons of mass destruction 

if they are able to acquire them. Specifically, I set out to examine the impact al-Qaeda’s ap- 

parent frustration in acquiring WMD has had on the group’s intent; perhaps their interest has 

waned in recent years, or has been overtaken by global events. 

I was surprised to discover that al-Qaeda’s WMD ambitions are stronger than ever. This in- 

tent no longer feels theoretical, but operational. I believe al-Qaeda is laying the groundwork 

for a large scale attack on the United States, possibly in the next year or two. The attack may 

or may not involve the use of WMD, but there are signs that al-Qaeda is working on an event 

on a larger scale than the 9/11 attack. 

When al-Qaeda number two Ayman Zawahiri published his book “Exoneration” in 2008, I 

dismissed it as the ranting of a leadership that is increasingly detached from reality. Reading 

various book reviews confirmed my impressions; terrorism experts dismissed “Exoneration” 

as a rather desperate, defensive reaction to a harsh critique of al-Qaeda by an imprisoned 

former associate.

So, I didn’t bother to read the book. I only picked it up again this summer because I was 

searching for clues on the current status of the aborted WMD religious ruling (fatwa) that al- 

Qaeda issued in May 2003; I was informed that the author of that fatwa, radical Saudi cleric 

Nasir al Fahd, was cited in “Exoneration.” 

As I read the text closely, in the broader context of al-Qaeda’s past, my concerns grew that 

Zawahiri has written this treatise to play a part in the ritualistic process of preparing for an 

impending attack. As Osama bin Laden’s fatwa in 1998 foreshadowed the 9/11 attack, Ayman 

Zawahiri’s fatwa in 2008 may have started the clock ticking for al-Qaeda’s next large scale 

strike on America. If the pattern of al-Qaeda’s modus operandi holds true, we are in the 

middle of an attack cycle. 

Even if this theory proves to be wrong, it is better to overestimate the enemy than to under- 

estimate him. Conventional wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is spent—that they are incapable 

of carrying out another 9/11. Leaving aside whether this view is correct, for which I harbor 

grave doubts, we will surely miss the signs of the next attack if we continue to overestimate 

our own successes, and dismiss what terrorists remain capable of accomplishing when they 

put their minds to it. 


January 12, 2011

CONTENTS 

Foreword 9 

Living in an Age of the Super-Enabled Individual 12 

The Allure of Nuclear Weapons 14 

Religion, Ideology and Secularity 14 

Apocalyptic Jihad 18 

The Court of Public Opinion 20 

The Quran and Weapons of Mass Destruction 22 

Noncombatant Immunity 23 

Proportionality 24 

Deterrence 25 

Religious Rulings (fatwa) 26 

Al-Qaeda’s Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism 28 

Osama bin Laden 1998 “fatwa” 29 

Zawahiri’s Project 30 

Ayman Zawahiri’s book “Exoneration” 34 

Zawahiri’s WMD fatwa 35 

Symmetry between 2003 WMD fatwa and 2008 “Exoneration” 36 

Zawahiri’s Three Operational Messages 38 

First Message: America is the Target 38 

Second message: The use of WMD is necessary 39 

Third Message: Al-Qaeda’s best is yet to come 41 

Radical Clerics in Support of al-Qaeda (Source: Exoneration) 43

Sunni Voices: Rejection of Terrorist Violence 44 

Chronology of Sunni Voices Against Al-Qaeda 46 

Reactions to the anti-WMD Fatwa 48 

Shia Voices: Iran and the Bomb 50 

Shia Clerics Against Nuclear Weapons 51 

Shia Clerics For Nuclear Weapons 53 

Unclear 54 

Chronology of Shia Voices on Nuclear Weapons 55 

Appendices 64 

Appendix A: Background on The Quran 64 

Appendix B: Al-Qaeda Nuclear Players 70 

Appendix C: Events from 2003–2010- Nuclear Timeline Update 72 

Appendix D: Excerpts of Grand Mufti Gomaa’s anti-WMD fatwa 75 

Appendix E: Sunni Biographies 80 

Appendix F: Shia Biographies 83 

Appendix G: Same Author Correlation by Text and Page Number 87 

Endnotes 146 

Acknowledgements 154 

About the Author 155

8 

Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons

FOREWORD 

It has been almost ten years since I was first charged with assessing the 

threat posed by terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). I 

vividly recall the day, not long after 9/11, when the CIA received unequivo- 

cal intelligence that al-Qaeda was seeking the bomb. At the time, I took 

solace in the assumption that it was probably too difficult for them to get 

their hands on a nuclear weapon. I was wrong. We can not exclude the 

possibility of nuclear terrorism. It is not tomorrow’s threat; it is with us 

here today. The game changing impact of a single mushroom cloud could 

destabilize the world order and raise fundamental doubts about the ability 

of governments to continue to provide security for their people. 

For years, I chased leads to al-Qaeda’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD), without finding the answers to fundamental questions. 

Yes, it is clear that al-Qaeda is seeking high-end WMD, specifically nuclear 

and biological weapons capable of causing mass casualties. But why has 

al-Qaeda set their sights so high? Isn’t a “dirty bomb” or a chemical device a 

more probable threat, since such weapons are much easier to obtain? What is 

al-Qaeda’s justification for using WMD—how much of a factor is religion in 

their thinking? What can terrorists hope to achieve by indiscriminately kill- 

ing people on a mass scale? 

In the absence of hard data, there are few facts and too many assumptions 

being made about terrorist WMD plans and intentions. As an intelligence 

officer at heart, I try to keep an open mind when analyzing a problem, but I 

must confess I find it hard to shake the intuitive logic of the troubling obser- 

vation of Harvard’s Graham Allison in the movie, Countdown to Zero: “You 

can’t kill four million Americans by flying airplanes into buildings.” 2 

Sub-state actors are the latest players on the nuclear scene, but the aspirations 

of states remain of high concern as well. Over many years of tracking Iran’s 

nuclear program, I remain uncertain about the Iranian leadership’s real inten- 

tions—is their quest for nuclear energy merely a cunning cover for develop- 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 

9

10 

ing nuclear weapons? Has a decision already been made to build a bomb? If so, who has 

made this decision, and on what basis? How important is the religious case, for or against 

nuclear weapons, in an Islamic theocracy? Are conflicting statements concerning the status 

of nuclear weapons issued by clerics and scholars signs of dissension between religious and 

secular authorities in Iran? 

Understanding Iran’s nuclear intentions assumes the added dimension of if and when Iran 

gets the bomb. A nuclear-armed Iran will pose new proliferation risks surrounding the pos- 

sible transfer of nuclear capability and know-how from state to sub-state actors, such as He- 

zbollah and Hamas. Scant attention has been paid to the nuclear intent of surrogate groups 

and their collusion with Iranian insiders with access to nuclear facilities. 

Considering the daunting challenge of divining what lies in someone’s mind, my modest ob- 

jective is to present a framework for analyzing key factors that impact on the religious justifi- 

cation under Islam for and against nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda (Sunni extremism) and Iran 

(Shia theocracy) are offered as two case studies in this regard, because their potential acquisi- 

tion of nuclear weapons is of greatest contemporary concern. Presenting them side by side 

will invite a comparison of the respective arguments of a state and sub-state actor, in both 

houses of Islam. However, their inclusion together in this project should not be construed as 

an effort to compare or equate al-Qaeda and Iran with one another, either their motivations, 

or in moral terms. 

The sections of this report represent a compilation of the various arguments that are being 

made in the Islamic community today. I have endeavored to faithfully represent the views of 

key voices in the Muslim world, scholars, and extremists, whether they are for or against nu- 

clear weapons—and to put their testimony on the record. For this reason, the paper contains 

a large number of quotes and excerpts of key lines of reasoning for and against the bomb. 

I was surprised to learn that there is a lack of basic research on the issues that sit at the cross- 

roads of nuclear proliferation, terrorism and religion. Perhaps this is due to the fact there are 

many experts in each of these domains, but very few experts in all three. Moreover, a nuclear 

attack has not happened in over half a century, perhaps reinforcing an unfortunate misper- 

ception that the dangerous interplay between states and sub-state actors in the nuclear arena 

is still a theoretical problem. 

This report is written for expert and layperson alike. It is meant to stimulate thought, pro- 

voke questions, and most importantly, broaden public awareness concerning the threat posed 


y nuclear weapons. After years of working on the problem, I have come to believe that 

eliminating the appeal of possessing nuclear weapons must come from people of all back- 

grounds and beliefs who are willing to speak out against the corrosive moral effects of these 

weapons of mass destruction. There is a growing global consciousness that the use of nuclear 

weapons can never be justified for any reason. We must nurture this feeling; rogue states and 

terrorists can ignore that reality, but they are not going to change it. 

Despite the intrinsically depressing nature of nuclear catastrophe, I remain an inveterate 

optimist. We can prevent WMD terrorism and eliminate the threat. From this project, I 

have learned that in the Muslim world, the debate over nuclear weapons is being held in 

earnest, fed by a yearning for social justice and human rights, and based on sincere religious 

convictions. The West must fearlessly join the discourse by showcasing its values and beliefs, 

because we are all in this together. Truth, itself, is at stake, and in the end, it will prevail. 

“There can be no peace among nations without peace among religions” 

Hans Kung 3 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School 11

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 

LIVING IN AN AGE OF 

THE SUPER-ENABLED INDIVIDUAL 

“To me, it was a weapon of war, and artillery weapon. We faced half 

a million casualties trying to take Japan by land. It was either that 

or the atom bomb, I didn’t hesitate a minute, and I never lost any 

sleep over it since.” 4 

US President Harry S. Truman 

It was probably not his intention in making this remark, but President Tru- 

man offered a two part justification for using a nuclear weapon to destroy two 

Japanese cities. First, he judged that a nuclear weapon is no different than 

any other weapon of war—he characterized it as an “artillery weapon.” Sec- 

ond, he decided that its use was necessary to win a war that had cost millions 

of people their lives and had wreaked utter devastation upon the world. 

The consequences of unleashing the nuclear genie are still playing out. A 

costly and dangerous nuclear arms race that dominated events in the 20 th cen- 

tury ended in a stalemate of mutually assured destruction between states—so 

called “rational actors”—who had come to realize that these weapons simply 

cannot be used. In the 21 st century, we no longer live in the twisted comfort 

of deterrence and mutually assured destruction. Today, terrorists are actively 

seeking to buy, steal or build a single bomb that could destroy any city—and 

we must not exclude the possibility that one day, they may succeed. 

“Just as we stood for freedom in the 20 th century, we must stand 

together for the right of people everywhere to live free from fear 

in the 21 st century. And as nuclear power—as a nuclear power, as 

the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United 

States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this 

endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it. 

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment 

to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It 

will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell 

us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, “Yes, we can.” 5 

President Barack Obama, Prague, April, 2009 

The world has turned full circle. Paradoxically, in this age of the super enabled individual, 

the world may confront a greater likelihood of nuclear catastrophe than during the Cold War. 

In addition to the destabilizing prospect of new states that are secretly developing nuclear 

weapons, a growing number of states are developing nuclear technologies and materials for 

weapons or peaceful purposes. 6 This global expansion of nuclear-related activity is spawning 

new and unpredictable pathways to a bomb. Taking into account the increasing probability 

of dynamic, opportunistic interactions between states and sub-state actors, adequate foresight 

and early warning of nuclear threats can not be assured. Indeed, it may be inherently impos- 

sible to assess and mitigate the nuclear threats of the 21 st century with the same doctrine and 

approaches that served the world so well in the latter half of the 20 th century. 

In this second nuclear age, nuclear actors straddle a single spectrum of risks, consisting of 

states possessing the most advanced nuclear arsenals on one end, to terrorist groups wielding 

a single crude improvised nuclear device on the other end. The complex transactions between 

states, states and groups, and groups with other groups must be identified and interpreted in 

order to identify any clandestine nuclear weapons-related activity that is taking place. 

Nuclear threats will emanate from non obvious relationships and non-linear combinations 

of actors. For example, a prospective nuclear weapons-armed Iran—with the witting or 

unwitting involvement of the government—could become a source of proliferation to sur- 

rogate groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas. A future nuclear crisis between Iran and Israel 

could be precipitated by the deliberate transfer or accidental loss of control of a single 

Iranian bomb into the arms of a terrorist group. 

Future rogue nuclear supplier networks, similar to the global network run by the father 

of the Pakistan nuclear weapons program, AQ Khan, might serve as a source of nuclear 

capabilities to a broader range of customers, including terrorist groups. In the aftermath 

of North Korea’s clandestine effort to provide a bomb-producing nuclear facility to Syria, 

for example, the world should question whether there are any limits in North Korean 

leader Kim Jong-Il’s willingness to provide nuclear weapons capabilities to other states, 

and even to terrorist groups. 


14 

The Allure of Nuclear Weapons 

The stability of nuclear stalemate is predicated on an assumption that no rational actor will 

use nuclear weapons against an adversary who has the capacity to retaliate in kind. The 

resulting doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” might seem like madness, but it has 

lowered the risks of making serious miscalculations that could unleash a nuclear holocaust. 

States are not deterred from using nuclear weapons because of moral or ethical concerns; 

decision-makers make cold, hard calculations of self interest and have concluded that they 

cannot achieve their goals by using nuclear arsenals. 

The nuclear play book needs to be re-written to take into account the emerging features of 

nuclear threats resulting from such broader trends as globalization, extremism, and energy 

demands. Calculations based on national interest will no longer constitute a sufficient basis 

for sustaining a viable nuclear order. Some measure of moral and ethical standards must 

enter into the equation, in order for a consensus to emerge among nations that must increas- 

ingly work together to mitigate nuclear-related risks. 

In a world brimming with the stuff of a nuclear Armageddon, can we assign different moral 

standards in assessing the behavior of states and sub-state actors? What does nuclear ac- 

countability and responsibility mean in the event a state were to wittingly or unwittingly 

provide nuclear capabilities to terrorists? Does deterrence have any meaning in influencing 

the nuclear ambitions of a terrorist group? 

If, as President Truman suggested, the bomb is just another weapon, and its use is deemed to 

be the best means of achieving victory, then however unpalatable as it may sound, we must 

be prepared for others to use the same reasoning against us. Al-Qaeda has offered a detailed 

argument that the use of nuclear weapons is justifiable to win a war they declared with the 

“Pearl Harbor” attack on 9/11. 7 They have challenged the world to refute them, on moral and 

ethical terms. Based on their statements, the al-Qaeda core is hoping they will not be joined 

on this field of battle, because they are convinced their enemies are reluctant to defend their 

moral position. 

Religion, Ideology and Secularity 

“There has always been a sensitivity that we do no want to do or say anything that 

will allow our efforts to be mischaracterized credibly as a war against Islam…. 

People in the administration should be making a clear distinction between Islam, 

which is a religion and which is not our enemy, and extremist Islam, which is 

a political ideology and our enemy…The fact is our enemies fly the banner of 


Estimated Global Nuclear Weapons Inventory in 2009: ~23,360 8 

United States: 

9,400 

Britain: 180 

France: 300 

Israel: 80–100 

India: 

60–80 

Pakistan: 70–90 

Russia: 13,000 

North Korea: ? 

China: 240 

In mid-2009, the global stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was about 1,600,000 kg, 

enough for more than 60,000 nuclear weapons. 9 

HEU 

In 2009, the global stockpile of separated plutonium(Pu) was about 500,000 kg, Since the critical 

mass of plutonium is about one third that of HEU, however, the global stockpile of plutonium also 

is sufficient for more than 60,000 first-generation nuclear weapons. 10 

Pu 

Only 25 kg of HEU or 8 kg of Pu 

are required to create one crude 

nuclear bomb. 11 

= 500 Nuclear Weapons 

There are currently 1,131 

nuclear facilities worldwide 

under IAEA Safeguards. 12 

Worldwide there are hundreds of locations holding nuclear weapons or weapons-usable 

material, 13 but due to the secret nature of these facilities the exact number is unknown. 


16 

Islam. They claim to represent the religion. There are other people who say they 

don’t. What we need is to be clear about this; our enemy has an extremist political 

ideology. They describe the ideology as the true religion. And there is no way 

we can deal with this phenomenon without confronting the fact that the enemy 

political ideology is rooted in religion.” 14 

Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons 

Douglas Feith 

Assumptions concerning the intent to use weapons of mass destruction are often based on 

superficial impressions of terrorists and their cause. There is a popular notion that terrorists 

enjoy killing for killing’s sake, that they are bloodthirsty and hateful. While at some level this 

may be true, making such assumptions tends to hype the threat and distort a more reliable, 

unemotional analysis of the problem. To be sure, nothing is scarier than the image of a mad 

terrorist wielding a nuke, ready to blow himself up in the name of God. Such an image, 

however, is a fictional embodiment of the threat. A dispassionate distinction must be drawn 

between the theological, ideological and secular motivations of terrorists to use WMD, and 

their relationship to mainstream religious views and expressions. 

At the outset of such an undertaking, the extreme interpretation of Islam must be recognized as 

being at sharp variance from broadly accepted tenets of the Muslim faith. As Islamic religious 

scholar Yusuf Qaradawi noted, equating Islam with terrorism is analogous to describing the 

Oklahoma City bombing as being the handiwork of Christianity. Bomber Timothy McVeigh’s 

motivation to kill hundreds of people in the name of God should not be identified with Christi- 

anity, as a religion, any more than al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack should be attributed to Islam. 15 

Falling prey to stereotypes about religion also trivializes militant Islam’s frightening sense of 

purpose, which might represent the most profound danger it poses to the world. For militant 

Islamists, the problem is defined by religion, the conflict flows from religion, and the solution 

is derived from religion. In their view, the root of the problem is essentially mankind’s 

alienation from God, the need to be reconciled with God, and Islam’s role in bringing 

mankind back to God’s good graces. 

According to this religious-based analysis of history, the pervasive influence of secularity— 

the separation of church and state—has shrouded the world in moral and ethical darkness. 

The “people of the book” (Jews and Christians) have replaced God with mammon. Christian- 

ity has committed the unforgivable sin of polytheism by elevating Jesus Christ to the status of 

God (through the doctrine of Trinity). Islam itself must be revitalized; so-called “apostate” 

(secular) Muslim states have failed to properly implement Islamic law and tradition, depriv- 

ing people of the freedom to practice the faith as God would have them practice it.

The resulting plan of action gives rise to a liberation ideology, of sorts. Individual Muslims 

must return to the original teachings of the Quran. Muslim lands must be restored from for- 

eign domination. Apostate states must be replaced by implementing Islamic law and tradi- 

tion. Finally, people must be liberated in all corners of the earth so they are free to embrace 

Islam. A vanguard of true believers, instructed in a deeper understanding of the problem, 

its causes, and solution, must lead the call to action. Ironically, like their arch enemy, athe- 

ist communism, militant extremists recognize that many people may not perceive what is in 

their best interests until they are suitably enlightened. 

The ideology of militant Islamists is extreme, but it is not irrational; it is a well-reasoned, 

well-developed weltanschauung, or world view. Thus, the rational actor model can be applied 

to militant Islamists, who possess an internally consistent belief system. The motivation to 

possess and use WMD flows logically from an extreme, but very rational set of concrete goals 

that are based on a certain interpretation of history and religion. 

The basic factors affecting a terrorist group’s risk-gain assessment for using a nuclear weapon 

can be arrayed in a chart consisting of five broad levels of interest, motivation and justifica- 

tion for WMD. 

Five Stages of Justification Risks, Benefits, and Constraints 

As military weapon—wield the effects 

of a super bomb 

Achieve state status in power and prestige- 

fulfill aspirations of a state or group 

To control events, rectify perceived 

grievances, and change the course 

of history 

Acquisition of nuclear weapons is a 

religious duty, to achieve specific ends 

Participate in religious prophecy by 

dispensing judgment; bring about “end 

of times” 

Is there such a limit in the means of 

terrorist violence that their constituency 

will support? 

Does holding state-like powers create 

new responsibilities and constraints 

on behavior? 

Would a nuclear attack work weaken 

one’s enemies in the long run, or escalate 

the stakes and make them stronger? 

Can nuclear weapons be justified in the 

name of a religion – in the name of God? 

Is the argument accepted as legitimate? 

Once the nuclear Pandora’s box is opened, 

are subsequent developments predictably 

advantageous, or is “faith” in “God’s Will” 

so strong it does not matter? 


18 

In applying this hierarchy of motivations to a group like al-Qaeda, it should be noted that ter- 

rorists have drawn a distinction between possession and use, at least theoretically. In 1998, 

for instance, Osama bin Laden said it was his Islamic duty to possess WMD as a means of 

deterrence. It has been assumed that if he wants such weapons, it is to use them; he has never 

explicitly stated that he will use them; such is assumed. Groups with a global aperture have 

a pronounced tendency to undertake a deliberate decision-making process to set precedent- 

setting events in motion, and as a result, they carefully study the consequences that their 

actions are likely to have on the world. 

Apocalyptic Jihad 

“It would be nice to think that, in the war against terror, our side, too, speaks of 

deep philosophical ideas—it would be nice to think that someone is arguing with 

the terrorists and with the readers of Sayyid Qutb. But here I have my worries. 

The followers of Qutb speak, in their wild fashion, of enormous human problems, 

and they urge one another to death and to murder. But the enemies of these 

people speak of what? The political leaders speak of United Nations resolutions, 

of unilateralism, of multilateralism, of weapons inspectors, of coercion and 

non-coercion. This is no answer to the terrorists. The terrorists speak insanely 

of deep things. The antiterrorists had better speak sanely of equally deep things. 

Presidents will not do this. Presidents will dispatch armies, or decline to dispatch 

armies, for better and for worse.” 16 


Paul Berman 

Sayyid Qutb, a devout Muslim who memorized the Quran by the time he was ten, was one of 

the deepest thinkers of all Sunni extremist philosophers. His ideas had a profound impact on 

Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, and heavily influenced the theological and ideologi- 

cal underpinnings of the al-Qaeda movement. 

Qutb’s provocative historical analysis, based entirely on his reading of the Quran, concluded 

that man can be liberated from oppression and social injustice only through Islam; and that 

man can achieve his full potential only through submission to God through Islam. Qutb 

exhorted Muslims to jihad, to serve God through action, to fix what is wrong with the world. 

The Egyptian radical defined the higher purpose of militant Islam: “This religion is not mere- 

ly a declaration of the freedom of Arabs, nor is its message confined to Arabs. It addresses 

itself to the whole of mankind, and its sphere of work is the whole world.” 17 

In an effort to determine the limits terrorists are willing to go, to achieve their aims, it is

worth pondering what Qutb, if he lived today, would make of al-Qaeda’s global jihad. In his 

prolific writings, Qutb described a utopian world that had resolved the contradictions of hu- 

man nature and modern life, had harmonized the secular with the sacred, and existed to exalt 

God. To fulfill his vision, he advocated terrorist violence to overthrow the morally bankrupt 

global status quo. Would the “martyred” activist approve of nuclear holocaust as an instru- 

ment of fulfilling his vision of man’s higher purpose? 

In the shadow of Qutb’s thoughts, the religious basis for using weapons of mass destruction 

resonates deeply with some rejectionist Islamists, probably because these weapons offer the 

prospect of scaling otherwise insurmountable summits. For apocalyptic thinkers such as 

Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and Aum Shinryko cult leader Shogo Asahara, nuclear 

weapons represent the enabling element in waging a struggle in which ordinary rules of con- 

duct do not apply. In such terms the religious pre-justification of WMD is required as part of 

a ritualistic process for introducing new rules into the conflict. Apocalyptic jihadists hope a 

nuclear attack would be seen by their constituency as a clear sign that “God is on our side”— 

victory is at hand. 

When nuclear weapons are sought in the name of a higher purpose, it is no longer possible 

to mask the intention to obtain and use them, even for the sake of preserving secrecy and an 

element of surprise for an attack. Shogo Asahara announced his intentions in advance by 

prophesying that nuclear weapons would spark an Armageddon that would destroy a cor- 

rupt world order. He settled on using chemical weapons only after all efforts to buy or build 

a nuclear bomb had failed. 18 The Japanese cult leader explained why using nuclear weapons 

would be morally cleansing: “…if the persons killed are scoundrels, or enmeshed in social 

systems so evil that their further existence in this life will result in even greater Karmic debt, 

then those who kill are doing their victims a kind of favor by enabling them to die early. 

Their early deaths would be a kind of mercy killing, allowing their souls to move to a higher 

level than they otherwise would have been allowed to achieve.” 19 

For Osama bin Laden, one bomb would represent a symbolic and credible fulfillment of his 

promise to destroy the US economy. To that end, the al-Qaeda leader considered it a moral 

duty to pre-justify a mass casualty attack that will kill men, women and children indiscrimi- 

nately. Al-Qaeda’s serial warnings of impending attacks arise from the group’s obligation 

to give ample opportunity for the target audience to convert to Islam. The al-Qaeda leader 

makes this point clear in his ominous warning to all Americans in 2007. “I invite you to 

embrace Islam, for the greatest mistake one can make in this world and one which is uncor- 

rectable is to die without surrendering to Allah.” 20 


20 

The Court of Public Opinion 

“Conventional wisdom holds that organizations such as al-Qaeda can not be 

deterred because they are not focused on self preservation, do not value human 

life as most state leadership do, do not have territory over whose sovereignty 

they wish to preside, and live as parasites on relatively innocent bodies of host 

communities that cannot be justified to be targeted for massive reprisal. However, 

this assumption should be questioned logically and empirically….Terrorist 

organizations, including al-Qaeda and Hezbollah evince a strong commitment to 

justice as they perceive it. Wanting others to see the justice of their cause requires 

some constraint on behavior so as to win sympathy with their constituencies and 

with those in the international community that they are trying to influence.” 21 


Andrea Phlebani 

Extreme religious views deeply influence nuclear intent, but terrorists also have pragmatic 

goals to consider. Like states, Islamist extremists seek sovereignty, status, and prestige. They 

seek to deter their enemies from attacking them. They aspire to hold territory, and to govern. 

Ayman Zawahiri has repeatedly stressed that in order for al-Qaeda to flourish, the movement 

must develop a vanguard of believers and build popular support for its ideology. 22 Presum- 

ably, such considerations also introduce constraints in employing weapons that may well 

change the game in ways that are inimical to their objectives. 

Yet, the leadership’s unwavering commitment to WMD suggests that they have taken all these 

considerations into account, and have determined that the benefits of WMD outweigh the risks. 

The evidence of al-Qaeda’s efforts to acquire WMD for over a decade overwhelmingly suggests 

that the senior leadership’s intent is focused on developing high end WMD, not chemical weap- 

ons or “dirty bombs” that lack the game changing qualities of nuclear or biological weapons. In 

this context, a possible explanation of Zawahiri’s puzzling cancellation of a small scale chemical 

attack on the New York City subway in 2003 is that it simply wasn’t worth doing. 23 

Or, perhaps Zawahiri recalled the impatience of Shogo Asahara, who failed to fulfill his 

prophecy to bring down the Japanese government by launching a hastily planned chemical 

attack on the Tokyo subway. 24 Al-Qaeda is not likely to make the same mistake. Pakistani 

journalist Hamid Mir hinted as much when he noted that whatever one thinks of al-Qaeda, 

“they always do what they say they are going to do”. 25 Mir, who has interviewed Osama bin 

Laden and Zawahiri, added that the al-Qaeda leader’s favorite Quranic verse is: “I will be 

patient until patience is outworn by patience.” 26

Yet, it is quite conceivable that al-Qaeda is seriously underestimating the likelihood of nega- 

tive popular reaction to a WMD attack. The group’s leadership has made such mistakes in 

the past. For instance, al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, launched a cam- 

paign to incite civil war between Sunni and Shia in Iraq that was so excessively violent that it 

turned the Iraqi population against al-Qaeda. After Zarqawi was killed by US forces in 2006, 

the senseless violence tapered off, but Al-Qaeda never recovered its former position. 27 

Ayman Zawahiri’s efforts to convince al-Zarqawi that violence had become counter-produc- 

tive might have been drawn from his own experiences in Egypt, where he suffered a similar 

dissociation from the people’s mood. As the author Lawrence Wright explained: 

The Luxor Massacre took place on 17 November 1997 in Luxor, Egypt. Ayman 

Zawahiri, Mustafa Hamza, the new emir of the Islamic Group, and Rifai Ahmed 

Taha, the military leader of the Islamic Group, all hoped a massive terror attack 

would devastate the Egyptian economy and provoke the government into repression 

that would kill the initiative and strengthen support for anti-government terrorism. 

The massacre, however, marked a decisive drop in Islamic terrorists’ fortunes 

in Egypt by turning Egyptian public opinion overwhelmingly against them. 

Organizers and supporters of the attack reacted with denial. The day after the 

attack, Rifai Taha claimed the attackers intended only to take the tourists hostage, 

despite the evidence of the immediate and systematic nature of the slaughter. 

Others denied Islamist involvement completely. Ayman Zawahiri maintained the 

Egyptian police had done it. 28 

Zawahiri’s misreading of the public’s appetite for violence played a significant role in the 

diminution of his group’s influence in Egypt. Today, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is 

vying for power through the electoral process. Not surprisingly, Zawahiri has denounced this 

decision in the course of an acrimonious series of public exchanges with his old colleagues. 29 

For the old Egyptian terrorist leader, the new position adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood, 

explicit or implied, is tantamount to a rejection of al-Qaeda’s strategy and tactics; as such, it 

represents a potential foreshadowing of al-Qaeda’s waning influence globally. 

Such concerns about their future as a global movement may help explain why the al-Qaeda 

core leadership seems more determined than ever to ratchet up the level of violence as far 

as it will go. Al-Qaedda’s core statements and actions that endorse ever increasing levels of 

violence do not appear to be resonating with the Muslim street. Given such a state of mind, 

free of the distractions of running a large organization, what kind of decisions are two fading, 

self-radicalized, and isolated figures likely to make? 


THE QURAN AND WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION 

Appendix A provides background information on the Quran and Islamic tradi- 

tion from the Oxford Dictionary of Islam. 

Although there were no nuclear weapons in the 7 th century, when the Prophet 

Muhammad received the Quran (“recitation”), it provided an absolute stan- 

dard for Muslims to judge the morality of these modern weapons as a po- 

tential means of waging war, and by extension, their use as an instrument of 

terrorist violence. 

Proponents and opponents alike largely agree on the fundamental concepts 

and relevant legal precedents for weighing the permissibility of possessing 

and using WMD. Both sides tend to cite the same references in the Quran, 

and associated hadiths, often drawing opposite conclusions in their interpre- 

tation of their meaning. There can be no contradiction in God, so the prob- 

lem must lie in the selective use of verses to argue a case, specifically when 

the text is taken out of context and loses its true meaning. 

For example, in the second surah, or chapter, of the Quran, two verses appear 

to stand in marked contrast to one another. In the first, God encourages the 

Muslims to “fight them until there is no persecution and the religion is Al- 

lah’s.” 30 In the other, God tells the Prophet Muhammad not to impose Islam 

by force, because “there is no compulsion in religion.” Various hadiths and 

legal rulings handed down over centuries have clarified the meaning of such 

verses in ways that reflect the internal consistency of the Quran. 

Like the Holy Bible, and Torah, the Quran must be read and interpreted ho- 

listically, for its Truth to be revealed.

Noncombatant Immunity 

In Islamic law, the legitimacy of a target in war is typically determined by the capacity of 

the target country or individual to fight against Muslims. This includes enemy soldiers and 

leaders, as well as advisers to the military and the enemy leadership, even civilian advisers. 

The vast majority of civilians, however, are excluded from target lists because they are not 

actively engaged in battle, especially women, children and the elderly, whose capacity to 

fight is considered minimal in most cases. On the basis of the Quran and the Sunnah (Way 

of the Prophet), rules have been enunciated to forbid Muslims to kill noncombatants. 31 

For example, the Quran has, at minimum, acknowledged the notion of limits during the 

conduct of conflict. 

“Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for 

Allah loveth not transgressors.” (2:190) 

In addition, the Quran makes clear that believers are not ever to be purposefully killed. 

“If a man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is Hell, to abide therein (For 

ever): And the wrath and the curse of Allah are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is 

prepared for him.” (4:93) 

Military engagements must distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, while applying 

a minimum of force to achieve the objective. 32 Moreover, the hadiths note that the Prophet 

relayed specific instructions on sparing the lives of noncombatants. 

‘Do not kill a decrepit old man, or a young infant, or a woman …’ 33 

Eminent jurist Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani in his Kitab al-Siyar (book of conduct), 

drawing on a number of hadith, wrote that the Prophet forbade treachery, mutilation, and 

the killing of women and children. 

‘He (of the enemy) who has reached puberty should be killed, but he who has 

not should be spared … You may kill the adults of the unbelievers, but spare the 

minors—the youth … The Apostle of God prohibited the killing of women … nor 

should you mutilate or kill children, women, or old men.’ 34 


24 

The first Caliph (successor to the Prophet Muhammad), Abu Bakr, referenced this principle 

in the delivery of a speech to the Muslim armies assembled for the invasion of Syria in 632. 

“Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate 

dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm 

to the trees, nor burn them with fire ... Slay not any of the enemy’s flock, save for 

food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic 

services, leave them alone.” 35 

In the following centuries, some interpretations drew distinctions between the innocent 

and the guilty through the lens of those who were polytheists and those who were not, 

and, for example, interpreting the application of the Prophet’s prohibition on the killing of 

women and children as one only applying to Jews and Christians. 36 As the tradition devel- 

oped, Muslim scholars had occasion to confront a variety of questions raised by battlefield 

experience. They knew, for example, about “collateral damage,” about killings covered by 

the rule of double effect and other categories familiar from the just war tradition. Their 

treatments of these suggest that the best way to understand the prophetic sayings is as 

follows: No one fighting in an Islamic cause should ever directly and intentionally target 

noncombatants. 37 The earlier reports of the Prophet and Islamic traditions, however, form 

the foundation for Islamic reasoning about particular issues regarding appropriate conduct 

in times of conflict. 

Proportionality 

According to the Quran, the notion of proportionality is a recognized principle in Islam. 

A criminal is dealt a punishment equal to the crime committed. While equal retaliation is 

sanctioned, showing patience is considered the better course of action. Those who follow 

such restraints will be aided by Allah. 

O ye who believe! the law of equality is prescribed to you in cases of murder: the free 

for the free, the slave for the slave, the woman for the woman. But if any remission 

is made by the brother of the slain, then grant any reasonable demand, and 

compensate him with handsome gratitude, this is a concession and a Mercy from 

your Lord. After this whoever exceeds the limits shall be in grave penalty. (2:178) 


The recompense for an injury is an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a person forgives 

and makes reconciliation, his reward is due from Allah. 

“for (Allah) loveth not those who do wrong.” (42:40) 

“And if ye do catch them out, catch them out no worse than they catch you out: 

But if ye show patience, that is indeed the best (course) for those who are patient”. 

(16:126) 

For Allah is with those who restrain themselves, and those who do good. (16:128) 

And if one has retaliated to no greater extent than the injury he received, and is 

again set upon inordinately, Allah will help him: for Allah is One that blots out 

(sins) and forgives (again and again). (22:60) 

Deterrence 

The Quran may also instruct Muslims to develop a deterrent to war, by amassing the strength 

in numbers and/or arms to have such an effect on their enemies: 

“Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including 

steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your 

enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. 

Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall 

not be treated unjustly.” (8:60) 

If one were to subscribe to the hadith mentioned above and the words of Abu Bakr, one 

would find it hard to make a case to use a weapon of war that causes general destruction, 

whereby the killing of women, children, the elderly, even believers, would be inevitable. The 

sayings and deeds as transmitted through early reports have been reinterpreted over and over 

for centuries to the point where al-Qaeda is now claiming that religious considerations trump 

the idea of collateral damage; unintentional harm allows for the killing of all those mentioned 

above; and there is considerable leeway and discretion underpinning the idea of military 

necessity. In this context al-Qaeda interprets the story of the Prophet using a catapult against 

the village of Ta’if—which, by design, is incapable of distinguishing the guilty from the inno- 

cent. This story has been reiterated by scholar after scholar and in fatwa after fatwa, including 


26 

both Saudi radical cleric Nasir al-Fahd and Ayman Zawahiri, and it seems to be one of the 

only examples they cite when justifying such general destruction. 

