Plato’s Sophist:
Annotated bibliography
of the studies in English
Last update: March 5th, 2022
by Raul Corazzon
website: https://www.ontology.co
e-mail: rc@ontology.co
05/03/22, 15:46
Plato's Sophist. Bibliography of the studies in English
Theory and History of Ontology (www.ontology.co)
by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co
Plato's Sophist. Bibliography of the studies in English
Contents
This part of the section History of Ontology includes of the following pages:
Semantics, Predication, Truth and Falsehood in Plato's Sophist
Annotated bibliography on Plato's Sophist:
Plato's Sophist. Annotated bibliography (A - Buc)
Plato's Sophist. Annotated bibliography (Can - Fos)
Plato's Sophist. Annotated bibliography (Fra - Kah)
Plato's Sophist. Annotated bibliography (Kal - Mig)
Plato's Sophist. Annotated bibliography (Mil - Pec)
Plato's Sophist. Annotated bibliography (Pel - San)
Plato's Sophist. Annotated bibliography (Say - Zuc)
Platon: Sophiste. Bibliographie des études en Français (A - L)
Platon: Sophiste. Bibliographie des études en Français (M - Z)
Platon: Sophistes. Ausgewählte Studien in Deutsch
Platone: Sofista. Bibliografia degli studi in Italiano
Platón: Sofista. Bibliografía de estudios en Español
Platão: Sofista. Bibliografía dos estudos em Portugués
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Bibliography
1.
"Plato's Sophist." 2013. The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and
Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:275-362.
Contents: PART IV: Plato’s Sophist 275; Nickolas Pappas: Introduction 277; John
Sallis: Plato’s Sophist: A Different Look 283; Vigdis Songe-Møller: Socrates, the
Stranger and Parmenides in Plato’s Sophist: Two Troubled Relationships 292; Jens
Kristian Larsen: The Virtue of Power 306; Hallvard J. Fossheim: Development and
Not-Being in Plato’s Sophist 318; Kristin Sampson: A Third Possibility: Mixture
and Musicality 329; Nickolas Pappas: The Story that Philosophers Will Be Telling
of the Sophist 339; Burt Hopkins: The Génos of Lógos and the Investigation of the
Greatest Genê in Plato’s Sophist 353-362.
2.
Ackrill, John Lloyd. 1955. "ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ." Bulletin of the Institute of
Classical Studies no. 2:31-35.
Reprinted in J. L. Ackrill, Essays on Plato and Aristotle, New York, Oxford
University Press, 1997, Chapter 4, pp. 72-79.
"It is the purpose of this short essay• to consider the meaning and implications of a
sentence in Plato's Sophist. At the end of the section on μέγιστα γένη (the
combination of kinds) the Eleatic visitor is made to speak as follows (259e4-6):
τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων: διὰ γὰρ
τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν (the isolation of
everything from everything else is the total annihilation of all statements; for it is
because of the interweaving of Forms with one another that we come to have
discourse). I shall be mainly concerned with the second half of this remark, and
shall refer to it, for brevity, as sentence or statement S." (p. 72 of the reprint)
(...)
"I have gradually passed from talking about Forms to talking about concepts, and I
have taken these to be, in effect, the meanings of general words. Correspondingly, I
have implied that the task assigned in Plato's later dialogues to the dialectician or
philosopher is the investigation and plotting of the relations among concepts, a task
to be pursued through a patient study of language by noticing which combinations
of words in sentences do, and which do not, make sense, by eliciting ambiguities
and drawing distinctions, by stating explicitly facts about the interrelations of word
meanings which we normally do not trouble to state, though we all have some latent
knowledge of them in so far as we know how to talk correctly. To justify all this,
and to add the many sober qualifications which it evidently demands, would take a
volume." (p. 78 of the reprint)
3.
———. 1957. "Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-9." Journal of Hellenic Studies
no. 77:1-6.
Reprinted in: R. E. Allen (ed.), Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul 1965, pp. 207-218, G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato. A Collection of Critical
Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Notre Dame: Indiana University Press
1971; J. L. Ackrill, Essays on Plato and Aristotle, New York: Oxford University
Press 1997, pp. 80-92.
"My purpose is not to give a full interpretation of this difficult and important
passage, but to discuss one particular problem, taking up some remarks made by F.
M. Cornford (in Plato's Theory of Knowledge) and by Mr. R. Robinson (in his
paper on Plato's Parmenides, Class. Phil., 1942)." (Allen 1965, p. 207)
(...)
"This examination of Plato's use of some terms, though far from exhaustive, is, I
think, sufficient to discredit Cornford's claim that the 'blending' metaphor is the one
safe clue to Plato's meaning, and to establish that μετεχειν and its variants,
μετλαμβανειν and κοννειν (with genitive), are not used by Plato as mere
alternatives for μειγνυσθαι. It may be admitted that in 2.5 5d, the passage Cornford
exploits, μετεχειν is used in an exceptional way; but one passage cannot be allowed
to outweigh a dozen others.(1)
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To sum up: I have tried to argue firstly, that the verb μετεχειν, with its variants, has
a role in Plato's philosophical language corresponding to the role of the copula in
ordinary language; and secondly, that by his analysis of various statements Plato
brings out - and means to bring out - the difference between the copula (μετεχει . . .
), the identity-sign (μετεχειν ταυτου ... ) and the existential ἔστιν (μετεχειν του
ὄντος)." (Allen 1965, p. 218)
(1) This is rather a cavalier dismissal of the passage on which Cornford relies so
heavily. But it is not possible in the space available to attempt a full study of the
perplexing argument of 255c 12-e 1, and without such a study no statement as to the
exact force of μετεχειν in 25 5c 4 is worth much. My own conviction is that even in
this passage μετεχειν does not stand for the symmetrical relation 'blending'; but it is
certainly not used in quite the same way as in the other places where it occurs in 2 5
1-9.
4.
Adomënas, Mantas. 2004. "'They are telling us a myth': a curious portrait of the
presocratic philosophers in Plato's Sophist." Literatura no. 46:8-14.
"Philosophical implications of the dialogue-form have been, for quite some time, all
the buzz in Platonic studies. One need not enumerate all the advantages and
productive insights that this approach has generated. One facet of Plato’s
philosophical method, however, remains insufficiently explored so far: namely,
Plato’s reflections on the question of genre and form of philosophical discourse
which could be gleaned from his judgments on his philosophical predecessors, the
Presocratics.
What I propose to do here is to offer a close reading of a couple of Platonic
passages were Plato’s protagonists’ engagement with the Presocratic doctrines is
described or dramatised. In doingthat, I shall seek to highlight Plato’s position and
judgments concerning the form, or genre,(1) of Presocratic discourse, and to trace
the implications of those judgments with one question in view: what is the nature,
in Plato’s view, of Presocratic teaching qua intellectual enterprise or ‘genre’?(2)" (P.
8)
(1) The notion of ‘intellectual genre’ here is considerably indebted to Alasdair
MacIntyre. Though he was not the first to interpret various types of philosophical
enquiry in terms of their genre of discourse, each of which presupposes a certain
distinct type of validity for its statements, I found MacIntyre’s observations in his
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry particularly rewarding.
(2) This is an aspect of larger project of reconstructing Plato’s reception of the
Presocratic thinkers, addressed in my doctoral thesis.
5.
Aguirre, Javier. 2011. "Plato's Sophist and Aristotelian being." Czesk and Slovac
Journal of Humanities no. 1:74-81.
Abstract: "In the chapter M 4 of Metaphysics, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics
practiced by Socrates. Aristotle attributes to Socrates the lack of “dialectical
power”. In the same way, in N 2, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by “the
dialecticians” imputing the archaic way in which the problem about being is posed.
There are many signs that make us think that Aristotle refers to Plato and the
Platonics with the term “dialecticians”, to whom he attributes the “dialectical
power”. Therefore, Aristotle is aware of the merits and shortcomings of Platonic
dialectics, more specifically of the dialectics practiced by Plato in the Sophist. In
the development of his own conception of the being (to on), in the middle books of
Metaphysics, Aristotle bears in mind the contents of this dialogue and makes the
attempt to overcome the difficulties stated in the Eleatist, such as the deficiencies of
the Platonic way of understanding the being."
6.
———. 2011. "Plato’s Sophist and the Aristotelian being." Czech and Slovak
Journal of Humanities Philosophica:74-81.
Abstract: "In the chapter M 4 of Metaphysics, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics
practiced by Socrates. Aristotle attributes to Socrates the lack of “dialectical
power”. In the same way, in N 2, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by “the
dialecticians” imputing the archaic way in which the problem about being is posed.
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There are many signs that make us think that Aristotle refers to Plato and the
Platonics with the term “dialecticians”, to whom he attributes the “dialectical
power”. Therefore, Aristotle is aware of the merits and shortcomings of Platonic
dialectics, more specifically of the dialectics practiced by Plato in the Sophist. In
the development of his own conception of the being (to on), in the middle books of
Metaphysics, Aristotle bears in mind the contents of this dialogue and makes the
attempt to overcome the difficulties stated in the Eleatist, such as the deficiencies of
the Platonic way of understanding the being."
7.
Albury, W. H. 1971. "Hunting the Sophist." Apeiron no. 5:1-12.