Thus, Islamist militants consider retaliation, and like-for-like, as being both broadly accept- 

able and encouraged under the Quran, but only in a strictly “defensive manner.” The argu- 

ment boils down, then, to a definition of what constitutes “defensive” action. The Quran has 

a clear injunction against taking offensive action; one can, and perhaps should, only punish 

them the way in which they have punished you. 

This implies that WMD simply cannot be used as a first-strike engagement, but it can po- 

tentially be used in retaliation for use in kind. This seeming allowance for WMD, however, 

begins to blur in the light of the Quran’s clear injunctions against killing the aged, women 

and children; how can one retaliate with a weapon that will inevitably cause such damage? 

Questions over what sort of guidance trumps another form of guidance will inevitably spark 

discussion. You cannot be for both rules given their contradiction, especially in the context 

of WMD. It is clear where al-Qaeda stands on the rule they have chosen, but it’s hard to 

find a Quranic justification for using WMD as a first-strike weapon, even before one decides 

whether or not noncombatant immunity applies. 

There has also been some discussion on 8:60 and its interpretation as one that characterizes 

the notion of deterrence. If this is the case, possession of WMD does not equal use, though it 

may certainly be allowed to possess. That being said, even if one does possess such weapons, 

one can only seem to use them in retaliation if they were attached with the same weapon. 

This, however, is a fragment of a much larger discussion on which considerations trump 

others in the context of war. Also, the statement by Abu Bakr to his Muslim armies before 

invading Syria, makes clear note that it is not permissible to burn trees, destroy agriculture, 

and in another translation (perhaps a longer one) not even harm animals of any kind—this 

can certainly be applied to the WMD context, for such a weapon is bound to cause exactly 

this kind of damage, in addition to killing noncombatants. 

Religious Rulings (fatwa) 

An Islamic legal ruling, or “fatwa,” has a special importance in the debate for and against 

WMD. It is accepted in the Islamic community that only religious authorities can rule on 


moral and ethical matters. This is salient in defining rules of war. Militant Islamists feel 

a compunction to seek legal rulings (fatwa) to support their argument that that they are 

engaged not in terrorism, but in war; that it is a just war because the enemy is the aggressor; 

and that their means of waging war are justified under Islam. Called “Usul al-fiqh” (Prin- 

ciples of Jurisprudence), a fatwa is binding when these four conditions are satisfied: 

It is in line with relevant legal proofs, deduced from Quranic verses and Hadiths; 

It is issued by a person (or a board) having due knowledge and sincerity of heart; 

It is free from individual opportunism, and not depending on political servitude; 

It is adequate with the needs of the contemporary world. 38 


AL-QAEDA’S RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATION 

OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 

“This vanguard constitutes the solid base [qaeda in Arabic] for the 

hoped-for society … We shall continue the jihad no matter how 

long the way, until the last breath and the last beat of the pulse—or 

until we see the Islamic state established.” 39 

Abdullah Azzam 

When legendary jihadist Abdullah Azzam was assassinated under mysterious 

circumstances in November 1989, suspects in his murder included Osama 

bin Laden and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) leader Ayman Zawahiri. After 

the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan, Azzam sought to shift jihad to 

his homeland, Palestine. Zawahiri sought to focus the jihad on Egypt and the 

other secular Muslim states, in hopes of restoring the caliphate, the rule of 

Islamic clerics, which had ended after the dissolution of the Ottoman Em- 

pire in 1924. After Islamic rule had been re-established in the Islamic world, 

Zawahiri wrote, “then history would make a new turn, God willing, in the 

opposite direction against the empire of the United States and the world’s 

Jewish government.” 40 

It is not clear who killed Azzam, but his departure from the scene played 

into Osama bin Laden’s hands, by shifting the target of the jihad not to 

Israel or to Egypt, but to the United States. When bin Laden formed al- 

Qaeda a year earlier, Zawahiri was convinced to throw in his lot with this 

“heaven-sent man,” 41 as Azzam had characterized bin Laden, principally 

because Zawahiri felt stymied in fulfilling his lifelong dream of overthrow- 

ing the Egyptian regime. 

Bin Laden would develop an idea that would breathe life back into Zawahiri’s 

dreams: the United States must become the target of the jihad. If the Americans 

could be provoked into war, they could be defeated like the Soviets, and ex- 

pelled from Muslim lands for good. The fall of the US superpower would lead 

to the overthrow of secular Arab states. This insight led to successive al-Qaeda

strikes against the US, including the unsuccessful bombing of the World Trade Center (1993), 

bombings of two US Embassies in East Africa (1998), and the bombing of the USS Cole (2000). 

It was not evident at the time, but the road to 9/11 began on the day al-Qaeda was formed. 

It was with a grim mood of impending confrontation with the United States that the two 

al-Qaeda leaders shared an interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. By 1992, al- 

Qaeda was already dabbling in the nuclear black market. Undaunted by a series of scams by 

hustlers and con men, Bin Laden and Zawahiri remained alert to opportunities to buy, steal, 

or build a bomb. After al-Qaeda was expelled from Sudan in 1994, Ayman Zawahiri mysteri- 

ously dropped out of sight. For two years, the Egyptian doctor and two of his top lieutenants 

traveled extensively to Russia, Yemen, Malaysia, Singapore and China. The purpose of their 

travels has never been established, but Zawahiri’s associations during his travels, and own 

statements suggest that he and his cohorts may have been hunting for WMD. 42 

It is no coincidence that 1998 was the year that Osama bin Laden openly declared war on the 

US, publicly stated that it was his Islamic duty to acquire WMD, and secretly launched the 

operational plan for the 9/11 attack. Bin Laden privately expressed frustration that two brazen 

assaults against US government interests abroad had failed to provoke the US into invading 

Afghanistan. 43 He formalized an agreement within al-Qaeda to attack the “far enemy,” the US, 

before the “near enemy,” the Muslim states. The al-Qaeda high command secretly initiated the 

operational planning that would culminate in the 9/11 attack. They began chemical, biological 

and nuclear programs under the direct supervision of Zawahiri and senior al-Qaeda members. 

At around this time, Zawahiri also began piecing together two separate Pakistani and Malay- 

sian-based networks to develop an anthrax weapon for use in the United States. 44 

Osama bin Laden 1998 “fatwa” 

“All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of 

war on God, his messenger, and Muslims. And ulema have throughout Islamic 

history unanimously agreed that the jihad is an individual duty if the enemy 

destroys the Muslim countries. This was revealed by Imam Bin-Qadamah in “Al- 

Mughni,” Imam al-Kisa’i in “Al-Bada’i,” al-Qurtubi in his interpretation, and the 

shaykh of al-Islam in his books, where he said: “As for the fighting to repulse [an 

enemy], it is aimed at defending sanctity and religion, and it is a duty as agreed [by 

the ulema]. Nothing is more sacred than belief except repulsing an enemy who is 

attacking religion and life.” 


30 

On that basis, and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa 

to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and 

military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country 

in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the 

holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out 

of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in 

accordance with the words of Almighty God, “and fight the pagans all together 

as they fight you all together,” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or 

oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.” 45 

Issuing this fatwa served several objectives. First, Osama bin Laden became the unquestioned 

leader of a global jihad, and the mastermind behind the movement’s decision to declare war 

on America. Although Osama bin Laden had no authority to issue a fatwa, he embraced 

an opportunity to seek “God’s approval” for the decision to escalate the conflict to the next 

stage. By authoring the fatwa himself, bin Laden also assumed a role as chief cleric in charge 

of translating Islamist extremist theology and ideology into action. This positioned him to 

anticipate and preempt interference from Sunni clerics who were opposed to al-Qaeda. 

By declaring it to be his “Islamic duty” to acquire WMD, the al-Qaeda leader envisioned the 

introduction of WMD (by either side) in the atmosphere of all out war that was sure to follow 

9/11; he pre-justified their use on religious grounds. Finally, bin Laden made it a religious 

duty for his followers to pursue WMD. Henceforth, Ayman Zawahiri made it his mission to 

develop the religious case for using WMD, in parallel with his efforts to acquire operational 

capability for future attacks against the US. 

Zawahiri’s Project 

Ayman Zawahiri on video tape, commenting on the 9/11 attack, in presence of Osama bin 

Laden and unidentified Saudi cleric. 

“This great victory was possible only by the grace of God,” he says with quiet pride. 

“This was not just a human achievement—it was a holy act. (emphasis added) 

These nineteen brave men who gave their lives for the cause of God will be well 

taken care of. God granted them the strength to do what they did. There’s no 


comparison between the power of these nineteen men and the power of America, 

and there’s no comparison between the destruction these nineteen men caused and 

the destruction America caused.” 46 

Not long after 9/11, the al-Qaeda core began taking steps to substantiate the use of WMD 

on religious grounds. In mid summer 2002, the group had begun making probes to quietly 

obtain a fatwa from clerics in Saudi Arabia to support what appeared to be a significant 

shift in tactics, based on intelligence that was available at the time. Al-Qaeda seniors in 

Saudi Arabia approached unnamed clerics who had endorsed the 9/11 attack, but were 

apparently rebuffed. At the time, there was a question as to whether senior clerics in the 

desert Kingdom were willing to accept the obvious implications of raising the stakes to 

such a scale. 47 

In late fall 2002, a terrorist cell associated with al-Qaeda completed planning for a chemical 

attack on the New York City subway, utilizing a cyanide gas dispersal device called the ‘mob- 

taker.’ Operatives sought permission from the al-Qaeda core to carry out the attack. Ayman 

Zawahiri, who was unaware of the plan in its earlier planning stages, called off the attack 

because he had “something better” in mind. 48 

Around the same time, Al-Qaeda’s chief in Saudi Arabia, Abu Bakr al-Azdi, was in com- 

munication with senior al-Qaeda in Iran regarding the potential purchase of “three Russian 

nuclear devices.” This small group, reportedly under house arrest in Iran at the time, in- 

cluded an assortment of key, WMD-associated seniors, including Sayf al Adl, Abd al Aziz al 

Masri, and Sulayman Abu Ghayth al Libi. Former Egyptian Army officer Sayf al Adl was in 

the very top tier of the al-Qaeda core leadership 49 ; Abd al Aziz al Masri, a dedicated nuclear 

operative, had conducted nuclear-related experiments in the Afghanistan desert in the late 

1990’s; and Abu Ghyath, al-Qaeda’s press spokesman, had publicly stated in June 2002 that it 

was justifiable to kill four million Americans. 50 

Based on a series of exchanges in a three way communication between Saudi operatives, al- 

Qaeda seniors in Iran, and Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, Abu Bakr was directed 

by Sayf al Adl to purchase the three devices, provided that a Pakistan (nuclear) specialist was 

able to verify the goods. 51 Al-Qaeda was cautiously and deliberately proceeding with their 

plans to purchase the three alleged “nuclear devices.” 

At the same time, operational preparations were nearing completion for al-Qaeda bomb- 


32 

ings of US and Saudi targets in the Kingdom. Intelligence reporting produced growing 

signs of terrorist plotting that indicated al-Qaeda had decided to raise the stakes by under- 

taking attacks against the Saudi Royal family. There were also signs they were considering 

the use of some form of WMD against US and possibly UK targets, either inside or outside 

the Gulf region. 

In parallel to operational planning, Al-Qaeda continued to prepare to unveil a fatwa authoriz- 

ing the use of weapons of mass destruction. Radical Saudi clerics Nasir Sheik al-Fahd, Ali al- 

Khudayr and Ahmed al-Khaldi had drawn up and co-signed a religious ruling (fatwa) autho- 

rizing the use of WMD against the US and the UK. Nasir al-Fahd, a senior Muslim cleric who 

is closely associated with al-Qaida, has written dozens of books and publications containing 

religious edicts against the US and anyone cooperating with it. Among his well-known pro- 

nouncements is that “anyone assisting the Americans is an infidel.” His treatises incite animos- 

ity towards the West, toward Christianity, and particularly towards Americans. 

Following the terrorist attacks in Riyadh on May 12, 2003, Saudi security forces launched an 

extensive manhunt for the three radical clerics. In a panic, Nasir al Fahd posted the fatwa on 

May 21, 2003, just before he was captured by Saudi security forces in the city of Medina. 52 

Al Fahd offered three central arguments for using WMD in his fatwa: 53 

“One kills in a good manner only when one can. If those engaged in jihad cannot 

do so, for example when they are forced to bomb, destroy, burn or flood, it is 

permissible.” 

“One avoids killing women and children only when one can distinguish them. If 

one cannot do so, as when infidels make a night attack or invade, they may be 

killed as collateral to the fighters.” 

“Similarly, killing a Muslim is forbidden and not permitted; but if those engaged 

in jihad are forced to kill him because they cannot repel the infidels or fight them 

otherwise, it is permitted, as when the Muslim is being used as a living shield.” 

The arrest of the three clerics created a backlash and led to rumors that two of the cler- 

ics—Al-Khudayr and al-Khaldi—were killed during an arrest attempt. The rumors of their 

death aroused an outcry and calls for revenge surfaced on many web sites associated with 

al-Qaeda. 54 Figures close to bin Laden reported that news that the two clerics had been killed 

greatly affected bin Laden, who pledged to avenge their death by harming the al-Saud family 


“in a way never before seen in the past.” 55 Saudi Interior Minister Prince Bin Nayyif con- 

firmed that the three clerics were in custody, but denied any of them had died. 56 

Throughout the summer of 2003, Saudi security forces conducted a series of raids that decimat- 

ed the al-Qaeda organization in Saudi Arabia. In June, senior al-Qaeda leader Yusef al-Ayeri 

was killed at a roadblock in a shootout with Saudi security forces. 57 Saudi security officials re- 

sponded decisively to arrest and interrogate anyone having any connection to the WMD fatwa. 

While under detention, Nasir al-Fahd recanted several of his fatwas on Saudi television—he 

referred to his previous views as being a “grave mistake.” It is unclear whether the WMD 

fatwa was among them. 58 In retrospect, the ambiguity of al Fahd’s recantation was purpose- 

ful. He subsequently wrote a letter from prison in which he asked his associates to spread the 

word that his recantation was coerced by Saudi authorities. 

The text of Nasir al-Fahd’s letter from prison is as follows: 

‘Shawwāl, 1425 H 

In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful 

“Praise be to Allāh, and may peace and blessings be upon the Messenger of Allāh, 

to proceed: 

Springing from Allāh’s saying: 

“But they never lost heart for that which did befall them in Allah’s Way, nor did 

they weaken nor degrade themselves. And Allah loves As-Sabirin. 

I write these words, and I declare before that, that I have dug a grave in my cell, and 

divorced this world thrice and have cut any link between it and me; and after this I 

say, and rely upon Allāh and seek His help...” 

“And may Allah reward all those who help spread, print and publish this on the 

internet and media channels.” 59 

The al-Qaeda fatwa story drifted into obscurity after al Fahd’s letter from prison. Did the 

fatwa continue to have the endorsement of the al-Qaeda leadership? Was Zawahiri’s involve- 

ment in commissioning a WMD fatwa related exclusively to the nuclear deal, or did it serve 

a broader purpose in al-Qaeda’s future plans? Would the fatwa be required to justify a future 

WMD attack? If so, it would be vital to clarify such questions to ensure there is a widely ac- 

cepted understanding that the case has already been made to justify the use of WMD, explain 

that the fatwa remains valid. 


34 

In November, 2007, Sayid Imam Abdel-Aziz Al Sharif, also known as Doctor Fadl, issued 

from his prison cell in Cairo, with the approval and encouragement of Egyptian authori- 

ties, a 111-page document entitled “Rationalizing Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World.” 

This document rejected his influential jihadist manifestos from 1988. Al-Sharif showed the 

document he wrote to the imprisoned leaders of al-Jihad for approval. The Islamic Research 

Academy at al-Azhar approved it and recommended that it be published. According to al- 

Sharif, he wrote his searing condemnation of al-Qeada in an effort to put a stop to an ideol- 

ogy of violence and terrorism. From his perspective, he believed al-Qaeda had distorted the 

true meaning of jihad. 60 

Ayman Zawahiri’s book “Exoneration” 

In March, 2008, Ayman Zawahiri responded directly to Dr Fadl with a book of his own that 

was posted on the internet, entitled “Exoneration.” Zawahiri goes to great lengths to refute, 

essentially thought by thought, Dr. Fadl’s text. And perhaps convincingly to any reader, he 

instills a canyon of doubt into the independence of the authorship, and whether or not it was 

written under duress. It looks as though he is genuinely dismayed by how critical the text 

was against him, al-Qaeda and their tactics, but understands the prisoner’s dilemma, and 

outlines a number of scenarios that may have occurred—leaning on one: the version of Dr. 

Fadl’s text is one which is both coerced and tailored to American and State Security interests 

as to clamp down on the “disturbing of public order.” 61 

Zawahiri devotes roughly the first half of the book to refute Dr. Fadl’s thoughts and asser- 

tions by targeting them line by line and citing scholar by scholar and cleric by cleric. In the 

middle, he apologizes for going off on a tangent, and plunges into an analysis of every one of 

al-Qaeda’s beliefs and tactics, celebrates his fallen and captured colleagues, and outlines why 

the ‘war’ has been fought a certain way and will continue to be fought a certain way, with 

America as the No. 1 enemy of Islam. 

Refuting Dr Fadl’s text and justifying WMD has the ability to serve two purposes: address al- 

Qaeda’s past actions, and vigorously defend them, while at the same time, justify and explain 

the reasons and goals for the group’s future attacks. It therefore has the potential to be both 

looking backward and looking forward. 


Zawahiri’s WMD fatwa 

“Shaykh Nasir Bin-Hamad al-Fahd….According to reports he is still in jail clinging 

firmly to righteousness. We know for certain that he has recanted what he said 

on a television show during which he was questioned by A’id al-Qarni. Regarding 

that show, the shaykh and his colleagues said that they were coerced and found 

interpretations of Shari’ah that they could say what the government wanted them 

to say because it promised to release them afterward. It did not release them. He 

said: If I had known what was going to happen, I would not have surrendered to the 

police detectives but would have fought until I was killed. He sent several messages 

out of his jail that show he is still firm on the path of righteousness. We pray to God 

to give him and all Muslims firmness in righteousness and a good end.” 62 

With these words, Ayman Zawahiri resurrects Nasir al Fahd from the obscurity of prison, 

answers the questions surrounding al Fahd’s recantation, breathes life back into the dormant 

fatwa, and gives it a contemporary purpose. In so doing, Zawahiri makes the fatwa his and 

al-Qaeda’s own. 

Nasir al-Fahd’s 2003 fatwa is built in its entirety into Exoneration: the same ideas, thoughts, 

examples and scholars to justify equal retaliation—“repaying like for like”. The similarities 

between the two texts are nothing short of striking. Virtually every single cleric, scholar, and 

example used by al-Fahd to justify the use of WMD has been resurrected in near-symmetry 

throughout “Exoneration”. While a handful of the same individuals were cited by both al- 

Fahd and Zawahiri to justify different issues, nearly 30 authors were identically sourced with 

correlating content. Indeed, Zawahiri tended to expand on the thoughts and ideas of al-Fahd 

by diving into a more comprehensive justification with even further citations. 

Zawahiri raises key Quranic themes to justify the use of WMD to include: the legality of 

killing women, children, and the elderly, the use of Muslim shields, the inevitability of 

environmental destruction, notions of retaliatory use and deterrence, attacking in the night 

and unintentionally harming noncombatants, among other such issues. Indeed, not only are 

the same scholars, clerics and quotations recounted in “Exoneration”, but many of the same 

examples are used nearly verbatim, including the Prophet’s reported sayings in the context of 

night raids and the harming of noncombatants, as well as the Prophet’s attack on the village 

of al-Ta’if using a catapult—thereby permitting the use of weapons of “general destruction” 

incapable of distinguishing between innocent civilians and combatants. 63 


36 

He offers a meticulously researched case to support the argument that using weapons of 

mass destruction should be judged on intent rather than on results. The same reasoning is 

applied in a detailed expository on such matters as loyalty to the State, contracts, obligations 

and treaties, the permissibility of espionage, and deception and trickery. For example, on the 

topic of Muslims killed in combat unintentionally, in the fight against infidels: “When Mus- 

lims fight non-believers, any Muslim who is killed is a martyr.” 64 

Symmetry between 2003 WMD fatwa and 2008 “Exoneration” 

There is no compelling need for Zawahiri to duplicate and expand on, albeit under the cloak 

of another purpose, the very same ideas of al-Fahd in vivid detail and similarity, often ex- 

panding on the issues to provide further legitimacy. While it appears these issues can be 

bifurcated throughout his text into different themes without any reference to the 2003 WMD 

fatwa, a large portion of the text is indeed not only similar in many respects, but provides 

more ‘proof ’ of its validity. Only four months had elapsed from Dr Fadl’s book to completing 

“Exoneration,” raising the distinct possibility Zawahiri was focused on the subject of WMD 

for reasons unrelated to the publication of Dr Fadl’s critique. 

Nasir Al-Fahd (2003) Ayman Zawahiri (2008) 

Justifying the Unintentional Killing of Noncombatants during Night Raids and General 

Destruction—including Women, Children and the Elderly 

Al-Sa’b ibn Jaththamah 

Ibn Qudamah 

Ahmad ibn Hanbal 

Al-Tahawi 

Salamah ibn al-Akwa 

Al-Rahibani 

Al-Tabari 

Al-Bayhaqi 

Abu Dawud 

Al-Sa’b Bin-Jaththamah 

Ibn Qudamah 


Al-Tahawi 

Salamah ibn al-Akwa 

Al-Nawawi 

Al-Bukhari 

Imam al-Shirazi 

Malik 

Al-Shafi’I 

Abu Hanifa 

Ibn Abd al-Birr 

Abu Bakr al-Jassas 


Justifying Environmental Destruction, Burning, Flooding, and Agricultural Harm 


Abu Dawud 

Usamah ibn Zayd 

Malik 

Ibn al-Qasim 

Al-Sahfi’I 

Ishaq 

Al-Thawri 

Al-Tirmidhi 

Al-San’ani 

Al-Mawwaq 

Ashhab 

Ibn Majah 

Al-Bukhari 

Al-‘Ayni 

Ibn ‘Umar 


Abu Dawud 

Usama Ibn Zayd 

Malik 

Ibn al-Qasim 

Al-Shafi’i 

Ishaq 

Al-Thawri 

Nafi’ 

Abu Hanifa 

Ibn Taymiyyah 

Al-Zuhari 

Yahya Ibn Yahya 

Muhammad Ibn Rumh 

Al-Layth 

Qutaybah Ibn Sa’id 

Imam al-Kasani 

Justifying the Unintentional Killing of Muslims used as Human Shields—under the Prin- 

ciple of Necessity—to Defeat an Enemy 

Ibn Taymiyah 

Al-Shafi’I 

Al-Sarakhsi 

Abu Bakr al-Jassas 

Al-Mawwaq 

Ashhab 

Al-Shaybani 

Ibn-Taymiyyah 

Al-Shafi’I 

Al-Sarakhsi 

Ibn Qudamah 

Al-Awza’I 

Abu Hanifah 

Al-Thawri 

Ibn-Qasim 

Abu al-Layth 

Al-San’ani 

Imam al-Kasani 


38 

Zawahiri’s Three Operational Messages 

For al-Qaeda, procuring a fatwa is part of a ritual process for an impending attack. The 1998 

fatwa was issued in support of 9/11. The 2003 fatwa was published to accompany concrete 

operational planning that was underway at that time. In 2008, Zawahiri’s purpose is to issue 

a warning of an impending attack. 

In “Exoneration,” Zawahiri’s words soar beyond the scale of Dr Fadl’s critique of al-Qaeda. The 

al-Qaeda leader is not simply addressing alleged past mistakes in course of rebutting an argu- 

ment made by an imprisoned former associate: he is pre-justifying a future, unprecedented 

attack capable of producing mass casualties. He takes pains to ensure he cannot be seen to be 

approaching this task lightly. His tone is somber and weighty; he acknowledges that causing 

mass casualties requires special justification—to his evident satisfaction, he provides it. 

Zawahiri’s effort to strengthen al Fahd’s WMD fatwa is much more concrete than the theo- 

logical orientation with which the 2003 fatwa was written. As a cleric, al Fahd likely did not 

know the operational intent that rested behind his legal argument. However, like bin Laden’s 

1998 fatwa, Zawahiri serves as both cleric and operational planner—he knows the specific 

purpose for which the fatwa is being issued. Zawahiri is making his case on both religious 

and operational levels. 

First Message: America is the Target 

In making a meticulous religious justification for using WMD, Zawahiri explicitly names the 

US as the intended target of a mass casualty attack. He quotes al-Fahd with respect to the 

legitimacy of waging jihad outside of Iraq: “There is no doubt that the greatest enemy of Islam 

and Muslims at this time is the Americans.” 65 

Zawahiri goes on to explain why he considers the United States to be a “single juridical entity” 

under Islam. 66 The implications are chilling: it means all Americans are valid targets, whether 

they are men, women, or children. His careful word choice reflects a seriousness of purpose; 

he takes the responsibility for justifying mass casualties very seriously. In quoting the Quran 

and Hadiths on this matter, he cites various view points, some of which support his judg- 

ments, some of which do not. At times, he dramatically prefaces his conclusion with “I say...” 

to signify his judgments that digress from the views held by some Islamic scholars. 67 His use 

of the first person also signifies the authority he seeks for himself as an arbiter on Islamic law. 

First quoting that “artillery bombardment is permissible when the jihad needs or requires it,” 68 

Zawahiri quotes Nasir al Fahd’s fatwa: 


“If a bomb were dropped on them, destroying 10 million of them and burning as 

much of their land as they have burned of Muslim land that would be permissible 

without any need to mention any other proof. We might need other proofs if we 

wanted to destroy more than this number of them!” 69 

Hearkening to the use of the term “artillery” from Truman to justify the bombing of Hiro- 

shima, it certainly is an interesting coincidence that Zawahiri’s text uses the phrase “artillery 

bombardments” in the context of general destruction. It very well could be, for him, just an- 

other weapon that cannot distinguish, such as the often-mentioned catapult, and thus justi- 

fies the use of such a weapon identically in the modern era. 

That said, Zawahiri’s argument leads to his view that that the introduction of the means of 

mass destruction has become a necessary means of confronting a stubborn superpower. 

Second message: The use of WMD is necessary 

Zawahiri’s complex reasons for redefining the rules of waging war as the West understands 

them include a strong ideological component, perhaps best expressed by his mentor, Sayyid 

Qutb, in his book “Milestones.” 

“The Islamic Jihad has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in 

the way it is conducted.” 

“(Islam) is a practical movement which progresses stage by stage, and at every stage 

it provides resources according to the practical needs of the situation and prepares 

the ground for the next one. It does not face practical problems with abstract 

theories, nor does it confront various stages with unchangeable means. Those who 

talk about Jihad in Islam and quote Quranic verses do not take into account this 

aspect, nor do they understand the nature of the various stages through which this 

movement develops, or the relationship of the verses revealed at various occasions 

with each stage. Thus, when they speak about Jihad, they speak clumsily and mix 

up the various stages distorting the whole concept of Jihad and deriving from the 

Quranic verses final principles and generalities for which there is no justification. 

This is because they regard every verse in the Quran as it were a final principle in 

this religion.” 

“This group of thinkers, who are a product of the present Muslim generation, 

have nothing but the label of Islam and have laid down their spiritual and rational 

arms in defeat. They say, “Islam has prescribed a defensive war!” And think that 


40 

they have done good for their religion by depriving it of their method, which is to 

abolish all injustice from the earth, to bring people to the worship of God alone, 

and to bring them out of servitude to others to into the servants of the Lord. Islam 

does not force people to accept its belief, but it wants to provide a free environment 

in which they will have choice of beliefs. What it wants is to abolish those 

oppressive political systems under which people are prevented from expressing 

their freedom to choose whatever beliefs they want, and after that it gives them 

complete freedom to decide whether they will accept Islam or not.” 70 

In the terms of examining al-Qaeda’s many declarations over the years, each stage of the “global 

jihad” serves to take the movement one step further on the path to its ultimate objective—to 

challenge world order and create conditions more conducive to the spread of the ideology of 

Islamist extremism. The 9/11 attack against the US heralded a new stage in the struggle. 

Zawahiri explains why the next stage in this conflict is at hand, historically, ideologically, and 

practically speaking; this next stage may require al-Qaeda to kill not merely thousands of 

people, but millions of people. 

But the Egyptian Doctor extends his argument—al-Qaeda must choose a means of attack 

commensurate with their goals. His argument flows between making the case for causing 

general destruction, on the one hand, to reaffirming the continuing importance of the US as 

the central target of jihad, on the other hand. 

To drive home the connection between using WMD and al-Qaeda’s concrete objectives and 

current plans, Zawahiri once again quotes Nasir al Fahd to unambiguously associate al-Qae- 

da’s “success” in the past with its prospects for the future. 

“Someone might say: Where is the victory that this attack (9/11) brought? 

The answer is: If the attack only turned upside down their history, power 

balances, strategic and military doctrines, and global order, that is enough of a 

victory. The raid was a momentous historical junction that caused many ideas 

and studies to be reconsidered.” 

“The event’s greatness is evident in five aspects.” 

“One: It restored Islam to the forefront in the wars against the infidels whereas 

formerly nationalist and ethnic factors and interests were the primary factors in 

provoking wars and conflicts. It thus brought out the crusader hostile spirit from 

its concealment and forced it into action.” 


“Two: It gave prominence to the great role of jihad in overturning global balances.” 

“Third: It ended the idea that “national states” control “politics” and declare “peace” 

or “war.” The management of the conflict is not in the hands of persons of a particular 

national affiliation but is in the hands of people spread—as the Americans say—over 

more than 60 countries who are joined by nothing else except salafi jihadist Islam or 

what they call “Wahabi” Islam. Indeed the four brigades that struck America were 

commanded by four men of four different nationalities. One was from Egypt, the 

second from the Gulf, the third from Syria, and the fourth from Al-Hijaz.” 

“Four: It irreversibly ended the era when the United States could attack the 

Muslims with impunity, God Willing.” 

“Five: It was the beginning of the collapse of the “New World Order,” which the 

Americans enjoyed for a few years only and it marked the beginning of America’s 

total collapse, God willing.” 

“The cycle of terror continues. We believe that this is in fulfillment of the oath 

made by Abu-Abdallah [bin Laden], may God give him victory, that the Americans 

would never know security.” 71 

Third Message: Al-Qaeda’s best is yet to come 

“…one hour in the path of jihad is worth more than 70 years of praying at home” 72 

Abdullah Azzam 

Zawahiri is a man of action, not of contemplation. His tone leaves little question that he 

believes the notion of exoneration is premature. He is confident that the final chapter has not 

been written in terms of judging al-Qaeda’s actions, and in assessing their impact on history. 

This feeling of incompleteness is palpable; he reflects his own doubts, acknowledges mistakes, 

and reminisces about the past. He exudes a reflective, expectant mood as he pays tribute to 

al-Qaeda’s past successes and conducts a nostalgic roll call of prominent jihadists and cler- 

ics—at times, it reads like his personal martyr document. 

Moreover, Zawahiri appears to have used his book as a means of engaging in a bit of decep- 

tion and misdirection; he has not repeated Nasir al Fahd’s mistake in openly declaring his 

2003 WMD fatwa as such, lest it betray al-Qaeda’s attack planning that may be underway. 

Instead, Zawahiri has hidden his fatwa and operational messages in plain sight of writing a 

rebuttal to Dr Fadl. 


42 

Because the document was written to respond to Dr. Fadl personally, one might imagine 

Zawahiri’s apology to Dr Fadl along the lines of this imaginary tribute—“this is the hardest 

thing I’ve ever had to write, using you Dr. Fadl, as a ploy, and degrading your thoughts and 

ideas despite their release under clear duress, but I am doing so to cloak an even larger strike, 

and for that you must forgive me, and understand my true intentions. In the same spirit, 

we, al-Qaeda have cut jihadists loose to plan attacks like the Christmas day flight and Times 

Square bombing—in the hope they will distract the infidels from a main event that is some- 

thing altogether different.” 

The aging jihadist provides a hint of what he has in mind, when he refers to the need to cor- 

rect the “people’s mood.” 

“Chiefly, that they spoiled the Muslim people’s mood because they were so great 

and powerful causing people to stop showing interest in lesser jihadist actions. 

For example if what happened in Indonesia had happened before the jihadist 

acts in America, they would have had a greater effect on the people, who would 

have rejoiced more. The people showed less attention to them because the image 

of the collapse of the two New York towers was something like a dream causing 

many other actions to appear smaller for a long time. This is the bad aspect, that it 

spoiled our mood and the people’s mood. Our mood will not be corrected until the 

United States vanishes and is followed by the Jewish state.” 73 

Near the end of “Exoneration,” Zawahiri outlines a prediction: 

“Read the history books well and use them to forecast the future. America has 

been broken in Iraq and Afghanistan and it is now gathering her belongings and 

picking up the pieces of what is left to her before departing. The Muslim nation 

and her jihadist pathfinders, on the other hand, are increasing in capabilities 

and power as time passes. This is the historical timeline which is clear to any 

comprehending mind.” 74 

Making good on this wistful vision of the future is the exoneration that Zawahiri seeks. By 

noting that jihadist capabilities and power are increasing, he hints at the notion of future 

strikes. Just as Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa to declare war on the United States in 1998, 

Ayman Zawahiri issued a fatwa a decade later to announce the impending transition to the 

next stage of conflict. The 9/11 attack transformed Osama bin Laden into a figure of mythi- 


cal proportions. After lifelong humiliation, disappointment, and questions concerning his 

effectiveness as a leader and operational planner, Zawahiri is desperately seeking an opportu- 

nity to become the architect of his movement’s future, and the master of his own destiny. 

Radical Clerics in Support of al-Qaeda (Source: Exoneration) 

Atiyatallah Mujahid Scholar 

Nasir Bin-Hamad al-Fahd Saudi Cleric * 

Abu-al-Walid al-Filastini Mujahid, battlefront fighter, mufti and 

Abd-al-Hakim Hassan 

judge of mujahidin 

Abu-Yahya al-Libi Libyan Teacher ** 

Husayn Umar Bin-Mahfuz Yemeni scholar 

Abu-al-Hasan al Masri 

Abu-Abdallah al-Muhajir Teacher 

Abu-Hafs al-Muritani 

(a.k.a. Dr. Mahfouz Oueld 

Scholar, poet, mujahid, author and educator 

el Oueld) 

Abu-al-Hasan al-Qari Mujahidin’s Quranic reciter and imam 

Abu-al-Mundhir al-Sa’idi Notable of the Libyan Fighting Group 

Abu Musab al-Suri Syrian Mujahid Preacher 

Abdullah Zakiri No official position 

*Last report, in Saudi custody 

** Currently in US custody 

Note: Only two passing references are made to Osama bin Laden in “Exoneration.” Zawahiri 

invokes Nasir al Fahd repeatedly. In the book, Zawahiri also names 14 clerics who reputedly 

support al-Qaeda, offering a brief description of each one. In the event questions arise in the 

future concerning Zawhiri’s authority to issue a fatwa, this list of clerics is likely intended to 

demonstrate al-Qaeda’s support from Islamic clerics and scholars. As always, Zawahiri has 

thought through his case to the last detail. 


SUNNI VOICES 

REJECTION OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE 

It is widely recognized in the Islamic community that nuclear weapons are 

not just super-bombs used by armies as a weapon of war, but that they pose 

unique and fundamental religious and moral issues that must be resolved by 

religious authorities. Fortunately, this consciousness introduces an additional 

level of scrutiny over the wisdom of the use of WMD in the Islamic world 

that does not exist in secular states that are under no obligation to seek any 

form of religious or moral authorization for their use. 

Thousands of Islamic clerics and scholars have repudiated al-Qaeda’s 

justification of terrorism, in some cases explicitly extending their 

prohibitions on resorting to violence to the use of weapons of mass 

destruction. Their voices are growing louder over time. Most notably, 

Pakistani Shaykh Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri recently issued a fatwa 

that arguably represents the most comprehensive Islamic ruling against 

terrorism, in all its forms, in the Sunni world. 

A number of prominent clerics and scholars have renounced the use of nucle- 

ar weapons as being un-Islamic. Grand Mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa has writ- 

ten a comprehensive anti-WMD fatwa that dismantles, point by point, the 

arguments made by al-Qaeda in its WMD fatwa. Sunni authorities such as 

the Grand Mufti vastly exceed, in the weight of their authority and reach, the 

radical clerics who support al-Qaeda today. Indeed the number of al-Qaeda 

associated clerics appears to have dwindled since 9/11. 

While they strongly support prohibitions of terrorism under Islam, many 

clerics and scholars continue to harshly criticize US presence in Muslim lands. 

Many support, or are ambivalent, on attacks against US forces in Iraq. Many 

condone terrorist violence in Israel, including attacks that may kill innocent 

women and children.

Controversial Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi has explicitly stated on numerous occa- 

sions that all Israeli civilians are legitimate targets for suicide attacks. At the same time, he 

has criticized al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack and sharply rejected the group’s definition of jihad. 75 

Al-Qaradawi has specifically warned about the perils of the extreme adaptation of ideas. He 

describes four symptoms in this regard: bigotry & intolerance, leading to lack of concern for 

others; a pattern of stubborn and coercive behavior; religious excessiveness and overburden- 

ing of others, i.e. when applying Islamic principles to people in non-Muslim countries or to 

people who have only recently converted to Islam, as well as to newly committed Muslims; 

and treating people harshly, roughness in the manner of approach, and crudeness in calling 

people to Islam, all which are contrary to the teachings of the Quran. 76 

The counter weight to ever-escalating levels of terrorist violence also comes from the ranks of 

disillusioned radicals. Prominent Saudi militant Salman Al-Odeh and imprisoned Egyptian 

extremist Sayid Imam Abdel-Aziz Al Sharif have recently condemned al-Qaeda for having 

corrupted the concept of jihad and sown great destruction on the Islamic community. 77 

On the other end of the spectrum, liberal scholars offer a broader perspective with which to 

address WMD than the narrow prism of war, jihad and killing. Gamal al-Banna and Tariq 

Ramadan emphasize Islamic teaching on tolerance and freedom of religion. Gamal al-Ban- 

na, the anti-authoritarian brother of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, believes 

that every Muslim has to think for herself/himself, and that critical ideas about Islam should 

be fought “by words and not by confrontation, terrorism or takfir - passing anathema on some- 

one by pronouncing them an infidel.” 78 

Gamal al-Banna is a fervent proponent of freedom of religion, often citing the Quranic verse: 

“There is no compulsion in religion” (al-Baqara, The Cow, II, 256). 79 

An Islamic scholar who wrote his master’s thesis on the German philosopher Friedrich 

Nietzsche during his studies in Switzerland, Tariq Ramadan speaks to “the responsibilities of 

Muslims in the West to think beyond their own grievances.” 80 He is an advocate for the co- 

existence of Islam and secular democracy. He notes that the Quran’s meaning is contextual 

and therefore it must be interpreted as the world evolves over time. Ramadan has aroused 

controversy for his alleged ties to terrorists, which he vehemently denied in an open letter to 

President Bush. 81 


Chronology of Sunni Voices Against Al-Qaeda 

See Appendix E for short biographies on this sampling of Sunni clerics. 

The objective of this section is to show a timeline of broad, representative statements against 

al-Qaeda’s desire to resort to violence on the scale of WMD. 

June 2003 

Yusuf al-Qaradawi rejected al-Qaeda’s killing of innocents. 

“Islam, the religion of tolerance, holds the human soul in high esteem, and 

considers the attack against innocent human beings a grave sin, this is backed by 

the Qur’anic verse which reads: Who so ever kills a human being for other than 

manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he has killed all mankind, 

and who so ever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all 

mankind,” (Al-Ma’dah:32). 

“The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, is reported to have said, ‘A believer 

remains within the scope of his religion as long as he doesn’t kill another person 

illegally…even in times of war, Muslims are not allowed to kill anybody save the 

one who is indulged in face-to-face confrontation with them. They are not allowed 

to kill women, old persons, children, or even a monk in his religious seclusion.” 82 

Qaradawi also rejected all terrorist attacks outside of Israel. 

2005 

“I have been asked several questions on TV programs and on public lectures about 

the martyr operations outside the Palestinian territories, and I always answer that 

I do agree with those who do not allow such martyr operations to be carried out 

outside the Palestinian territories.” Instead we should concentrate on facing the 

occupying enemy directly. It is not permissible, as far as Islam is concerned, to shift 

confrontation outside the Palestinian territories. This is backed by the Qur’anic 

verse that reads: “Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you, but 

begin not hostilities. Lo! Allah loves not, aggressors”. 83 

Shaykh Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri was among the 170 Islamic scholars from various sects 

who signed an antiterrorist fatwa in Amman in 2005. 84 

46 Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons

2007 

Former militant cleric Salman Al-Odeh warned Osama bin Laden that if he did not relin- 

quish the path of terror he would find himself responsible for the deaths of millions, for 

which he would ultimately have to answer to Allah. 85 

2008 

6,000 Indian Muslim clerics endorsed an anti-terror fatwa. 86 

2009 

Saudi newspaper quoted prominent Saudi cleric al-Obeikan’s condemnation of al-Qaeda. 

“Affiliation with the so-called al-Qaeda group is haram” (banned), adding “It is strictly prohib- 

ited to legitimize the shedding of blood of other Muslims without having the right to do so.” 87 

2009 

Egyptian Grand Mufti Gomaa outlined a ten point, detailed legal ruling (fatwa) that using 

WMD is banned (impermissible) under Islam: 

• An individual or group cannot declare war 

• The use of WMD is a breach of international agreements and treaties 

• Using WMDs involves killing people and taking them by surprise 

• Killing and harming women and children is forbidden 

• Killing and harming Muslim residents of the target countries is forbidden 

• Ramifications of using WMDs will bring about catastrophe for the entire world 

• Consequences of using WMD will damage individual and public properties 

• Permission to enter a country is considered a non-verbal security agreement not to 

cause corruption in the host country. 

• It is invalid to base the permissibility of using WMDs on analogy [Ar.qiyās] to tabyīt, 

using the catapult, or tahrīq 

• It is not permissible to use human shields 

Note: See Appendix D for relevant sections of the fatwa 


Reactions to the anti-WMD Fatwa 

Dr Ibrahim Negm highlighted the importance of issuing a counter-WMD ruling: “This fatwa 

is the first one we issued on this topic and comes in response to the wave of uninformed 

opinions from various groups.” 88 

Dr. Taha Jabir al-Alwani, president of the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences and 

the Fiqh Council, supported the anti-WMD fatwa because mass destruction does not distin- 

guish the innocent from the criminal and therefore is prohibited under Islam. 89 

Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi, deputy chairman of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, 

noted a self-defense exception: “[I]n case these nuclear weapons are used against Muslims, it 

becomes permissible for Muslims to defend themselves using the same weapon.” 90 

September 2009 

Former militant cleric Salman Al-Odeh urged Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri 

to stop killing Muslims, noting that Al-Qaeda had killed more Muslims than non-Muslims, 

and that the Muslim world was “being roasted on the flames of Al-Qaeda” and exposed to 

violent events and bombings. 

“Muslims are the only nation whose sons kill each other; there is no other nation 

in the world—not the Jews, not the Christians, not the Buddhists, not the pagans— 

whose sons do this... “How long will people cling to weapons as if they were the 

only means of achieving their goals?” 91 

Al-Odeh added that people who had accepted Al-Qaeda’s ideology of takfir and bombings 

were motivated not by religious or rational conviction, but by emotional distress, frustration, 

and an inner sense of discrimination. 

“I have called on, and will continue to call on our loyal clerics and preachers to call 

things by their true name, and to remove the divine and holy epithet ‘jihad’ from 

the operations carried out by murderous organizations that kill innocent people 

and undermine security in Islamic countries, or other countries with which we 

have agreements... It is important to explicitly condemn the evil crimes perpetrated 

worldwide in the name of Islam or of jihad, and to remove the disguise that their 

names provide for them—whether that name is ‘Al-Qaeda,’ or ‘jihad organizations,’ 

or ‘military or combat organizations,’ or ‘the Islamic state. 


“I command myself, and my fellow preachers, and the speakers and the writers, to 

condemn in the clearest possible terms this perversion, which includes bloodshed, 

destruction of society, corruption of the image of Islam, hindrance of growth, 

[dissemination] of and contempt for the essential foundations of Islamic law and of 

humanism, wickedness worldwide, and aggression against human life…” 

“I [re]iterate sincerely and loudly: Allah will not lend success to the deeds of the 

corrupt and the traitors... nor to those who kill Muslims in the name of Islam or in 

the name of implementing shari’a. They will never succeed; Allah’s punishment will 

overtake them and they will become an object of mockery for their fellows unless 

they repent.” 92 

December 2009 

Shaykh Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri issued the most detailed antiterrorist fatwa ever writ- 

ten, an exhaustive, 600 page theological and legal studies of the Islamic teachings on the use 

of force and armed resistance. His fatwa: terrorism is at all times, in all conditions, against 

Islam. The murders terrorists commit will send them, not to paradise in the company of 

virgins, as often claimed, but to hell. 93 “[Terrorists] are the heroes of hellfire.” 94 

Drawing extensively on Islamic texts Qadri declared: “Islam does not permit, under any cir- 

cumstances, the massacre of innocent citizens, terrorist explosions and suicide bombings” which 

according to Islamic law are unacceptable violations of human rights and constitute kufr, 

(unbelief). 95 

“This is an absolute, unconditional, unqualified condemnation of terrorism, 

without any kind of exception or excuse…No context; no discussion of foreign 

policy of a certain country, no occupation ... can create a pretext for the people to 

take up arms.” 96 

The solution, said Qadri, is not violence, but democratic dissent, achieved through political 

channels, petitions, lawful activism and peaceful protest. 97 


SHIA VOICES 

IRAN AND THE BOMB 

Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Kho- 

meini is said to have issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons—some now 

claim he never uttered such words, while others claim his statement mys- 

teriously disappeared. Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, 

issued an anti-nuclear fatwa in September 2004. 98 While sourced by a vari- 

ety of Iranian authorities, the fatwa itself has yet to be officially released or 

found. But in light of the many references, it would seem that Khameini’s 

fatwa is legitimate and absolute. Is the issue then not clear, from a religious 

point of view? It is not so simple, as the testimony of the following voices 

from within Iran will attest. 

The range of opinion on this matter is far-reaching, with the overwhelming 

majority of religious voices taking a stand against nuclear weapons. Indi- 

viduals in opposition include current and former Supreme Leaders of Iran, 

the former Deputy Supreme Leader, the former Secretary of the Supreme 

National Security Council, the Chairman of Parliament of Iran, Iran’s Ambas- 

sador to Pakistan, and the Grand Marja of Shia Islam, among others. Those 

in favor of possession, including on a conditional basis as a deterrent and 

in the context of equal retaliation, include a member of the Iranian Parlia- 

ments’ Judicial Commission, a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, and 

two middle-ranking clerics. It is also important to note that Hezbollah’s 

Secretary-General, Sayyed Nasrallah, recently announced the right to possess 

any weapon, and as such, the Iran-Hezbollah nexus cannot be ignored if in 

fact Iran were to realize nuclear weapons capabilities. 99 

As one will recognize from the analysis below, there is a serious internal de- 

bate on this issue within the religious community regarding: acquiring such 

a weapon that cannot distinguish between combatants and non-combatants; 

the use of WMD as a retaliatory measure if attacked by the same weapon; 

possessing such a weapon as a deterrent measure; among other issues. Sur- 

prisingly, justifying the acquisition of WMD either for equalizing or defen- 

sive purposes has rarely if ever been mentioned in the context of any regional 

threat, including that of Israel.

In producing this survey of Shi’a voices in Iran, no assumptions have been made as to wheth- 

er or not Iran is indeed pursuing nuclear weapons. By compiling numerous comments made 

by a range of religious clerics, scholars and authorities over the last several years, the goal is 

to assess the substance and significance of the religious discourse concerning Shi’a Islam and 

the permissibility or impermissibility of WMD acquisition, possession and use. 

Shia Clerics Against Nuclear Weapons 

“The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its fundamental religious and legal beliefs, 

would never resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction… In contrast to the 

propaganda of our enemies, fundamentally we are against any production of weapons 

of mass destruction in any form.” 

Ayatollah Khameini 

Supreme Leader of Iran 

“There is complete consensus on this issue. It is self-evident in Islam that it is 

prohibited to have nuclear bombs. It is eternal law, because the basic function of 

these weapons is to kill innocent people. This cannot be reversed.” 

Grand Ayatollah Yusef Saanei 

Grand Marja of Shia Islam, Iranian Scholar 

“Those in Iran who clandestinely believed they could develop nuclear weapons have 

now been forced to admit that is forbidden under Islam.” 

Hussein Shariamadari 

Managing Editor of Kayhan, an Iranian newspaper 

“In light of the scope of death and destruction they bring, and in light of the fact that 

such weapons cannot be used solely against an army of aggression but will invariably 

sacrifice the lives of innocent people, even if these innocent lives are those of future 

generations nuclear weapons are not permitted according to reason or Sharia.” 

Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri (Died 12 December, 2009) 

Former Deputy Supreme Leader of Iran, Iranian Scholar 


52 

“The decree by Khamenei “prohibit[s] the development and use of nuclear weapons” 


Mohammad Javad Zarif 

Former Ambassador of Iran to the United Nations 

“When the Iranian leader issues such a fatwa, then we have given a political, religious 

and ideological guarantee that we are not pursuing the production of nuclear weapons.” 

Hassan Rowhani 

Former Secretary of Supreme National Security Council 

A Turkish diplomat, describing a visit in May by Al Larijani, said that Larijani made 

the religious roots of the proscription clear. “I was in the meeting,” said the diplomat, 

who spoke on condition of anonymity. “He said there is even a fatwa, a religious 

ruling, since the time of Khomeini, that Iran will not produce any nuclear weapons.” 

Ali Larijani 

Chairman of Parliament of Iran 

Nuclear weapons as well as the atom bomb are haram (prohibited) according to the laws 

of Islam, a private television channel quoted Iran’s Ambassador to Pakistan as saying. 

Khazali Mashallah Shakiri 

Iran’s Ambassador to Pakistan 

While evidence suggests Khomeini indeed barred Iranian forces from unconventional 

weapons during the 1980-88 war with Iraq, the religious underpinning for such a 

ban is regarded as less than absolute. 

Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini (Died 3 June, 1989) 

Former Supreme Leader of Iran 

“According to Islamic teachings, there’s the principle that the goals never justify the 

means… It has not been supported in Islam that you can do whatever you want to

defend yourself. You are not allowed to gather weapons that are not allowed by Islam, 

even against your enemies.” 

Kazem Mosavi Bojnoordi 

Chief editor of Iran’s Center for the Great Islamic Encyclopedia 

Announced that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, in a message to the 

Tehran conference on April 17, declared “Iran regards utilizing nuclear weapons as 

haram (forbidden in Islam) and it is incumbent on everyone to safeguard humanity 

from such weapons.” 

Shia Clerics For Nuclear Weapons 

Mohammad Khazaee 

Current Permanent Representative of the Islamic 

Republic of Iran to the United Nations 

“There are no Shari’a [religious law] or legal restrictions on having such weapons 

as a deterrent.” 

Hojatoleslam Mohammad Taghi Rahbar 

Iranian Legislator, Member of Parliament’s Judicial Commission 

“We have to produce the most advanced weapon inside the country, even if our enemies 

don’t like it. There is no reason that they have the right to produce a certain special type 

of weapon, but that other countries not have that right.” 

Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi 

Iranian Cleric, Member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts 

It is “only natural” to have nuclear bombs as a “countermeasure” against other nuclear 

powers. “When the entire world is armed with nuclear weapons, it is permissible to use 

these weapons as a counter-measure. According to Sharia too, only the goal is important.” 

Mohsen Gharavian (Conditional) 

Iranian Cleric, Disciple of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi 


54 

“From all I can see, it’s not forbidden, but it’s hard to say it’s allowed. In jurisprudence 

these terms are different. If your enemies have these bombs, it’s not forbidden to have 

them. Don’t forget that Israel has these bombs. It’s outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” 

Unclear 


Mohsen Kadivar (Conditional), 

Iranian Cleric, Faculty Member of the Department of 

Islamic Philosophy at the Iranian Institute of Philosophy 

“They have supplied vast quantities of weapons of mass destruction and 

unconventional weapons to Israel. They have permitted it to have them and they 

have shut their eyes to what is going on. They have nuclear, chemical and biological 

weapons and long-range missiles and suchlike. 100 Of course, that is very important. 

If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel 

possesses now, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use 

of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will 

only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality. 

Of course, you can see that the Americans have kept their eyes peeled and they are 

carefully looking for even the slightest hint that technological advances are being 

made by an independent Islamic country. If an independent Islamic country is 

thinking about acquiring other kinds of weaponry, then they will do their utmost to 

prevent it from acquiring them. Well, that is something that almost the entire world 

is discussing right now.” 101 

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, (March 1997) 

Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Former President of Iran 

“No, we’re not willing to suspend. But we’re ready to provide greater assurances to the 

world that we won’t move from peaceful nuclear technology to military technology.” 

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, (June 2005) 

Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Former President of Iran 

Asked whether the ayatollahs could simply rip up their fatwa one day and issue a new rul- 

ing blessing the development of nuclear weapons, Fazal Miboudi, a mullah who is professor

of political science at Mofid University in Qom, said any reversal of such a high-profile issue 

would require years of awkward theological maneuvering. 

“There is room for maneuver in Islam. Things can be haram (forbidden) one day 

and halal (acceptable) later on. But this takes time…,” 

Fazal Miboudi, 

Professor of Political Science at Mofid University in Qom 

Iran’s former president, Mohammed Khatami, has dismissed as a “satanic conspiracy” claims 

the Islamic republic was secretly developing nuclear weapons during a wide-ranging address 

in Australia. 102 

Mohammad Khatami 

Former President of Iran 

“This question is ambiguous…taking weapons of mass destruction as a whole, I’m 

against it…” But in the context of deterrence and self-defense, “It’s not clear.” 

Jalal al Din Taheri 

Former Member of the Assembly of Experts in Iran, Iranian Scholar 

Chronology of Shia Voices on Nuclear Weapons 

See Appendix F for short biographies on Shia clerics and scholars cited in this chronology. 

October 2003 

Led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the nation’s supreme leader, Iranian clerics repeatedly 

declared that Islam forbids the development and use of all weapons of mass destruction. 

“The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its religious beliefs, would never resort to the use of 

weapons of mass destruction,” Khamenei said recently. “In contrast to the propaganda of our 

enemies, fundamentally we are against any production of weapons of mass destruction in any 

form.” 103 

“Those in Iran who clandestinely believed they could develop nuclear weapons have now 

been forced to admit that is forbidden under Islam,” 104 said Hussein Shariatmadari, who is 


president of the Kayhan chain of newspapers, controlled by Khamenei, and an unofficial 

spokesman for the supreme leader. 

Grand Ayatollah Yusef Saanei, one of the highest-ranking clerics in Iran, said in an interview: 

“There is complete consensus on this issue. It is self-evident in Islam that it is prohibited to 

have nuclear bombs. It is eternal law, because the basic function of these weapons is to kill 

innocent people. This cannot be reversed.” 105 

Saanei said clerical authorities had expressed opposition to the development of weapons of 

mass destruction for many years, and he described it as the reason that Iran never retaliated 

with chemical weapons when Saddam Hussein used them to kill Iranian troops and Iran- 

backed Kurds during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. “You cannot deliberately kill innocent 

people,” he said. 106 

Asked whether the ayatollahs could issue a new ruling blessing the development of nuclear 

weapons, Fazal Miboudi, a mullah who is professor of political science at Mofid University in 

Qom, said any reversal of such a high-profile issue would require years of awkward theologi- 

cal maneuvering. “There is room for maneuver in Islam. “Things can be haram (forbidden) 

one day and halal (acceptable) later on. But this takes time,” he said. 107 


The country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa in 2004 describing the 

use of nuclear weapons as immoral. In a subsequent sermon, he declared that “developing, 

producing or stockpiling nuclear weapons is forbidden under Islam.” 108 

November 2004 

According to Javad Zarif, the Iranian ambassador to the UN, the decree by Khamenei 

“prohibit[s] the development and use of nuclear weapons” 109 

Iranian legislator Hojatoleslam Mohammad Taqi Rahbar said on November 9, 2004, that, “There 

are no Shari’a [religious law] or legal restrictions on having such weapons as a deterrent.” 110 

February 2005 

Hasan Rowhani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council stated: “When the 

Iranian leader issues such a fatwa, then we have given a political, religious and ideological 

guarantee that we are not pursuing the production of nuclear weapons.” 111 


June 2005 

Rafsanjani said, “No, we’re not willing to suspend. But we’re ready to provide greater assurances 

to the world that we won’t move from peaceful nuclear technology to military technology.” 112 

June 2005 

Before the presidential elections, Mesbah Yazdi published a book called The Islamic Revolu- 

tion—Surges in Political Changes in History. 

Some of the sections of the book deal with seeking to acquire technology, because, according 

to Mesbah Yazdi, Iran must acquire “a certain kind of special weapon.” 113 

“We cannot know with certainty when the wolf-like elements in many countries 

which hold power will disappear and be wiped off the face of the earth, or when 

they will change their murderous ways. Therefore, we should not be indifferent to 

defensive policy and must strengthen our internal forces … Experience shows that 

such an [indifferent] attitude is incorrect and we must always strive to strengthen 

the country’s military and defense systems.” 114 

“We have to produce the most advanced weapon inside the country, even if our 

enemies don’t like it. There is no reason that they have the right to produce a 

certain special type of weapon, but that other countries not have that right.” 115 

August 2005 

According to the official Iranian statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA) on August 9, 2005: “The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali 

Khamenei, has issued the fatwa that the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weap- 

ons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire 

these weapons,” 116 

Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa in 2005 forbidding the production of WMDs as 

“un-Islamic” and said that “developing, producing or stockpiling nuclear weapons is forbid- 

den under Islam.” 117 

February 2006 

Iran’s hardline spiritual leaders have issued a new fatwa, sanctioning the use of atomic 

weapons against its enemies. Mohsen Gharavian, a disciple of the ultra-conservative 


Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi, who is widely regarded as the cleric closest 

to Iran’s new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, stated that it is “only natural” to have 

nuclear bombs as a “countermeasure” against other nuclear powers, thought to be a refer- 

ence to America and Israel. 118 

According to internal Iranian reporting, he added: “When the entire world is armed with 

nuclear weapons, it is permissible to use these weapons as a counter-measure. According to 

Sharia too, only the goal is important.” 119 

Comment: This first public statement by the Yazdi clerical cabal on the nuclear issue ap- 

pears to be part of an effort by the country’s religious hardliners to begin preparing a theo- 

logical justification for the ownership—and possible use—of atomic bombs. Gharavian did 

not specify what kinds of “goals” would justify a nuclear strike, but it is likely that military 

intervention by the United States would be considered sufficient grounds. Ayatollah Yazdi 

has previously justified use of suicide bombers against “enemies of Islam” and believes that 

America is bent on destroying the Islamic republic and its values. 120 

June 2006 

A Turkish diplomat, describing a visit in May 2006 by the chief Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali 

Larijani, said. “I was in the meeting,” said the diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonym- 

ity. “He said there is even a fatwa, a religious ruling, since the time of Khomeini, that Iran 

will not produce any nuclear weapons.” 121 

That said, interviews with a range of clerics and other students of Islamic teachings inidate 

that although Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini barred Iranian forces from unconven- 

tional weapons during the 1980-88 war with Iraq does not necessarily preclude a future 

religious basis for possessing WMD might be found. 

“This question is ambiguous,” said Grand Ayatollah Jalalodine Taheri, who was a leading fig- 

ure in the Iranian government before becoming a critic. Taheri, 80, said during an interview 

at his bedside in the central Iranian city of Isfahan that “taking weapons of mass destruction 

as a whole, I’m against it.” But he added that religious texts might offer avenues that would 

allow stockpiling such weapons in the name of deterrence or self-defense. “It’s not clear… ” 122 

Mohsen Gharavian asserted: “Producing and using WMD is forbidden, just as producing 

deadly poison or harmful drugs, ... I think there is no ambiguity here .... I have not seen any 


other type of interpretation among religious scholars. But I have got to add something to 

this: If any other nation has produced this WMD and has used it against a second nation, the 

second nation in the name of defending itself has the right to have it and to use WMD.” 123 

“I believe this is the logic of Islamic morals,” Gharavian said, professing himself “100 

percent sure” that Khomeini and Iran’s current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 

“based on Islamic principles, have the same logic: Islam does not allow anyone to initiate 

harming a human being.” 

The same caveat about self-defense was offered by an influential cleric aligned with Iran’s reform- 

ers, members of the relatively liberal movement recently sidelined by hard-line conservatives. 

“In the time of the prophet, we didn’t have nuclear bombs, so there’s not a verse about it in the 

Quran,” said Mohsen Kadivar, who like Gharavian is a middle-ranking cleric. “But we have 

some verses which say we can’t kill anyone who hasn’t committed a crime. It’s very, very clear.” 

The faith does accept the concept of retaliation, however, so long as it stops short of injur- 

ing innocents. Kadivar said that proviso appears to proscribe actual use of weapons of mass 

destruction, as would scriptures warning against damaging the environment. 

“From all I can see, it’s not forbidden, but it’s hard to say it’s allowed. In 

jurisprudence these terms are different. If your enemies have these bombs, it’s not 

forbidden to have them. Don’t forget that Israel has these bombs. It’s outside the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty.” 

“In the eight-year war with Iraq, this was a very hot debate among all the Islamic teach- 

ers, because Iranian cities were being bombarded,” said Kazem Mosavi Bojnoordi, who 

sat on the defense committee of Iran’s parliament during part of the war. “The conclusion 

was that it’s not allowed. Never during those eight years do we have one example of Iran 

bombarding cities.” 

Bojnoordi recalled that after the first salvos from Iraq, a senior Iranian commander declared, 

“Now we will flatten Baghdad.” The comment brought an immediate rebuke from Khomeini, 

whose fatwa closed the matter for the balance of the war. 

“According to Islamic teachings, there’s the principle that the goals never justify the means,” 

said Bojnoordi, whose father was a grand ayatollah. “It has not been supported in Islam that 


you can do whatever you want to defend yourself. You are not allowed to gather weapons 

that are not allowed by Islam, even against your enemies.’’ 

Note: If Iran is indeed working to produce nuclear weapons, experts say the program would 

surely be entrusted to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Formed in 1979 by clerics 

who did not trust Iran’s existing army, the Revolutionary Guards have grown into a major 

force in Iran’s economy and political offices. Their insignia, one analyst noted, includes a pas- 

sage from the Quran that reads, “Prepare any strength you can muster against them, and any 

cavalry with which you can overawe God’s enemy and your own enemy as well, plus others 

besides them whom you do not know.” 124 

March 2007 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei: “The Iranian nation needs nuclear energy for life, not weapons.”—Insist- 

ing that Iran’s commitment to uranium enrichment was born out of a desire to harness nuclear 

technology for peaceful purposes; the use of nuclear weapons would violate Islamic law. 125 

June 2008 

Iran’s supreme leader said that “no wise nation” would pursue nuclear weapons but his 

country will continue to develop its nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Ayatollah Ali 

Khamenei appeared to be reacting to suggestions by the International Atomic Energy Agency 

that Tehran may be withholding information on secret attempts to make nuclear weapons. 

“Iran is after the peaceful use of nuclear energy and we will strongly pursue and reach it 

despite the envy of our enemies,” Khamenei said at a ceremony honoring the founder of the 

Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. 

He also warned against nuclear terrorism, saying that one day “world terrorists could attain 

nuclear weapons and take peace away from all the people in the world.” 126 

March 2009 

Iran’s former president, Mohammed Khatami, dismissed as a “satanic conspiracy” claims 

the Islamic republic was secretly developing nuclear weapons during a wide-ranging ad- 

dress in Australia. 127 


Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini stated that the US and its allies: “…falsely 


accuse the Islamic republic of producing nuclear weapons. We fundamentally reject nuclear 

weapons and prohibit the production and the use of nuclear weapons… They know them- 

selves that it’s not true... but it is part of Iran-phobia policy that controls the behavior of these 

arrogant governments today.” 128 

October 2009 

Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri offered the following fatwa: “In light of the 

scope of death and destruction they bring, and in light of the fact that such weapons 

cannot be used solely against an army of aggression but will invariably sacrifice the lives 

of innocent people, even if these innocent lives are those of future generations nuclear 

weapons are not permitted according to reason or Sharia. Anyway, humanity, particu- 

larly Muslims who follow the Sharia of the Seal of Prophets, and the Prophet, Praise be 

Upon Him, must take the lead in banning legally and practically all such weapons for all 

countries and in soliciting the help of respectable and dependable international organi- 

zations in guaranteeing such ban.” 129 

February 2010 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei asserted claim that Islam is “opposed to nuclear weapons,” insisting that 

Tehran is not trying to build them. Iran’s ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency 

is also calling a leaked report that Tehran is working to build a nuclear warhead baseless. 

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued the fatwa against nuclear weapons while addressing a crowd 

of military commanders after a ship-inaugurating ceremony. 

“Islam is opposed to nuclear weapons and that Tehran is not working to build 

them…We have said time and again that our religious beliefs and fundamentals 

consider nuclear weapons as a symbol of annihilation of generations, thus our 

religion forbids them. Accordingly we do not believe in acquiring nuclear arms.” 130 

The threadbare and vain claims that nuclear arms are being made in Iran 

indicate that enemies of the nation have resorted to repetition even in the field of 

propaganda out of extreme helplessness. 131 

“In response to such vain claims, the Islamic Republic of Iran will not fall into 

emotions because we have repeatedly said that our religious ideas and beliefs 

consider such weapons, which are the symbols of mankind degeneration, forbidden 

and “Haram” (religiously prohibited).” 132 


Comment: For additional information, see “Supreme Leader: Iran has no belief in atom 

bombs” 133 and “Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei Says Islam Opposes Nuclear Weapons” 134 

April 2010 

Iran’s permanent envoy to the UN, Mohammad Khazaee, announced that Supreme Leader 

Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, in a message to the Tehran conference on April 17, declared: 

“Iran regards utilizing nuclear weapons as haram (forbidden is Islam) and it is incumbent on 

everyone to safeguard humanity from such weapons.” 135 

Hezbollah leader Sayyed Nasrallah stressed that the resistance party, “has the right to possess 

any weapon, but its policy implies that it abstains from denying or confirming any informa- 

tion about the type of weapons it has; and if someone announced that Hezbollah has nuclear 

weapons, Hezbollah would not deny that.” 136 

June 2010 

Nuclear weapons are haram (prohibited) according to the laws of Islam, a private television 

channel quoted Iran’s Ambassador to Pakistan Mashallah Shakiri. 137 

July 2010 

Ali Larijani, in Switzerland to attend the 3rd World Conference of the Speakers of Parliament, 

stated: “Producing nuclear weapons has no place in Iran’s defense doctrine and like all NPT 

(Non-Proliferation Treaty) members Iran has a right to use the peaceful nuclear energy.” 138 



APPENDICES 

Appendix A – Background on The Quran 

The book of Islamic revelation; scripture. The term means “recitation.” The 

Quran is believed to be the word of God transmitted through the Prophet 

Muhammad. The Quran proclaims God’s existence and will and is the ulti- 

mate source of religious knowledge for Muslims. The Quran serves as both 

record and guide for the Muslim community, transcending time and space. 

Muslims have dedicated their best minds and talents to the exegesis and reci- 

tation of the Quran. Because the Quran is the criterion by which everything 

else is to be judged, all movements, whether of radical reform or of moderate 

change, whether originating at the center or at the periphery of the Islamic 

world, have grounded their programs in the Quran and used it as a support. 

Revelation of the Quran to Muhammad began in 610 with the first five verses 

of surah 96. No further revelations followed for a period of up to two years, 

at which point Muhammad received reassurance that the revelation was from 

God, not the devil. Thereafter, revelation continued without interruption 

until his death in 632 , at which time the Quran was considered complete. 

Partial collections of the Quran were made during Muhammad’s lifetime 

by his wives, companions, and scribes. The final, authoritative version was 

completed and fixed under the direction of the third caliph, Uthman, within 

twenty years after Muhammad’s death. The Quran consists of 114 surahs 

(chapters), varying in length from 3 to 286 ayat (verses). Surahs are arranged 

by length, with the latest and longest surahs at the beginning and the earli- 

est and shortest surahs at the end. Very early commentators classified these 

chapters into Meccan surahs (received while Muhammad lived in Mecca) and 

Medinan surahs (received after the hijrah, when Muhammad and his follow- 

ers moved to Medina). 

The fundamental message of the Quran may be summarized in the term taw- 

hid, the oneness of God. Both men and women are held to be rational and 

ethically responsible creatures whose duty is to submit to the divine truth ex- 

pressed in revelation. This act separates Islam, surrender and submission to 

the one God, from kufr, disbelief. Men and women who trust in God and live 

moral lives in thought, word, and deed become God’s stewards, responsible

for caring for the rest of God’s creatures on earth. The society composed of such witnesses to 

the truth appears in history as the community created by Muhammad and his Companions 

in Medina in 622 –32. 139 

Hadith 

Report of the words and deeds of Muhammad and other early Muslims; considered an 

authoritative source of revelation, second only to the Quran (sometimes referred to as say- 

ings of the Prophet). Hadith (pl. ahadith; hadith is used as a singular or a collective term in 

English) were collected, transmitted, and taught orally for two centuries after Muhammad’s 

death and then began to be collected in written form and codified. They serve as a source of 

biographical material for Muhammad, contextualization of Quranic revelations, and Islamic 

law. A list of authoritative transmitters is usually included in collections. Compilers were 

careful to record hadith exactly as received from recognized transmission specialists. The six 

most authoritative collections are those of al-Bukhari, Muslim, al-Tirmidhi, Abu Daud al- 

Sijistani, al-Nasai, and al-Qazwini. The collections of Malik ibn Anas and Ahmad ibn Hanbal 

are also important. Shiis also use these collections but recognize only some Companions as 

valid authorities; they consider hadith reports from descendants of Muhammad through Ali 

and Fatimah as fully authoritative. Other important Shii collections are those of al-Kulayni, 

al-Qummi, and al-Tusi. The science of hadith criticism was developed to determine authen- 

ticity and preserve the corpus from alteration or fabrication. Chains of authority and trans- 

mission were verified as far back as possible, often to Muhammad himself. Chains of trans- 

mission were assessed by the number and credibility of the transmitters and the continuity 

of the chains (isnad). The nature of the text was also examined. Reports that were illogical, 

exaggerated, fantastic, or repulsive or that contradicted the Quran were considered suspect. 

Awareness of fabrication and false teaching has long existed but became a major issue in 

academic circles in the twentieth century due to early reliance on oral, rather than written, 

transmission. Traditionally, the body of authentic hadith reports is considered to embody 

the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad. Muslim reformers encourage Muslims to be more 

discerning in acceptance of hadith. 140 

Sunnah 

Established custom, normative precedent, conduct, and cumulative tradition, typically based 

on Muhammad’s example. The actions and sayings of Muhammad are believed to comple- 

ment the divinely revealed message of the Quran, constituting a source for establishing 

norms for Muslim conduct and making it a primary source of Islamic law. In the legal field, 

Sunnah complements and stands alongside the Quran, giving precision to its precepts. Sun- 

nah encompasses knowledge believed to have been passed down from previous generations 

and representing an authoritative, valued, and continuing corpus of beliefs and customs. 