"The Stranger from Elea is asked by Socrates, at the outset of Plato's dialogue, the
Sophist, to distinguish between the Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher — "not so
short and easy a task," as the Stranger tells us (217 b).
To Theaetetus, his joint inquirer, the Stranger says, "We had better, I think, begin by
studying the Sophist and try to bring his nature to light in a clear formula" (218 bc).
But being brought to light is, of course, the very thing which the Sophist most
resists, for he is a creature who "takes refuge in the darkness of not-being, where he
is at home and has the knack of feeling his way" (254 a).
Thus, the Stranger warns Theaetetus, "it is not so easy to comprehend this group we
intend to examine or to say what it means to be a Sophist" (213 c). Now since the
Sophist is such a "troublesome sort of creature to hunt down" (212 d) : it seems
reasonable to ask why the Stranger has decided to begin with him instead of with
the Statesman or the Philosopher." (p. 1)
8.
Alieva, Olga. 2010. "Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato’s Sophist." Hermatena no.
189:71-91.
"The well-known sixth definition of the sophist in the homonymous dialogue
contains a discussion of the elenchus (230b4-e3) which is often referred to as a
manifestation of the late Plato’s attitude towards this method of argumentation. It is
generally assumed that the definition of the sophist ‘of noble lineage’ given here
should be applied to Socrates as represented in earlier Platonic dialogues."
(...)
"The scope of this paper is to demonstrate that the mention of the elenchus at
230b4-e3 is not merely retrospective, and to draw attention to the elenctic
dimension of the whole dialogue. This, in its turn, enables us to reconsider also the
method of diairesis and its methodological potential." p. 71)
9.
———. 2016. "Ὀρθολογία περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν: Heidegger on the Notion of Falsehood in
Plato’s Sophist." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in
Marburg (1924-25), edited by de Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 143-155.
Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"A crucial question Plato poses in the Sophist is how it is possible to say
falsehoods: it involves the assumption that non-being exists (τὸ μὴ ὂν εἶναι), for
otherwise falsehood could not come into existence (236e–237a). Plato’s solution to
this problem has been explored mainly in terms of the modern philosophy of
language with an emphasis on the meanings of the verb ‘to be’
existential/copulative/veridical),(1) types of predication (ordinary/definitional),(2)
the character of false statements (affirmative/negative)(3) etc. It has been generally
acknowledged that to understand the solution Plato offers to the so called
“falsehood paradox” we must focus mainly on the propositional dimension of lógos,
on its subject-predicate structure. In sharp contrast, Heidegger endeavours to “get
rid of propositions” (GA 19, 594/411)(4) while interpreting the Sophist,(5) and this
endeavour will be our topic in what follows." (p. 143)
(1) Ackrill (1957), 1−6; Kahn (1966), 245−265, and others; a useful overview can
be found in Fronterotta (2011), 35f.
(2) Crivelli (2012), 9 and passim.
(3) Owen (1978), 223f; McDowell (1982), 115f; Brown (2008), 437f, etc.
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(4) 4 Hereinafter the number after the slash refers to the English translation by
Rojcewicz and Schuwer (1997)
(5) There are extremely few references to Heidegger in the vast literature on Plato’s
Sophist. See, e.g.: Cordero (1993), 224; 227; Notomi (1999), 7. It has been
repeatedly noted that Heidegger fails to do justice to the dialogical form of the
writing because he reads Plato “through Aristotle”. See, e.g.: Gonzalez (2009), 60;
Rosen (1983), 4f.
References
Ackrill, John L. “Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251–259.” Journal of Hellenic
Studies 77, no. 1 (1957): 1–6.
Brown, Lesley. “The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood.” In The
Oxford Handbook of Plato, edited by Gail Fine, 437–62. Oxford, New York: OUP,
2008.
Cordero, Nestor-Luis. Platon: Le Sophiste. Paris: Flammarion, 1993.
Crivelli, Paolo. Plato’s Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist. Cambridge,
New York: CUP, 2012.
Gonzalez, Francisco J. Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue. University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009.
Heidegger, Martin. Plato’s Sophist, translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre
Schuwer. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997.
Kahn, Charles H. “The Greek Verb ‘to Be’ and the Concept of Being.” Foundations
of Language 2, no. 3 (1966): 245–65.
McDowell, John. “Falsehood and Not-Being.” In Language and Logos: Studies in
Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G.E.L. Owen, edited by Malcolm Schofield
and Martha C. Nussbaum, 115–34. Cambridge, New York: CUP, 1982.
Notomi, Noburu. The Unity of Plato’s Sophist: Between the Sophist and the
Philosopher. Cambridge, New York: CUP, 1999.
Owen, G. E. L. “Plato on Not-Being.” In Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays.
Edited by Gregory Vlastos, 223–67. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1978.
Rosen, Stanley. Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1983.
10.
Allred, Ammon. 2009. "The Divine Logos: Plato, Heraclitus, and Heidegger in the
Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 14:1-18.
Abstract: "In this paper, I address the way in which Plato’s Sophist rethinks his
lifelong dialogue with Heraclitus. Plato uses a concept of logos in this dialogue that
is much more Heraclitean than his earlier concept of the logos. I argue that he
employs this concept in order to resolve those problems with his earlier theory of
ideas that he had brought to light in the Parmenides. I argue that the concept of the
dialectic that the Stranger develops rejects, rather than continues, the idea reached
at the end of the Theaetetus that knowledge has to be grounded in a nous aneu
logou (a non-logical, divine intellect) even while the Stranger appropriates the
concerns that lead to his conclusion. Ultimately, I suggest that my differentiation of
the later Plato’s appropriation of the tradition from Aristotle’s appropriation of that
tradition is closely related to the re-thinking of the full sense of logos in the later
Heidegger on Heraclitus and on Parmenides. I end by suggesting that the question
that Plato and Heraclitus pose to us is to ask what such a divine logos tells about
human ways of knowing."
11.
Altman, William H. F. 2016. The Guardians on Trial. The Reading Order of Plato’s
Dialogues from Euthyphro to Phaedo. Lanham: Lexington Books.
See Chapter 2: Plato’s Trilogy: Sophist, Statesman, and Apology of Socrates 69169.
"In the traditional retelling of the outworn story of Plato’s Development,
Parmenides marks its author’s abandonment or modification of the views of his
“middle period,” especially as presented in Republic 5-7 and Phaedo. By
configuring Timaeus, Philebus, Sophist-Statesman, and Laws as “late dialogues,”
that story suggests that Plato has, in some meaningful ways, outgrown Socrates; I
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am challenging that story on the basis of Reading Order, an alternative paradigm for
ordering and reading his dialogues. Looking back to The Guardians in Action [*],
the indisputable fact that Plato joined Republic to Timaeus-Critias in a dramatic
sense has not been given its due, and the parallel fact guiding The Guardians on
Trial is that Plato, once again indisputably, has joined Sophist-Statesman to the trial
and death of Socrates, primarily by means of Euthyphro." (p. 9, a note omitted)
[*] W. H. F. Altman, The Guardians in Action. Plato the Teacher and the PostRepublic Dialogues from Timaeus to Theaetetus, Lanham: Lexington Books 2016.
12.
Ambuel, David. 2005. "On What is Not: Eleatic Paradox in the Parmenides and the
Sophist." In Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum
Pragense, edited by Havlícek, Ales and Karfík, Filip, 200-215. Prague: Oikoymenh.
"The following argument undertakes to show one positive thesis implied by the
thicket of interrelated contradictions that is the Parmenides. There may well be
others. In particular, it is proposed here that, as a consequence of the multiply
contradictory conclusions and the methods that lead to them, any analysis of the
kind of unity that we find in the world - namely, that of composites, of wholes of
parts - demands that being is not a form, but form the principle of being.
To accomplish this, the following thoughts look into parallels linking the Sophist
with the Parmenides. Emphasis is directed especially to the concept of not-being as
it appears in the second part of Parmenides and in the Sophist, 237a-244d. Both
dialogues reveal inadequacies of Parmenides’ metaphysics by employing the logic
of Eleatic metaphysics to examine form - being is and is intelligible (like the ideas),
not-being is its opposite, their opposition is that of simple contradictories, i.e.
between being and not-being lies nothing - with the result that the real is either
empty, transcendent and inaccessible, or that being, all of reality, is reduced to the
manner of existence of sensibles (i.e. having the being of wholes and parts), which,
subsequently, upon analysis, leads to contradiction and unintelligibility." (p. 200)
13.
———. 2007. Image and Paradigm in Plato's Sophist. La Vegas: Parmenides
Publishing.
Second edition; first edition Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991.
"The Sophist is a rather technical piece. The myth and drama are at their minimum,
and Plato introduces a set of plodding definitions that evolves into a discussion of
terms of highest abstraction: ‘being,’ ‘rest,’ ‘motion,’ ‘sameness,’ ‘otherness.’
And yet it is not only a technical piece. This volume aims to give an interpretation
of the Sophist as a whole, with sensitivity to its subtleties and implications. The
philosophical commentary is followed by a translation. As R. E. Allen remarked on
translating Plato, “Plato, as a writer, stands with Shakespeare, but his translators do
not, so this task is all but impossible.” There have been several translations of the
Sophist, and I have learned from them all. The goal here is not to add one to their
number, but to add clarity to the interpretation. Those familiar with other
interpretations will quickly apprehend that the reading presented here sets out with
an approach distinct from many. The intent is not to make a definitive statement of
doctrine; where there is such philosophical richness, there is no finality. Instead, the
intent is to overcome the barriers that keep us from the Sophist’s philosophical
depths. As the Philebus states, discussing analysis and definition by divisions, when
improperly done, is the cause of impasse; properly done, it is the entry to an open
path. The Sophist presented here is not an artifact of our intellectual past or a
notable historical point marking the ancestry of later developments; it is living
philosophy." (Preface, pp. XI-XII)
(...)