66 

Early Muslim scholars developed and elaborated the concept of Prophetic Sunnah in order 

to capture as complete a picture of Muhammad’s exemplary life as they could authenticate 

on the basis of hadith reports. The quest to memorialize Muhammad’s life and ground it in 

historically verifiable process led to the biographical tradition known as sirah. This litera- 

ture informed and inspired Muslim communities’ interpretations of Islam as they sought to 

ground their own juridical, doctrinal, and historical identities in what they perceived to be 

normative Sunnah. Sunnah serves as a common template for Muslim groups and individu- 

als, permitting them to represent a connection with the beginnings of Islam and acting as a 

common referent in the religious discourse of community formation and identity. It fosters 

self-identity and enhances the private moral lives of Muslims. 141 

Sunni Islam 

The Sunnis are the largest branch of the Muslim community, at least 85 percent of the world’s 

1.2 billion Muslims. The name is derived from the Sunnah, the exemplary behavior of the 

Prophet Muhammad. All Muslims are guided by the Sunnah, but Sunnis stress it, as well as 

consensus (ijma; the full name of Sunnis is Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Ijma, people of the Sunnah 

and consensus). The other branch of Islam, the Shiis, are guided as well by the wisdom of 

Muhammad’s descendants, but through his son-in-law Ali. 

Sunni life is guided by four schools of legal thought—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali—each 

of which strives to develop practical applications of revelation and the Prophet’s example. 

Although Sunni Islam comprises a variety of theological and legal schools, attitudes, and 

outlooks conditioned by historical setting, locale, and culture, Sunnis around the world share 

some common points: acceptance of the legitimacy of the first four successors of Muhammad 

(Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali), and the belief that other Islamic sects have introduced 

innovations (bidah), departing from majority belief. 

Sunni Islamic institutions developed out of struggles in early Islam over leadership of the 

Muslim community. Political and religious positions, articulated by scholars, arose out of 

disputes over the definition of “true” belief, the status of those who profess Islam but commit 

a great sin, freedom, and determinism. Sunnis tend to reject excessive rationalism or intel- 

lectualism, focusing instead on the spirit and intent of the Quran. 

Reform movements within Sunni Islam began to appear during the eighteenth century in 

the works of scholars seeking to revive the dynamism of Islamic thought and life in order 

to meet the demands of the modern world. These movements gained momentum with the 

imposition of European colonial control throughout the Muslim world. The nineteenth and 


twentieth centuries witnessed the revival of Quranic studies as well as renewed commitment 

to science and education as the path to independence and development within the context of 

Islamic values and identity. Sunni thought of the eighteenth through twentieth centuries has 

also reexamined traditional Islamic law. Many modern reformers believe that fiqh (juris- 

prudence), as a human interpretation of divine law, should be open to reinterpretation in 

accordance with present circumstances and community needs. Almost all twentieth-century 

Muslim countries are debating the role of Islamic law and civil codes in modern society and 

the implications for constitutional law and the organization of the state. 

Many Islamic thinkers reject the notion that Islam requires a particular form of state and 

government, looking instead to Quranic principles such as shura (consultation) for guid- 

ance. Some believe that religion and the state are intended to be separate entities, while 

others, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-i Islami, believe that an Islamic state is 

necessary to the development of an Islamic social order. Many thinkers have studied in the 

West and are open to dialogue with the West and commitment to a common struggle for 

the causes of humanity. They have examined the impact of European imperialism, Western 

neocolonialism, exploitation by socialist-bloc countries, the Cold War, the displacement 

of Palestinians, the lack of democracy in the Muslim world, and other crisis factors. Most 

Muslim thinkers today stress the importance of justice, especially social justice, in Islam. 

A Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights has been propounded, next to that of 

the United Nations. Increasing attention is also being given to subjects such as women and 

gender, the family, religious freedom, pluralism, the status of minorities, and religious tol- 

erance. Islam is increasingly emphasized as a total way of life, encompassing both religious 

and worldly issues. Human beings are seen as God’s stewards on earth, and the Muslim 

community is intended to reflect God’s will. In this view, secularism is often rejected as 

being antithetical to religious values. Instead, Islam is presented as perfectly suited for hu- 

man society, individually and collectively. 142 

Shia Islam 

Shii Muslims, the followers or party of Ali , believe that Muhammad ‘s religious leadership, 

spiritual authority, and divine guidance were passed on to his descendants, beginning with 

his son-in-law and cousin, Ali ibn Abi Talib, his daughter, Fatimah , and their sons, Hasan 

and Husayn . The defining event of Shiism was the martyrdom of Husayn, his male family 

members, and many companions at Karbala (Iraq) in 681 by the Umayyads, granting an ele- 

ment of passion and pathos to Shiism. 

There are three main branches of Shiis today: the Zaydis, the Ismailis (Seveners), and the Ith- 

na Asharis (Twelvers or Imamis). The Zaydis (followers of Zayd ibn Ali ibn al-Husayn) are 


68 

located in Yemen, Iraq, and parts of Africa. They represent the activist groups who believe 

that the imam ought to fight for his rights and be a ruler of state. The Ismailis (Seveners) are 

named after the seventh imam, Ismail. They founded the Fatimid Empire (909–1171) and 

represent esoteric Shiism. The Ithna Asharis (Twelvers or Imamis) are the largest and most 

moderate group. They believe in twelve imams, beginning with Ali and ending with Muham- 

mad al-Mahdi, who went into occultation and is expected to return at the end of time as the 

messianic imam who will restore justice and equity on earth. He is therefore referred to as 

the imam al-muntazar, the expected or awaited imam. 

Shii political thought entered its modern phase during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution 

of 1905–11, when Shiis were divided between the forces of constitutionalism, modernism, 

reason, and secularism, on one hand, and more traditional interpretations of faith, religious 

law, and the role of clerics, on the other. The clerical establishment ultimately joined with 

secular revolutionaries in opposing European colonialism. By the 1940s and 1950s Shii 

political thought was addressing issues such as Communism and nationalism, often present- 

ing Shiism as an alternative. During the 1960s the institutional bases for the propagation of 

modern Shii political thought were formed through Quranic schools and voluntary associa- 

tions of Muslim university students and professionals. Informal gatherings led by clerics 

and intellectuals also promoted Shii political mobilization. The most important event of the 

1960s was the 1963 uprising led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989), who called for 

the ouster of the shah. 

The most effective ideologue of modern Shiism was Ali Shariati (d. 1977). In the late 1960s 

and 1970s Shariati combined Islam with Third Worldism and revolution into an activist po- 

litical ideology. He identified Western imperialism, cultural colonialism, social injustice, and 

political repression as the greatest contemporary challenges. In contrast to the passive, suf- 

fering role typically assumed by Shiis, Shariati cast Shiism as activist, radical, revolutionary, 

classless, and opposed to tyranny and repression. Shariati inspired the Iranian clerics Ayatol- 

lah Khomeini , who emerged at the head of the Iranian Islamic revolution, and Imam Musa 

al-Sadr (d. 1978), who encouraged the Shiis of Lebanon to take an activist role in struggling 

for better socioeconomic conditions and political representation. 

Khomeini was the most rhetorically successful revolutionary Shii. Opposed to the increas- 

ing secularization of Pahlavi society and American domination of Iranian political, social, 

economic, and cultural life, Khomeini introduced the principle of vilayat-i faqih as the 

foundation for Islamic government. According to this principle, in the absence of an imam, 

the leadership of Muslim nations is to be entrusted to Shii jurists, who are to rule by virtue of 

their knowledge of sacred law and their ability to regulate the daily affairs of Muslims. The 


esultant Islamic revolution of 1979 and constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran represent 

the ideological institutionalization of modern Shii political ideas. In the post-revolutionary 

period, such reformist thinkers as Abd al-Karim Soroush have tried to move ideological 

debates beyond factionalism toward serious engagement of the consequences of the success 

of the Islamic revolution. 143 

Takfir 

Pronouncement that someone is an unbeliever (kafir) and no longer Muslim. Takfir is used 

in the modern era for sanctioning violence against leaders of Islamic states who are deemed 

insufficiently religious. It has become a central ideology of militant groups such as those 

in Egypt, which reflect the ideas of Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn Kathir. 

Mainstream Muslims and Islamist groups reject the concept as a doctrinal deviation. Lead- 

ers such as Hasan al-Hudaybi (d. 1977) and Yusuf al-Qaradawi reject takfir as un-Islamic and 

marked by bigotry and zealotry. 144 

Fatwa 

Authoritative legal opinion given by a mufti (legal scholar) in response to a question posed 

by an individual or a court of law. A fatwa is typically requested in cases not covered by the 

fiqh literature and is neither binding nor enforceable. Its authority is based on the mufti’s 

education and status within the community. If the inquirer is not persuaded by the fatwa, 

he is free to go to another mufti and obtain another opinion; but once he finds a convincing 

opinion, he should obey it. Theoretically, muftis should be capable of exercising legal reason- 

ing independently of schools of law (ijtihad), although followers of tradition (muqallids) are 

also allowed to issue fatwas. Historically, fatwas were independent of the judicial system, 

although some muftis were officially attached to various courts. In the Ottoman and Mughal 

political systems, the chief mufti was designated shaykh al-Islam. Other muftis were appoint- 

ed to positions as market inspectors, guardians of public morals, and advisers to government 

on religious affairs. Under colonial rule, madrasas took over the role of religious guides, and 

special institutions were established to issue fatwas. In modern times, print and electronic 

media have reinforced the role and impact of fatwas by making them instantly available to 

the public. Present-day Muslim states have tried to control fatwas through official consulta- 

tive/advisory organizations within religious ministries. 145 


70 

Appendix B: Al-Qaeda Nuclear Players 

Name: Sayf al Aadl 

Title: Al-Qaeda Chief of 

Operations 

Nationality: Egyptian 

Status (2010): Unknown - 

reportedly in Iran 

Name: Abu Bakr 

(al-Ghamdi) 

Title: Al-Qaeda Chief in 

Saudi Arabia 

Nationality: Saudi 

Status (2010): Surrendered to 

Saudis - in custody 

Name: Abu Khabab 

Title: CBRN expert, 

headed al-Qaeda nuclear 

efforts 2003-2008 


Status (2010): Killed July 28, 2008 

Name: Osama bin Laden 

Title: Head of Al-Qaeda 


Status (2010): Unknown 


Name: Bahsiruddin 

Mahmood 

Title: Associate of Al- 

Qaeda/Headed UTN 

Nationality: Pakistani 

Status (2010): Lives in Islamabad, 

cannot leave Pakistan 

Name: Abd al Aziz 

al-Masri 

Title: Al-Qaeda nuclear 

CEO 


Status (2010): Unknown; as of 

2005, reportedly in Iran 

Name: Abu Hamza 

al-Muhajir 

Title: Senior aide to 

Zarqawi 


Status (2010): Killed by Iraqi and 

US forces in Iraq 

Name: Abdul Majid 

Title: UTN principal, 

Nuclear engineer 


Status (2010): In Pakistan

Name: Abu Musan 

al-Suri aka Mustafa 

Sitmaryam 

Title: Member of Al-Qaeda; 

proficient writer 

Nationality: Syrian 

Status (2010): US claims in 

custody- location classified 

Name: Ayman 

al-Zawahiri 

Title: Operational and 

strategic commander of Al-Qaeda 


Status (2010): Unknown 

Name: General 

Hamid Gul 

Title: Former Chief of 

Pakistani Intelligence, on 

UTN board 


Status (2010): In Pakistan 

Name: SulaymanAbu 

Ghayth al-Libi 

Title: Al-Qaeda Press Chief 

Nationality: Libyan 

Status (2010): Unknown - 

reportedly in Iran 

Name: Adnan 

el-Shkurijumah 

aka Jaffar al-Tayyar (“the 

Pilot”) 

Title: Cased US targets before 

9/11- of nuclear interest 


Status (2010): External operations 

chief, located in Pakistan/ 

Afghanistan 

Name: Abu Rida 

al-Suri aka Mohammed 

Luay Bayazid 

Title: Nuclear physicist, al-Qaeda 

inner circle 

Nationality: Syrian 

Status (2010): In Sudan 


Appendix C: Events from 2003–2010 - Nuclear Timeline Update * 

(*Nuclear-related supplement to 2009 Al-Qaeda WMD Threat: Hype or Reality?) 

Note: Although these events do not relate specifically to the story line of al-Qaeda leadership’s justi- 

fication of nuclear terrorism, they help contextualize bin Laden and Zawahiri’s thinking over time. 

March 2003 

Khaled Shaykh Muhammed captured in Pakistan. Confirms existence of al-Qaeda’s nuclear 

program. Provides information on key operatives involved. 146 

Late October 2005 

Capture of Abu Musab al Suri aka Mustafa Sitmaryam. In December 2004, he published the 

manuscript, ‘‘The International Islamic Resistance Call.” 147 In this 1,600-page global jihadi 

blueprint and in his ‘‘Letter of Reply to the U.S. State Department,’’ al-Suri enthusiastically ar- 

gues that weapons of mass destruction should be used against the United States and criticizes 

Osama bin Laden for not using weapons of mass destruction in the 9/11 attacks. He states: 

‘‘If I were consulted in the case of that operation I would advise the use of planes in 

flights from outside the U.S. that would carry WMD. Hitting the U.S. with WMD 

was and is still very complicated. Yet, it is possible after all, with Allah’s help, and 

more important than being possible—it is vital.” 148 

‘‘The ultimate choice is the destruction of the United States by operations of 

strategic symmetry through weapons of mass destruction, namely nuclear, 

chemical, or biological means, if the Muhajidin can achieve it with the help of those 

who possess them or through buying them.’’ 149 

He argues that acquiring WMD should be a foremost priority of the global jihadi commu- 

nity and is more important than attacking American troops in Iraq. Al-Suri calls on the 

militants to create special elite squads that would carry out strategic operations and should 

consist of highly trained operatives who possess advanced WMD knowledge and receive 

ample financial support, ‘‘when there is a need to counter attack or to achieve strategic sym- 

metry with the United States.” 150 

October 10, 2006 

Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, then the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, called for nuclear scientists and 


explosive experts to help his organization in making biological and radioactive weapons. 

That same year, British citizen Dhiren Barot pleaded guilty to conspiring to detonate a radio- 

active dirty bomb. He planned to target underground parking garages in the U.K. and U.S. 

institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the New York Stock 

Exchange, and offices belonging to Citigroup and Prudential Financial. 151 

January 18 2006 

Predator strike—Abu Khabab is killed. At the time of his death, Abu Khabab was report- 

edly continuing his decade long effort to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons 

for al-Qaeda. 152 

November 27, 2008 

Zawahiri interview. Many of the questions dealt with Egypt, the history of the Islamic Group 

and the Al Jihad Group, and the political situation in that country. Some of his responses 

were quite cryptic; responding to the question when will there be a wing of the organization 

in Egypt? Zawahiri said: “the days will reveal to you what you didn’t know, And news will 

come to you from those who didn’t have it” 153 

July 23, 2009 

Bashiruddin Mahmud strongly endorses Pakistan’s nuclear program in a wide ranging inter- 

view. The former UTN chief, who has been under a form of house arrest and other restrictions 

for years, asserted that nuclear weapons belong to the whole “ummah” (Islamic community). 154 

Mahmood, who held a fireside chat with Osama bin Laden to discuss the al-Qaeda leaders 

interest in nuclear weapons before 9/11, may have been motivated to assist terrorists in ob- 

taining a bomb because he shared their goal of fulfilling Islamic prophecy, as he sees it. In his 

writings, he predicts that the period from 2007 to 2014 would be of great turmoil and destruc- 

tion in the world: “At the international level, terrorism will rule; and in this scenario use of mass 

destruction weapons cannot be ruled out. Millions, by 2002, may die through mass destruction 

weapons, hunger, disease, street violence, terrorist attacks, and suicide.” 155 

Mahmood has advocated sharing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons technology with other Islamic 

nations which he believed would give rise to Muslim dominance in the world. 

He is fascinated “with the role sunspots played in triggering the French and Russian Revolu- 

tions, World War II and assorted anti-colonial uprisings.” 


In his book “Cosmology and Human Destiny” Mahmood argued that sunspots have influenced 

major human events, including the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, and World War 

II. He asserted that governments across the world “are already being subjected to great emo- 

tional aggression under the catalytic effect of the abnormally high sunspot activity under which 

they are most likely to adapt aggression as the natural solution for their problems.” 156 

July 15, 2009 

Ayman Zawahiri warned in an audio message that the US intends to seize Pakistan’s 

nuclear arsenal. Zawahiri implied that Pakistani insiders at nuclear facilities should choose 

their loyalties carefully. 157 

July 2010 

Adnan el-Shukrijumah, an American citizen on the FBI’s most-wanted list for his unresolved 

WMD and possible 9/11-related connections, was named as an accomplice in the New York 

subway bomb plot with Najibullah Zazi. 158 Shukrijumah is reportedly named chief of ex- 

ternal operations for al-Qaeda, giving him responsibility for coordinating attacks against 

western interests, including in the US. 


Appendix D: Excerpts of Grand Mufti Gomaa’s anti-WMD fatwa 

Recently, various sects and groups issued several publications asserting the permissibility of 

using weapons of mass destruction against non-Islamic countries claiming that their allega- 

tions conform to Islamic law. They substantiate their claims with proof from some juristic 

texts, and on analogy to turs [En. human shield], tabyīt [En. surprising the enemy at night] 

and tahrīq [En. killing with fire] mentioned in some books of Islamic jurisprudence. 

Possessing these kinds of weapons to deter enemies is a requirement of Islamic law. This is 

evidenced by the words of Allah: “And prepare against them whatever you are able of power 

and steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy” 

In his interpretation of the verse, the luminary, al-Alusi, said: “Anything that can be used as 

a deterrence in war” [10/24 Dar al-Turath al-Arabi]. In the previous verse Allah commands 

Muslims to deter their enemies who may be inclined to attack Muslims. Apart from being 

a principle of Islamic law that factors in punishments and disciplinary actions, deterrence is 

also a legitimate political principle sanctioned by states in their defense policies and estab- 

lished in military strategies. 

It is well known that acquiring and possessing WMDs creates strategic and military bal- 

ance between states and serves to deter any state that is tempted to launch a hostile attack 

against a Muslim country therefore preventing them from being dragged into an undesired 

war. This applies to acquiring WMDs and using them to deter enemies and oppressors. 

There is a difference between acquiring these weapons to deter potential aggressors and 

between initiating their use. 

The scenario of initiating the use of WMDs which is based on the personal reasoning and 

opinions of individual sects, factions, and groups is prohibited by Islamic law. Any opinion 

that maintains its permissibility or attributes it to Islamic law and its scholars is a false claim 

and accusation against [sacred] law and religion. This is substantiated by the following: 

The decision to declare war 

The principle in war is that it should be launched with the authorization of the Muslim 

ruler; it is imperative that the decision to declare war be based on his own reasoning and his 

subjects must obey him. A ruler is authorized to declare war due to his knowledge of evident 


76 

and hidden matters, the consequences of actions and the interest of his people. For this 

reason, a ruler is authorized to declare wars and hold domestic or international treaties as 

soon as he assumes office. In turn, he does not issue decisions based on [personal] whims. 

He declares a war only after consulting specialists in every relevant field such as techni- 

cal specialists, military personnel, and political consultants who are indispensable in the 

military strategy. 

A person or persons who independently determine the use of WMDs not only impose their 

opinion on their rulers but on the entire [Muslim] community. They give themselves the 

right to make decisions relating to the destiny of the entire community without recourse to 

ahl al-hall wal-’aqd [En. those who are qualified to elect or dispose of a ruler on behalf of the 

Muslim community] in matters that expose the country or people to great dangers. 

Breach of international agreements and treaties 

Islamic states must abide by the agreements and treaties that they acknowledged and entered 

into on their own accord; standing firmly with the international community towards achieving 

global peace and security [only] to the extent of the commitment of the signatory countries. 

Using WMDs involves killing people and taking them by surprise 

Abu Hurairra (may Allah be pleased with him) narrated that the Messenger of Allah (peace 

and blessings be upon him) said: “A believer is not to kill [others]. Faith is a deterrent to 

killing”. Ibn al-Athir said: “Killing [here] means taking others by surprise and killing them 

while they are unprepared” [Al-Nihaya fi Gharib al-Hadith wa al-Athar 3/775]. The hadith 

means that faith is a deterrent to attacking others suddenly while they are unprepared. The 

Prophet’s words: “A believer is not to attack [others] by surprise” is a clear prohibition since 

it involves deception. Khubayb al-Ansarī (may Allah be pleased with him) was captured 

by the polytheists and sold in Mecca to Banī al-Hārith ibn ‘Amir ibn Nawfal ibn abd Manāf. 

It was Khubayb who killed al-Hārith ibn ‘Amir in the battle of Badr. He remained a prison- 

er with them for some time. Once, he asked the daughter of al-Harith for a razor to shave 

and placed her son on his lap. When she came upon this scene and saw Khubayb holding 

the razor in his hand and her son on his lap, she became scared. Thereupon, Khubayb said 

to her: “Are you afraid that I might kill him? I will never do that.” She said: “I never saw a 

captive better than Khubayb.” This is an example of a Muslim imprisoned by his enemies 

who plotted to kill him. In spite of being on the verge of death, he refrained from killing 

their son when he had the opportunity to do so. The manners of a Muslim are free from 

deception and killing others by surprise. 


Killing and harming women and children 

Al-Bukhari and Muslim reported through Abdullah ibn Umar (may Allah be pleased with 

them both) that a woman was found dead in one of the battles fought by the Prophet. There- 

upon he condemned killing women and children. Another phrasing of the hadith states: 

“The messenger of Allah forbade killing women and children.” Imam al-Nawawi said: “There is 

a scholarly consensus on putting this hadith in practice as long as the women and children do 

not fight [the Muslims]. If they do, the majority of scholars maintain that they should be killed” 

[Sharh Muslim 12/48]. 

Killing and harming Muslim residents of the target countries 

Targeting other countries with WMDs will endanger the lives of Muslims residents, natives 

or visitors. The noble Shari’ah honors the life of Muslims and warns against shedding their 

blood without right. Allah Almighty says: “But whoever kills a believer intentionally—his 

recompense is Hell, wherein he will abide eternally, and Allah has become angry with him 

and has cursed him and has prepared for him a great punishment.” [Al-Nisa`] 

On that account: We ordained for the children of Israel that if any one kills a person—unless 

it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land—it would be as if he killed the whole 

people, and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of all people [Al-Maeda. 

Abdullah ibn ‘Amr (may Allah be pleased with them both) narrated that the Prophet said: 

“The perishing of this world is easier in the sight of Allah than taking a Muslim’s life” [Sunan 

al-Nassa’i]. 

The ramifications of using WMDs 

Such a foolish act will bring about catastrophes not only upon Muslims but upon the entire 

world because the countries under attack may retaliate either in kind or in a more brutal 

manner. Moreover, the destructive effects of some of these weapons may exceed the targeted 

area and spread by wind to other countries not involved in the conflict. Hence, the immedi- 

ate and far reaching evils of WMDs are greater than the benefits, if any. It is worthy to men- 

tion at this point that preventing harm is among the principles of Islamic law. This is based 

on legal maxim, “Preventing harm takes precedence over gaining benefit.” 

Consequences of using WMD 

Some of these weapons damage individual and public properties, wasting wealth which is 

forbidden by Islamic law. The prohibition is greater if the wasted wealth belongs to the op- 


78 

pressed. Thus, this prohibition lies in violating Islamic law on the one hand and the rights of 

others on the other. 

The use of some of these weapons may require the perpetrator to enter the target 

Permission to enter a country is considered a non-verbal security agreement not to cause 

corruption in the host country. 

Imam al-Khurqī said in his Mukhtasr: “Whoever enters enemy lands in safety is not allowed 

to cheat them of their money.” Commenting on this statement, Ibn Qudāma said that it 

is prohibited to betray them [non-Muslims in non-Muslim countries] because there is an 

unspoken covenant to enter in safety on the condition that the person who seeks permission 

to enter a foreign country does not betray or oppress them. So whoever enters our lands in 

safety and betrays us violates this security agreement. This is prohibited because it involves 

treachery which is forbidden in our religion. [Al-Mughni 9/237]. 

The legal and juristic texts used as evidence to spread this extreme idea are taken out of 

context. Using these texts in such a manner disturbs peace, ignoring the differences between 

states of war and peace, and the special rulings pertaining to each of them. This is a compel- 

ling difference that is inconsistent with using WMDs weapons based on textual evidence on 

the permissibility of tabīt and ramy al turs. It is a grave mistake to make this analogy even 

though they are valid in themselves within the context cited by the authors of these texts. It 

is dangerous to take these rulings from their context and apply them to different situations. 

Moreover, it is impermissible to derive a ruling permitting the use of WMDs against an op- 

pressor based on analogy since it is established that there is a difference between the rulings 

for repelling an aggressor and those of jihad [En. fighting for the cause of Allah]. These in- 

clude repelling the aggressor by the least violent means. If it is possible to resolve the conflict 

in a peaceful manner, it is prohibited to use weapons against the aggressor. Using WMDs 

against others is not consistent with Islamic values. 

It is invalid to base the permissibility of using WMDs on analogy [Ar.qiyās] to tabyīt, us- 

ing the catapult, or tahrīq 

There are great and manifest differences between the two situations. The prophetic traditions 

mentioned on tahrīq, tabyīn, and the catapult were narrated in a state of war; there is a differ- 

ence between a state of war and peace. There is a great difference in the effects of throwing 

stones at the enemy using the catapult and between using WMDs. The effects of the catapult 

are relatively restricted as compared to the effects of WMDs. The above methods of warfare 


mentioned in the prophetic traditions were conducted with the approval of rulers. Giving a 

person, [other than a ruler], the right to declare war is a crime against the [Islamic] commu- 

nity and its rulers under the pretext of jihad. 

Even if we assume the authenticity of these prophetic traditions, we must note that they refer 

to specific incidents and cannot be put into general practice. For this reason, some scholars 

maintained that the principle [in war] is to avoid tabyīt, tahrīq, and destruction; they base 

their opinion on the general religious texts which discuss the ethics of war. 

Our opinion is that WMDs that cause fires must not be used due to the prohibition of burn- 

ing. After ordering his troops to use fire, the prophet forbade its implementation as a weap- 

on even though the Muslims were in a state of war. Abū Hurayrah narrated that the prophet 

[pbuh] said: “Allah alone has the right to punish with fire” [Bukhārī]. It is known that many 

WMDs cause huge fires, therefore it is better to ban their use even in a state of war. 

It is a mistake to base the issue of the use of WMDs on tabyit because scholars restricted its 

permissibility by the following: It must be implemented in a state of war. The enemy must 

be from among those whom Muslims are permitted to fight as compared to the enemy with 

whom Muslims have a truce. It is impermissible to attack the enemy under the cover of night 

because it is a violation of the security pact between them in terms of lives, wealth, and hon- 

or. If it is prohibited to attack under the cover of darkness the enemy with whom Muslims 

have a security pact, then it is even more prohibited to use such lethal weapons against them. 

Human Shields 

It is impermissible to use human shields save in state of war and under specific conditions 

detailed by jurists. [Bahr Ra`iq 80\5, Hashiyat ibn ‘Abī Dīn 223\3, Rawdat al Tablibīn 239\10, 

Mughnī al Muhtāj 223\4, Mughni ibn Qudāma 449\8, 386/10]. 


80 

Appendix E: Sunni Biographies 

Dr. Taha Jabir al-Alwani is President of Cordoba University. He also holds the Imam Al- 

Shafi’i Chair in Islamic Legal Theory at The Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences 

at Corboda University. Alalwani concentrates on the fields of Islamic legal theory, jurispru- 

dence (fiqh), and usul al-fiqh. Alalwani emigrated from Saudi Arabia to the United States 

in 1983. Alwani has written about the Islamization of Knowledge, the need for Ijtihad, and 

is the founder together with Dr. Qaradawi of fiqh al-aqalliyyat (Muslim minority jurispru- 

dence) which stands for making fiqh easy. 159 

Gamal al-Banna. With his rationalistic, progressive interpretation of Islam, the youngest 

brother of the founder of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, Hassan al-Banna, has called for an 

Islamic revival (al-ihya` al-islami) based on the Quran and reason. In this context, he considers 

the Quran to be the authentic word of God, but warns that some hadiths (reports on Messen- 

ger Muhammad’s statements and acts) have been falsified; thus, Muslims should trust only the 

Sunna (prophetic tradition) which does not contradict the true meaning of the Quran. 160 

He wrote a preface in 1991 in “A Disrupted World” that exhorted Islam to fill the moral void 

that he perceived exists in the world: “The collapse of Marxism doesn’t mean that capitalism 

will succeed. Rather, this means that the mistakes of Marxism were bigger than the mistakes 

of capitalism. Islam replaces the class system with its elitist barriers and dead ends by the 

general equality of the people, the highest ranks or the strata of notables by the declaration 

of absolute equality among the people, without any difference between black and white, male 

and female, rich and poor, base and noble. What was new was the spirit of freedom, the prin- 

ciples of justice and equality that Islam let shine. Today Islam is called upon to fulfill this role 

a second time.” 161 

Grand Mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa began memorizing the Quran at the age of ten and, al- 

though he did not go to religious schools, by the time he graduated from high school he had 

studied the six canonical collections of hadith as well as Maliki jurisprudence. In course of 

his studies, he memorized many of the foundational texts in jurisprudence, Arabic grammar, 

Quranic recitation, and hadith methodology. 162 

In 2003, Shaykh Gomaa was appointed Grand Mufti of Egypt. Since taking on the position 

he has revolutionized the process of issuing fatwas in in Egypt transforming Dar al-Ifta from 

an institution that was the extension of one individual (the Grand Mufti) to a modern institu- 

tion with a fatwa council and a system of checks and balances. 163 


In addition to his WMD fatwa, the grand mufti has also stated that it is not allowed for Mus- 

lims to kill civilians even during a declared war. 164 

Faysal Mawlawi is Deputy Chairman of the European Council on Fatwa and Research 

(Current or Former). The Jamaa al-Islamiya (Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood 

elected Ibrahim al-Masri as secretary general to replace Sheikh Faisal al-Mawlawi who is suf- 

fering from a chronic disease in 2008. 165 

Ibrahim Negm was as an intellectual at an early age, the Egyptian cleric earned distinguished 

scholarship to pursue Islamic studies at Al Azhar University. He has taught and studied at 

many prestigious institutions in the United States, including Harvard. Sheikh Negm is cur- 

rently serving as a representative of Sheikh Ali Goma, and is currently teaching at al-Azhar 

University in Egypt. 166 

Abdul Mohsen al-Obeikan is a top religious scholar and an advisor in the court of Saudi 

King Abdullah. He has asserted that Muslims who join al-Qaeda and engage in terrorist 

operations are deviating from the right path of Islam. 167 

Salman Al-Odeh, The Saudi cleric who was a leader of the extremist Saudi Sahwa move- 

ment. He spent 1994–1999 in prison because of his opposition to Saudi government policy 

during the first Gulf War (1990–1991). In November 2004, Al-Odeh was one of 26 clerics 

who signed a fatwa supporting jihad against U.S. forces in Iraq. In recent years, Al-Odeh has 

tempered his views, and has publicly criticized Osama bin Laden, though he continued to 

support resistance against coalition forces in Iraq. 168 

Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri was trained both in traditional madrasas and at Punjab Uni- 

versity where in 1972 he earned an MA and PhD in Islamic Studies. Qadri appeals to Islamic 

traditionalists as well as to those that appreciate his integration of traditional Islamic sciences 

with modern disciplines. Though he studied in Saudi Arabia, Qadri is a vocal critic of Wa- 

habi and Salafi Islam’s extremist and violent tendencies. 169 

Yusuf al-Qaradawi was once a close associate of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader Has- 

san al Banna. Qaradawi has denounced the attacks against civilians in the U.S. and encour- 

aged Muslims to donate blood to the victims of the attack: “Our hearts bleed for the attacks 

that has targeted the World Trade Center, as well as other institutions in the United States 


82 

despite our strong oppositions to the American biased policy towards Israel on the military, 

political and economic fronts” 170 

However, Qaradawi makes a sharp distinction in the case of Israel. Qaradawi supports sui- 

cide attacks on all Israelis, including women and children since he views the Israeli society as 

a “completely military” society that did not include any civilians. He also considers pregnant 

women and their unborn babies to be valid targets on the ground that the babies could grow 

up to join the Israeli Army. 171 

Tariq Ramadan is considered to be a liberal, progressive bridge-builder between Islam and 

the west. As a young man, Ramadan took his French wife and his children to Egypt, where 

he embarked on an intense, 20-month study of Islam, and his family studied both Islam 

and Arabic. His purpose: “I now meant to stand up for my religion, explain it, and, above 

all, show that we have so much in common with Judaism and Christianity but also with the 

values advocated by humanists, atheists, and agnostics. I meant to question prejudices, to 

question false constructions of Europe’s past, and of course, help open the way to confidently 

living together in harmony as our common future requires.” 172 

As Ramadan’s prolife grew, he was accused by some “of being a ‘prince of doublespeak’: 

essentially, saying one thing in French and another in Arabic.” 173 The mistrust with which 

Ramadan is viewed in the United States relates to his familial connections to his uncle, the 

founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and to alleged meetings he is said to have 

arranged with terrorists, including Ayman al-Zawahiri and Omar Abdel Rahman. He has 

denied meeting either man. 174 

Imam Abdulaziz al-Sharif is the imprisoned founder of the Egyptian Jihad organization 

and a prominent jihad theoretician better known as “Doctor Fadl.” His work, called Tarshid 

al-amal al-jihadi fi misr wa al-alam (Rationalizing the Jihadi Action in Egypt and the World), 

harshly criticized Salafi-jihadist extremism. 175 Ayman Zawahiri attempted to rebut his cri- 

tique in his own book “Exoneration” (2008). Dr Fadl wrote a sequel in response to “Exon- 

eration” in 2010. 


Appendix F: Shia Biographies 

Kazem Mosavi Bojnoordi sat on the defense committee of Iran’s parliament during part of 

the war and is now chief editor of Iran’s Center for the Great Islamic Encyclopedia. 176 

Mohsen Gharavian is a disciple of the ultra-conservative Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi 

Mesbah-Yazdi, who is widely regarded as the cleric closest to Iran’s new president, Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad. He is a lecturer based in a religious school in the holy city of Qom. 177 

Ayatollah Mohsen Kadivar is an Iranian philosopher, University lecturer, cleric and activist. 