"It has been observed that “all Platonic scholars hold that in the Sophist and
subsequent works the protagonist expresses Plato’s own views.”(2) By now, it will
not have escaped the attention of the reader familiar with the literature on the
Sophist that I share neither this assumption that the Eleatic speaks straight Platonic
doctrine nor other related presuppositions about the text. The reasons I find these
absurd should become clear to the reader who persists. For the reader who does
hold to what “all Platonic scholars” hold, and has both the kindly indulgence and
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diligence to persevere, let this be a dialectical exercise to discover what this
dialogue might uncover, on the hypothesis that it is, after all, a work of
metaphysics." (Introduction, P. XVII)
(2) Richard Robinson, Essays in Greek Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969,
p. 21.
14.
———. 2011. "The Coy Eristic: Defining the Image the Defines the Sophist." In
Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense,
edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 278-310. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"The argument of this paper is informed by two observations about the Sophist’s
dramatic structure: in contrast to the denial in all other Platonic depictions of the
sophist, here the sophist is assumed to have an art. That assumption is never
relinquished, even though the reason given elsewhere for declaring him artless is
explicitly voiced when he is described as a kind of magician (233b–c). Secondly,
the discussion is led, not by Socrates, but by an Eleatic philosopher, and is
conducted following a process that adheres to an Eleatic ontology that admits no
intermediate between being and absolute not-being.
Without an ontological intermediary, every image is as real as any reality, and every
practice an art." (p. 278)
15.
———. 2013. "Difference in Kind: Observations on the Distinction of the Megista
Gene." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas
M., 247-268. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"In short, the nominalism of an Eleatic metaphysics (or of a Heraclitean
metaphysics, as they are interpreted in the Sophist and the Theaetetus) cannot state
what anything “is,” which would require the means to conceive of a character that is
universal, distinguishable from things that are characterized by it, and attributable in
the same or in related senses to a plurality. Consequently, what a thing “is” becomes
what it is not.
The analysis of combinations furnishes the abstract, if contradictory, logic
underpinning the method of division used to pursue the sophist.
The irony is that, by setting aside the ontological inquiry into the opposite of
“being” and identifying “not-being” (in one sense) with “other,” the being and
nature of anything as a result is constituted entirely by its difference from what it is
not. Being, in effect, is nothing other than not-being." (p. 267)
16.
Andic, Martin, and Brown, Malcolm. 1973. "False Statement in the "Sophist" and
Theaetetus' Mathematics." Phoenix no. 27:26-34.
"The purpose of this paper is to call attention to a parallel between Plato's account
of false statement in the Sophist and Theaetetus' study of incommensurables,
substantially preserved for us in Euclid's Elements, Book 10." (p. 26)
(...)
The main parallel to which we are calling attention gives rise to the following
question. We have emphasized that the proportions into which we analyze
assertions that a given statement is true or false put the same objects on both sides
of the division between statement and being: does this not collapse the true
statement with the fact it states? Readers of Russell's Problems of Philosophy
(London 1912), Chapter 12, are often vexed by a similar puzzle in his doctrine of
false belief, which is in many ways like the doctrine of the Sophist. If and only if it
is true what Othello believes, i.e., that Desdemona loves Cassio, then there exists
such a complex as Desdemona's love for Cassio (or, that Desdemona loves Cassio),
and this, though its actual existence is independent of Othello's mind, is composed
of the very objects which also go to compose his belief. But how, one wonders, can
the objects of the world be the very objects in the believer's mind? In reply, one
might ask, how can they fail to be the very objects concerning which he has belief?
It seems a reasonable answer to this question simply to say that it is the same thing
that can be believed and can be. More fully, the same relation which is believed to
hold among objects, or holds among them in a picture, can also hold among them in
reality, and does so just when the belief or picture is true to reality. Similarly, it is
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the same thing that one states to be the case with certain objects and which is the
case when the statement is true, or not the case when it is false. Finally, a point
about the Academy in the mid-fourth century. If we are right in finding a strict
parallel between these philosophical and mathematical researches into "not-being in
logos" at the Academy, we would have found some confirmation of the familiar
Platonic thesis that mathematics prepares the way for philosophy. Nor would it be
any surprise if Plato, admiring Theaetetus' work on incommensurability, should
have developed his own treatment of false statement so as to run parallel to it, and
accordingly had good reason for assigning to this mathematician a central role in
the Sophist." (p. 34)
17.
Anscombe, G.E.M. 1966. "The New Theory of the Forms." The Monist no. 50:403420.
Reprinted in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, Volume
One: From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1981, pp. 21-33.
"I want to suggest that Plato arrived at a revised theory of forms in the later
dialogues. Or perhaps I might rather say that he constructed a new underpinning for
the theory. This can be discerned, I believe, in the Sophist, taken together with
certain parts of the dialectic of the Parmenides which use the same language as the
Sophist." (p. 21)
(...)
"If I am right, then the idea of some forms as having parts is of extreme importance.
In the Sophist (1158d-e) it is especially stressed that the other is divided up into
many bits and parcelled out among all things in relation to one another, and we hear
of the part of the other that stands over against the being of each, or, if we follow
Simplicius, of each part of the other that stands over against being. I prefer the MSS
reading, but on my interpretation it makes no difference to the sense. For the
language of being divided up and parcelled out occurs also in the Parmenides in
relation to one and to being (144), and it seems immensely unlikely that this part of
the argument there was not also part of Plato's final view. This gives us three points:
(1) the being and unity of each form are parts of being and of the one respectively;
(2) the one being is a whole of parts, among which are the existent unitary forms of
the early theory; (3) each existent form is a whole composed of the form and its
being. Thus there will be a part of the other (the bottom right hand layer in my
diptych as it lies open) which is a part of being that stands over against being. This
part of the other will itself be divided into pans each of which stands over against
part of being, i.e. the being in one of the forms of the early theory. We may add that
one will, like being, same and other, "run through" everything, and same, like
being, one and other, will be "parcelled out" among all things." (p. 30)
18.
Baltzly, Dirk C. 1996. ""To an Unhypothetical First Principle" in Plato's Republic."
History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 13:149-165.
"This paper argues that we may find examples of two unhypothetical principles in
Parmenides and Sophist. But, in the Republic, Plato speaks only of an
unhypothetical principle. Moreover, commentators almost universally identify the
unhypothetical principle of the Republic with the Form of the Good, or some
account of the Form of the Good. My unhypothetical principles-One has a share of
Being, some of the kinds blend-do not look like they have much to do at all with the
Form of the Good. How, then, can these passages from Sophist and Parmenides be
illustrations of the method described in Book VII in the ascent to an unhypothetical
starting point?" (p. 157)
19.
Beere, Jonathan. 2019. "Faking Wisdom: The Expertise of Sophistic in Plato's
Sophist." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 57:153-189.
"How should we understand the Sophist’s definition of sophistic?
We tend to assume that the problem with sophistic is that sophists use bad
arguments in the logical sense that the arguments are either invalid or unsound.
Sophistic is either some special facility in the use of fallacious forms of argument or
it is a character defect, the willingness to use such arguments, or both. But the
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concept of a logical fallacy distorts Plato’s view of sophistry, which is both stranger
and more interesting, as I will argue. Indeed, perhaps the most interesting and, in its
own way, puzzling aspect of the definition of sophistic has been neglected: the
Eleatic Visitor defines sophistic as an expertise (τέχνη, Soph. 221 d 1–6).(1)" (p.
153)
(1) While I originally drafted this paper some time before the appearance of L.
Brown, ‘Definition and Division in Plato’s Sophist’ [‘Definition’], in D. Charles
(ed.), Definition in Greek Philosophy [Definition] (Oxford, 2010), 151–71, the two
papers are antitheses to one another. Brown claims, ‘Sophistry, the sophist: these are
not appropriate terms to be given a serious definition . . . there is no such genuine
kind as sophistry—especially not under the genus of technē, skill, art, or expertise’
(Brown, ‘Definition’, 153). I attempt here to vindicate the seventh and final
definition of sophistic by vindicating the claim that sophistic is an expertise.
20.
Benardete, Seth. 1960. "Plato Sophist 223 b1-7." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient
Philosophy no. 5:129-139.
"We must now ask what bearing this distinction between the hunter and the hunted
has on the dialogue as a whole. Suppose all hunters were different, while all the
things hunted were of the same kind. Art would then be definable exclusively in
terms of its procedure. There would be no separable classes of beings in so far as
they were beings, but only in so far as there were different ways of hunting them.
There would be no εἶδη, Suppose, on the other hand, all the things hunted were
different, while all the hunters were the same. Art would then be definable only in
terms of its single subject. It would have no procedure, for an art presupposes a
differentiable class of beings on all of which the same procedure can be applied;
and a lack of procedure would entail no distinction between knowledge and
ignorance. An art, then, must be defined both by its objects - the art of something and by its way to that something." (p. 131)
21.
———. 1963. "The Right, the True, and the Beautiful." Glotta no. 41:54-62.
Whenever a Platonic character says ναί in answer to a question, we know that his
"yes" is the same as ours; and if he answers πῶς γάρ; or πῶς γάρ οὔ; he is
confirming a negative or positive statement; but when one of them says ὀρθός,
αληθή, χαλώς is not self-evident that he means the same as we do in saying "right",
"true", "fine". These answers hardly look except for their greater rarity more
significant than ναί." (p. 54)
(...)
"Were there a gap in our manuscripts between two questions of Socrates, we should
not now be able to say which stereotyped phrase was most suitable. Was Plato
equally perplexed?
Are his "rights", "trues", and "fines" as arbitrary and interchangeable as Homeric
formulae, or are they, as we shall try to show, dependent on and prompted by the
form the previous question takes?" (p. 54)
(...)
"To bathe the reader in enough examples and yeτ not drown him, I have chosen to
explain καλώς (κάλλιστα), ορθώς (ὀρθότατα) and αληθή (αληθέστατα) in two
dialogues only, the Sophist and Politicus.
As the "dramatic" element in them is not so prominent as elsewhere, the propriety
of each word for the course of the argument appears more distinctly. The danger,
however, of using them lies in the similarity of their themes, style, and speakers,
which may be thought to exclude any inference about other dialogues; but these
very similarities allow us to check them against one another: to see how a similar
remark in each provokes the same answer. And yet to indicate that our definitions
are not too parochial, further examples from other dialogues have been added,
though without explanation the force of these words is easily missed." (p. 55)
(...)
"If our interpretation of these passages is correct, we should not conclude that it
holds everywhere. There may be cases where it would be impossible for us to make
any discrimination, and we could go no farther than the almost-empty "fine",
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"right", and "true"; and possibly Plato did not always keep to the same usage
throughout his writings. But the consistency of our results in two dialogues and
their agreement with the other passages cited (from a much larger store), put out of
court the possibility of accident and randomness. They show Plato's ability even in
small things to imitate and sharpen the distinctions of ordinary speech). They
further suggest that every context would have to be as thoroughly analyzed before
we could decide on the scope and accuracy of our tentative definitions. It is not,
however, a project that can be published. Complete lists, without explanation,
would be almost useless, and with them, too tedious to be valuable. They would be
as long as the Platonic corpus itself. We only offer this paper as a specimen and
challenge: the reader of Plato must work out the rest for himself." (p. 62)
22.
———. 1986. Plato's Sophist: Part II of 'The Being of the Beautiful'. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Contents: Introduction IX; Guide for the Reader XVII; Sophist II.1; Sophist
Commentary II.69; Notes II.168; Selected Bibliography II.178-180.
"The Sophist’s dialogic form presents us with another riddle: Either Socrates is just
another sophist, or all philosophers prior to Socrates were sophists. The first half of
the dialogue, in which the stranger traps Socrates in progressively narrower
definitions until the sophist can be only Socrates, is balanced by its second half, in
which the stranger proceeds to condemn all earlier philosophers for not
understanding the necessity of Socrates’ so-called second sailing. Inasmuch as the
second sailing is inseparable from Socrates’ discovery of political philosophy, the
Sophist’s companion dialogue, the Statesman, in which the stranger brings about a
complete identity of dialogic form and argument, needs to be put together with the
Sophist before the Sophist can be understood by itself. It is because the Statesman
is essentially prior to the Sophist that it follows it of necessity. The Sophist then
requires a double reading. But even such a double reading does not suffice, for its
problem is initiated by the Theaetetus, in which the joint failure of Socrates and
Theaetetus to answer the question, What is knowledge?, prompts them to appeal to
the Eleatic stranger. His answer is contained in the Sophist and the Statesman; it is
not contained in either of them separately. It is therefore another question whether
his twofold answer differs from the answer to be found in the Theaetetus." (p. 210)
23.
———. 1993. "On Plato's Sophist." The Review of Metaphysics no. 46:747-780.
Reprinted in: S. Benardete, The Argument of the Action: Essays on Greek Poetry
and Philosophy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp. 323-353.
"It seems at first as if the Stranger's analysis of λόγος into agent and action is
designed solely for finding truth or falsity in the correct or incorrect attachment of
an action to a known agent; by his restriction of imitation to impersonation,
however, the agent becomes significant in himself and independent of what he does.
(13) The sophist embodies virtue as it is understood in opinion, despite his
suspicion that he does not know what his σχῆμα declares he knows.
Gorgias exemplifies this perfectly, but what he does is to contradict and refute the
opinions about virtue the interlocutor himself maintains and believes he sees
represented in the sophist. The sophist impersonates the opinions he refutes. What,
then, of Socrates?
He is not an impersonator. Theodorus at any rate found him pokerfaced, and could
not figure out what Socrates believed from his totally convincing presentation of a
Protagorean position (Theaetetus 161a6). Socrates, however, is ironical. Does his
claim to ignorance come across as knowledge in light of his capacity to show up the
ignorance of others? More particularly, does the incoherence in opinion about a
virtue, once Socrates has exposed it, induce the impression that Socrates himself
possesses that virtue? It would seem impossible that Socrates could display popular
virtue without its inconsistencies while bringing to light its inconsistencies, but
Socrates the logic-chopping moralist seems to be doing exactly that.
Λόγος as dialogue thus comes to light as the problem of Socrates the agent in his
action. We can say that the Sophist ends at that point where the problem has been
uncovered, and the Statesman is designed to treat Socratic agency. Socrates the
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agent, however, cannot show up in himself; instead, he shows up in the patient,
young Socrates." (pp. 779-780)
(13) In the summary the Stranger gives of the sophist's genealogy (268c8-d4), all
but one of his lines of descent can be rephrased as a verb: the difference between
divine and human imitation resists such a rephrasing.
24.
Benitez, Eugenio. 1996. "Characterisation and Interpretation: The Importance of
Drama in Plato's Sophist." Literature & Aesthetics no. 6:27-39.
"I confess that I would not recommend the Sophist to anyone as a work of literature.
But I deny that the dramatic form is ever unimportant in Plato. In my own work on
Plato I have found that the drama and the philosophy are not separable.(10) to At
the very least, the drama complements, supplements, and augments the philosophy.
Let me cite what should be an uncontroversial example from the Sophist.
Theodorus innocently uses the word '(γένος ('kind') in his first speech: the Stranger,
he says, belongs to the γένος of Elea (i.e. he is Eleatic by birth). Socrates, who has a
nose for ambiguity, picks up the term in his second speech, claiming that the kind
called 'philosopher' is scarcely easier to discern than the kind 'god'. The discussion
then turns to a consideration of three '(γένη ('kinds') - sophist, statesman and
philosopher [216c3, 217a7] - but ultimately even this topic yields to discussion of
the five μέγιστα γένη ('greatest kinds'), namely being, sameness, difference, motion
and rest. An innocent remark leads to the most extraordinary inquiry. This
progression is the dramatic complement of the Stranger's own remark that: 'one
must practise first on small and easy things before progressing to the very greatest'
[218d1-2]." (p. 28)
(10) For a discussion of the importance of the dialogue form see E. Benitez,
'Argument, Rhetoric and Philosophic Method: Plato's Protagoras', Philosophy and
Rhetoric 25 (1992): 222-252.
25.
Berger, Fred R. 1965. "Rest and Motion in the Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for
Ancient Philosophy no. 10:70-77.
"In a recent article,(1) Professor Julius M. E. Moravcsik has attempted an
interpretation of a very difficult passage in Plato's Sophist (255 a4-b 6), in which
Plato sought to prove that neither the Same nor the Other is identical with either
Rest or Motion. The interpretation which Moravcsik puts forth aims at making
Plato's argument sound and consistent with other points made in the dialogue.
Unfortunately, Moravcsik's presentation is not always clear itself. It is one of the
chief purposes of this paper to clarify Moravcsik's argument. In addition, it will be
argued that his interpretation of the passage in the Sophist fails to save Plato's
argument, and that it rests on a subtle logical distinction which there seems little
reason to assume Plato intended to use. Indeed, it will be argued that an
interpretation which Moravcsik rejects seems better suited to Plato's passage." (p.
70)
(1) Julius M. E. Moravcsik, "Being and Meaning in the 'Sophist'," Acta
Philosophica Fennica, Fasc. XIV (1962), pp. 23-78. I am indebted to Professor
Jürgen Mau who first called my attention to some of the problems in Moravcsik's
interpretation.
26.
Berman, Brad. 2015. "The Secret Doctrine and the Gigantomachia: Interpreting
Plato’s Theaetetus-Sophist." Plato Journal no. 14:53-62.
Abstract: "The Theaetetus’ ‘secret doctrine’ and the Sophist’s ‘battle between gods
and giants’ have long fascinated Plato scholars. I show that the passages
systematically parallel one another.
Each presents two substantive positions that are advanced on behalf of two separate
parties, related to one another by their comparative sophistication or refinement.
Further, those parties and their respective positions are characterized in
substantially similar terms. On the basis of these sustained parallels, I argue that the
two passages should be read together, with each informing and constraining an
interpretation of the other."
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27.
Berman, Scott. 1996. "Plato's Explanation of False Belief in the Sophist." Apeiron
no. 29:19-46.