A political dissident, Kadivar has been a vocal critic of the doctrine of clerical rule, also 

known as Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), and a strong advocate of 

democratic and liberal reforms in Iran. In 1999, he became the first intellectual jailed in a 

crackdown on Iran’s democracy movement. As a student, in the religious city of Qom, he was 

taught by prominent teachers like Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri. Kadivar taught fiqh and 

Islamic philosophy at Qom Seminary. Kadivar has written a detailed critique of Ayatollah’s 

Khomeini’s theory of Islamic government as rule by Shia clerics. 178 

Grand Ayatollah Ali Hoseyni Khāmene’i is the head of the Muslim conservative establish- 

ment in Iran and Twelver shi’a marja. He was president of Iran from 1981 to 1989, and has 

been Supreme Leader of Iran since June 1989 when the Assembly of Experts selected him to 

succeed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. He has been described as one of only three people 

having “important influences” on the Islamic Republic of Iran (the other two being the 

founder of the republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the president of Iran for much of 

the 1990s, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani). 179 

Seyed Mohammad Khātamī is an Iranian scholar and politician. He served as the fifth 

President of Iran from August 2, 1997 to August 3, 2005. Khatami attracted global attention 

during his first election to the presidency when, as “a little known cleric, he captured almost 

70% of the vote.” Khatami had run on a platform of liberalization and reform. During his 

two terms as president, Khatami advocated freedom of expression, tolerance and civil society, 

constructive diplomatic relations with other states including those in the Asia and European 

Union, and an economic policy that supported a free market and foreign investment. 180 

Mohammad Khazaee is the current Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran 


84 

to the United Nations. He presented his credentials to the United Nations Secretary-General 

Ban Ki-moon on July, 2007. Khazaee has a B.A. in Business Administration from the Universi- 

ty of Guilan, and master’s degree from George Mason University in the United States. Khazaee 

has taught macroeconomics and philosophy at Tehran’s Allameh Tabatabai University. 181 

Syed Ruhollah Moosavi Khomeini (24 September 1900–3 June 1989) was an Iranian reli- 

gious leader and politician, and leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution which saw the over- 

throw of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. Following the revolution and a national 

referendum, Khomeini became the country’s Supreme Leader—a position created in the 

constitution as the highest-ranking political and religious authority of the nation—until his 

death. Khomeini was a marja (“source of emulation”, also known as a Grand Ayatollah) in 

Twelver Shi’a Islam, but is most famous for his political role. In his writings and preachings 

he expanded the Shi’a Usuli theory of velayat-e faqih, the “guardianship of the jurisconsult 

(clerical authority)” to include theocratic political rule by Islamic jurists. 182 

Ali Larijani is an Iranian politician and the chairman/speaker of the Iranian parliament. 

Larijani was the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council from August 15, 2005 

to October 20, 2007. In his post as secretary he functioned as a top negotiator on issues of 

national security, including Iran’s nuclear program. 183 

Fazal Miboudi is a pro-reform mullah who is a professor of political science at Mofid 

University in Esfahan. 184 

Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri (1922–19 December 2009) was a prominent 

Iranian scholar, Islamic theologian, democracy advocate, writer and human rights activist. 

He was one of the leaders of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. He was once the designated 

successor to the revolution’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, with whom he had a 

falling out in 1989 over government policies that Montazeri claimed had infringed on 

people’s freedom and denied them their rights. Montazeri was essentially exiled in his later 

years to the holy city of Qom, where he remained influential to the reformist movement. 

He was widely known as one of the most knowledgeable senior Islamic scholars in Iran and 

a Grand Marja (religious authority) of Shi’ite Islam. 185 

Hassan Rowhani is an Iranian politician and cleric, and as of March 2007, a member of the 


Supreme National Security Council. He served as chief negotiator with UK, France, and Ger- 

many on Iran’s nuclear program. Under his supervision, his team agreed to unconditionally 

suspend nuclear enrichment. He was subsequently replaced, and enrichment was resumed. 

Rowhani has previously been a Deputy Speaker of Majlis, as a representative from Tehran 

and is currently member of the Expediency Discernment Council. On August 14, 2005, 

Rowhani was replaced by Ali Larijani as the secretary of the council. 186 

Grand Ayatollah Yousef Sanei is a scholar, theologian and Islamic philosopher who has 

called for radical reform. Born in Isfahan in 1937, Sanei retired from the Guardian Coun- 

cil in 1983 and has not held any political office since that time. Sanei has been considered 

the successor of Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri as the spiritual leader of the op- 

position movement. 187 

Mashallah Shakiri is the Iranian ambassador to Pakistan. 188 

Hossein Shariatmadari is the managing editor of Kayhan, a conservative Iranian newspaper. 

A supporter of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, he has been described as being a close 

confidant of Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei. He reportedly has inks to Iran’s intelligence 

services. On February 12, 2009, he wrote a controversial article suggesting that former Presi- 

dent Khatami might be assassinated if he ran again for President. 189 

Ayatollah Jalal Al-Din Taheri Esfahani is an Iranian scholar, theologian and Islamic Philos- 

opher. Taheri was a member of Assembly of Experts and representative of Ayatollah Khomeini 

in Isfahan province. In 2002, Taheri resigned after 30 years as prayer leader in Isfahan. Taheri’s 

resignation letter complained of “generalized corruption of religious power in Iran.” He is a critic 

of Islamic extremism and supreme leader of Iran. In 30 June 2009, Taheri wrote an open letter 

in which he called Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s election to President illegitimate. 190 

Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi is a hardline Iranian Twelver Shi’i cleric and politician 

who is widely seen as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s spiritual advisor. He 

is also a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, the body responsible for choosing the Su- 

preme Leader, where he heads a minority ultraconservative faction. He has been called “the 

most conservative” and the most “powerful” and “influential ... clerical oligarch” in Iran’s 

leading center of religious learning, the city of Qom. Mesbah Yazdi advocates Islamic phi- 


86 

losophy and in particular Sadra Mutahillin’s Transcendent School of Philosophy (Hikmat-e 

Muta`aliya). He believes Iran has strayed from the values of the 1979 Iranian revolution and 

strongly opposes democratic rule and the Reformist movement in Iran. 191 

Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif is a former Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of 

Iran to the United Nations. He presented his credentials to the United Nations Secretary-Gen- 

eral on August 5, 2002. He attended the Graduate School of International Studies at the Uni- 

versity of Denver and obtained a Ph.D. in International Law and Policy. He also attended San 

Francisco State University as a graduate student in the Department of International Relations. 

Zarif currently teaches at Iran’s School of International Relations in Tehran. 192 


Appendix G: Same Author Correlation by Text and Page Number 

Referencing Al-Nawawi 

Al-Fahd: Page 6, 7 

Killing in a good manner; distinguishing the possible from the impossible, fulfilling God’s 

command as you are able. 

Zawahiri: Page 26, 41, 72, 80, 81, 108, 110, 167, 168, 170, 173, 176, 211, 244 

Obligation to depose rulers’ who show signs of non-belief and try to alter Shari’ah—they 

should depose him only if they are able to do so; appeasing this ruler is a sin; a true Muslim 

should live in another land to safeguard the religion if they are unable to do anything. 

In the context of killing women, children, young boys and old men: “Old men among infi- 

dels should be killed if they are men of counsel.” 

“Someone trying to change vice to virtue has the right to use all possible means…he also has 

the right to retrieve any possession from a person who has forcibly taken it from another.” 

“If the infidels enter a Muslim city or are deployed in a place overlooking it, jihad becomes 

the duty of every single Muslim even if they do not enter the city.” 

In the context of night attacks and the inability to distinguish women and children, the Prophet 

has been quoted as saying “They are of them”—With regard to the rule governing children of 

non-believers attacked during the night, the children belong to the parents, and thus it is per- 

missible; so long as they are not targeted intentionally without necessity, it is permissible; with 

regard to this hadith concerning the killing of women and children, one cannot distinguish in 

the night and this hadith contains proof of the permissibility to attack at night. 

In the context of permissibility to kill non-believers with a catapult, and by analogy, other 

kinds of weapons such as artillery, tanks and war planes—justifying the cutting and burning 

of “date palms” and “palm-trees.” 

“If he murders by the sword, vengeance is exacted from him only by the sword, on the basis 

of God’s word: ‘Whoso commits aggression against you, do you commit aggression against 

him like as he has committed against you; If the murderer burned his victim, drowned him, 

stoned him, threw him from a cliff, hit him with a piece of wood, locked him up and de- 


88 

nied him food and drink until he died, the next-of-kin may take vengeance in the same way, 

on the basis of God’s word: ‘And if you chastise, chastise even as you have been chastised’ 

[Quranic verse; al-Nahl 16:126]. This is also based on what al-Bara’ related, that the prophet 

said: ‘Whoever burns, we burn him; whoever drowns, we drown him.’” 

Referencing Abu Dawud 

Al-Fahd: Page 6, 9, 10, 11, 16, 20 

In the context of the Prophets orders on raids to not mutilate or kill a child, citing the basic 

rule of killing in a good manner those who are lawful targets without being excessive, then 

describes all the exceptions to this rule, starting with the notion of distinguishing the possible 

from the impossible re: necessity, women and children, killing Muslims, and Muslim shields. 

“Ahmad [ibn Hanbal] and Abu Dawud relate a hadith from Salamah ibn al-Akwa’, who said 

“The Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, appointed Abu Bakr to 

be our commander, and we raided a group of polytheists. We lay wait for them at night to 

kill them. Our slogan that night was ‘Kill! Kill!’ With my own hand that night I killed seven 

high-ranking polytheists.”” 

“Ahmad [ibn Hanbal], Abu Dawud, and Ibn Majah transmit a hadith from Usamah ibn Zayd, 

a Companion of the Prophet, that the Prophet sent him to a country called Ubna and said 

“Come upon them at dawn, and then set it afire”—justifying setting enemy territory on fire, 

cutting down trees and crops.” 

Citing a hadith describing the Prophet’s action of setting up a catapult to attack the people of 

al-Ta’if—“As everyone knows, a catapult stone does not distinguish between women, chil- 

dren, and others; it destroys anything that it hits, buildings or otherwise. This proves that the 

principle of destroying the infidels’ lands and killing them if the jihad requires it and those in 

authority over the jihad decide so is legitimate; for the Muslims bombarded these countries 

with catapults until they were conquered. No one reports that they ceased for fear of annihi- 

lating the infidels or for fear of destroying their territory. God alone knows best.” 

Abu Dawud is quoted as transmitting a hadith that has the Prophey saying “Only God, the 

master of fire, punishes with fire.” He is also quoted as transmitting a story of the Prophet 

where “The Messenger of God then cut down their date-palms and set fires. When they saw 

the date-palms being cut down and burned, they cried out: “Muhammad, you used to pro- 


hibit corruption! How can you cut down and burn date-palms?” God then revealed the verse, 

“Whatever palm-trees you cut down…” (Quran 59:5).” 

Zawahiri: Page 35, 83, 85, 86, 89, 90, 103, 136, 141, 142, 169, 172, 203, 239 

Quoting a hadith transmitted by Abu Dawud: “He who is killed defending his property is a 

martyr, he who is killed defending his life is a martyr, he who is killed defending his religion 

is a martyr, and he who is killed defending his kinfolk is a martyr.” 

In the context of: “God has said: ‘Whoso commits aggression against you, do you commit ag- 

gression against him like as he has committed against you’ [Quranic verse; al-Baqarah 2:194]. 

And also: ‘And if you chastise, chastise even as you have been chastised’ [Quranic verse; al- 

Nahl 16:126-127].” 

“They said that this is a general rule in all things. They supported it by the fact that the 

prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) confined the broken bowl to the tent of 

the woman who broke it and handed over the whole one, saying, ‘Vessel for vessel, and food 

for food.’ The tradition is included by Abu Dawud.” 

Abu Dawud narrated about Al-Zuhari that Irwah said: “So Usama told me that the prophet, 

prayers and peace of God be upon him, had entrusted him with it saying ‘attack Ubna in the 

morning and destroy it by fire’. 

Referencing Al-Bukhari 

Al-Fahd: Page 6, 10, 16 

“Mutilation has been forbidden” 

In the context of setting fire to enemy territory, burning trees and crops: “Al Bukhari devoted 

a chapter to it, entitled, “On Burning Houses and Palm-Trees.” 

“The Prophet besieged the people of al-Ta’if, as related by both Muslim and al-Bukhari, and 

according to al-Bayhaqi he set up a catapult against them. Judge by analogy to this anything 

that causes general destruction.” 


90 

Zawahiri: Page 5, 8, 25, 26, 50, 59, 70, 101, 102, 133, 134, 140, 143, 167, 173, 204, 217 

Al-Bukhari writes: “From al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah: “The prophet (may God bless him and 

grant him peace) passed by me at al-Abwa or Waddan, and was asked whether it was permis- 

sible to attack non-believer tribesmen at night, in such wise as their women and children 

might be hit. The prophet replied, ‘They are of them.’ I also heard him say, ‘There is no sacred 

enclosure (hima) except for God and His Messenger’.”” 

Referencing al-Sa’b ibn Jaththamah / al Sa’b ibn Jathama 


“Among them is a hadith transmitted in both Sahihs from al-Sa’b ibn Jaththamah, a Com- 

panion of the Prophet, who said that the Prophet was asked about some Muslims who had 

raided the polytheists at night, wounding some of their women and children. He replied, 

“They are of them.”” 

“Al-Bayhaqi devoted a chapter of al-Sunan al-Kubra (9:78) to al-Sa’b’s hadith, entitling it: “On 

Unintentionally Killing Women and Children in a Night Raid or Attack, Hadiths Transmitted 

Permitting Night Attacks.” 

“Al-Tahawi mentions the reports relevant to the prohibition on killing women and children. 

Then he mentions the hadith of al-Sa’b ibn Jaththamah about the night raid and says…This 

agrees with my interpretation of the hadith of al-Sa’b. Thus, he as enjoined us to fight the 

enemy, but he has forbidden us to kill women and children. It is a sin for us to intend to do 

what he has forbidden us to do, but it is permitted for us to intend to do what has been per- 

mitted for us, even if it involves harming others whom we have been forbidden to harm and 

for whom we are not responsible.” 

“Other authentic texts prove that it is permitted to kill women and children in the case of a 

night attack or invasion. There is the tradition from Sa’b ibn Jaththamah, a Companion of 

the Prophet. Putting these texts together, scholars concluded that the prohibition applies 

to cases when women and children can be distinguished from others; when they cannot be 

distinguished from others, it is permitted to kill them collaterally with the others.” 

Zawahiri: Page 39, 158, 159, 167, 169, 184, 186, 209 

“The second ambiguity: They say that among the dead were innocent people who had 


done nothing wrong. The answer to this ambiguity is this: 

First: Al-Sa’b Bin-Jathamah, may his soul find favor with God, recounted that the prophet 

was asked what rule pertained to the worshipers of idols who are attacked at night and then 

find that their women and children had been killed. He replied: “They are of them.” 

This Hadith shows that women and young boys, that is, those who may not be killed sepa- 

rately, may be killed if they are mixed with others and it is not possible to distinguish be- 

tween one and the other. The Muslims were asking about night raids, when it is not possible 

to distinguish one person from another. The prophet permitted this because an act that 

follows another as a consequence is permitted even if it is not permitted separately. 

Second: Muslim commanders used catapults in their wars with the infidels. It is known that 

a catapult cannot differentiate among those whom it hits. It might hit those so-called in- 

nocent people. Yet the Muslim custom in their wars was to use catapults. They used them 

against Al-Ta’if ’s inhabitants.” 

“They say that there are innocent people who have done no wrong among those who were 

killed, and the answer to this accusation has a number of aspects: 

First aspect: Al-Sa’b Ibn Jathama, may God be content with him, narrated about the prophet, 

prayers and peace of God be upon him, that he was asked about the nonbelievers in the lands 

who were attacked by night and their women and children were harmed, so he said: “They 

are of them,” Hadith. 

This Hadith proves that women and children and those whose killing is not permissible as 

individuals can be killed when mixed with others and could not be singled out, because they 

asked the prophet, prayers and peace of God be upon him, about the night raids which is kill- 

ing by night, for in night raids it is not possible to differentiate. Thus, what is permitted as a 

consequence of [circumstances] is not permitted independently of [the circumstances]. 

“Al-Zuhri related from Ubaydallah Ibn Abdallah, who related from Ibn Abbas, who related 

from al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah, who said: ‘The prophet (may God bless him and grant him 

peace) was asked about the polytheist tribesmen who were being attacked by night and some 

of whose children and women were being hit. He said that the latter were of them.’ 


92 

“As everyone knows, whoever attacks such people cannot help hitting their children and 

women whom it is forbidden to kill. Similarly, if there are Muslims among them, that must 

not prevent the launching of an attack on them and shooting them with arrows and other 

things, even if there is fear of hitting a Muslim.” 

“Someone might argue that the only reason for this is that the children of polytheists are of 

them, as the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) said in the Hadith of al-Sa’b 

Ibn Jaththamah. The answer would be that the prophet could not have intended to say about 

their children that they were of them in non-belief, since minors cannot actually be non- 

believers, nor can they deserve to be killed or punished for the deeds of their parents in terms 

of the cancellation of blood money and expiation.” 

From al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah: “The prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) passed 

by me at al-Abwa or Waddan, and was asked whether it was permissible to attack non-believ- 

er tribesmen at night, in such wise as their women and children might be hit. The prophet 

replied, ‘They are of them.’ I also heard him say, ‘There is no sacred enclosure (hima) except 

for God and His Messenger’.” 

“Sufyan recited the following tradition to him on the authority of al-Zuhri, who had it from 

Abdallah, who had it from Ibn Abbas, who had it from al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah, who said: ‘I 

heard the messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace) being asked about the 

polytheist tribesmen, whether we should attack them by night and hit some of their women 

and children. He said that the latter were of them.’ 

The Imam al-Shirazi (may God have mercy on him) said: “Chapter: If he erects a catapult 

against them or attacks them by night when there are women and children among them, this is 

permissible on the basis of what Ali (may God honor him) transmitted: that the prophet (may 

God bless him and grant him peace) erected a catapult against the people of al-Ta’if although 

the city was not devoid of women and children. Also, al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah related: ‘I asked 

the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) about the children of non-believers who 

are attacked by night and their women and children are hit. He said the latter were of them.’ 

This is because the non-believers are not devoid of women and children, and if we abstained 

from shooting at them for the sake of the women and children, jihad would cease.” 

Abu Bakr al-Jassas (may God have mercy on him) said: “Al-Zuhri related from Ubaydallah 

Ibn Abdallah, who related from Ibn Abbas, who related from al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah, who 


said: ‘The prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) was asked about the polytheist 

tribesmen who were being attacked by night and some of whose children and women were 

being hit. He said that the latter were of them.’” 

Referencing Ahmad ibn Hanbal 

Al-Fahd: Page 9, 10, 11, 16, 17 






“The Imam Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal] said, as stated in al-Mughni (9:230): “There is nothing 

wrong with night attacks. The attack on the Byzantines was nothing but a night attack. We 

know of no one who finds it reprehensible to attack the enemy by night.” 





Al-‘Ayni said in ‘Umdat al-Qari, 14:270: “Ibn ‘Umar’s hadith proves that Muslims may em- 

ploy any stratagems that will sap their polytheist enemy’s strength, weaken their cunning, and 

facilitate victory over them. They may cut down their crops, divert their water, and besiege 

them. Those permitted this were the Kufans, Malik, al-Sahfi’I, Ahmad [ibn Hanbal], Ishaq, 

al-Thawri, and Ibn al-Qasim. The Kufans said that their trees could be cut down, their lands 

devastated, and their cattle slaughtered or hamstrung if they could not be dislodged.” 

This hadith is clear in its indication that setting fire to enemy territory is permissible if the 

fighting requires it.” 

“Ibn Qudamah (al-Mughni, 9:230): Al-Khiraqi said, ‘When the enemy is fought, they are 

not burnt with fire.’ When one has power over the enemy, one may not burn him with fire. 

We know of no disagreement about this. Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, may God be pleased with 

him, used to order that the people who apostatized after the Prophety’s death should be 


94 

fought with fire, and Khalid ibn al-Walid did this at his command. Today, however, I know 

of no disagreement among scholars concerning this. As for bombarding them with fire 

before taking them: if they can be taken without fire, one may not bombard them with it, 

because they fall under the category of those over whom one has power. However, if one is 

powerless against them without fire, one may do so, according to what most scholars hold. 

So said al-Thawri, al-Awza’I, and al-Shafi’i. The same holds for opening the floodgates 

against them to drown them: if they can be overcome without it, it is not permissible, since 

this involves annihilating women and children, whom it is forbidden to annihilate inten- 

tionally. However, if they cannot be overcome otherwise, it is permissible. Night raids 

that involve this are also permissible, and one may setup a catapult against them. The plain 

sense of the words of Ahmad [ibn Hanbal] is that it is permissible both when there is need 

and when there is not.” 

“Al-Rahibani (Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 2:516): “’Also’ it is permitted ‘to bombard them with the 

catapult.’ This is explicit, ‘because the Prophet set up a catapult against al-Ta’if.’ Al-Tirmidhi 

transmitted the report with a gap in the chain of transmission. Also, ‘Amr ibn Al-‘As set up 

catapults against Alexandria. The plain sense of the words of Ahmad [ibn Hanbal] is that it is 

permissible both when there is need and when there is none. ‘Also’ they may be bombarded 

with ‘fire and things like scorpions.’ Such as adders. ‘They may be smoked out of under- 

ground dens,’ i.e., excavations in the ground, as defined in the dictionary of al-Qamus. ‘Also’ 

it is permitted ‘to cut off the road,’ i.e., their highway, ‘and’ to cut off ‘the water’ from them, 

‘or open it to drown them. ‘And’ it is permitted to ‘destroy their cultivated land,’ even if it 

includes annihilating some women and children unintentionally, because it falls under the 

same rule as night raids. 

Zawahiri: Page 33, 40, 61, 71, 79, 88, 89, 90, 91, 124, 136, 141, 142, 151, 165, 168, 169, 170, 

175, 176, 177, 183, 211 

“First class: They might be those who do not fight alongside the countries they live in and do 

not help them with their persons, wealth, counsel, or other types of assistance. These may not 

be killed but on condition that they hold themselves separately from the others. If they are 

not separated from the others, it is permitted to kill them including old people, women, young 

boys, sick persons, incapacitated persons, and unworldly monks. Ibn-Qudamah said: Women 

and children may be killed during a night raid on condition that they are not killed intentional- 

ly and separately. It is permitted to kill their riding animals and livestock if this helps the Mus- 

lims to kill them. There is no disagreement on this point. He added: It is permitted to carry out 


a night raid on the enemy. Ibn-Hanbal said night raids were permitted especially against the 

Byzantines. We will not discourage anyone from carrying out night raids.” 

“Chapter: The ruling is similar regarding opening the floodgates on them to drown them: if 

they can be overcome in another way, it is not permissible —if that entails the destruction of 

women and children, whose intentional destruction is forbidden. If they can be overcome 

only in that way, it is permissible, as night attacks entailing the same things are permis- 

sible, and it is permissible to erect a catapult against them. The plain sense of Ahmad [Ibn 

Hanbal] is that it is permissible when need is present and when it is absent. This is because 

the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) erected a catapult against the people 

of al-Ta’if. Among those who hold this opinion are al-Thawri, al-Awza’i, al-Shafi’i, and the 

masters of opinion. Ibn al-Mundhir said that a tradition from the prophet states that he set 

up a catapult against the people of al-Ta’if and one from Amr Ibn al-As states that he set up a 

catapult against the people of Alexandria. Also: because fighting by such means is customary 

and like shooting arrows.” 

“Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal] said there was nothing wrong with attacking by night. ‘Are the attacks 

of the Byzantines anything but night attacks? We know of no one who disapproves of attack- 

ing the enemy by night.’ 

“Sufyan recited the following tradition to him on the authority of al-Zuhri, who had it from 

Abdallah, who had it from Ibn Abbas, who had it from al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah, who said: ‘I 

heard the messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace) being asked about the 

polytheist tribesmen, whether we should attack them by night and hit some of their women 

and children. He said that the latter were of them.’ 

“He [Ibn Hanbal] said that the chain of transmitters was good.” 

“Someone might object that the prophet forbade the killing of women and children.” 

“We would say that it refers to killing them intentionally.” 

“Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal] said, ‘If he intends to kill them, then it is not permissible’.” 

The Imam al-Nawawi (may God have mercy on him) said: “3288: Yahya Ibn Yahya and 

Muhammad Ibn Rumh reported to us that they had been told by al-Layth; and Qutaybah Ibn 


96 

Sa’id reported to us that al-Layth also reported to him from Nafi’, who had it from Abdal- 

lah, that the messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace) set fire to the date 

palms of the Banu al-Nadir at al-Buwayrah and cut them down. Qutaybah and Ibn Rumh 

added in their report that God revealed the following verse on this occasion: ‘Whatever 

palm-tress you cut down, or left standing upon their roots, that was by God’s leave, and that 

He might degrade the ungodly.” [Quranic verse; al-Hashr 59:5]. 

“In this Hadith there is permission to cut down and burn the trees of the non-believers. 

This was held by Abd-al-Rahman Ibn al-Qasim, Nafi’ the mawla of Ibn Umar, Malik, al- 

Thawri, Abu Hanifah, al-Shafi’i, Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal], Ishaq, and the great majority. 

However, there is a tradition from Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, al-Layth Ibn Sa’d, Abu Thawr, 

and al-Awza’i (may God be pleased with him) that it is not permitted.” 

“God allowed the Muslims to mutilate the non-believers if the latter mutilated them, even 

though mutilation is forbidden. God has said: ‘And if you chastise, chastise even as you 

have been chastised’ [Quranic verse; Al-Nahl 16:126]. This indicates that punishment by 

cutting off the nose or the ear, ripping open the belly, and the like, is punishment in kind, 

not aggression, and that equivalence is justice. 

“As for the prohibition of mutilation, it is based on the Hadith that Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal] 

included in his Musnad on the authority of Samurah Ibn Jundub and Imran Ibn al- 

Husayn: ‘Never did the messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace) 

preach a sermon to us but that he commanded us to charity and forbade us to mutilate.’” 

Ibn Muflih (may God have mercy on him) said: “Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal] said that they ought 

not to torture him. He also said that if they mutilated, they can be mutilated. Abu Bakr 

mentioned this.” Ibn Taymiyyah (may God have mercy on him) has said: 

“For this reason, scholars have agreed on the permissibility of destroying trees and crops be- 

longing to the non-believers if they have done the same to us or if they can be overcome only 

by these means. About its permissibility short of such circumstances there is a well-known 

controversy. There are two accounts related on the authority of Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal]. Per- 

mitting it is the doctrine of al-Shafi’i and others.” 

“What do you mean by the innocent?” 


Those whose answers are not void of three cases: First case: “That they would not be of those 

who fought with their countries nor had been hired by them physically, financially, by opin- 

ion, consultation nor otherwise, for it is not permissible to attack this type on condition that 

they be outstanding and not having mixed with others. But if they mixed with others and 

were not distinguishable then their killing would be permissible in conformity and subject 

to those such as the aged, women, children, sick people, the handicapped, and the dedicated 

monks. Ibn Qudamah [al-Maqdisi] narrated: and it is possible to unintentionally kill women 

and children in night attacks and burial places, if not intentionally individually killed. It is 

permissible to kill their cattle leading to their killing and defeat, and there is no dispute about 

that (meaning and elaboration 10/503). And he said: it is permissible to attack the enemy by 

night. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal said there is no harm in attacking by night, for the conquest of the 

West is but by night, and he said and we know not anyone who disliked the attacks by night.” 

Referencing Salamah ibn al-Akwa 

Al-Fahd: Page 9 






Zawahiri: Page 168 

In the context of night-raids and intentional/unintentional killing of women and children: 

“From Salamah Ibn al-Akwa (may God be pleased with him): “Our battle cry the night we at- 

tacked Hawazin with Abu Bakr al-Siddiq—the prophet had made him our commander—was 

‘Kill! Kill!’ I killed with my own hands that night seven prominent people.” 

Referencing ibn Umar 


“Among them is a hadith transmitted in both Sahihs from al-Sa’b ibn Jaththamah, a Compan- 

ion of the Prophet, who said that the Prophet was asked about some Muslims who had raided 

the polytheists at night, wounding some of their women and children. He replied, “They are of 

them.” Also in both Sahihs is a hadith from Ibn ‘Umar, a Companion of the Prophet, that says: 


98 

“The Prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, attacked the Banu-Mustaliq while they 

were off guard among their cattle. He killed the fighters and took the children captive.” 

“We read in both Sahihs from Ibn ‘Umar, a Companion of the Prophet: “The Messenger 

of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, burned and cut down the date palms of 

the Banu al-Nadir.” Concerning this, God said: “Whatever palm-trees you cut down, or left 

standing upon their roots, that was by God’s leave.” (Quran 59:5). In some traditions related 

by the two shaykhs [Muslim and al-Bukhari] one reads that the name of the land set afire 

was al-Buwayrah. 

Al-‘Ayni said in ‘Umdat al-Qari, 14:270: “Ibn ‘Umar’s hadith proves that Muslims may em- 
















He might degrade the ungodly.’ [Quranic verse; al-Hashr 59:5]. 

“In this Hadith there is permission to cut down and burn the trees of the non-believers. This 

was held by Abd-al-Rahman Ibn al-Qasim, Nafi’ the mawla of Ibn Umar, Malik, al-Thawri, 

Abu Hanifah, al-Shafi’i, Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal], Ishaq, and the great majority. However, there 

is a tradition from Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, al-Layth Ibn Sa’d, Abu Thawr, and al-Awza’i (may God 

be pleased with him) that it is not permitted.” 


Referencing Usama / Usamah ibn Zayd 






Zawahiri: Page 8, 159, 168, 184, 203 

“The prophet, prayers and peace of God be upon him, sent Usama Ibn Zayd to Abani in 

Palestine and commanded him to attack and set it on fire. This was during the time of the 

prophecy and before the conquest of the Levante. 

Abu Dawud narrated about Al-Zuhari that Irwah said: “So Usama told me that the prophet, 

prayers and peace of God be upon him, had entrusted him with it saying ‘attack Ubna in the 

morning and destroy it by fire’.” 

“Al-Zuhri related from Ubaydallah Ibn Abdallah, who related from Ibn Abbas, who related 

from al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah, who said: ‘The prophet (may God bless him and grant him 

peace) was asked about the polytheist tribesmen who were being attacked by night and some 

of whose children and women were being hit. He said that the latter were of them.’” 

“The prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) once sent Usama bin Zayd and said 

to him, ‘Attack Ubna195 in the morning and burn it.’ He used to order the expeditions to wait 

for those they were attacking and to refrain from them if they gave the call to prayer; if they 

heard no call, they were to attack. The well-guided caliphs continued this policy. 




things, even if there is fear of hitting a Muslim.”” 

The Imam al-Jassas (may God have mercy on him) said: “The prophet (may God bless him 

and grant him peace) once sent Usama bin Zayd and said to him, ‘Attack Ubna212 in the 

morning and burn it.’ He used to order the expeditions to wait for those they were attacking 


100 

and to refrain from them if they gave the call to prayer; if they heard no call, they were to at- 

tack. The well guided caliphs continued this policy.” 

“It is common knowledge that anyone who attacks such people cannot avoid hitting their 

children and women who are forbidden to be killed; similarly, if there are Muslims among 

them. This must not prevent the launching of the raid against them and shooting at them 

with arrows and other things, even if there is danger of hitting the Muslim.”” 

“Abu Bakr al-Jassas (may God have mercy on him) said: “Al-Zuhri related from Ubaydallah 

Ibn Abdallah, who related from Ibn Abbas, who related from al-Sa’b Ibn Jaththamah, who 

said: ‘The prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) was asked about the polytheist 

tribesmen who were being attacked by night and some of whose children and women were 

being hit. He said that the latter were of them.’ 

“The prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) once sent Usama bin Zayd and said 

to him, ‘Attack Ubna195 in the morning and burn it.’ He used to order the expeditions to wait 

for those they were attacking and to refrain from them if they gave the call to prayer; if they 

heard no call, they were to attack. The well-guided caliphs continued this policy. 




things, even if there is fear of hitting a Muslim.”” 

“The prophet, prayers and peace of God be upon him, sent Usama Ibn Zayd to Abani in 

Palestine and commanded him to attack and set it on fire. This was during the time of the 

prophecy and before the conquest of the Levante.” 

Referencing Al-Tirmidhi 


“Al-Tirmidhi cites the hadith and then says: “This is a good and sound hadith. Many scholars 

have held this opinion and have seen nothing wrong in cutting down trees and laying waste 

to strongholds. On the other hand, some have judged it to be reprehensible: such was the 

opinion of al-Awza’i.” 


“He also said (Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 1:623): “’Also,’ it is permitted ‘to bombard them’ viz., 

the infidels, ‘with a catapult.’ This is explicit, because the Prophet ‘set up a catapult against al- 

Ta’if.’ The report is transmitted by al-Tirmidhi with a gap in the chain of transmission.” 

“Al-Rahibani (Matalib Uli al-Nuha, 2:516): “’Also’ it is permitted ‘to bombard them with the 

catapult.’ This is explicit, ‘because the Prophet set up a catapult against al-Ta’if.’ Al-Tirmidhi 

transmitted the report with a gap ijn the chain of transmission. 


Regarding his saying, “by erecting catapults,” i.e., it is against their forts because the prophet 

erected them against Al-Ta’if. Al-Tirmidhi transmitted this. 

Referencing Al-Awza’i 

Al-Fahd: Page 10, 15, 16, 17, 21 

“The great mass of scholars held the view that burning and devastating are permissible in 

enemy territory. Those who held it reprehensible were al-Awza’I, al-Layth, and Abu Thawr.” 

“Al-Hafiz ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani (Fath al-Bari, 6:155): “The majority of scholars have held it 

permissible to burn and devastate in enemy territory. Al-Awza’I, al-Layth, and Abu Thawr 

considered it reprehensible.” 

“Ibn Qudamah (al-Mughni, 9:230): “Al-Khiraqi said, ‘When the enemy is fought, they are 


We know of no disagreement about this. Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, may God be pleased with him, 

used to order that the people who apostatized after the Prophety’s death should be fought 

with fire, and Khalid ibn al-Walid did this at his command. Today, however, I know of no 

disagreement among scholars concerning this. As for bombarding them with fire before 

taking them: if they can be taken without fire, one may not bombard them with it, because 

they fall under the category of those over whom one has power. However, if one is power- 

less against them without fire, one may do so, according to what most scholars hold. So said 

al-Thawri, al-Awza’I, and al-Shafi’i. The same holds for opening the floodgates against them 

to drown them: if they can be overcome without it, it is not permissible, since this involves 

annihilating women and children, whom it is forbidden to annihilate intentionally. However, 

if they cannot be overcome otherwise, it is permissible. Night raids that involve this are also 


102 

permissible, and one may setup a catapult against them. The plain sense of the words of Ah- 

mad [ibn Hanbal] is that it is permissible both when there is need and when there is not.” 

“The following Quranic verse was revealed regarding this: ‘Whatever palm-trees you cut 

down…’ (Quran 59:5). The polytheists said, ‘You prohibit corruption in the earth. What 

about cutting down and burning trees?’ The majority have held that it is permitted to burn 

and despoil in enemy territory. Al-Awza’I and Abu Thawr considered it reprehensible.” 

Zawahiri: Page 156, 165, 166, 170, 185, 207 

“Ibn Qudamah the Hanbali (may God have mercy on him) said: “Chapter: The ruling is simi- 

lar regarding opening the floodgates on them to drown them: if they can be overcome in an- 

other way, it is not permissible—if that entails the destruction of women and children, whose 

intentional destruction is forbidden. If they can be overcome only in that way, it is permis- 

sible, as night attacks entailing the same things are permissible, and it is permissible to erect a 

catapult against them. The plain sense of Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal] is that it is permissible when 

need is present and when it is absent. This is because the prophet (may God bless him and 

grant him peace) erected a catapult against the people of al-Ta’if. Among those who hold this 

opinion are al-Thawri, al-Awza’i, al-Shafi’i, and the masters of opinion. Ibn al-Mundhir said 

that a tradition from the prophet states that he set up a catapult against the people of al-Ta’if 

and one from Amr Ibn al-As states that he set up a catapult against the people of Alexandria. 

Also: because fighting by such means is customary and like shooting arrows.” 

“Ibn Qudamah also said: “Chapter: If they take a Muslim as a shield and necessity does not 

call for shooting at them due to the war’s not being ongoing, or because they can be over- 

come without it, or because one feels safe from their evil, it is not permissible to shoot at 

them; and so if he shoots at them and hits a Muslim, he bears liability for him. However, 

if necessity calls for shooting at them because of fear for the Muslims, shooting at them is 

permissible because it is a case of necessity and so the non-believers are targeted. If there is 

no fear for the Muslims, but the enemy can be overcome only by shooting, al-Awza’i and al- 

Layth say that shooting at them is not permissible, on the basis of the Quranic verse: ‘If it had 

not been for certain men believers and certain women believers whom you knew not, lest 

you should trample them, and there befall you guilt unwittingly on their account…’ [Quranic 

verse; Al-Fath 48:25]. 