"Introduction. In this paper, I will reconstruct Plato's explanation of false belief as it
emerges from his Sophist and suggest why it is explanatorily better than the
principal contemporary account. Since Frege, the received view in contemporary
analytic philosophy of mind and philosophy of language is that human cognition of
the world is always mediated through some sort of intensional object.(1) Moreover,
the identity conditions of such intensional objects have been assumed to be
ontologically independent of their relation to the world. This theory of human
cognition is worse ontologically as compared with a theory which does not require
any mediary objects because the former commits itself to a larger ontology than the
latter. However, the larger ontology is allegedly justified by gains in explanatory
power. If that is the case, then the postulation of such further entities is justified. On
the other hand, if the alleged gain in explanatory power is, as I shall suggest,
illusory, then Plato's theory of human cognition, which makes no reference to
intensional objects which are ontologically independent of their relation to the
world, will be a better explanation insofar as it will commit itself to a smaller
ontology in that explanation and further, will actually explain something we want
explained." (p. 19)
(1) I owe a great debt, both here and elsewhere, to Penner, Terry. (1988). Plato and
the Philosophers of Language. Unpublished manuscript.
28.
Bernabé, Alberto. 2013. "The Sixth Definition (Sophist 226a-231c) : Transposition
of religious language." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and
Robinson, Thomas M., 42-56. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Plato defines the sophist, in the sixth definition of the dialogue of the same name
(226a – 231c), as one who purifies the soul of wrong opinions through the
technique of refutation. In so doing, however, he ends up in an awkward position:
the result of applying the method of diairesis seems to result rather in a definition of
the philosopher Socrates (1), or, what is worse, a definition valid for both the
sophist and the philosopher, and likely to produce confusion between them. So the
sixth definition looks a little bizarre, and is difficult to understand.
My aim is to make a contribution to the solution of the problem from the point of
view of a philologist. I shall be looking at the use of certain words which in Plato’s
time were as pertinent to the religious sphere as they were to the philosophical. I
shall pay particular attention to those that had been used by him in dialogues
antecedent to the Sophist.
This analysis will allow me to introduce a number of facts into the discussion from
a point of view which is different from the usual, and to open up new possibilities
for the understanding of this section of the dialogue." (p. 41)
(...)
"The art of the sophist, like the practices of Orpheus and his followers, is deceptive,
false, and lies in the realm of δόξα. The philosopher alone is a true educator,
physician and purifier, who effects a genuine liberation. And philosophy alone can
be placed on the level of genuine religion." (p. 56)
(1) Cf. N. Notomi, The Unity of Plato’s ‘Sophist’. Between the Sophist and the
Philosopher, Cambridge 1999, 65 n. 72, for those who take it that it is Socrates who
is represented here.
29.
Berrettoni, Pierangiolo. 2008. "A Metamathematical Model in Plato's Definition of
Logos." Histoire Épistemologie Langage no. 30:7-19.
Abstract: "The definition of logos given by Plato in the Sophist is investigated
together with its (meta) mathematical background.
Terminological resonances found in philosophical and mathematical authors are
pointed out in order to show the generalization of an epistemic model based on the
concept of generation."
"In a recent article (Berrettoni, forthcoming) I observed that Plato’s definition of
logos, noun and verb in the Sophist makes use of a set of terms and of a
phraseology which had a wide range of use in mathematical sciences, in many cases
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acquiring the status of technical terms; this might lead us to the hypothesis that the
definition had a (meta)mathematical background. By this I understand a conceptual
frame and mental map ultimately derived from mathematical sciences, which gave
Plato the model and the form for his definition of logos, according to the apt
expression with which Starobinski (1966), in his study on the history of the concept
of “nostalgy”, characterizes the cultural hegemony of a discipline inside a particular
historical epistēme, as in the case of the generalization of an epistemic model
derived from psychoanalysis in the culture of the 20th century.
I am fully aware that this hypothesis is very strong and difficult to demonstrate on a
strictly textual and philological basis. I am not claiming that Plato was consciously
and deliberately applying mathematical concepts to the definition of logos, but
simply that he was conditioned by his view of knowledge as based on a hierarchy of
sciences, where the central role was attributed to mathematics." (p. 7)
References
Berrettoni, Pierangiolo (forthcoming). « Un modello matematico nella definizione
platonica di nome e verbo », Atti del XXXI Convegno della Società Italiana di
Glottologia, Categorie del verbo. Diacronia, teoria, tipologia (26 - 28 ottobre 2006,
Scuola Normale Superiore) [2008, pp. 31-51].
Starobinski, Jean (1966). « The Idea of Nostalgia », Diogenes 54, 81-103.
30.
Berry, John M. 1986. "A Deconstruction of Plato’s “Battle of Gods and Giants”."
Southwest Philosophy Review no. 3:28-39.
"The Eleatic Stranger's extremely problematic refutation of materialism in Plato's
"battle of gods and giants" (Soph. 246-48) is an instance of what Heidegger terms
an 'ontology,' a 'theoretical inquiry explicitly devoted to the meaning of entities' - in
this case, living things, souls, wisdom, justice, and the like. Every such explicit
inquiry into beings, Heidegger claims, "has its foundation" in the implicitly
presupposed "pre-ontological understanding of being" that characterizes the
inquirers themselves - in this case, the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus (as a
surrogate materialist). For all inquirers into being "fall prey to the tradition"
from which they have "more or less explicitly" received their "pre-ontology." The
Stranger's and Theaetetus's pre-ontology, that is, dictates the direction and scope of
their inquiry without their being aware of it. To understand the Sophist inquiry,
then, "this hardened tradition must be loosened up and the concealments ...
dissolved." My thesis is that, to a point, Heidegger is correct: The Eleatic Stranger's
and Theaetetus's ontology, their explicit inquiry into being, is controlled
('mastered") by their traditional "pre-ontological" understanding of being. To
understand them we must "destroy [i.e., unstructure or deconstruct their] ancient
ontology' to reveal what it conceals." (p. 28)
31.
———. 1988. "Plato's Forms. A text that self-destructs to shed its light." Southwest
Philosophy Review no. 4:111-119.
"Heidegger would call Plato's problematic revision of his theory of forms in "the
Battle of Gods and Giants" (Soph. 246-48) an "ontology," a "theoretical inquiry
explicitly devoted 10 the meaning of entities."
(...)
"On its surface, then, the text is incoherent. It can be coherent only if beneath its
surface the Stranger's charge of inconsistency is somehow on target, and his move
to conform the theory to his own ontology is somehow relevant.
I will show that the attack is on target and the revision relevant. For though the
Stranger and the friend of forms cannot know it, their startling conclusion that being
is nothing but power turns out to be the Heideggerian "preontology" that has
controlled their inquiry from the outset, the subsurface upon which the theory of
fom1s itself rests. Real being is "power either to affect anything else or to be
affected," the Stranger concludes, "I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real
things that they are nothing but power" (247de). This explicit ontology is the
surfacing of the implicit "pre-ontology" which underlies and supports this text and
the theory of forms wherever it is found. When on the surface the Stranger
irrelevantly forces the theory of forms to conform to his apparently alien ontology,
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beneath the surface he is in fact forcing it to conform to its own presupposition. The
text. that is, and the theory of forms which it attacks both make sense only if
understood as presupposing the text's conclusion. The argument turns a perfect
Heideggerian circle: its surface anomalies are the barely decipherable indications
that within its depths its presupposition is twisting itself into position to surface
disguised as the argument's conclusion." (p. 111)
32.
Bestor, Thomas Wheaton. 1978. "Plato on Language and Falsehood " The
Southwestern Journal of Philosophy no. 9:23-37.
"In a recent article in this journal entitled "Plato and the Foundations of Logic and
Language,"(1) William B. Bondeson makes several acute points about Plato's
philosophy of language, particularly as it relates to the so-called "paradox of false
judgment." On one point he is almost certainly right, and importantly right. On
another, however, he is almost certainly wrong, and importantly wrong. Both points
deserve a certain amount of amplification, I believe, and that is what I want to give
them here. The details provide us with a much clearer perspective on Plato's basic
picture of how language works. They also provide a rather nice illustration of the
relevance of analytic philosophy to Platonic scholarship today." (p. 23)
(1) Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1975): 29-41.
33.
Blondell, Ruby. 2002. The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Preface IX; 1. Drama and dialogue 1; 2. The imitation of character 53; 3.
The elenctic Sokrates at work: Hippias Minor 113; 4. A changing cast of characters:
Republic 165; 5. Reproducing Sokrates: Theaetetus 251; 6. Putting Sokrates in his
place: Sophist and Statesman 314; Bibliography 397; General index 428; Index of
passages cited 438-452.
"My first two chapters are devoted to clarifying certain preliminary matters that
underlie this way of approaching Plato. I begin, in this chapter, with some general
questions about “dramatic” form and literary” interpretation, which will help to
clarify my methodology.
Chapter 2 explores issues surrounding literary and philosophical notions of
character and its interpretation in ancient texts generally, and in Plato in particular,
with special attention to the figure of Sokrates.
Subsequent chapters offer readings of a select number of individual dialogues:
Hippias Minor, Republic, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. These works were
chosen in part to exemplify a broad range of Platonic styles and methods, and in
part because most of them have received relatively limited “literary” study, but also
because their discursive content connects with my particular concerns, especially in
their focus on the representation and use of literary character." (p. 3)
(...)
"The last chapter was concerned with Theaetetus on its own terms. But it is also the
first of a triad of dialogues, completed by Sophist and Statesman, which are linked
by a variety of thematic and structural connections.(1)
These three works are also bound together by formal features, in a way that is
unparalleled among Plato’s works. These features include dramatic sequencing,
explicit cross-references, and an overlapping cast of characters. At the end of
Theaetetus Sokrates looks forward to continuing his conversation with Theaitetos
and Theodoros the next day (210d); at the beginning of Sophist Theodoros alludes
to “yesterday’s agreement” to continue (216a); and in Statesman, Sokrates refers
back explicitly to his first meeting with Theaitetos and the previous day’s
discussion (257a, 258a).
The explicitness and the dramatic character of these links distinguish them from
other forms of Platonic intertextuality, and invite us to read these three works
together, in a certain sequence, and in each other’s light." (p. 314)
34.
Bluck, Richard Stanley. 1957. "False Statement in the "Sophist"." Journal of
Hellenic Studies no. 77:181-186.
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"Various attempts have been made to find a satisfactory alternative to Cornford's
explanation of what the Sophist has to say about false statement, and in particular to
his interpretation of the passage in which the statements ‘Theaetetus is sitting’ and
‘Theaetetus is flying’ are discussed. The difficulty with Cornford's view is that he
wants to find the explanation of truth and falsity entirely in the ‘blending’ or
incompatibility of Forms, but that in the examples Socrates chooses, while Sitting
and Flying may be Forms, Theaetetus cannot be. Hence Cornford has to say, ‘It is
not meant that Forms are the only elements in all discourse. We can also make
statements about individual things. But it is true that every such statement must
contain at least one Form’. Unfortunately, when talking about the ϵἴδων συμπλοκή
at 259e, the Stranger seems clearly to envisage a blending of ϵἴδη with each other:.
How can this be reconciled with an ‘example’ in which only one term stands for a
Form?
I do not propose to discuss in detail the various solutions that have been offered, but
to set forth my own interpretation of the whole passage. This may be regarded as to
some extent a ‘blending’ of what has been said by Professor Hackforth and Mr.
Hamlyn, but a number of points arise which deserve further discussion, and it may
perhaps be hoped that such a σύνθϵσις as this may prove to be ." (p. 181)
35.
———. 1975. Plato's Sophist: A Commentary. Manchester: Manchester University
Press.
Edited by Gordon Neal.
"The problems raised by the Parmenides being extremely complicated, and the date
of the Timaeus being a matter of dispute, studying the Sophist is perhaps the most
promising way of trying to discover whether, and if so in what manner, Plato’s
philosophy—and in particular his theory of Forms—developed or changed after the
writing of the Republic.
(...)
No doubt the dialogue is capable, and is meant to be capable, of being interpreted
without reference to Platonic Forms. The arguments of the unconverted sophist
against the possibility of saying or thinking what is false must be controverted with
arguments that he will accept as valid. Yet at the same time it is most unlikely that
Plato would repeatedly use the term εἶδη; without bearing in mind that readers
acquainted with his earlier works would at once think of his Forms; and it is
therefore highly probable that what is said is meant to be capable of being
interpreted in terms of Forms. This is all the more likely, as a great deal is said
about one Kind (λέγως) or Form (εἶδος) partaking of another, and the question was
raised in the Parmenides, clearly with reference to the theory of Forms, whether one
εἶδος could partake of another. It is therefore a reasonable working hypothesis that
the arguments are intended to be interpreted in terms of Platonic Forms by those
acquainted with Platonic doctrine, while at the same time being capable of being
interpreted without special reference to such doctrine by those who rejected it or
had no knowledge of it. The aim in what follows is to try to determine the most
natural significance of each argument from the Platonist’s point of view, taking the
γένη or εἶδος; as Forms, and to see whether these arguments and the dialogue as a
whole will, after all, make good sense when so interpreted. A positive answer to
this question will emerge as the book proceeds. The reader must judge whether the
case is proved.
Those who have never doubted that the Kinds can be taken as Forms may consider
such an enquiry unnecessary. But there are many passages, as has already been
mentioned, where difficulties raised have never been satisfactorily met, and the
precise nature of the Platonic doctrine implied is still far from clear. New
interpretations are here offered, for example, of the arguments for the separateness
of the Kinds (chapter VII), of what is meant by a vowel Form (chapter VI), and of
the argument against the monists (chapter III)" (pp. 1-2).
36.
Bolton, Robert. 1975. "Plato's Distinction between Being and Becoming." The
Review of Metaphysics no. 29:66-95.
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Reprinted in: N. D. Smith (ed.), Plato. Critical Assessments, Vol. II: Plato's Middle
Period: Metaphysics and Epistemology, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 116-141.
"The guiding questions to which I refer are familiar ones. First: What is the fate of
the theory of paradigm forms of the Phaedo and Republic in view of the apparent
criticism of the theory found in the Parmenides? And second: What is the fate of the
distinction of the Phaedo and Republic between being (οὐσία) and becoming
(γένεσις) in view of the apparent criticism of the adequacy of that distinction found
in the Theaetetus and Sophist? Lately, the first of these two questions has received
the greater share of the attention of philosophers and scholars. I want here to
redirect attention to the equally important and equally intriguing second question."
(p. 66, note omitted)
(...)
"The conclusion of our investigation is that Plato's theory of reality was neither
subject to as much or to as little flux as some have believed. There were important
modifications in his view of becoming and also in his view of being. In each case
the changes were based on important philosophical developments. But Plato
retained a version of the being-becoming distinction strong enough to sustain his
theory of degrees of reality and of sufficient conceptual power to make that theory
intelligible.
In the light of the history of Platonic scholarship it would be foolish to claim that no
other theory of the development of Plato's views on being and becoming could be
defended. All that is here claimed is that the theory which is here offered is the one
which best accommodates all the available evidence. It accounts for Aristotle's
testimony, for the explicit statements of the Phaedo and Republic and the argument
of Republic V, for the explicit changes in Plato's way of characterizing being and
becoming after the Theaetetus, and for the changes in Plato's view of the epistemic
status of becoming. On this account none of these matters need be explained away
or given any interpretation other than the most straightforward one. That constitutes
the strongest argument in favor of this account." (p. 95)
37.
Bondeson, William. 1972. "Plato's "Sophist": Falsehoods and Images." Apeiron no.
6:1-6.
"The chief arguments of the Sophist occur in what is sometimes called its "inner
core". The core is that large section which begins after the dichotomies employed to
catch the sophist come to an impasse about "nonbeing" and falsehoods, and which
ends with the return to dichotomous division after the account of "logos" in the
sense of "statement" has been given. This inner core runs from 232B to 263E. The
relations between shell and core depend upon how seriously Plato is thought to
have regarded the method of "division" (διαίρεσις). Such problems are not relevant
to the questions discussed here, nor does Plato's attempt to catch the sophist appear
to be entirely serious.
Rather, I want to discuss the puzzles about falsehood and how these puzzles are
connected with the hunt for the sophist." (p. 1)
38.
———. 1973. "Non-Being and the One: Some Connections between Plato's
"Sophist" and "Parmenides"." Apeiron no. 7:13-21.
"The purpose of this paper is to point out some similarities between a part of Plato's
treatment of non-being in the Sophist and two hypotheses of the Parmenides. I shall
first discuss a small section of the Sophist and try to show what Plato means by the
phrase το μηδαμως όν. I shall then, by an analysis of the first and sixth hypotheses
of the Parmenides, try to show that Plato wants to make virtually the same points as
he made in the Sophist.
The conclusions reached here should be helpful for a more comprehensive
interpretation of these two dialogues." (p. 13)
See the reply by Paul D. Eisenberg, "More ou'uon-being and the one". Apeiron, 10,
1976, pp. 6-14.
39.
———. 1974. "Plato's Sophist and the Significance and Truth-Value of
Statements." Apeiron:41-48.
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"The greater portion of Plato's Sophist deals with a number of issues in what might
be called the philosophy of language. It also deals with a series of metaphysical and
ontological views and attempts to show how language and reality are related. Thus
one way of organizing the views of Plato in the Sophist is to view much of the
material up to and including 260E as concerned with topics centring around the
question: how is discourse possible? Thus Plato talks about Being, Non-being,
Sameness and Otherness and makes the claim that it is the των ειδών συμπλοκή
which makes discourse possible (259E). The interpretation of this important
passage and what precedes it in the dialogue must be left aside for the purposes of
this paper because it is concerned with what follows 260E rather than with what
precedes it.
(...)
In this paper I want to do four things. First, it will be necessary to discuss and
evaluate Plato's answer to the "nature" question about statements and their parts.
Second, I want to determine the relation between statements and truth or falsehood,
and to determine how statements can be true or false.
Third, I want to determine whether Plato has adequately discussed and answered the
Sophist's difficulties and confusions about falsehoods (these will be also discussed
as the topics in the first two parts are developed), and fourth, to point out the
propositional character of belief which will indicate some important connections
between the Sophist and the Theaetetus." (p. 41)
40.
———. 1975. "Plato and the Foundations of Logic and Language." The
Southwestern Journal of Philosophy no. 6:29-41.