“Having cited the scholarly positions available to us from the various legal schools on the 

question of shooting at non-believers when they are mixed with Muslims or when they take 


them as human shields or take as shields people who may not be killed, such as women, 

children, protected minorities (dhimmis), or people with safe-conduct, we say in summary: 

Prohibition: This is the position cited from Malik and al-Awza’i.” 

“The Imam al-Nawawi (may God have mercy on him) said: “3288: Yahya Ibn Yahya and 






palm-trees you cut down, or left standing upon their roots, that was by God’s leave, and that 







“Ibn Qudamah also said: “Chapter: If they take a Muslim as a shield and necessity does not 



them; and so if he shoots at them and hits a Muslim, he bears liability for him. However, if 

necessity calls for shooting at them because of fear for the Muslims, shooting at them is per- 

missible because it is a case of necessity and the non-believers are targeted. If there is no fear 

for the Muslims, but the enemy can be overcome only by shooting, al-Awza’i and al-Layth say 

that shooting at them is not permissible, on the basis of the Quranic verse: ‘If it had not been 

for certain men believers and certain women believers whom you knew not, lest you should 

trample them, and there befall you guilt unwittingly on their account’ 

Referencing Al-Shafi’i 

Al-Fahd: Page 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, 21, 23 

“Al-Shafi’I said there was nothing wrong with setting fires in enemy territory and cutting 

down trees and crops.” 


104 

“Al-‘Ayni said in ‘Umdat al-Qari, 14:270: “Ibn ‘Umar’s hadith proves that Muslims may em- 








“Al-Shafi’I (Kitab al-Umm, 4:257): “If the enemy fortifies himself on a hill, by a stronghold, by 

entrenchment, or by scattering caltrops, or any kind of fortification, they may be bombarded 

with catapults, siege engines, fire, scorpions, snakes, and anything hateful to them. The fight- 

ers may divert water against them to drown them or so that they become bogged down in 

mud. All this may be done whether or not there are children, women, and monks with them, 

because the abode has not become immune by profession of Islam or treaty. Similarily, there 

is nothing wrong with burning their fruit trees and other trees and devastating their culti- 

vated land and any of their inanimate possessions.” 

“As for bombarding them with fire before taking them: if they can be taken without fire, one 

may not bombard them with it, because they fall under the category of those over whom one 

has power. However, if one is powerless against them without fire, one may do so, according 

to what most scholars hold. So said al-Thawri, al-Awza’I, and al-Shafi’i. The same holds for 

opening the floodgates against them to drown them: if they can be overcome without it, it is 

not permissible, since this involves annihilating women and children, whom it is forbidden 

to annihilate intentionally. However, if they cannot be overcome otherwise, it is permissible. 

Night raids that involve this are also permissible, and one may set up a catapult against them.” 

in al-Risalah, p.299: “In our view, and God alone knows best, the meaning of the prohibition 

of killing women and children is on intentionally seeking to kill them when they can be rec- 

ognized and distinguished from those who have been ordered to be killed. The meaning of 

the Prophet’s words, ‘They are of them,’ is that they unite two traits: they do not have the legal 

factor of faith, which spares one’s blood, nor do they live in an abode of faith, which prevents 

an attack on that abode.” 

They cannot be distinguished when they are hit by these weapons, and so the legal ruling is 


like the one that applies to night attacks, bombardment by catapult, and the like. Some schol- 

ars, cited in the preceding chapter, said that by analogy the ruling applicable to the catapult 

applies to anything else that causes general destruction. Al-Shafi’i, for example, said, “Judge 

analogously whatever belongs to the same category of causing general destruction.” 

Al-Shafi’I says: “We prefer al-Awza’I’s position if we have no compelling necessity to fight 

the people of the stronghold. Desisting from them if there are Muslims among them is more 

magnanimous and more likely to avoid harming the Muslims among them. However, if we 

have compelling necessity to fear for our lives if we desist from fighting them, we should fight 

them, but not intending to kill any Muslims. If we do harm any, we should make expiation. 

Whenever there is no such compelling necessity, desisting from fighting them is the safer 

course and preferable in my view.” 

“In the jihad to repel, it is unrestrictedly permitted if the enemy cannot be repelled other- 

wise. This ought to be a point of agreement among jurists. We have already cited the words 

of al-Shafi’i: “However, if we have compelling necessity to fear for our lives if we desist from 

fighting them, we should fight them, but not intending to kill any Muslims.” It is exactly like 

the question of using human shields, for scholars have agreed that infidels may be killed even 

if they use Muslims as shields, if there is compelling necessity. 

Zawahiri: Page 29, 32, 35, 103, 108, 110, 130, 131, 148, 157, 158, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 

170, 172, 177, 184, 185, 186 

“I say: “As for Ibn al-Arabi’s saying about al-Shafi’i, ‘Al-Shafi’i held our position’: if he meant 

prohibiting shooting at polytheists if they use Muslims as human shields—and I think that is 

what he meant, based on what he says afterward, i.e., ‘This is evident; for it is not permitted 

to reach a permitted end by forbidden means, especially by means of the life of a Muslim; 

and so there is no position except the one held by Malik (may God be pleased with him)’— 

then he is at variance with the facts. Al-Shafi’i in fact allowed shooting at polytheists if Mus- 

lims are mixed with them, whether they have taken them as human shields or not, as will be 

discussed later, God willing.”” 

“If he meant that al-Shafi’i made someone who shot a Muslim amid the polytheists liable to 

paying blood money, the fact is that al-Shafi’i (may God have mercy on him) distinguished in 

the matter between someone who shot and hit a Muslim unwittingly—he must perform ex- 

piation, but not pay blood money—but if he knew the person to be a Muslim and shot when 

he was forced to shoot, he is liable both to blood money and to expiation, as will be discussed 

later, God willing.” 


106 

C. The third position on the issue is that it is permissible to shoot at the non-believers, along 

with at any Muslims mixed in with them and any non-believers whose killing has been spe- 

cifically prohibited. 

Al-Shafi’i (may God have mercy on him) says: “Someone might object, saying, ‘How have you 

permitted bombardment by catapult and fire of a group of non-believers among whom there 

are children and women that it is prohibited to kill?’ The answer is that we have permitted 

it in the way we have described and because the prophet (may God bless him and grant him 

peace) launched an attack on the Banu al-Mustaliq, taking them by surprise, and ordering a 

night attack and burning, knowing all the while that there were children and women among 

them. The principle was that the tribe was a tribe of polytheism and not forbidden. 

“He only forbade intentionally killing women and children, when their killer knows them in- 

dividually. This is because of the report from the prophet (may God bless him and grant him 

peace) and that the prophet took them captive and made them property. He has written this 

before this. If there are Muslim captives or merchants with safe-conduct among the tribe, 

I dislike exposing them to the general burning and drowning, but I do not clearly forbid it. 

This is because if the tribe is a permissible target, it is not clear that it becomes prohibited 

by there being a Muslim whose blood is forbidden in it. I only dislike it as a precaution and 

because it is permitted to us, were there no Muslim in it, to pass it by and not fight it; and if 

we fight it, we fight it by means that are not all-encompassing, such as burning and drown- 

ing. However, if the Muslims or some of them are in close combat and they think that they 

can harm those fighting them by drowning or burning them, I think that they should do it 

and do not dislike it for them. That is because they receive two rewards: one for defending 

themselves, the other for harming their enemy not in close combat. So shield yourselves with 

the children of the polytheists. It has been said that they do not protect themselves and those 

of them that use a human shield are struck, but that the child is not intended. It has been 

said that one desists from the person being used as a shield. If they should use a Muslim as a 

shield, I think that one should desist from the person they are using as a shield, except if the 

Muslims are in close combat; then one does not desist from the person using the shield: one 

strikes at the polytheist and protects the Muslim as far as possible. If in any of these cases 

one strikes a Muslim, one frees a slave [as expiation].” 

Al-Shafi’i also says (may God have mercy on him): “If he shoots into enemy territory and hits 

a Muslim with a safe-conduct or captive, or an non-believer who has converted to Islam, and 


did not shoot at them intentionally and did not see them, he should free a slave [as expia- 

tion], but there is no blood money for the victim. However, if he saw the person, knew his 

status, and shot being forced to do so, and killed him, he must pay blood money and per- 

form expiation. If he shot intentionally, knowing the person to be a Muslim, he is subject to 

retribution (qasas) if he shot him without necessity or error and intended to kill him. If an 

non-believer uses the person as a human shield and he knows him to be a Muslim and the 

man grapples with him, so that he thinks he can save himself only by striking the Muslim, 

he should strike him intending to kill the non-believer. If he strikes the Muslim, we shield 

him from retribution, but impose blood money on him. All of this is if he is in the land of 

non-believers or in their ranks. However, if he frees himself from the non-believers and is 

between the lines of the Muslims and the non-believers, that is a place where there might 

be Muslims and non-believers. So if a man kills a man and says, ‘I thought he was an non- 

believer, but then I found him to be a Muslim,’ this was the result of error. He pays a fine for 

bloodshed (‘aql); if the man’s next-of-kin are suspicious, he swears to them that he did not 

know he was a Muslim when he killed him.” 

Al-Shafi’i also says (may God have mercy on him): “If the enemy shuts up women, children, 

and captives in their forts, should the forts be bombarded by catapults?” 

“The answer is that if there are women, children, and Muslim captives in the fort, it is not 

wrong to set up the catapult against the fort, to the exclusion of the houses in which there 

are residents. However, if the Muslims grapple close to the fort, it is not wrong to shoot at 

its houses and walls. If there are fighters entrenched in the fort, the houses and the fort are 

shot at. If they shield themselves with Muslim or non-Muslim children and the Muslims 

are in close combat, it is not wrong to target the fighters to the exclusion of the Muslims and 

children. If they are not in close combat, I would prefer that he desist from them until he can 

fight them when they are not using human shields. It is similar if they bring them out and 

say, ‘If you shoot at us and fight us, we will kill them.’ Naphtha and fire are like the catapult, 

and likewise water and smoke.” 

“Chapter: The ruling is similar regarding opening the floodgates on them to drown them: if 

they can be overcome in another way, it is not permissible—if that entails the destruction of 

women and children, whose intentional destruction is forbidden. If they can be overcome 

only in that way, it is permissible, as night attacks entailing the same things are permis- 

sible, and it is permissible to erect a catapult against them. The plain sense of Ahmad [Ibn 

Hanbal] is that it is permissible when need is present and when it is absent. This is because 


108 

the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) erected a catapult against the people 

of al-Ta’if. Among those who hold this opinion are al-Thawri, al-Awza’i, al-Shafi’i, and the 

masters of opinion. Ibn al-Mundhir said that a tradition from the prophet states that he set 

up a catapult against the people of al-Ta’if and one from Amr Ibn al-As states that he set up a 

catapult against the people of Alexandria. Also: because fighting by such means is customary 

and like shooting arrows.” 

Al-Layth said that abstaining from the conquest of a fort that could be conquered was better 

than wrongly killing a Muslim. Al-Awza’i said: ‘How are they to shoot when they do not see? 

They would only be shooting at the children of Muslims.’ Al-Qadi and al-Shafi’i said that they 

may be shot at when the war is ongoing, because not doing so would lead to halting jihad. 

Two texts are offered in support of this view, that if he kills a Muslim, he is liable to expiation 

and blood money. 














The Imam al-Qurtubi (may God have mercy on him) said: “Scholars differ regarding 

someone who destroys or spoils any animals or wares that have not been measured or 

weighed. Al-Shafi’i, Abu Hanifah, their colleagues, and one group of scholars say that the 

person is liable to the like, and one does not turn toward the value except in the absence 

of the like. This is because God has said: ‘Whoso commits aggression against you, do you 

commit aggression against him like as he has committed against you’ [Quranic verse; al- 

Baqarah 2:194]. And also: ‘And if you chastise, chastise even as you have been chastised’ 

[Quranic verse; al-Nahl 16:126-127]. 


Ibn Taymiyyah (may God have mercy on him) has said: “For this reason, scholars have 

agreed on the permissibility of destroying trees and crops belonging to the non-believers if 

they have done the same to us or if they can be overcome only by these means. About its 

permissibility short of such circumstances there is a well-known controversy. There are two 

accounts related on the authority of Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal]. Permitting it is the doctrine of 

al-Shafi’i and others.” 

Al-Shafi’i (may God have mercy on him) said: “Someone might object, saying, ‘How have 

you permitted bombardment by catapult and fire of a group of non-believers among whom 

there are children and women that it is prohibited to kill?’ The answer is that we have permit- 

ted it in the way we have described and because the prophet (may God bless him and grant 

him peace) launched an attack on the Banu al-Mustaliq, taking them by surprise, and order- 

ing a night attack and burning, knowing all the while that there were children and women 

among them. The principle was that the tribe was a tribe of polytheism and not forbidden. 

“He only forbade intentionally killing women and children, when their killer knows them in- 

dividually. This is because of the report from the prophet (may God bless him and grant him 

peace) and that the prophet took them captive and made them property. This has been writ- 

ten previously. If there are Muslim captives or merchants with safe-conduct among the tribe, 

I dislike exposing them to the general burning and drowning, but I do not clearly forbid it. 

This is because if the tribe is permissible, it is not clear that it becomes prohibited by there 

being a Muslim whose blood is forbidden in it. I only dislike it as a precaution and because it 

is permitted to us, were there no Muslim in it, to pass it by and not fight it; and if we fight it, 

we fight it by means that are not all-encompassing, such as burning and drowning. However, 

if the Muslims or some of them are in close combat and they think that they can harm those 

fighting them by drowning or burning them, I think that they should do it and do not dis- 

like it for them. That is because they receive two rewards: one for defending themselves, the 

other for harming their enemy.” 

Referencing Ishaq 

Al-Fahd: Page 10, 11, 20, 22 

“Ishaq said that setting fire was Sunnah if it would cause damage to them.” 




110 




devastated, and their cattle slaughtered or hamstrung if they could not be dislodged.” This 

hadith is clear in its indication that setting fire to enemy territory is permissible if the fighting 

requires it.” 

Ibn Ishaq transmits a report that when The Messenger of God then cut down their date- 

palms and set fires. When they saw the date-palms being cut down and burned, they cried 

out: “Muhammad, you used to prohibit corruption! How can you cut down and burn date- 

palms?” God then revealed the verse, “Whatever palm-trees you cut down…” (Quran 59:5).” 

Al Jassas said (Akham al-Qur’an, 3:589): “As for the argument of those who cite the verse, “If 

it had not been for certain men believers and certain women believers…’ (Quran 48:25), as 

ground for prohibiting bombarding the infidels because of the Muslims in their midst, the 

verse cannot be used to prove the point of contention. That is because the most the verse says 

is that God turned Muslims away from them because among them were some Muslims that 

the Prophet’s companions were in danger of harming if they entered Mecca with the sword. 

This only proves that it is permitted to eschew bombarding them and advancing on them. It 

does not prove that it is forbidden to advance against them with the knowledge that there are 

Muslims among them. It might permit desisting from them for the sake of the Muslims, and 

it also might permit advancing as an option. Thus it contains no proof that advancing is for- 

bidden. “Someone might say that the import of the verse implies prohibition, because it says, 

‘Whom you knew not, lest you should trample them, and there befall you guilt unwittingly 

on their account,’ and, but for the prohibition no guilt of murdering them by striking them 

would have befallen them. The reply is that interpreters have differed over the meaning of 

‘guilt (ma’arrah)’ here. Ibn Ishaq interpreted it as meaning the fine of blood money (diyah); 

others interpreted it as meaning expiation (kaffarah); others interpreted it as grief (ghamm) 

at having occasioned a Muslim’s death, because a believer would be grieved at this even if he 

had not done it intentionally. Others interpreted it as meaning disgrace (‘ayb). One inter- 

preter is reported to have said that ma’arrah meant sin (ithm), but this is false, because God 

said that it had happened, it would have happened without our knowledge: ‘Whom you knew 

not, lest you should trample them, and there befall you ma’arrah unwittingly or their account, 

and one incurs no sin for what one does not know and of which God has given no indication. 

For God says ‘There is no fault in you if you make mistakes, but only in what your hearts 

premedidate.’ (Quran 33:5). Thus we know that ma’arrah does not mean sin…” 


Zawahiri: Page 159, 170 

“As for the argument of those who cite the verse, ‘If it had not been for certain men believers 

and certain women believers whom you knew not, lest you should trample them…’ [Quranic 

verse; Al-Fath 48:25] as prohibiting shooting at non-believers for the sake of the Muslims 

among them, the verse contains no evidence regarding the point at issue. The most that it 

says is that God restrained the Muslims from them because there were Muslims among them 

whom the Companions of the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) feared they 

would smite if they entered Mecca by the sword. This merely shows that it is permissible to 

abstain from shooting and attacking them, given that one knows the presence of Muslims 

among them. It is permissible to allow desisting from them for the sake of the Muslims, and 

it is also permissible to allow attacking as an option. Therefore, there is no indication in the 

verse of a prohibition of an attack. Someone might argue that something in the tenor of the 

verse indicates prohibition, namely the words, ‘Whom you knew not, lest you should trample 

them, and there befall you guilt unwittingly on their account.’ Were it not for the prohibi- 

tion, no guilt would have befallen them from killing them by hitting them. The reply to him 

is that the commentators have disagreed about the meaning of ‘guilt’ (ma’arrah) here. “Ibn 

Ishaq is reported to have said that ma’arrah means the payment of blood money. Someone 

else said it means expiation. A third person said it means grief because of the slaying of a 

Muslim at his hands, as a believer will be grieved by this, even if he did not intend it. Oth- 

ers said it means shame. Someone is reported to have said that ma’arrah means sin, but that 

must be false, since God says, ‘Whom you knew not, lest you should trample them, and there 

befall you ma’arrah unwittingly on their account,’ and no sin is incurred where there is no 

knowledge—God never indicated that. God has said, ‘There is no fault in you if you make 

mistakes, but only in what your hearts premeditate’ [Quranic verse; al-Ahzab 33:5]. Thus we 

learn that He did not mean sin.” 








He might degrade the ungodly’ [Quranic verse; al-Hashr 59:5]. 


112 






Referencing Al-Hafiz ibn Hajar al-Asqalani / al-Askalani 


Al-Hafiz [Ibn Hajar] commented as on the hadith of Ibn ‘Umar in Fath al-Bari, 6:155, as 

follows: “The great mass of scholars held the view that burning and devastating are permis- 

sible in enemy territory. Those who held it reprehensible were al-Awza’I, al-Layth, and Abu 

Thawr. They argued from Abu Bakr’s instructions to his armies not to do anything of the 

sort. Al-Tabari replied that the prohibition should be taken to mean intent to do so, not if 

such damage was done in the course of fighting, as happened when the catapult was used 

against al-Ta’if. He replied similarily about the prohibition on killing women and children. 

Most Scholars held the same view, including death by drowning. Another scholar said that 

Abu Bakr prohibited his armies from doing these things because he knew that these coun- 

tries would be conquered, so he wanted to preserve for the Muslims. Only God knows which 

view is correct.” 

Al-Shawkani (Nayl al-Awtar, 8:78): Having cited a series of hadiths, including the aforemen- 

tioned hadith of Ibn ‘Umar, he says: “In these hadiths there is proof that burning is permitted 

in enemy territory, as al-Hafiz [Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani] said in Fath al-Bari.” He cites approv- 

ingly the passage mentioned above, and then says, “It is obvious that what was done by Abu 

Bakr is not sufficient to invalidate what the Prophet is known to have done, since by agree- 

ment the words of a companion are not a conclusive argument [against the Prophet].” 

Zawahiri: Page 134, 135, 140, 143, 167, 177, 205 

Ibn Hajar (may God have mercy on him) says: “The word bayat, as used in the Hadith, means 

that the non-believers are attacked at night, so that one cannot distinguished among them as 

individuals.” 

“The phrase, ‘They are of them,’ means that it is so in that case. It does not mean that they 

may be killed by aiming at them; the meaning is that if the parents can be reached only by 


trampling the children, who, if hit, are hit because they were mixed with the former, the latter 

may be killed.” 

Ibn Hajar (may God have mercy on him) said: “One of the lessons to be derived from this Ha- 

dith… is that equivalence in retaliation is not the kind of mutilation that has been forbidden.” 

Referencing Al-Layth 













Zawahiri: Page 78, 161, 166, 170, 183, 185 

However, if necessity calls for shooting at them because of fear for the Muslims, shooting at 

them is permissible because it is a case of necessity and so the non-believers are targeted. If 

there is no fear for the Muslims, but the enemy can be overcome only by shooting, al-Awza’i 

and al-Layth say that shooting at them is not permissible, on the basis of the Quranic verse: 

‘If it had not been for certain men believers and certain women believers whom you knew 

not, lest you should trample them, and there befall you guilt unwittingly on their account…’ 

[Quranic verse; Al-Fath 48:25]. Al-Layth said that abstaining from the conquest of a fort that 

could be conquered was better than wrongly killing a Muslim. Al-Awza’i said: ‘How are they 

to shoot when they do not see? They would only be shooting at the children of Muslims.’ Al- 

Qadi and al-Shafi’i said that they may be shot at when the war is ongoing, because not doing 

so would lead to halting jihad. Two texts are offered in support of this view, that if he kills a 

Muslim, he is liable to expiation and blood money. 


114 








He might degrade the ungodly’ [Quranic verse; al-Hashr 59:5]. “In this Hadith there is per- 

mission to cut down and burn the trees of the non-believers. This was held by Abd-al-Rah- 

man Ibn al-Qasim, Nafi’ the mawla of Ibn Umar, Malik, al-Thawri, Abu Hanifah, al-Shafi’i, 

Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal], Ishaq, and the great majority. However, there is a tradition from Abu 

Bakr al-Siddiq, al-Layth Ibn Sa’d, Abu Thawr, and al-Awza’i (may God be pleased with him) 

that it is not permitted.” 

Ibn Qudamah also said: “Chapter: If they take a Muslim as a shield and necessity does not 




if necessity calls for shooting at them because of fear for the Muslims, shooting at them 

is permissible because it is a case of necessity and the non-believers are targeted. If there 

is no fear for the Muslims, but the enemy can be overcome only by shooting, al-Awza’i 

and al-Layth say that shooting at them is not permissible, on the basis of the Quranic 

verse: ‘If it had not been for certain men believers and certain women believers whom you 

knew not, lest you should trample them, and there befall you guilt unwittingly on their 

account’[Quranic verse; Al-Fath 48:25]. 

Al-Layth said that abstaining from the conquest of a fort that could be conquered was better 

than wrongly killing a Muslim. Al-Awza’i said: ‘How are they to shoot when they do not see? 

They would only be shooting at the children of Muslims.’ Al-Qadi and al-Shafi’i said that they 

may be shot at when the war is ongoing, because not doing so would lead to halting jihad.” 

Referencing Abu Thawr 














Al-San’ani (Subl al-Salam, 4:51): From Ibn ‘Umar, a Companion of the Prophet: “The Mes- 

senger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, burned and cut the d ate-palms of 

the Banu al-Nadir.’ The hadith is generally accepted. It proves thatit is permitted to spoil 

the possessions of belligerents by burning and cutting for a benefit. The following Quranic 

verse was revealed regarding this: “Whatever palm-trees you cut down…’ (Quran 59:5). The 

polytheists said, ‘You prohibit corruption in the earth. What about cutting down and burn- 

ing trees?’ The majority have held that it is permitted to burn and despoil in enemy territory. 

Al-Awza’I and Abu Thawr considered it reprehensible, arguing that Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s 

companion, ordered his armies not to do it. The response is that he saw benefit in their 

remaining because he knew that they would become the Muslims’, so he wanted them to 

remain for them, thus it depends on the perception of benefit. 


“3288: Yahya Ibn Yahya and Muhammad Ibn Rumh reported to us that they had been told by 

al-Layth; and Qutaybah Ibn Sa’id reported to us that al-Layth also reported to him from Nafi’, 

who had it from Abdallah, that the messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him 

peace) set fire to the date palms of the Banu al-Nadir at al-Buwayrah and cut them down. 

Qutaybah and Ibn Rumh added in their report that God revealed the following verse on this 

occasion: ‘Whatever palm-tress you cut down, or left standing upon their roots, that was by 

God’s leave, and that He might degrade the ungodly’ [Quranic verse; al-Hashr 59:5]. 







116 

Referencing Al-Ayni 











Regarding his saying, “by erecting catapults,” i.e., it is against their forts because the prophet 

erected them against Al-Ta’if. Al-Tirmidhi transmitted this. The word majaniq (catapults) 

is the plural of manjaniq (so vocalized by most), which is a loan-word from Persian, some- 

times treated as masculine, but better as feminine. It is a device for hurling large stones. It 

is no longer used today as it is not needed because of modern cannons. His words, “burning 

them,” refer to burning their homes and possessions. Al-Ayni said: “The outward sense is 

burning their persons by means of catapults. Now if it is licit to make war on them by burn- 

ing them, their possessions can be burnt with greater reason.” 

Referencing Malik 











“Ibn al-‘Arabi (ahkam al-Qur’an, 4:176): “Authorities have differed about devastating and 

burning enemy territory and cutting down their crops. There are two opinions. The first is 

that it is permissible, [Malik] said so in al-Mudawwanah. The second is that the Muslims 

know that these things will be theirs, they do not do it; if they have no such hope, they do 

it. [Malik] said this in al-Wadihah, and the Shafi’is dispute with him about this. The correct 

opinion is the first. The Messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, knew 

that the date-palms of the Banu al-Nadir would be his, yet he cut them down and burned 

them so as to damage and weaken the Banu al-Nadir and induce them to depart. Destroying 

some property for the sake of rest is permitted by religious law and approved by reason.” 

“Al-Mawwaq (Al-Taj wa-al-Iklil, 4:544): “By cutting off water and by a machine.’ Ibn al- 

Qasim said [this means] that there is nothing wrong with bombarding their strongholds by 

means of the catapult and cutting off their provisions and water, even if there are Muslims 

and children among them. Ashhab also said this. [Malik] said in al-Mudawwanah that there 

is nothing wrong with burning their villages and strongholds, flooding them with water, 

plundering them, cutting down fruit trees, and so forth, because God has said, ‘Neither tread 

they any tread enraging the unbelievers, nor gain any gain from any enemy, but a righteous 

deed is thereby written to their account.’ (Quran 9:120). The Prophet cut down and burned 

the date-palms of the Banu al-Nadir.” 

Zawahiri: Page 108, 156, 157, 158, 166, 167, 170, 172, 191, 207, 211, 244 

Chapter Eight: The Legal Judgment on Shooting at Non-Believers if Muslims or Persons Who 

May Not Be Killed Are Mixed With Them 

A. The first position is to forbid shooting at the non-believers if Muslims are mixed with 

them. This position is reported to have been that of Malik and al-Awza’i, though later mem- 

bers of the Maliki school disagreed, as will be seen later, God willing. 

“Abu Zayd said, ‘I asked Ibn al-Qasim what his opinion would be if the people of Islam be- 

sieged some polytheists in a fort of theirs while they were holding Muslim captives—should 

this fort be burned or not?’ He said: ‘I heard Malik when he was asked about some non- 

believers in their boats, whether we should hurl fire at their boats when they had captives on 


118 

board with them. Malik said that he did not think it was right to do so, on the basis of God’s 

word regarding the people of Mecca: ‘Had they been separated clearly, then We would have 

chastised the non-believers among them with a painful chastisement.’ 

“Malik also said: ‘We had besieged the city of the Greeks and cut off their water. They would 

send down captives to draw water for them, and no one could shoot arrows at them. So wa- 

ter reached them without our choice.’ 

“Al-Shafi’i held our position. This is evident; for it is not permitted to reach a permitted end by 

forbidden means, especially by means of the life of a Muslim; and so there is no position except 

the one held by Malik (may God be pleased with him). And God is most knowledgeable.” 

“As for Ibn al-Arabi’s saying about al-Shafi’i, ‘Al-Shafi’i held our position’: if he meant prohib- 

iting shooting at polytheists if they use Muslims as human shields—and I think that is what 

he meant, based on what he says afterward, i.e., ‘This is evident; for it is not permitted to 

reach a permitted end by forbidden means, especially by means of the life of a Muslim; and 

so there is no position except the one held by Malik (may God be pleased with him)’—then 

he is at variance with the facts. Al-Shafi’i in fact allowed shooting at polytheists if Muslims 

are mixed with them, whether they have taken them as human shields or not, as will be dis- 

cussed later, God willing.” 

In what he says, Al-Qurtubi was trying to reconcile allowing shooting at the human shield 

and the argument of Imam Malik. He therefore set severe restrictions that I do not think can 

be met in reality: one of these being that if the non-believers are not shot at, they will kill the 

human shield and take control of the whole nation! 

Having cited the scholarly positions available to us from the various legal schools on the 

question of shooting at non-believers when they are mixed with Muslims or when they take 

them as human shields or take as shields people who may not be killed, such as women, chil- 

dren, protected minorities (dhimmis), or people with safe-conduct, we say in summary: 

The jurists’ positions can be divided into three: 

A. Prohibition: This is the position cited from Malik and al-Awza’i. 

B. Unconditional permission, with cancellation of blood money and expiation: This is the 


position of the Hanafis and the later Malikis who agree with them. 

C. Distinction: This is the position of the Shafi’is and Hanbalis. They do not prohibit shoot- 

ing, as long as there is necessity or need for the Muslims to do so. Muslims are not aimed at 

except in cases of necessity, because omitting to do so would lead to halting the jihad. They 

disagree about any Muslims killed, whether the slayer has no liability, whether he is liable 

for blood money along with expiation, or whether he is liable for expiation only, as we have 

mentioned. And God is most knowing! 

Al-Nawawi says: “Its implied meaning: He was asked about the rule governing the children of 

nonbelievers who are attacked while they are spending the night, and so some of their wom- 

en and children are mortally wounded. He said that the children belong to their parents; in 

other words, there is nothing wrong with doing so. The legal status of their parents applies to 

them in inheritance, marriage, retaliation, bloodwit, and other matters. The meaning also is 

if they are not intentionally targeted without necessity. 

“As for the previous Hadith, concerning the prohibition on killing women and children, the 

intention is if they can be distinguished. This Hadith that we have just mentioned, concern- 

ing the permissibility of attacking them by night and killing women and children in the night 

raid, is our doctrine and the doctrine of Malik, Abu Hanifah, and the majority. 















120 

“They said that this is a general rule in all things. They supported it by the fact that the 

prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) confined the broken bowl to the tent of 

the woman who broke it and handed over the whole one, saying, ‘Vessel for vessel, and food 

for food.’ The tradition is included by Abu Dawud. 

“Malik and his colleagues say that in the case of animals or wares that have not been mea- 

sured or weighed, the person is liable for the value, not for the replacement. 

“There is no disagreement among the scholars that this verse is the basic rule with regard to 

similarity in matters of retribution. For example, someone who murders with something is 

killed by the same thing by means of which he murdered. This is the opinion of the great 

majority—unless he murdered his victim by means of such depravity as homosexual inter- 

course or giving alcohol to drink, in which case he is killed by the sword. 

“The position of the Shafi’is is that he is to be killed in the same way. A stick of the same de- 

scription is taken and driven up his anus until he dies, or he is make to drink wine until he dies.” 

It is here that many scholars prohibit the killing of Muslim human shields along with non- 

believers, except in case of necessity maintained by unquestionable fear of eradication of 

Muslims at large and not merely out of necessity or benefit. Of the scholars who strictly en- 

dorsed this is Imam Malik [Imam Malik Ibn Anas, one of the most highly respected scholars 

of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam], may God have mercy on him. 

Referencing Al-Thawri 


























Zawahiri: Page 157, 165, 170 

“Abu Hanifah, his colleagues, and Al-Thawri permitted shooting into the forts of polytheists 

even if there were Muslim prisoners and their children among them. Even if an non-believer 

uses a Muslim child to shield himself, the polytheist is shot at; and if a Muslim is hit, there is 

no blood money or expiation for him.” 

“Al-Thawri said that there is expiation, but not blood money.” 

“Al-Shafi’i held our position. This is evident; for it is not permitted to reach a permitted end by 

forbidden means, especially by means of the life of a Muslim; and so there is no position except 

the one held by Malik (may God be pleased with him). And God is most knowledgeable.” 

Ibn Qudamah the Hanbali (may God have mercy on him) said: “Chapter: The ruling is simi- 










122 











He might degrade the ungodly’[Quranic verse; al-Hashr 59:5]. 






Referencing Ibn al-Qasim 


“Al-‘Ayni said in ‘Umdat al-Qari, 14:270: “Ibn ‘Umar’s hadith proves that Muslims may 

employ any stratagems that will sap their polytheist enemy’s strength, weaken their cun- 

ning, and facilitate victory over them. They may cut down their crops, divert their water, and 

besiege them. Those permitted this were the Kufans, Malik, al-Sahfi’I, Ahmad [ibn Hanbal], 

Ishaq, al-Thawri, and Ibn al-Qasim. The Kufans said that their trees could be cut down, their 

lands devastated, and their cattle slaughtered or hamstrung if they could not be dislodged.” 



“Al-Mawwaq (Al-Taj wa-al-Iklil, 4:544): “By cutting off water and by a machine.’ Ibn al- 

Qasim said [this means] that there is nothing wrong w ith bombarding their strongholds by 

means of the catapult and cutting off their provisions and water, even if there are Muslims 

and children among them. Ashhab also said this. [Malik] said in al-Mudawwanah that there 

is nothing wrong with burning their villages and strongholds, flooding them with water, 


plundering them, cutting down fruit trees, and so forth, because God has said, ‘Neither tread 

they any tread enraging the unbelievers, nor gain any gain from any enemy, but a righteous 

deed is thereby written to their account.’ (Quran 9:120). The Prophet cut down and burned 

the date-palms of the Banu al-Nadir.” 

Zawahiri: Page 38, 39, 41, 156, 170 

Second: Muslim commanders used catapults in their wars with the infidels. It is known that 

a catapult cannot differentiate among those whom it hits. It might hit those so-called in- 

nocent people. Yet the Muslim custom in their wars was to use catapults. They used them 

against Al-Ta’if ’s inhabitants. 

Ibn-Qudamah, may he rest in peace, said: Using catapults is permitted because the prophet, 

may God’s prayers and peace be upon him, used catapults against Al-Ta’if ’s inhabitants and 

Amru Bin-al-As used catapults against the people of Alexandria. Ibn-Qasim says in his 

commentary: It is permitted to use catapults against the infidels even if young boys, women, 

old people, and monks are killed along with the others because it is permitted to attack them 

collectively. Ibn-Rushud, may he rest in peace, said: Collective attacks against all types of 

idolaters are permitted. 

Third: Muslim jurists permitted killing Muslims used as human shields by the enemy af- 

ter they fall captive into the infidels’ hands. If the infidels use Muslim captives to protect 

themselves from the Muslims’ arrows, they may be killed although they are faultless. Ibn- 

Taymiyyah, may he rest in peace, said: The ulema have agreed that if the infidel army uses 

captive Muslims as human shields and there is fear for the Muslims’ lives if they do not fight, 

they should attack even if this leads to killing the human shields. Ibn-Qasim, may he rest in 

peace, said: If they use a Muslim as a human shield, it is not permitted to fire arrows at them 

unless we fear for the Muslim army’s safety. 

“Abu Zayd said, ‘I asked Ibn al-Qasim what his opinion would be if the people of Islam be- 

sieged some polytheists in a fort of theirs while they were holding Muslim captives—should 

this fort be burned or not?’ He said: ‘I heard Malik when he was asked about some non- 

believers in their boats, whether we should hurl fire at their boats when they had captives on 

board with them. Malik said that he did not think it was right to do so, on the basis of God’s 

word regarding the people of Mecca: ‘Had they been separated clearly, then We would have 

chastised the non-believers among them with a painful chastisement.’ 