"Whatever Plato's philosophy of language and his logical theory might be, they are
backed by a metaphysics and an ontology. Or, to put the claim more strongly,
Plato's philosophy of logic and language implies a metaphysics and an ontology,
and the elaboration of these is his primary goal, even in those dialogues, i.e., the
later ones, where linguistic considerations might seem to be predominant. Or, as
one recent interpreter of Plato, Julius Moravcsik, has put it, Plato constructs an
elaborate metaphysics and ontology in order to make our ordinary ways of thinking,
talking, and knowing intelligible.(14)
Thus, in this paper, the concern shall be with a variety of topics in Plato's
philosophy of logic and language, but there is not the space here for developing
many of the metaphysical implications of those views.
Probably the most fundamental question in interpreting Plato, and in terms of which
most questions concerning Plato's views are settled, is the question of whether, and
to what extent, the views in the dialogues are cut from the same cloth and form a
single philosophic whole. Most analytic interpreters do not hold such a view; rather,
they maintain that there are important differences in the doctrines of the various
dialogues. Other interpreters have maintained that there are differences in the angle
of approach to a problem or that there are differences in topic without real change in
the overall doctrine. It will be shown that this will not work for at least some of the
logical and linguistic problems with which I am concerned." (p. 30)
(...)
"Many distinctions and clarifications need to be made before the"object" view and
its resultant paradoxes can be laid to rest; senses of "is" and "is not" need to be
distinguished, negation and negative predication need to be understood, and how
the forms and their interrelations make discourse possible needs to be shown. But
all of these problems can be solved only if there is a clear awareness of the nature
and function of statements in accounts of stating, believing, and knowing.
It seems to me that Plato realized that the "object" view is confused and
contradictory and that in the Theaetetus, and even more so in the Sophist, he
attempts to dispel it. Thus, the concept of a λόγος is the fundamental notion which
ties the Theaetetus and the Sophist together." (p. 39)
(14) Being and Meaning in the Sophist, Acta Philosophica Fennica, fasc. 14 (1962).
41.
———. 1976. "Some Problems about Being and Predication in Plato's Sophist 242249." Journal of The History of Philosophy no. 14:1-10.
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"One of the central tasks which Plato sets for himself in the Sophist is to say what
being (τὸ ὄν) is. In doing this he makes a variety of philosophical moves. The first
is to show that non-being in a very restricted sense of the term (τὸ μηδαμώς ὄν) is
an impossible and self-contradictory concept. (1) This occupies the first part (237A
ff.) of the central section of the Sophist. After discussing some puzzles concerning
deceptive appearances (240 B) and falsehoods (240 D), Plato turns to a discussion
of being at 242B. In this section of the dialogue Plato claims to show that the
attempts of previous philosophers to define being have failed and he makes his own
first attempt in the dialogue to define being (cf. 242C and 247E). 2 In this paper I
am concerned only with this section of the Sophist (242-249), and I want to show
first that Plato's notion of being here is ambiguous, the term τὸ ὄν shifting between
"being" and "what has being," between the form and those things which participate
in it. Second, I want to show that the definitions of being at 248C and 249D are not
only compatible with one another but also that, when properly understood, they
make sense of Plato's use of motion and rest in the Sophist. And finally, I want to
show that Plato is caught in the snares of self-predication when he talks about being
and other Forms of the same ontological level. This is due to the way in which he
formulates the difference between statements of identity and predication in the
argument against Parmenides in this section of the Sophist." (p. 1)
(1) Cf. my "Non-being and the One: Some Connections between Plato's Sophist and
Parmenides," forthcoming in Apeiron [1973]. My view is somewhat different from
that of G. E. L. Owen's "Plato on Not-Being" in Plato, A Collection of Critical
Essays, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1971), vol. I.
(2) Cf. Owen, ibid. p. 229, n. 14. Owen presents a convincing case that Plato is
giving a definition (as opposed to a mark or sign) of being. However, Owen also
seems to take the view, for example against Moravcsik in Being and Meaning in the
Sophist (Acta Philosophica Fennica, XIV [1962]), that little of philosophical
significance happens in 242-249. I hope to show in this paper that this is not the
case.
42.
Booth, N. B. 1956. "Plato, Sophist 231 a, etc." The Classical Quarterly no. 6:89-90.
"Mr G. B. Kerferd , in Classical Quarterly XLVIII (1954), 84 ff. writes of 'Plato's
Noble Art of Sophistry'. He suggests that Plato thought there was a 'Noble Art' of
sophistry, other than philosophy itself; and he seeks to find this Art in the better and
worse arguments of Protagoras. This suggestion is, unfortunately, based on a
mistranslation of Plato, Sophist 231 a (...). Mr. Kerferd supposes that this can mean:
'For I do not think there will be dispute about distinctions which are of little
importance when men are sufficiently on guard in the case of resemblances.'
(...)
But further, what are these distinctions which, if we accept Mr. Kerferd's view, are
'of little importance'? They are distinctions on the one hand between tame and
fierce, and on the other hand between the cathartic process of dialectic and
sophistry. The 'tame' and 'fierce' distinction is not between tame and fierce merely;
it is a distinction between the very tamest and the very fiercest of animals (Plato
uses superlatives at the beginning of 231 a). How Plato could have in the same
paragraph stressed the vastness of the difference by means of superlatives and then
spoken of 'small distinctions', is more than I can see. I also fail to see how Plato
could ever have thought the distinction between sophistry and healing dialectic to
be a small one; that would be saying that there was little to choose between
Socrates and Thrasymachus. No: Plato is saying here that there is a certain
superficial resemblance between healing dialectic and sophistry, but we must
beware of that resemblance; in fact the one is a tame watch-dog, the other a
ravening wolf, and 'we shall find in the course of our discussion, once we take
adequate precautions, that there is no small distinction between the two'." (p. 89)
43.
Bossi, Beatriz. 2013. "Back to the Point: Plato and Parmenides – Genuine
Parricide?" In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson,
Thomas M., 157-173. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
https://www.ontology.co/biblio-pdf/plato-sophist-biblio.htm
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"Famous scholars in the XXth century (1) understood that Plato really does refute
Parmenides’ absolute condemnation of not-being as unthinkable and inutterable by
his demonstration that ‘not-being’ ‘is’ in the sense of ‘is different from’. Though
this goal is made explicit and is almost claimed to have been achieved by the
Stranger in the Sophist, Plato offers certain clues that show there is enough
evidence for a different reading that admits of some nuances. The Stranger begs
Theaetetus not to suppose that he is turning into some kind of parricide (241d3). Yet
Plato does toy with a potential parricide, which the Stranger claims he will never
commit. The attitude might be regarded as a literary trope inserted for dramatic
purposes, but in the context it could be merely rhetorical.
In my view, the person the Stranger really fights and kills is, not Parmenides
himself but the ghost of a ridiculous Parmenides character dreamed up by the
sophist, who will shelter his own ‘relativistic’ view beneath his cloak by denying
the possibility of falsehood." (p. 158)
(1) Guthrie (1978) 151; Diès (1909) 7; Taylor (1960) 389; Ross (1966) 115;
Cornford (1970) 289 –294 quoted by O’Brien (1995) 43 n.1. Also Notomi: ‘The
two extreme philosophical positions of Parmenides and Protagoras converge on the
denial of the possibility of falsehood’ (1999) 182.
References
Cornford, F.M., Plato’s Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist of
Plato translated with a running commentary, London 1935, (repr. 1970) = Cornford
(1935, 1970).
Diès, A., La définition de l’être et la nature des idées dans le Sophiste de Platon,
Paris 1909 = Diès (1909).
Guthrie W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy 5: Later Plato and The Academy,
Cambridge 1978 = Guthrie (1978).
Notomi, N., The Unity of Plato’s ’Sophist’. Between the Sophist and the
Philosopher, Cambridge 1999 = Notomi (1999).
O’Brien, D., Le Non-être. Deux études sur le ‘Sophiste’ de Platon, Sankt Augustin
1995 = O’Brien (1995).
Ross, W.D., Plato’s Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1951, repr. 1966 = Ross (1951, 1966).
Taylor, A.E., Plato, the Man and his Work, London 1960 = Taylor (1960).
44.
Bossi, Beatriz, and Robinson, Thomas M., eds. 2013. Plato's Sophist Revisited.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Proceedings of the International Spring Seminar on Plato's Sophist at the "Centro de
Ciencias de Benasque Pedro Pascual", Benasque (Spain), May 26 - May 31, 2009.
Contents:
I. Defining Sophistry
Thomas M. Robinson: Protagoras and the Definition of ‘Sophist’ in the Sophist 3;
Francesc Casadesús Bordoy: Why is it so Difficult to Catch a Sophist? Pl. Soph.