124 

“Similarly, if an non-believer uses a Muslim as a human shield, it is not permissible to shoot 

at him. If someone does so and annihilates a Muslim, he must pay blood money(diyah) and 

perform expiation (kaffarah). If the person did not know, he is liable neither to blood money 

nor to expiation. If they knew, they should not have shot; and if they did, they became unin- 

tentional homicides, and their fellow tribesmen (aqilah) became liable for the blood money. 

However, if they did not know, they could shoot; and if they permitted the deed, it is not 

allowed for consequence of it to remain against them. 














Referencing Amr Ibn al-As 


“Al-Bayhaqi and others relate that ‘Amr ibn al-‘As, a Companion of the Prophet, set up a cata- 

pult to attack the people of Alexandria.” 

“He also said (Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, 1:623): “’Also,’ it is permitted ‘to bombard them’ viz., 

the infidels, ‘with a catapult.’ This is explicit, because the Prophet ‘set up a catapult against al- 

Ta’if.’ The report is transmitted by al-Tirmidhi with a gap in the chain of transmission. Also, 

‘Amr ibn al-‘As set up catapults against Alexandria. The plain sense of the words of Ahmad 

[ibn Hanbal’ is that it is permissible both when there is need and when there is not. ‘Also’ 

it is permissible to bombard them ‘with fire, and’ it is permissible ‘to cut off the road,’ i.e., 

the highway, ‘and’ cut off ‘water’ from them, ‘or open it to drown them. And’ it is permitted 


‘to destroy their cultivated land,’ even if it includes annihilating some women and children, 

because it falls under the same rule as night raids.” 

Zawahiri: Page 39, 124, 165, 208, 210 



Amru Bin-al-As used catapults against the people of Alexandria. Ibn-Qasim says in his 



collectively. Ibn-Rushud, may he rest in peace, said: c collective attacks against all types of 














Public opinion varied between permitting killing and restraining it according to necessity, as 

I explained in detail in Chapter Eight. 

b. Public opinion did not confine the killing of human shields to jihad of defense but permit- 

ted it in all operations of jihad, and drew upon the Sunnah of the prophet, prayers and peace 

be upon him, in his exasperated labor against the people of Al-Ta’if and his brigades which 

raided the non-believers, among whom were women and children. The prophet, prayers and 

peace of God be upon him, and his companions were not, in these cases in jihad of defense, 

yet the siege of Al-Ta’if was after the conquest of Mecca. Ibn Qudamah [Al-Maqdisi - Islamic 

scholar of the Hanbali madhhab] said in Al-Mughni [a well-known Hanbali book of fiqh] 

that Amr Ibn al-’As [Muslim conqueror of Egypt in 641-642 Hijri] had installed the catapult 

against the people of Alexandria [Egypt].266 This was jihad al-talab [jihad of oppression]. 


126 

The second aspect: Muslim leaders used catapults in fighting the non-believers. It is known 

that catapults if used, do not differentiate between one fighter and the other. They can strike 

those who are called innocent; nevertheless, the Muslim tradition was that it was used in 

wars. Ibn Qudamah, may God have mercy upon him, said: Using catapults is permissible 

because the prophet, prayers and peace of God be upon him, used them against the people 

of Al-Ta’if and Amr Ibn al-As used them against the people of Alexandria (Al-Mughni and 

Al-Sharh 10/503). Ibn Qassim, may God have mercy upon him, said in Al-Hashiyyah: ‘It 

is permissible to use catapults against the non-believers even if children, women, old men 

and monks are killed inadvertently, because crushing the enemy is allowed according to the 

consensus of the scholars. [Abu al Walid Mohammad] Ibn Rushud [Muslim scholar, philoso- 

pher and physician of 12th century Al-Andalus], said: “Crushing the enemy is permissible 

according to the consensus of scholars and against any type of polytheist” (Al-Hashiyah ala’ 

Ar-Raudh, vol. 4, p 271). 

Referencing Al-Sarakhsi 


“Al-Sarakhsi, citing Muhammad ibn al-Hasan [al-Shaybani] (Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir, 4:1467): 

“He said that there was nothing wrong with the Muslims’ burning the polytheists strongholds 

or flooding them with wáter; setting up catapults against them; cutting off their water; or put- 

ting blood, dung, or poison in their water to befoul it for them. This is because we have been 

commanded to subdue them and break their strength. All these things are military tactics 

that will cause their strength to break; they derive from obedience, not disobedience to what 

has been commanded. Furthermore, all these things damage the enemy, which is a cause 

for the acquisition of reward. God has said, ‘Nor gain they from any enemy, but a righteous 

deed is thereby written to their account.’ (Quran 9:120). One abstains from none of this 

while there are Muslim prisoners of war or Muslims with a safe-conduct, young or old, men 

or women, among them, even if we know about it; for there is no way to avoid striking them 

while still obeying the commandment to subdue the polytheists. What cannot be avoided, 

must be pardoned.” 

“Al-Sarakhsi (al-Mabsut, 10:65): “There is nothing wrong with releasing water into the en- 

emy’s city, burning them with fire, or bombarding them with the catapult, even if there are 

children or Muslim prisoners of war or traders among them.” 


Zawahiri: Page 149, 161 

“The prophet was asked about this” (he transmitted this in al-Nahr from Abu al-Layth) i.e. in 

our saying to him, “Shall we shoot or not,” and we follow what he says. He did not mention 

if it is not possible to ask him. “Any of them who are hit”: i.e., if we aim at the non-believers 

and hit one of the Muslims whom the non-believers are using as a human shield, we are not 

liable for him. Al-Sarakhsi says that credence is given to the shooter’s oath that he aimed for 

the nonbeliever, not to the slain Muslim’s next-of-kin that killed him intentionally. “Because 

duties are not coupled with fines,” it is as if someone subject to the prescribed punishment of 

scourging or amputation were to die. 

Referencing Al-Kasani 


Al-Kasani (Badayi’ al-Sanayi;, 7:101): “There is nothing wrong with burning their strong- 

holds, flooding them with wáter, devasting them and destroying them on top of them, or 

setting up a catapult against them. God has said ‘They destroy their houses with their own 

hands, and the hands of the believers.’ (Quran 59:2). All of this belongs to war, with its 

implicit overcoming, subduing, and enraging of the enemy. The immunity of possessions 

derives from the immunity of their possessors, and the latter have no immunity even from 

death. How then could their possessions be immune?” 

Zawahiri: Page 106, 168, 170, 171, 186 

Imam Al-Kasani said: “If general mobilization is declared after an enemy attacks the country, 

then it becomes the individual duty of every single able-bodied Muslim to join the battle, 

based on God Almighty’s command: ‘Go ye forth, whether lightly or heavily equipped’ 

[Quranic verse; the Repentance 9:41]. The Muslims used to say, I joined the battle in re- 

sponse to the general call.” 

The Imam al-Kasani (may God have mercy on him) said: “There is nothing wrong with raid- 

ing them and attacking them by night.” 

The Imam al-Kasani (may God have mercy on him) said: “There is nothing wrong with 

cutting down their fruit trees and other trees and ruining their crops, based on the Quranic 

verse: ‘Whatever palm-tress you cut down, or left standing upon their roots, that was by 

God’s leave, and that He might degrade the ungodly’ [Quranic verse; al-Hashr 59:5]. At the 


128 

beginning of the verse, God gives permission to cut down the palm trees; at the end of it He 

indicates that this is to crush and demoralize the enemy—‘that He might degrade the ungodly.’ 

“There is nothing wrong with burning their forts with fire or drowning them with water, with 

destroying them and razing them on top of them, or with erecting a catapult against them. 

God has said, ‘As they destroyed their houses with their own hands, and the hands of the be- 

lievers’ [Quranic verse; al-Hashr 59:2]. All of this falls under the heading of fighting, because 

of the compulsion, crushing, and demoralization in it. The inviolability of property derives 

from the inviolability of its owners; when the owners have no inviolability and can be killed, 

how much more so their property! There is nothing wrong with shooting them with arrows, 

even if Muslim prisoners and merchants are known to be among them, due to necessity; for 

rarely are the forts of non-believers devoid of Muslim captives or merchants. Giving consid- 

eration to them would lead to closing the door of jihad. However, in all this one targets the 

non-believers, not the Muslims, because there is no necessity for intending to kill Muslims 

wrongfully. 

“Likewise, if they use Muslim children as human shields, there is nothing wrong with shoot- 

ing at them, because of the necessity of carrying out one’s religious duty, but one aims at the 

non-believers, rather than the children. If they shoot at them and a Muslim is hit, there is 

neither blood money nor expiation.” 

(Same 3 paragraphs above quoted again several pages later) 

Referencing Ibn Qudamah 


















Zawahiri: Page 28, 39, 40, 108, 131, 152, 165, 166, 168, 169, 185, 186, 208, 210, 211 



Amru Bin-al-As used catapults against the people of Alexandria. Ibn- Qasim says in his 



collectively. Ibn-Rushud, may he rest in peace, said: Collective attacks against all types of 


What do you mean by innocent people? They come in three classes: First class: They might 

be those who do not fight alongside the countries they live in and do not help them with 

their persons, wealth, counsel, or other types of assistance. These may not be killed but on 

condition that they hold themselves separately from the others. If they are not separated 

from the others, it is permitted to kill them including old people, women, young boys, sick 

persons, incapacitated persons, and unworldly monks. Ibn-Qudamah said: Women and chil- 

dren may be killed during a night raid on condition that they are not killed intentionally and 

separately. It is permitted to kill their riding animals and livestock if this helps the Muslims 

to kill them. There is no disagreement on this point. He added: It is permitted to carry out 

a night raid on the enemy. Ibn-Hanbal said night raids were permitted especially against the 

Byzantines. We will not discourage anyone from carrying out night raids. 

Second class: Some do not go forth in their own persons to fight alongside their belligerent 

countries but they assist them with money or counsel. These are not called innocent persons 

because they support the troops. Ibn-Abd-al-Birr, may he rest in peace, said: The ulema 

never disagreed that the Muslims are permitted to kill women and children if they fight and 

also young boys able to fight and who do so. Ibn-Qudamah reported a consensus among the 

ulema that it is permitted to kill women, young boys, and the old and infirm if they help their 

people in battle. Ibn-Abd-al-Birr said: They all recounted that the prophet killed Durayd 

Bin-al-Sammah in the Battle of Hunayn because he gave clever counsel to his people in war. 

All ulema agree that an old man of this type should be killed in war. Al-Nawawi, citing the 


130 

book “Consensus on Matters of Jihad,” said that old men among the infidels should be killed 

if they are men of counsel. Ibn-Qasim, may he rest in peace, wrote in his commentary: The 

unanimous opinion is that those who support the troops should be killed. Ibn-Taymiyyah 

cited this unanimous opinion. He also said that those who give any kind of aid to the sect 

that refuses to accept Islam should suffer the same fate. 













Ibn Qudamah also said (may God have mercy on him): “(7577) Chapter: If in war they use 

their women and children as shields, it is permissible to shoot at them, but one aims at the 

fighters. This is because the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) shot at them 

with the catapult when there were women and children with them. It is also because the 

Muslim’s abstaining from them would lead to the halting of jihad; for when the enemy found 

out, they would take them as shields whenever they were afraid, and so jihad would halt. 

“It is the same regardless of whether the fighting is at close quarters or not, because the 

prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) did not delay shooting when the fighting 

was at close quarters.” 






permissible because it is a case of necessity and so the non-believers are targeted. If there is 


no fear for the Muslims, but the enemy can be overcome only by shooting, al-Awza’i and al- 



you should trample them, and there befall you guilt unwittingly on their account…’ [Quranic 

verse; Al-Fath 48:25]. Al-Layth said that abstaining from the conquest of a fort that could be 

conquered was better than wrongly killing a Muslim. Al-Awza’i said: ‘How are they to shoot 

when they do not see? They would only be shooting at the children of Muslims.’ Al-Qadi and 

al-Shafi’i said that they may be shot at when the war is ongoing, because not doing so would 

lead to halting jihad. Two texts are offered in support of this view, that if he kills a Muslim, 

he is liable to expiation and blood money. 

“One of them is that it is obligatory because he killed a believer in error, so it falls under the 

provisions of the verse: ‘If any slays a believer by error, then let him set free a believing slave, 

and bloodwit is to be paid to his family’ [Quranic verse; al-Nisa’ 4:92]. 

“The second is that there is no blood money because he was killed in enemy territory (dar 

al-harb) by permissible shooting, so he falls under the provisions of the verse: ‘If he belong to 

a people at enmity with you and is a believer, let the slayer set free a believing slave’ [Quranic 

verse; al-Nisa’ 4:92], which mentions no blood money. 

“Abu Hanifah said he is liable neither to blood money nor to expiation because the shoot- 

ing was permitted although the situation was known; and so it rendered nothing incumbent, 

even as the shooting of someone whose life may be taken. “Our view is based on the cited 

verse, on the fact that he has killed someone protected by faith, and that the slayer is a person 

who bears liability; so it is similar to if he had not been taken as a human shield.” 

Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi (may God have mercy on him) said: “Section: There is nothing 

wrong with attacking the non-believers by night, i.e., raiding them by night and killing them 

when they are unprepared. 

Ibn Qudamah (may God have mercy on him) said: “(7577) Chapter: If in war they use their 

women and children as shields, it is permissible to shoot at them, and he should aim at the 

fighters. This is because the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) shot at them 

with the catapult when there were women and children with them. It is also because the 

Muslim’s abstaining from them would lead to the halting of jihad; for when the enemy found 

out, they would take them as shields whenever they were afraid, and so jihad would halt.” 


132 






permissible because it is a case of necessity and the non-believers are targeted. If there is no 

fear for the Muslims, but the enemy can be overcome only by shooting, al-Awza’i and al- 



you should trample them, and there befall you guilt unwittingly on their account’ [Quranic 

verse; Al-Fath 48:25]. Al-Layth said that abstaining from the conquest of a fort that could be 

conquered was better than wrongly killing a Muslim. Al-Awza’i said: ‘How are they to shoot 

when they do not see? They would only be shooting at the children of Muslims.’ Al-Qadi and 

al-Shafi’i said that they may be shot at when the war is ongoing, because not doing so would 

lead to halting jihad.” 

Public opinion did not confine the killing of human shields to jihad of defense but permit- 

ted it in all operations of jihad, and drew upon the Sunnah of the prophet, prayers and peace 

be upon him, in his exasperated labor against the people of Al-Ta’if and his brigades which 

raided the non-believers, among whom were women and children. The prophet, prayers and 

peace of God be upon him, and his companions were not, in these cases in jihad of defense, 

yet the siege of Al-Ta’if was after the conquest of Mecca. Ibn Qudamah [Al-Maqdisi - Islamic 

scholar of the Hanbali madhhab] said in Al-Mughni [a well-known Hanbali book of fiqh] 

that Amr Ibn al-’As [Muslim conqueror of Egypt in 641-642 Hijri] had installed the catapult 

against the people of Alexandria [Egypt].266 This was jihad al-talab [jihad of oppression]. 

The second aspect: Muslim leaders used catapults in fighting the non-believers. It is known 

that catapults if used, do not differentiate between one fighter and the other. They can strike 

those who are called innocent; nevertheless, the Muslim tradition was that it was used in 

wars. Ibn Qudamah, may God have mercy upon him, said: Using catapults is permissible 

because the prophet, prayers and peace of God be upon him, used them against the people 

of Al-Ta’if and Amr Ibn al-As used them against the people of Alexandria (Al-Mughni and 

Al-Sharh 10/503). Ibn Qassim, may God have mercy upon him, said in Al-Hashiyyah: ‘It 

is permissible to use catapults against the non-believers even if children, women, old men 

and monks are killed inadvertently, because crushing the enemy is allowed according to the 


consensus of the scholars. [Abu al Walid Mohammad] Ibn Rushud [Muslim scholar, philoso- 

pher and physician of 12th century Al-Andalus], said: “Crushing the enemy is permissible 

according to the consensus of scholars and against any type of polytheist” (Al-Hashiyah ala’ 

Ar-Raudh, vol. 4, p 271). 

That they would not be of those who fought with their countries nor had been hired by them 

physically, financially, by opinion, consultation nor otherwise, for it is not permissible to at- 

tack this type on condition that they be outstanding and not having mixed with others. But if 

they mixed with others and were not distinguishable then their killing would be permissible 

in conformity and subject to those such as the aged, women, children, sick people, the handi- 

capped, and the dedicated monks. Ibn Qudamah [al- Maqdisi] narrated: and it is possible to 

unintentionally kill women and children in night attacks and burial places, if not intention- 

ally individually killed. It is permissible to kill their cattle leading to their killing and defeat, 

and there is no dispute about that (meaning and elaboration 10/503). And he said: it is per- 

missible to attack the enemy by night. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal said there is no harm in attacking 

by night, for the conquest of the West is but by night, and he said and we know not anyone 

who disliked the attacks by night. 

Or they are of those who have not embarked upon fighting with their countries which are 

in war, but are hired by them for money or opinion. Those are not considered innocent, but 

are fighters and apostates (that is the hired and the supporter). Ibn Abd al-Bir [al Maliki], 

may God have mercy upon him, said in Al-Istithkar: Scholars have not disagreed about those 

women and old people who have fought for it is permissible to kill them. It is permissible to 

kill children who were capable of fighting and did fight (Al-Istithkar, 14/74). The consensus 

also cited Ibn Qudamah, may God have mercy upon him, that he permitted the killing of 

women, children and old people if they helped their countries. 

Ibn Abd al-Bir, may God have mercy upon him, said: consensus was that the prophet of 

God, may prayers and peace of God be upon him, killed Durid Ibn al-Samma on Hanin day 

because he had attitude and intrigue in warfare. So, he of the shaykhs who was like that was 

to be killed in the opinion of all (Al-Tamhid (16/142)). Al-Nawawi, may God have mercy 

upon him, cited in Sharh Muslim in Book of Al-Jihad the consensus that if any of the shaykhs 

of non-believers had an attitude they would be killed. Ibn Qasim, may God have mercy upon 

him, cited in Al-Hashiyah, that consensus was that the rule concerning him who supports or 

assists [in war] is a straightforward rule in jihad. Ibn Taymiyyah, may God have mercy upon 

him, was quoted that this was a consensus, and he [Ibn Taymiyyah] was also quoted as saying 

that supporters of inactive factions and their supporters are from them and like them. 


134 

Referencing Muhammad Ibn Isma’il al-Amir al-San’ani 


Al-San’ani (Subl al-Salam, 4:51): From Ibn ‘Umar, a Companion of the Prophet: “’The Mes- 

senger of God, may God bless him and grant him peace, burned and cut the d ate-palms of 

the Banu al-Nadir.’ The hadith is generally accepted. It proves thatit is permitted to spoil 

the possessions of belligerents by burning and cutting for a benefit. The following Quranic 

verse was revealed regarding this: “Whatever palm-trees you cut down…’ (Quran 59:5). The 

polytheists said, ‘You prohibit corruption in the earth. What about cutting down and burn- 

ing trees?’ The majority have held that it is permitted to burn and despoil in enemy territory. 

Al-Awza’I and Abu Thawr considered it reprehensible, arguing that Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s 

companion, ordered his armies not to do it. The response is that he saw benefit in their 

remaining because he knew that they would become the Muslims’, so he wanted them to 

remain for them, thus it depends on the perception of benefit. 

Zawahiri: Page 155, 158, 169, 170 

(One of the citations for the following quote): “Sometimes it is permitted to kill a human 

shield. About this there will be no disagreement, God willing. This happens when the ben- 

efit to be gained is necessary, universal, and definite. Its being necessary means that the non- 

believers can be reached only by killing the human shield. Its being universal means that it 

extends to the entire nation, with all Muslims receiving benefit from the killing of the human 

shield, and with the non-believers killing the human shield and taking control of the entire 

nation if it is not done. Its being definite means that the benefit in question will definitely 

come about from the killing of the human shield. Our scholars have said: There should be no 

disagreement about taking account of this benefit with these restrictions. The assumption is 

that the human shield will definitely be killed, either by the enemy, whereupon the great evil 

of the enemy’s taking control of all Muslims will occur, or by the Muslims, whereupon the 

enemy will perish and the Muslims all be saved. No reasonable man would think of saying 

that the human shield should in no wise be killed under these circumstances, for that would 

entail the destruction of the human shield, Islam, and the Muslims. However, since this 

benefit is not devoid of attendant evil, the mind of anyone who has not considered the matter 

very carefully is repelled. However, the evil, compared to what results from it, is nothing or 

as nothing. And God is most knowledgeable.” 

Al-Amir al-San’ani (may God have mercy on him) said: “From Makhul (may God be pleased 


with him): ‘The prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) erected a catapult against 

the people of Al-Ta’if.’ “Abu Dawud included it among traditions with an incomplete chain 

of transmission not going all the way back to the prophet, though its links were trustworthy. 

Al-Uqayli traced it back to the prophet, though with a weak chain of transmission, from Ali 

(may God be pleased with him) “The Hadith contains evidence that it is permitted to kill 

fortified non-believers with a catapult and, by analogy, other kinds of artillery and the like.” 

Referencing Al-Shawkani 


Al-Shawkani (Nayl al-Awtar, 8:78): Having cited a series of hadiths, including the aforemen- 

tioned hadith of Ibn ‘Umar, he says: “In these hadiths there is proof that burning is permitted 

in enemy territory, as al-Hafiz [Ibn Hajar al-‘Asqalani] said in Fath al-Bari.” He cites approv- 

ingly the passage mentioned above, and then says, “It is obvious that what was done by Abu 

Bakr is not sufficient to invalidate what the Prophet is known to have done, since by agree- 

ment the words of a companion are not a conclusive argument [against the Prophet].” 

He also said (al-Sayl al-Jarrar, 4:534): “God has commanded that the polytheists should be 

killed. He did not specify the manner in which it should be done, nor did he obligate us to 

do it in a certain manner. Therefore there is nothing to prevent their being killed by every 

cause of death: shooting, piercing, drowning, razing, casting from a cliff, and so forth.” 

Zawahiri: Page 15, 101, 130, 132, 142 

(One of the citations for the following quote): “Islamic law assumes that the lives and prop- 

erty of non-believers are legitimate targets, except by virtue of a peace treaty (sulh), a safe- 

conduct (aman), or a covenant of protection (dhimmah); for the land of the enemy is a land 

of fighting, plunder, and legitimate targets.” 

Referencing Buraydah ibn al-Husayb 


In the Sahih of Muslim there is an authentic tradition from Buraydah ibn al-Husayb, a 

companion of the Prophet, who said: “Whenever the Messenger of God, may God bless him 

and grant him peace, appointed a commander overa n army or expedition, he urged him to 

fear God and take good care of the Muslims who were with him. Then he would say: ‘Attack 


136 

in the Name of God and in God’s Path. Fight anyone who denies God. Attack, but do not 

exceed the bounds. Do not act treacherously, do not mutilate, and do not kill a child.’” There 

are other texts also and all indicate that killing women and children is prohibited. The use of 

such weapons will kill them. 

(Followed by a rebuttal of this argument justifying the killing of women and children) 


We read in the Sahih of Muslim, on the authority of Buraydah Ibn al-Husayb, that whenever 

the prophet sent out a commander over a detachment or an army or on some mission of his, 

he would especially exhort him to fear God and to be good to the Muslims who were with 

him. He would say: ‘Fight in the name of God and in the way of God. Fight against those 

who disbelieve in God. Do not exceed the bounds, do not act treacherously, do not mutilate, 

and do not kill children’.’ 

(Followed by a justification of like-for-like mutilation and vengeance) 

Referencing Ibn Taymiyah / Ibn Taymiyyah 


The Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah said (al-Fatawi al-Kubra, 4:520): “Fighting to repel 

the enemy is the strongest means of keeping the attacker away from family and faith. It 

is universally considered an obligation. Nothing is a greater duty, after faith itself, than 

repelling an enemy attacker who sows corruption to religion and the world. No condi- 

tions limit this: one repels the enemy however one can. Our fellow scholars and others 

have said so explicitly. 

The Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah (al-Fatawi, 28:546 said: “Scholars have agreed that if 

the infidel army uses their Muslim prisoners as human shields and the Muslims stand to 

be harm if they do not fight, they fight, even if it leads to the killing of Muslims whom they 

used as shields.” 

Here ends the treatise. 


Zawahiri: Page 27, 32, 36, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 59, 74, 75, 76, 86, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 109, 

135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 144, 145, 164, 165, 174, 175, 177, 187, 189, 190, 197, 210, 211, 212, 

215, 245 

Ibn-Taymiyyah said: “After the initial obligation to believe, there is no greater duty than to 

repulse a marauding enemy.” 

In his collection of major fatwas, Ibn-Taymiyyah said: “In matters of jihad one should rely 

on the opinion of those who have a sound knowledge of religion and also experience of the 

world. Those ulema who do not delve deep into matters of religion and examine only the 

surface and those who have no experience of the world should not be consulted.” 

Ibn-Taymiyyah, may he rest in peace, said: The ulema have agreed that if the infidel army 

uses captive Muslims as human shields and there is fear for the Muslims lives if they do not 

fight, they should attack even if this leads to killing the human shields. 

Al-Nawawi, citing the book “Consensus on Matters of Jihad,” said that old men among the 

infidels should be killed if they are men of counsel. Ibn-Qasim, may he rest in peace, wrote 

in his commentary: The unanimous opinion is that those who support the troops should be 

killed. Ibn-Taymiyyah cited this unanimous opinion. He also said that those who give any 

kind of aid to the sect that refuses to accept Islam should suffer the same fate. 

Ibn-Taymiyyah said: They have the right to mutilate their enemies’ bodies to avenge similar 

mutilation done to the Muslims. They can, if they want, abandon this custom and endure 

especially when mutilation is not a necessary part of their jihad and not carried out in ven- 

geance for similar mutilation. If, however, mutilation is used to call the enemies to the Mus- 

lim faith or deter them from further aggression, it comes under the heading of meting out 

Shari’ah punishment and legitimate jihad. Ibn-Miflih cited this opinion by Ibn-Taymiyyah. 

On this issue Shaykh al-Islam Ibn-Taymiyyah says: “Religion’s foundations are a book that 

guides and a sword that brings victory and God is a sufficient guide and bringer of victory.” 

On matters of jihad we should accept the opinion of sound followers of the faith who also 

have experience of the world just as Ibn-Taymiyyah said: “On issues of jihad it is necessary to 

take the opinion of the followers of the true faith who also have experience of the world. The 

opinion of worldly people who understand religion only superficially should not be heeded 

nor the opinion of religious people who have no experience of the world.” 


138 

Ibn Taymiyyah (may God have mercy on him) says: “The scholars agree that if the infidel 

army uses its Muslim captives as human shields, and the Muslims are in danger if they do not 

fight, they fight even if that leads to the killing of the Muslims being used as shields. If there 

is no danger for the Muslims, there are two well-known positions taken by scholars on the 

permissibility of fighting that leads to the killing of these Muslims. 

When such Muslims are killed, they are martyrs; and one does not desist from duty of jihad 

on account of those who are killed as martyrs. When Muslims fight non-believers, any 

Muslim who is killed is a martyr. Anyone undeserving of death killed while in the womb 

for the sake of the welfare of Islam is a martyr. It is established in the two Sahih books that 

the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) said: ‘An army of men will attack this 

house, and lo, while they are in the desert, the ground will swallow them up.’ Someone asked, 

‘Messenger of God, there might be forced conscripts among them!’ He replied, ‘They will 

be resurrected according to their intentions.’ If God causes the chastisement that He inflicts 

on the army attacking the Muslims to fall on the forced conscript, how much more so with 

regard to the chastisement whereby God chastises them at the hands of the believers! As God 

has said: ‘Say: ‘Are you awaiting for aught to come to us but one of the two rewards most fair? 

We are awaiting in your case too, for God to visit you with chastisement from Him, or at our 

hands’’ [Quranic verse; Al-Tawbah 9:52].” 

Ibn Taymiyyah (may God have mercy on him) says: “As for cruel and exemplary punish- 

ments or mutilation, it is not permissible except as retribution. Imran Ibn Husayn (may God 

be pleased with him and his father) said: ‘Never did the messenger of God (may God bless 

him and grant him peace) preach a sermon to us but that he commanded us to charity and 

forbade us to mutilate. Even when we killed non-believers, we did not mutilate them after 

killing them. We did not cut off their ears and noses or rip open their bellies, unless they 

had done that to us; and then we would do to them as they had done. However, abstaining 

from such things is better, as God has said: ‘And if you chastise, chastise even as you have 

been chastised; and yet assuredly if you are patient, better it is for those patient’ [Quranic 

verse; Al-Nahl 16:126]. And: ‘And be patient; yet is thy patience only with the help of God’ 

[Quranic verse; Al-Nahl 16:127]. 

Some say that the verse was revealed only because the polytheists mutilated Hamzah and 

other martyrs of the Battle of Uhud (may God be pleased with them); whereupon the proph- 

et said, ‘If God gives me victory over them, I will mutilate them twice as much as they mu- 


tilated us.’ God then revealed this verse, although verses like the following had already been 

revealed in Mecca: ‘They will question thee concerning the Spirit. Say: ‘The Spirit is of the 

bidding of my Lord’’ [Quranic verse; Al-Isra’ 17:85]. And: ‘And perform the prayer at the two 

ends of the day and nigh of the night; surely the good deeds will drive away the evil deeds’ 

[Quranic verse; Hud 11:114]. These and other verses were revealed in Mecca; then some 

occasion requiring addressing them arose in Medina, and so they were revealed a second 

time. So the prophet said, ‘Rather, let us be patient.’ We read in the Sahih of Muslim, on the 

authority of Buraydah Ibn al-Husayb, that whenever the prophet sent out a commander over 

a detachment or an army or on some mission of his, he would especially exhort him to fear 

God and to be good to the Muslims who were with him. He would say: ‘Fight in the name of 

God and in the way of God. Fight against those who disbelieve in God. Do not exceed the 

bounds, do not act treacherously, do not mutilate, and do not kill children’.’” 

Ibn Taymiyyah (may God have mercy on him) also said: “If the non-believers mutilate 

Muslims, mutilation is the right of the latter: they have the right to do it to exact vengeance, 

but they may forego it; and patience is better. This is because the mutilation allowed to them 

involves nothing that would summon to faith and preserve them from aggression. In this 

case it belongs to the imposition of the prescribed hadd punishments and jihad. The case 

at Uhud was not like that, and therefore patience was better. When exemplary punishment 

is the right of God, patience is a duty, as it is when aiding oneself is not possible, and impa- 

tience is unlawful.” 

Ibn Taymiyyah (may God have mercy on him) has said: “For this reason, scholars have 

agreed on the permissibility of destroying trees and crops belonging to the non-believers if 

they have done the same to us or if they can be overcome only by these means. About its 

permissibility short of such circumstances there is a well-known controversy. There are two 

accounts related on the authority of Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal]. Permitting it is the doctrine of 

al-Shafi’i and others.” 

Ibn Taymiyyah (may God have mercy on him) says: “The scholars agree that if the infidel 

army uses its Muslim captives as human shields, and the Muslims are in danger if they do 

not fight, they fight even if that leads to the killing of the Muslims being used as shields. If 

there is no danger for the Muslims, there are two well-known positions taken by scholars on 

the permissibility of fighting that leads to the killing of these Muslims. When such Muslims 

are killed, they are martyrs; and one does not desist from duty of jihad on account of those 

who are killed as martyrs. When Muslims fight non-believers, any Muslim who is killed is 


140 

a martyr. Anyone undeserving of death killed while in the womb for the sake of the welfare 

of Islam is a martyr. It is established in the two Sahih books that the prophet (may God bless 

him and grant him peace) said: ‘An army of men will attack this house, and lo, while they are 

in the desert, the ground will swallow them up.’ Someone asked, ‘Messenger of God, there 

might be forced conscripts among them!’ He replied, ‘They will be resurrected according to 

their intentions.’ If God causes the chastisement that He inflicts on the army attacking the 

Muslims to fall on the forced conscript, how much more so with regard to the chastisement 

whereby God chastises them at the hands of the believers! As God has said: ‘Say: ‘Are you 

awaiting for aught to come to us but one of the two rewards most fair? We are awaiting in 

your case too, for God to visit you with chastisement from Him, or at our hands’’ [Quranic 

verse; Al-Tawbah 9:52].” 

The third aspect: Muslim religious scholars allowed the killing of Muslim (human shields) if 

they were captives in the hands of non-believers who were going to use them as human shields 

to protect themselves from the darts of Muslims even though they have done nothing wrong, 

were innocent and their killing was not permissible. Ibn Taymiyyah, may God have mercy 

upon him, said: scholars agreed that if the army of non-believers took Muslim captives as hu- 

man shields and there was fear that harm will befall the Muslims if they did not fight, then they 

should fight even if this led to the killing of Muslims who were used as human shields (Fatwas 

28/537-546, section 20/52). Ibn Qasim [eighth Idrisi ruler and sultan of Morocco], may God 

have mercy upon him, said in Al-Hashiyyah: If they use a Muslim as a human shield then it is 

not permissible to attack them except that we fear for Muslims, so they attack them, meaning 

the nonbelievers, and this is without dispute (Al-Hashiyah ‘ala Ar-Raudh 4/271) 

Of the scholars sayings concerning the permissibility of revenge in the same way: Ibn Taymi- 

yyah said: Treating them in the same way is their right, for they can do this to exact revenge. 

They can leave it, for patience is better. This is when torturing them does not add to jihad, 

nor is their exact punishment for the like. If punishment is a call for them to believe or is a 

restraint from aggression, then here it is for the establishment of limits and legitimate jihad, 

Ibn Miflih quoted Ibn Taymiyyah in the segments 6/218. 

Referencing Abu Bakr Ahmad al-Razi al-Jassas 


Al-Jassas said (Ahkam al-Qur’an, 3:389): “As for the argument of those who cite the verse, ‘If 

it had not been for certain men believers and certain women believers…’ (Quran 48:25), as 


ground for prohibiting bombarding the infidels because of the Muslims in their midst, the 

verse cannot be used to prove of contention. That is because the most the verse says is that 

God turned the Muslims away from them because among them were some Muslims that 

the Prophet’s companions were in danger of harming if they entered Mecca with the sword. 

This only proves that it is permitted to eschew bombarding them and advancing on them. 

It does not prove that it is forbidden to advance against them with the knowledge that 

there are Muslims among them. It might permit desisting from them for the sake of the 

Muslims, and it also might permit advancing as an option. Thus it contains no proof that 

advancing is forbidden. Someone might say that eh import of the verse implies prohibi- 

tion, because it says, ‘Whom you knew not, lest you should trample them, and there befall 

you guilt unwittingly on their account,’ and, but for the prohibition, no guilt of murdering 

them by striking them would have befallen them. The reply is that interpreters have dif- 

fered over the meaning of ‘guilt (ma’arrah)’ here. Ibn Ishaq interpreted it as meaning the 

fine of blood-money (diyah); others interpreted it as meaning expiation (kaffarah); others 

interpreted it as grief (ghamm) at having occasioned a Muslim’s death, because a believer 

would be grieved at this even if he had not done it intentionally. Others interpreted it as 

meaning disgrace (‘ayb). One interpreter is reported to have said that ma’arrah meant sin 

(ithm), but this is false, because God said that had it happened, it would have happened 

without our knowledge: ‘Whom you knew not, lest you should trample them, and there 

befall you ma’arrah unwittingly on their account,’ and one incurs no sin for what one does 

not know and of which God has given no indication. For God says: ‘There is no fault in 

you if you make mistakes, but only in what your hearts premeditate.’ (Quran 33:5). Thus 

we know that ma’arrah does not mean sin…It being established, as we have mentioned, 

that it is permitted to advance against the infidels with the knowledge that there are Mus- 

lims among them, the like must be permitted if they use Muslims as human shields. In 

both cases, the intent is to strike the infidels, not the Muslims. Neither blood-money nor 

expiation are required for any who are struck. Similarly, no blood-money or expiation are 

necessary for any Muslim in an infidel stronghold who are hit by the bombardment. We 

have been given permission to shoot although we know that Muslims are in that direc- 

tion; and so their legal status is of those whom it is allowed to kill. Nothing is required in 

return. The ma’arrah mentioned in the verse is neither blood-money nor expiation; neither 

the word itself nor anything else imply as much. The Likeliest interpretation is the grief 

and distress one would feel at having occasioned the death of a believer, as usually happens 

to someone at whose hand this happens. The interpretation that it means disgrace is also 

possible, because a person usually is disgraced if someone is mistakenly killed at his hands, 

even if the disgrace does not take the form of legal punishment.” 


142 

Zawahiri: Page 35, 80, 82, 83, 87, 88, 92, 98, 158, 160, 168, 184 

According to Abu Bakr al-Jassas: “Scholars of the prophet’s biography have transmitted that 

the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) besieged the people of Al-Ta’if and 

bombarded them by catapult, although he had prohibited the killing of women and children. 

He knew that he might hit them and that it was not permissible to kill them intentionally. 

This shows that the presence of Muslims among the belligerents does not prevent their being 

bombarded, since the intention was to hit the non-believers to the exclusion of the Muslims. 

The Imam al-Jassas (may God have mercy on him) said: “The prophet (may God bless him 

and grant him peace) once sent Usama bin Zayd and said to him, ‘Attack Ubna212 in the 

morning and burn it.’ He used to order the expeditions to wait for those they were attacking 

and to refrain from them if they gave the call to prayer; if they heard no call, they were to at- 

tack. The well guided caliphs continued this policy.” 

“It is common knowledge that anyone who attacks such people cannot avoid hitting their 

children and women who are forbidden to be killed; similarly, if there are Muslims among 

them. This must not prevent the launching of the raid against them and shooting at them 

with arrows and other things, even if there is danger of hitting the Muslim.” 

Abu Bakr al-Jassas (may God have mercy on him) said: “Scholars of the prophet’s biography 

have transmitted that the prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) besieged the 

people of al-Ta’if and bombarded them by catapult, although he had prohibited the killing of 

women and children. He knew that he might hit them, although it was not permissible to kill 

them intentionally. This shows that the presence of Muslims among the belligerents does not 

prevent their being bombarded, since the intention was to hit the non-believers to the exclu- 

sion of the Muslims. 

Referencing Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani 


Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir, 4:1467): “One abstains from 

none of this while there are Muslim prisoners, Muslims with safe-conduct, Young or old, 

men or women among them, even if we know this; for there is no way to guard against harm- 

ing them while obeying the command to subdue the polytheists. What cannot be avoided, 


must be pardoned.” 

Zawahiri: Page 128, 129, 130, 132, 143, 151, 152, 153 

Imam Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (may God have mercy on him) says the follow- 

ing about prisoners of war to whom the non-believers grant a safe-conduct but whom they 

then treat perfidiously: 

“784. If some people from among them meet the captives and ask them, ‘Who are you?’ and 

they reply, ‘We are merchants who entered with a safe-conduct from your comrades’; or, ‘We 

are emissaries of the caliph’; it does not behoove them afterward to kill any of them; for they 

have manifested what is an indication of seeking safe-conduct. It is to be deemed a seeking 

of safe-conduct by them, and so they may not treat them perfidiously afterward, so long as 

the inhabitants of the land of war do not harass them. 

“785. If the inhabitants of the land of war find out that they are captives and so take them, 

but then they escape from them, it is permissible for them to fight them and take their prop- 

erty, because the status of having sought safe-conduct is lifted from them by virtue of what 

they have done. 

“Do you not see that if the king of the inhabitants of the land of war acts perfidiously toward 

those who have sought safe-conduct, takes their property, and imprisons them, but then they 

escape, they may kill the inhabitants of the land of war and take their property? They may do 

so on the ground that that was a breaking of the treaty by their king. 

“786. Likewise, if a man should do so at the command of their king or with his knowledge, 

and the king did not prevent him from doing so, then the maxim is: A fool not prohibited has 

been, as it were, commanded. However, if they acted without the prince’s knowledge or the 

knowledge of his party, the seekers of safe-conduct may not regard the foe’s women as fair 

game because of what he did to them.” 

(Cited for the below quote): 

“Islamic law assumes that the lives and property of non-believers are legitimate targets, 

except by virtue of a peace treaty (sulh), a safe-conduct (aman), or a covenant of protection 

(dhimmah); for the land of the enemy is a land of fighting, plunder, and legitimate targets.” 


144 

Similar to this is what Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (may God have mercy on him) 

says in [Kitab] al-Siyar al-Kabir about a Muslim captive in the hands of nonbelievers, who 

tricks them and kills them when they feel safe from him: “If the captive says to them, ‘I know 

medicine,’ and they ask him to give them a dose of medicine and he gives them poison and it 

kills them: if he gives it to their men, he is not to be blamed, as it was a way of harming them. 

However, I disapprove of his giving it to children and women, just as I disapprove of his kill- 

ing them—unless one of their women has done him harm, and then there is nothing wrong 

with his giving her a dose of it, just as there is nothing wrong with his killing her if can.” 

In the same chapter, Al-Shaybani discusses others for whom it is permissible to kill and take 

the property of people of war by other tricks based on custom. Al-Shaybani (may God have 

mercy on him) says: “Suppose a group of Muslims comes to the frontier of the enemy and 

says, ‘We are emissaries of the caliph,’ and they produce a letter that resembles a letter of the 

caliph, or they do not produce one, this being a trick they are using against the polytheists. 

Suppose, furthermore, that the polytheists say to them, ‘Enter,’ and they enter the abode of 

war. It is not permissible for them to kill any of the people of war or take any of their prop- 

erty so long as they are in their territory.” 

Then al-Shaybani (may God have mercy on him) says: “It is similar if they say, ‘We have 

come desiring to trade,’ their intention being to murder them unaware. Inasmuch as they, 

if they were really merchants as they claimed, would not be permitted to act treacherously 

against the people of war, they are similarly forbidden even if they only pretend to them that 

they are.” 



146 

ENDNOTES 

1. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. 

2. “Countdown to Zero.” Documentary movie directed by Lucy Walker, and produced by Lawrence Bender. 

3. Sharma, Arvind. The World’s Religions After September 11 th . Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008. pg. 187. 

4. “The Presidency: The World of Harry Truman.” Time. 8 January 1973. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,910501-4,00.html 

5. Obama, Barack. Obama Prague Speech On Nuclear Weapons. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/05/obamaprague-speech-on-nu_n_183219.html 

6. Author’s Note: There are 31 states that have nuclear energy today; over 50 countries are in varying stages of exploring 

the development of nuclear energy in the future 

7. “TRANSCRIPT: The Solution.” A Video Speech from Usama bin Laden Addressing the American People. September 

2007. http://counterterrorismblog.org/site-resources/images/SITE-OBL-transcript.pdf 

8. Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2009,” 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. November/December 2009. 

9. “Global Fissile Materials Report 2009.” International Panel on Fissile Materials. October 2009. pg. 4. 

10. Ibid. 

11. Ibid. pg. 127. 

12. Baute, Jacques. International Atomic Energy Agency. “Strengthening Nuclear Security Globally: The Role of the IAEA,” 

online supplement to Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, “2009 International Nuclear Non-proliferation 

Symposium.” 22 October 2009. 

13. Belfer Center “Nuclear Terrorism Threat Assessment”, The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (April 12, 

2010) slide 6. 

14. Scarborough, Rowan. “Obama at Odds with Petraeus doctrine on Islam,” The Washington Times. 11 July 2010. 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/11/obama-at-odds-with-petraeus-doctrine-on-islam/ 

15. “Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi Condemns Attacks Against Civilians.” Islam Online. 13 September 2001. http://www.cair. 

com/AmericanMuslims/AntiTerrorism/SheikhYusufAlQaradawiCondemnsAttacks.aspx 

16. Berman, Paul. “The Philosopher of Islamic Terror.” The New York Times. 23 March 2003. http://www.nytimes. 

com/2003/03/23/magazine/23GURU.html 

17. Qutb, Seyyid. “Milestones,” USA: SIME journal (http://majalla.org), 2005. Pg. 33. http://majalla.org/ 

books/2005/qutb-nilestone.pdf 

18. “Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo, Al-Qaeda and the Kinshasa Reactor” RAND Research 

Brief. 2005. http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB165/RAND_RB165.pdf 

19. Rauf, Feisal Abdul. What’s Right With Islam: a new vision for Muslims and the West. New York: Harper Collins, May 

2004. pg. 135. 

20. “TRANSCRIPT: The Solution.” A Video Speech from Usama bin Laden Addressing the American People. September 

2007. http://counterterrorismblog.org/site-resources/images/SITE-OBL-transcript.pdf 

21. Plebani, Andrea. “Attractiveness of WMD for Radical Islamist Movements: Ideological Constraints, Black-Spots, and 

Failed-Weak States.” Strategic Insights. Vol VI, Issue 5, August 2007. 

22. Zawahiri, Ayman. The Exoneration. March 2008. pg. 116. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/osc/exoneration.pdf 

23. Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. pgs. 273-274. 

24. Olson, Kyle B. “Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat,” CDC (1999) http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/olson. 

htm 

25. “Don’t underestimate your enemy. You may dislike them but they don’t lie.” 

Mauro, Ryan. “Al-Qaeda’s Hidden Arsenal and Sponsors: Interview with Hamid Mir.” Canada Free Press. 25 May 2006. 

http://canadafreepress.com/2006/mauro052506.htm 

26. Ibid. 


27. Beehner, Lionel. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Resurging or Splintering,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder. 16 July 

2007. http://rebecca.cfr.org/publication/13007/alqaeda_in_iraq.html#p5 

28. Wright, Lawrence. Looming Towers. New York: Knopf, 2006. pg. 257–8 

29. Khalil, Lydia. “Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood,” Terrorism Monitor. Volume 4: Issue 6. 23 March 2006. http:// 

www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=714&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1 

30. The Quran 

31. Satha-Anand, Chaiwat. “Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Actions,” in Glenn D. Paige, Chaiwat 

Satha-Anand and Sarah Gilliatt (eds), Islam and Nonviolence. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 1993. pg.10. 

32. Kelsay, John. Islam and War: A Study of Comparative Ethics. Louisville, KY:Westminster/John Knox Press 1993. pg.36. 

33. Ibid. 

34. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani, as translated by Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations. Baltimore, MD: 

Johns Hopkins University Press 1966. Sections 28, 29, 30 and 47. pgs. 59–60. 

35. Ahmad, Razi. “Islam, Nonviolence, and Global Transformation,” in Paige et al. pg. 39. Cited in Chaiwat Satha-Anand, 

“Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Actions,” in Glenn D. Paige, Chaiwat Satha-Anand and 

Sarah Gilliatt (eds), Islam and Nonviolence. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 1993. 

36. Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Bidayat al-Mujtahid, in Peters, Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam, cited in John Kelsay, Islam 

and War: A Study of Comparative Ethics. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press 1993. pg. 62. 

37. Kelsay, John. “Osama bin Laden and the Just Conduct of War.” America. 8 October 2001. 

38. Author’s Note: a compilation of the conditions that must be satisfied for issuance of a fatwa, from open sources. 

39. “The Solid Base” (Al-Qaeda), Al-Jihad (journal), April 1988. n. 41. 

40. Wright, Lawrence. Looming Towers. New York: Knopf, 2006. pg. 46. 

41. Ibid. 

42. Wright, Lawrence. “The Man Behind Bin Laden.” The New Yorker. 16 September 2002. http://www.newyorker.com/ 

archive/2002/09/16/020916fa_fact2 

Author’s Note: The substance of Mr Wright’s text was confirmed and amplified in my discussions with foreign intelligence 

officials. Ayman Zawahiri himself has stated that al-Qaeda operatives sought and obtained nuclear weapons from 

the FSU; no specific information has surfaced, to my knowledge, that substantiates his public assertion. It would seem 

highly unlikely that al-Qaeda would make an off hand, public assertion of this sort if they actually obtained bona fide 

nuclear weapons usable materials. However, his presumed failure to procure CBRN-related capabilities does not detract 

from his evident personal interest in them. 

43. 9/11 Commission Report. pg. 191; amplified in my discussions with government officials. 

44. “The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland.” National Intelligence Estimate. July 2007. 

45. Bin Laden, Osama. “Al-Qaeda’s Fatwa.” 23 February 1998. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/ 

fatwa_1998.html 

46. Youtube Video. “Zawahiri on 9/11 and the 19 martyrs” Ayman Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. http://www.youtube. 

com/watch?v=1kqpZGBOKZQ 

47. Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm. New York: HarperCollins, 2007. pgs. 275–276. 

48. Ibid. pg. 275. 

49. “Most Wanted Terrorist: Saif Al-Adel.” FBI. http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/teraladel.htm 

50. http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1202.150 

http://www.nctc.gov/docs/ct_calendar_2010.pdf 

51. Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. “Al-Qaeda’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Foreign Policy. 25 January 2010. http:// 

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/25/al_qaedas_pursuit_of_weapons_of_mass_destruction?page=0,2 

52. Fighel, Yoni and Moshe Marzouk. “Saudi cleric Issues Fatwah on the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction” International 

Institute for Counter Terrorism. 7 May 2003. http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/580/currentpage/19/ 

Default.aspx 

53. al-Fahd, Nasir. “A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction Against Infidels.” May 2003. 

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/fatwa.pdf 

54. Bodansky, Yossef. The Secret History of the Iraq War. New York: Harper 2004. pgs. 306–307. 

55. Ibid. pg. 306. 

56. MacFarquhar, Neil. “Threats and Responses: Investigation; Saudis Arrest 8 in Deadly Riyadh Bombing.” The New York 


148 

Times. 29 May 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/29/world/threats-and-responses-investigation-saudis-arrest-8in-deadly-riyadh-bombing.html?ref=nayef 

57. Cordesman, Anthony H. and Nawaf Obaid. “Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia .” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 

26 January 2005. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/050106_al-qaedainsaudi.pdf 

58. U.S. Dept of State. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. “Middle East Overview.” 29 April 2004. 

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2003/31638.htm 

http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2004/ioi/040223- 

http://www.saudinf.com/display_news.php?id=1243 

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/nov/23/20031123-111636-4783r/ 

59. http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/letter-imprisoned-shaykh-nasir-al-fahd-518/ 

http://www.olympic.org/en/content/The-IOC/Members/Sheikh-Ahmad-Al-Fahad-AL-SABAH/ 

60. Wright, Lawrence. “The Rebellion Within” The New Yorker. 2 June 2008. http://www.newyorker.com/ 

reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all 

61. Ibid. 

62. Ibid. 

63. Zawahiri. pg. 39. 

64. Ibid. pg. 164. 

65. Ibid. pg. 195. 

66. Ibid. pg. 58. 

67. Ibid. pg. 72; 92; 94. 


69. Ibid. pg. 174. 

70. Qutb, Seyyid. “Milestones,” USA: SIME journal (http://majalla.org), 2005. Pg. 33. http://majalla.org/books/2005/qutbnilestone.pdf 

71. Ibid. pg. 66. 

72. Ummah Forum. “Sheikh Abdullah Azzam - the 20th century Mujahid Imam.” 12 September 2004. http://www.ummah. 

net/forum/printthread.php?t=43451 

73. Ibid. pg. 64. 


75. Helfont, Samuel. “Islam and Islamism Today: The Case of Yusuf al-Qaradawi,” Foreign Policy Research Institute. January 

2010. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201001.helfonts.islammodernityqaradawi.html 

76. “Islamic Awakening Between Rejection and extremism.” book chapter. http://www.witness-pioneer.org 

77. Wright, Lawrence. “The Rebellion Within.” The New Yorker. 2 June 2008. http://www.newyorker.com/ 

reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?currentPage=all 

78. Timothy Garton Ash, “We are Making a fatal mistake by ignoring the dissidents within Islam.” The Guardian. 15 March 

2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/mar/15/religion.comment 

79. The Quran. al-Baqara, The Cow, II, 256. 

80. Romano, Carlin. “Vetting Tariq Ramadan.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. 23 May 2010. http://chronicle.com/article/Vetting-Tariq-Ramadan/65620/ 

81. Ramadan, Tariq. “Why I’m Banned In the US.” The Washington Post. 1 October 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 

wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/29/AR2006092901334.html 

82. “Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi Condemns Attacks Against Civilians.” Islam Online. 13 September 2001. http://www.cair. 

com/AmericanMuslims/AntiTerrorism/SheikhYusufAlQaradawiCondemnsAttacks.aspx 

83. Ibid. 

84. “Muslim clerics endorse anti-terror fatwa.” UPI. 8 November 2010. http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2008/11/08/Muslim-clerics-endorse-anti-terror-fatwa/UPI-38241226199440/ 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/11/08/6000-muslim-clerics-endor_n_142415.html 

85. “Saudi Cleric Salman Al-Odeh Slams ‘Brother’ Osama bin Laden.” Memri. 14 September 2007. http://www.memri.org/ 

report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/2378.htm 

86. “6,000 Muslim Clerics Endorse Anti-Terrorism Fatwa.” Huffington Post. 8 November 2008. http://www.huffingtonpost. 


com/2008/11/08/6000-muslim-clerics-endor_n_142415.html 

87. “Saudi Cleric Bans Muslims from Joining al-Qaeda.” Al Arabiya. 12 January 2010. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/01/12/97095.html 

88. Radsch, Courtney C. and Marwa Awad. “Egypt’s Grand Mufti Bans Muslim Use of WMD.” Al Arabiya. 1 June 1 2009. 

http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/06/01/74509.html 

89. Ibid. 

90. Ibid. 

91. “Senior Saudi Cleric calls for Moderation, Criticizes Al-Qaeda and Terrorism.” Free Muslims Coalition. 20 April 2010. 

http://www.islamtoday.net/albasheer/services/printart-12-124519.htm 

92. Ibid. 

93. Power, Carla. “Can a Fatwa Against Terrorism Stop Extremists.” Time. 12 March 2010. http://www.time.com/time/ 

world/article/0,8599,1969662,00.html 

94. Ibid. 

95. Ibid. 

96. Ibid. 

97. Ibid. 

98. Iranian News Agency (IRNA) issued a statement on Aug 12 2005 referring to Ayatollah Khameini’s anti-nuclear weapons 

fatwa “The leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khameini has issued the Fatwa that the production, 

stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never 

acquire these weapons.” 

99. “Sayyed Nasrallah: Hezbollah Has the Right to Possess Any Weapon.” Al-ManarTV. 1 May 2010. http://www.almanar. 

com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=135786&language=en 

100. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2001/011214-text.html 

101. Ibid. In March of 1997, Rafsanjani did an interview with Mike Wallace of 60 Minutes and was asked specifically about 

the development of nuclear weapons—he categorically denied Iran’s current or future pursuit: the video can be found at 

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=137SJ8qILp0 

102. Mercer, Phil. “Khatami calls nuclear row “a satanic conspiracy’.” The National. 27 March 2009. http://www.thenational. 

ae/article/20090327/FOREIGN/837851678/1002 

103. “Moral Case Against Nuclear Weapons.” Zero Nukes. 2009. http://www.zero-nukes.org/Disarmament_Scenarios_Case_ 

Against_Nukes_Moral.html 

104. Collier, Robert. “Nuclear weapons unholy, Iran says/Iran forbids use, clerics proclaim.” SFGate.com. 31 October 2003 

http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-10-31/news/17515120_1_nuclear-program-nuclear-weapons-supreme-leader 

105. “Moral Case Against Nuclear Weapons.” Zero Nukes. 2009. http://www.zero-nukes.org/Disarmament_Scenarios_Case_ 

Against_Nukes_Moral.html 

106. Collier, Robert. “Nuclear weapons unholy, Iran says/Iran forbids use, clerics proclaim.” SFGate.com. 31 October 2003 

http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-10-31/news/17515120_1_nuclear-program-nuclear-weapons-supreme-leader 

107. Ibid. 

108. Zakaria, Fareed. “They May Not Want the Bomb.” Newsweek. 23 May 2009. http://www.newsweek.com/2009/05/22/ 

they-may-not-want-the-bomb.html 

109. “D.C. Now.” LA Times. 5 November 2004. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/dcnow/iran/ 

110. “Iran’s Missing Anti-Nuclear Fatwa.” The FAS. 11 August 2005. http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2005/08/081105. 

html (also see “Dr. Strangelove in Iran.” RFE/RL Iran Report. 23 November 2004. http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1342709.html) 

111. Ibid. 

112. “Background Report: Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.” Compiled by Chris Han for the Online NewsHour. 16 June 2005. 

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iran/leader_rafsanjani.html 

113. “Top Cleric: Iran Has Right to ‘Special Weapons.’” CBS News. 14 June 2010. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/14/world/main6581622.shtml 

114. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 4 March 2010. 

Yazdi, Mesbah. “The Islamic Revolution—Surges in Political Changes in History.” 2005. pg. 337. http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/iran_e055.htm 


150 

115. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 4 March 2010. 

Yazdi, Mesbah. “The Islamic Revolution—Surges in Political Changes in History.” 2005. pg. 337. http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/html/iran_e055.htm 

116. “Iran’s Statement at IAEA Emergency Metting.” Mehr News Agency. 10 August 2005. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/ 

iran/nuke/mehr080905.html 

117. “Egypt’s Grand Mufti bans Muslim Use of WMDs.” Al Arabiya News Channel. 1 June 2010. http://www.alarabiya.net/ 

articles/2009/06/01/74509.html 

118. Freeman, Colin, and Philip Sherwell. “Iranian fatwa approves use of nuclear weapons.” The Telegraph. 19 February 

2006. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1510900/Iranian-fatwa-approves-use-of-nuclearweapons.html 

119. Ibid. 

120. Ibid. 

121. Vick, Karl. “Iran’s Gray Area on Nuclear Arms.” The Washington Post. 21 June 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 

wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/20/AR2006062001584_pf.html 

122. Ibid. 

123. Ibid. 

124. Ibid. 

125. Altman, Alex. “Ayatullah Ali Khemenei: Iran’s Supreme Leader.” Time. 17 July 2009. http://www.time.com/time/world/ 

article/0,8599,1905079,00.html#ixzz0u407ck4N 

126. “Iran’s Supreme Leader: Nuclear Program Will Go On.” CBS. 3 June 2008. http://cbs5.com/national/iran.nuclear.program.2.739126.html 

127. Mercer, Phil. “Khatami calls nuclear row “a satanic conspiracy’.” The National. 27 March 2009. http://www.thenational. 

ae/article/20090327/FOREIGN/837851678/1002 

128. Deshmukh, Jay. “Ahmadinejad heads for UN, slammed at home and scorned abroad.” Google. 20 September 2009. 

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iKr-XH2nRJPog5WtHUgrWi-uHWjA 

129. Milani, Abbas. “Exclusive: A Green Ayatollah’s Fatwa Against Nukes.” The New Republic. 20 October 2009. http://www. 

tnr.com/blog/the-plank/exclusive-green-ayatollah%E2%80%99s-fatwa-against-nukes 

130. “Iran’ Supreme Leader: Nuclear Weapons are Against the Teachings of Islam” Islam Today. 20 February 2010. http:// 

en.islamtoday.net/artshow-234-3519.htm 

131. Ibid. 

132. Ibid. 

133. “Supreme Leader: Iran has no belief in atom bombs.” The Star. 20 February 2010. http://thestar.com.my/news/story. 

asp?file=/2010/2/20/nation/20100220112117&sec=nation 

134. “Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei Says Islam Opposes Nuclear Weapons.” Voice of America News. 19 February 2010. 

http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Supreme-Leader-Khamenei-Says-Islam-Opposes-Nuclear- 

Weapons-84771247.html 

135. “Statement by H.E. Mr. Mohammad Khazaee, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic 

of Iran to the United Nations before The United Nations Security Council” (New York, 9 June 2010) http://www. 

iran-un.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=866:statement-by-he-mr-mohammad-khazaee-ambassador-and-permanent-representative-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-to-the-united-nations-before-the-unitednations-security-council-after-adoption-of-resolution-1929-new-york-9-june-2010&catid=35:security-council- 

&Itemid=53 

136. “Sayyed Nasrallah: Hezbollah Has the Right to Possess Any Weapon.” Al-ManarTV. 1 May 2010. http://www.almanar. 

com.lb/newssite/NewsDetails.aspx?id=135786&language=en 

137. “N-bombs are haram in Islam: Iranian Envoy.” Daily Times. 20 June 2010. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default. 

asp?page=2010\06\20\story_20-6-2010_pg7_2 

138. “Iran Ready to Continue nuclear talks.” TREND. 21 July 2010. http://en.trend.az/regions/iran/1724141.html 

139. “Quran.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Ed. John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 7 August 2010. http:// 

www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1945 

140. “Hadith.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Ed. John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 7 August 2010. http:// 



141. “Sunnah.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Ed. John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 7 August 2010. 

http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2279>. 

142. “Sunni Islam.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Ed. John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 7 August 2010. 

http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2280 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/subdivisions/sunnishia_1.shtml 

143. “Shii Islam.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Ed. John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 7 August 2010. 

http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2189 

144. “Takfir.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Ed. John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 7 August 2010. http:// 


145. “Fatwa.” In The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Ed. John L. Esposito. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. 7 August 2010. http:// 


146. Warrick, Joby. “How a Detainee Became an Asset.” Washington Post. 29 August 2009. 

147. Bergen, Peter. ‘‘Reading al-Qaeda.’’ Washington Post. 11 September 2005. 

148. Paz, Reuven. Global Jihad and WMD: Between Martyrdom and Mass Destruction. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 

2005. pg. 83. 

Haqqani and Eric Brown, eds. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. Washington D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2005. pg. 82. 

149. Sitmaryam, Mustapha. ‘‘The International Islamic Resistance Call” 

150. Ibid. 

151. Harman, Jane and Susan Collins. “Al-Qaeda Still Wants a Dirty Bomb.” The Wall Street Journal. 3 July 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748704201604575373270385490484.html 

152. Roggio, Bill. “Al-Qaeda confirms WMD expert Abu Khabab killed in South Waziristan strike.” The Long War Journal. 3 

August 2008. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/al_qaeda_confirms_wm.php146 

153. Mansfield, Laura. “Zawahiri Answers Questions: “Open Meeting”.” LiveLeaks. http://www.liveleak.com/ 

view?i=a60_1207256093 

154. Mahmood, Bashiruddin. “Interview on Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.” PakistanTalk. 23 July 2009. http://www.pakistantalk.com/forums/nuclear-missiles/3102-sultan-bashiruddin-mahmood-interview-pakistans-nuclear-program.html 

155. Mahmood, Bashiruddin. “Cosmology and Human Destiny,” Dar-ul-Hikmat. 2006. pg 46. http://www.darulhikmat.com/ 

cosmology%20book.pdf 

156. Ibid. Pg. 21. 

157. Al-Zawahiri, Ayman. “l-Sahab Releases Ayman Al-Zawahiri Audio Statement on US Presidential Visit.” 2 June 2009. 

http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace/bitstream/10066/4686/1/ZAW20090602.pdf 

Author’s Note: Zawahiri was clearly appealing to “insiders” working in the Pakistan nuclear establishment to consider 

their lyalties carefully; his intent was to get them to question whether they wanted the US or the Islamic “ummah” 

(community) should possess these weapons. In the case of the latter, he implies that they should assist al-Qaeda gain 

access to these weapons. 

http://www.google.com/search?q=Zawahiri+interview+2009&hl=en&client=safari&rls=en&prmd=v&source=univ&t 

bs=vid:1&tbo=u&ei=jg5PTPfLJsHSnAe2op3BBw&sa=X&oi=video_result_group&ct=title&resnum=4&ved=0CCwQq 

wQwAw 

http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/zawahiri_renews_threats_against_jews.htm 

158. “Transcript: Ashcroft, Mueller News Conference.” CNN. 26 May 2004. http://articles.cnn.com/2004-05-26/us/terror. 

threat.transcript_1_al-qaeda-large-scale-attack-terrorist-threats 

Author’s Note: Jaffar al-Tayyar (“the pilot”), aka Adnan Shukrijumah, was one of the first core al-Qaeda operatives with 

confirmed CBRN interests that preceded the 9/11 attack. Press reports indicate he is now al-Qaeda’s external operations 

chief; as such, he is responsible for planning attacks in the US. 

159. Fishman, Shammai. “Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities.” Hudson Institute. 24 August 2010. 

http://www.currenttrends.org/docLib/20061018_MonographFishman2.pdf 

160. Timothy Garton Ash, “We are Making a fatal mistake by ignoring the dissidents within Islam.” The Guardian. 15 March 

2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/mar/15/religion.comment 

161. Al-Banna’s book al-barnamadj al-islami. “The Islamic Program.” pgs. 6–8. 

162. Gomaa, Ali. “Biography.” Ali Gomaa: Grand Mufti of Egypt. accessed 24 August 2010. http://www.aligomaa.net/bio. 

html 


152 

163. Gomaa, Ali. “Biography.” Ali Gomaa: Grand Mufti of Egypt. accessed 24 August 2010. http://www.aligomaa.net/bio. 

html 

164. Sardar, Ziauddin. “Fatwa Against Terrorism.” NewStatesman. 19 June 2008. http://www.newstatesman.com/religion/2008/06/terrorism-fatwa-india-islam 

165. “Faisal Mawlawi Seriously Ill; Replaced As Leader of Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood.” The Global Muslim Brotherhood 

Daily Report. 24 August 2010. http://globalmbreport.com/?p=1750 

166. “Islamic Learning Foundation” site. Scholars. accessed 24 August 2010. http://www.islamiclearningfoundation.com/ 

site/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=136&Itemid=34 

167. Bardin, Jeff. “Without Historical Precedent - Without Religious Support.” CSO. 24 August 2010. http://blogs.csoonline. 

com/without_historical_precedent_without_religious_support 

168. “Reactions and Counter-Reactions to the Saudi Clerics’ Communiqué Calling for Jihad in Iraq .” MEMRI. 21 April 

2005. http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1361.htm 

169. Esposito, John. “Influential Pakistani cleric issues fatwa against terrorism.” The Washington Post. 5 March 2010. http:// 

newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/panelists/john_esposito/2010/03/influential_pakistani_cleric_issues_fatwa_ 

against_terrorism.html 

170. Kurzman, Charles. “Pro-U.S. Fatwas.” UNC. http://www.unc.edu/~kurzman/cv/Kurzman_Pro_US_Fatwas.pdf. 

171. “Stop Terror SHeikhs, Muslim Academics Demand.” Arab News. 30 October 2004. http://archive.arabnews.com/?page= 

4&section=0&article=53683&d=30&m=10&y=2004 

172. Ramadan, Tariq. What I Believe. New York: Oxford University Press. 2010. 

173. Romano, Carlin. “Vetting Tariq Ramadan.” The Chronicle. 23 May 2010. http://chronicle.com/article/Vetting-Tariq- 

Ramadan/65620/ 

174. Ibid. 

175. Keating, Joshua. “Dr. Fadl’s new book,” Foreign Policy. 29 January 2010. http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/ 

posts/2010/01/29/dr_fadls_new_book 

176. Vick, Karl. “Iran’s Gray Area on Nuclear Arms.” Washington Post. 21 June 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/06/20/AR2006062001584.html 

177. Freeman, Colin, and Philip Sherwell. “Iranian fatwa approves use of nuclear weapons.” The Telegraph. 19 February 

2006. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/1510900/Iranian-fatwa-approves-use-of-nuclearweapons.html 

178. Macleod, Scott. and Nahid Siamdoust/Tehran. “The Critical Cleric: Reclaiming Islam for a new world.” Time Online 

Edition. 5 May 2004. http://www.time.com/time/2004/innovators/200405/kadivar.html 

179. Ganji, Akbar. “The Latter-Day Sultan: Power and Politics in Iran.” Foreign Affairs. December 2008. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64606/akbar-ganji/the-latter-day-sultan 

180. Erlich, Reese. “Iran and Leftist Confusion.” Common Dreams. 29 June 2009. http://www.commondreams.org/ 

view/2009/06/28-10 

181. “New Permanent Representative of Iran Presents Credentials.” United Nations. 25 July 2007. http://www.un.org/News/ 

Press/docs/2007/bio3895.doc.htm 

182. Nasr, Vali. The Shia Revival. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 2006. 

183. Fathi, Nazila and Michael Slackman. “Iran’s Nuclear Envoy Quits; Talks in Doubt.” New York Times. 21 October 2007. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/21/world/middleeast/21iran.html 

184. Collier, Robert. “Stifled by clerics, Iranians escape online / Uneasy youth abandon politics for chat rooms and porn 

sites.” SFGate. 16 November 2003. http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-11-16/news/17516888_1_zayandeh-river-iraniansyazd 

185. Slackman, Michael. “Cleric Wields Religion to Challenge Iran’s Theocracy.” New York Times. 21 November 2009. http:// 

www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/world/middleeast/22ayatollah.html?_r=2&hp 

186. Fathi, Nazila and Michael Slackman. “Iran’s Nuclear Envoy Quits; Talks in Doubt.” New York Times. 21 October 2007. 

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/21/world/middleeast/21iran.html 

187. Athanasiadis, Iason. “Iran Unrest Could Boil Over Jan. 16.” CBS. 5 January 2010. http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/05/world/main6057839.shtml 

188. Khan, Sumera. “Iran’s Lack of Cooperation Irks Pakistan.” The Express Tribune. 10 June 2010. http://tribune.com.pk/ 

story/20165/iran’s-lack-of-cooperation-irks-pakistan/ 


189. Rafizadeh, Shahram. “Rection to Assassination Threat Against Khatami.” Rooz 1241. 16 February 2009. http://www. 

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190. “Ayatollah Taheri: Enterprise this president is illegitimate and Ghasbanh.” BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/ 

iran/2009/06/090630_mg_brief_election_taheri.shtml 

191. Javedanfar, Meir. “Ahmadinejad’s messianic connections.” The Guardian. 6 May 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/may/06/iran-ahmadinejad-mahdi 

192. “Dr. Javad Zarif.” Biography on The UN site. http://www.un.org/Dialogue/Zarif.html 


154 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

This report would not have been possible without the important contributions of some 

associates at Harvard University whose assistance I would like to acknowledge. 

Rahim B. Kanani is a master’s student in religion, ethics, and politics at Harvard Divinity 

School where he focuses on Islamic studies and international security policy. Rahim spent 

a great many hours assisting me with the research that went into this report. He also made a 

major contribution in writing portions of the report, including an exhaustive, in-depth com- 

parative text analysis. 

Mary Crowley is an administrative assistant at the Belfer Center for Science and International 

Affairs. Mary assisted in research and preparation of this report. 

Natasha Lawrence is an undergraduate student who worked as a summer intern (2010) at the 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Natasha helped research this report. 

And finally, I would like to pay a special note of gratitude to the Director of the Belfer Center 

for Science and International Affairs, Dr. Graham Allison. Dr. Allison’s passion for solving 

the seemingly intractable problems of our time, has served as a boundless source of inspira- 

tion for my work. 


ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

Prior to his appointment as a senior fellow at the Belfer Center, Mr. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen 

served over three years as the Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. 

Department of Energy. Prior to this, he served for 23 years as a CIA intelligence officer in 

various domestic and international posts, to include Chief of the Europe Division in the 

Directorate of Operations, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counter- 

terrorist Center, and Deputy Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. 

His overseas assignments include Stockholm (1984-1987), Moscow (1988-1990, 1992-1994), 

Athens (1990-1992), Yerevan (1992), Zurich (1994-1996) and Oslo (1998-2000). Prior to his 

career in intelligence, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served as an officer in the U.S. Army. He is a grad- 

uate of the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY. He is married to Roswitha and 

has three children. He is a recipient of the CIA Director’s Award, the George W. Bush Award 

for Excellence in Counterterrorism, the Secretary of Energy’s Exceptional Service Medal, the 

Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, Secretary of Defense Civilian Distinguished Service 

Medal, and the National Intelligence Superior Performance Medal, among others. 


156 


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Cambridge, MA 02138 

Fax: (617) 495-8963 

Email: belfer_center@harvard.edu 

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