218d3 and 261a5 15; Josep Monserrat Molas and Pablo Sandoval Villarroel: Plato’s
Enquiry concerning the Sophist as a Way towards ‘Defining’ Philosophy 29;
Alberto Bernabé: The Sixth Definition (Sophist 226a– 231c): Transposition of
Religious Language 41; Michel Narcy: Remarks on the First Five Definitions of the
Sophist (Soph. 221c – 235a) 57; José Solana: Socrates and ‘Noble’ Sophistry
(Sophist 226b –231c) 71; Kenneth Dorter: The Method of Division in the Sophist:
Plato’s Second Deuteros Plous 87;
II. Parricide: Threat or Reality?
Enrique Hülsz: Plato’s Ionian Muses: Sophist 242 d –e 103; Denis O’Brien: Does
Plato refute Parmenides? 117; Beatriz Bossi: Back to the Point: Plato and
Parmenides – Genuine Parricide? 157; Antonio Pedro Mesquita: Plato’s Eleaticism
in the Sophist: The Doctrine of Non-Being 175; Néstor-Luis Cordero: The
relativization of “separation” (khorismos) in the Sophist 187;
III. Mimesis, Image and Logos
Francesco Fronterotta: Theaetetus sits – Theaetetus flies. Ontology, predication and
truth in Plato’s Sophist (263a –d) 205; Jesús de Garay: Difference and Negation:
Plato’s Sophist in Proclus 225; David Ambuel: Difference in Kind: Observations on
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the Distinction of the Megista Gene 247; Lidia Palumbo: Mimesis in the Sophist
269;
Bibliography 279; Index Locorum 291; Subject Index 301-304.
"The papers included fall into three broad categories: a) those dealing directly with
the ostensible aim of the dialogue, the definition of a sophist; b) a number which
tackle a specific question that is raised in the dialogue, namely how Plato relates to
Heraclitus and to Parmenides in the matter of his understanding of being and nonbeing; and c) those discussing various other broad issues brought to the fore in the
dialogue, such as the ‘greatest kinds’, true and false statement, difference and
mimesis." (Preface, p. V)
45.
Bostock, David. 1984. "Plato on 'Is Not' (Sophist, 254-9)." Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy no. 2:89-119.
"According to the received doctrine, which I do not question, the uses of the Greek
verb 'to be' may first be distinguished into those that are complete and those that are
incomplete. In its incomplete uses the verb requires a complement of some kind
(which may be left unexpressed), while in its complete uses there is no
complement, and it may be translated as 'to exist' or 'to be real' or 'to be true' or
something of the kind. What role the complete uses of the verb have to play in the
Sophist as a whole is a vexed question, and one that I shall not discuss. For I think it
will be generally agreed, at least since Owen's important article of 1971, (1) that in
our central section of the Sophist it is the incomplete uses that are the centre of
Plato's attention. Anyway, I shall confine my own attention to these uses, and
accordingly my project is to elucidate and evaluate Plato's account of 'is not' where
the 'is' is incomplete. I might also add here that, for the purposes of the Sophist as a
whole, I am in agreement with Owen's view that what Plato himself took to be
crucial was the account of 'not', and what he has to say about 'is' is, in his own eyes,
merely ancillary to this. But I do not argue that point, partly because Owen has
already done so, and partly because it is not needed for my main contentions. As we
shall see, one cannot in fact understand what Plato does say about 'not' without first
considering his views on the incomplete 'is'.
Reverting to the received doctrine once more, the incomplete uses of 'is' may be
divided into two. In one sense the verb functions as an identity sign, and means the
same as 'is the same as', while in the other it functions merely as a sign of
predication, coupling subject to predicate, and cannot be thus paraphrased. The vast
majority of commentators on the Sophist seem agreed that Plato means to
distinguish, and succeeds in distinguishing, these two different senses of the verb.
(2) This I shall deny. In fact I shall argue not only that Plato failed to see the
distinction, but also that his failure, together with another ambiguity that he fails to
see, wholly vitiates his account of the word 'not'. The central section of the Sophist
is therefore one grand logical mistake." (pp. 89-90)
(1) Plato on Not-Being in Plato I, ed. G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 223-267.
(2) One may note P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), 298; J. L. Ackrill,
‘Plato and the Copula’, Journal of Hellenic Studies, LXXVII (1957), 1-6 esp. 2; J.
M. E. Moravcsik, 'Being and Meaning in the Sophist’, Acta Philosophica Fennica,
XIV (1962), 23-64 esp. 51; W. G. Runciman, Plato’s Later Epistemology
(Cambridge, 1962), 89; I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines, vol. II
(London, 1963), 449; R. S. Bluck, Plato's Sophist (Manchester, 1975), 151; J.
Malcolm, ‘Plato’s Analysis of to on and to me on in the Sophist', Phronesis, XII
(1967), 130-46 esp. 145; Owen, above n. 1, 256; G. Vlastos, ‘An Ambiguity in the
Sophist' in his Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 287; and I would add J.
McDowell, ‘Falsehood and not-being in Plato’s Sophist’ in Language and Logos, ed
M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum (Cambridge, 1982), 115-34 (discussed below). But
the older commentators do not always agree, e.g. F. M. Comford, Plato’s Theory of
Knowledge (London, 1935), 296, and A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Sophist and the
Statesman (London, 1961), 82. More recently J. C. B. Gosling, Plato (London,
1973), 216-20, has put the case for scepticism, and F. A. Lewis, ‘Did Plato discover
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the estin of identity?’, California Studies in Classical Antiquity, VIII (1975), 11343, has argued it at length.
46.
Brisson, Luc. 2011. "Does Dialectic Always Deal with the Intelligible? A Reading
of the Sophist 254d5-e1." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh
Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 156172. Praha: Oikoymenh.
47.
Brown, Lesley. 1986. "Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry." Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy no. 4:49-70.
Reprinted with revisions in G. Fine (ed.), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), pp. 455–478.
"Plato's Sophist presents a tantalizing challenge to the modern student of
philosophy. In its central section we find a Plato whose interests and methods seem
at once close to and yet remote from our own. John Ackrill's seminal papers on the
Sophist, (1) published in the fifties, emphasized the closeness, and in optimistic
vein credited Plato with several successes in conceptual analysis. These articles
combine boldness of 'argument with exceptional clarity and economy of expression,
and though subsequent writers have cast doubt on some of Ackrill's claims for the
Sophist the articles remain essential reading for all students of the dialogue. I am
happy to contribute an essay on the Sophist to this volume dedicated to John
Ackrill.
Among the most disputed questions in the interpretation of the Sophist is that of
whether Plato therein marks off different uses of the verb einai, 'to be'. This paper
addresses one issue under that heading, that of the distinction between the
'complete' and 'incomplete' uses of 'to be', which has usually been associated with
the distinction between the 'is' that means 'exists' and the 'is' of predication, that is,
the copula." (p. 49)
(1) Symploke Eidon (1955) and Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-59 (1957), both
reprinted in Plato I, ed G. Vlastos (New York, 1971), 201-9 and 210-22.
48.
———. 1994. "The Verb 'To Be' in Greek Philosophy: Some Remarks." In
Companions to Ancient Thought: Language, edited by Everson, Stephen, 212-236.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"The existence of at least these three distinct uses of 'is' was taken for granted by
commentators and assumed to apply, by and large, to ancient Greek, though with
some salient differences. These include the fact that Greek can and regularly does
omit esti in the present tense, though not in other tenses, and that the complete 'is' is
still very much a going concern, though more or less defunct in modern English.
The fact that the esti of the copula can be omitted means that a predicative use of
esti can convey a nuance over and above that of the mere copula (for instance
connoting what really is F rather than merely appearing F, or what is enduringly F).
And the fact that current English has more or less abandoned the use of the
complete 'is' to mean 'exist' (as in Hamlet's 'To be or not to be), while in Greek it is
very much a going concern, may lead us to question whether the complete esti
really shares the features of the 'is' which means (or used to mean) 'exist'." (p. 215)
(...)
"I cannot offer here a full account of what I take to be the results of the Sophist, far
less a defence of such an account, but confine myself to a few points. To the
question whether the dialogue distinguishes an 'is' of identity from an 'is' of
predication, I have indicated my answer: that it does not, but it does draw an
important distinction between identity-sentences and predications (see section I and
n. 2 above). Here I focus on the question whether and if so how it distinguishes
complete from incomplete uses. I shall suggest that Plato developed a better theory
about the negative 'is not' than his argumentation in the Republic suggests, while
continuing to treat the relation between the complete use (X is) and the incomplete
(X is F) in the way I have described in section IV, that is, by analogy with the
relation between 'X teaches' and 'X teaches singing'." (p. 229)
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49.
———. 2001. "Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants, Sophist
245-249." In Method in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Gentzler, Jyl, 181-207. New
York: Oxford University Press.
"In Greek mythology, Zeus and the other Olympian deities were challenged in a
mighty battle by the race of giants, a battle which, with the help of Herakles, the
gods won. Unlike the earlier battle of the Titans, in which Zeus' party defeated and
supplanted their own forebears, the Titans, the Gigantomachia ended with the
preservation of the old order in the face of the newcomers' challenge.
(...)
Here I focus on the section of the Sophist whose high point is represented by Plato,
through his chief speaker, the Stranger, as a Gigantomachia, a debate about being
between materialists and immaterialists, or so-called Friends of the Forms. The
materialists, cast in the role of 'giants', hold that only the material (what is or has a
body) is or exists.
Their opponent the 'gods', labelled 'Friends of the Forms', take the opposite view;
they accord the title 'being' only to the immaterial, to 'certain intelligible Forms',
and relegate to the status of genesis (coming to be) those material, changing things
the giants champion. In this section, in which the Stranger takes on each party in
turn and aims at a rapprochement between them, Plato takes what may be thought
of as first steps in ontology. in reflective discussion and argument about what there
is and about how one should approach the question of what there is. There is
considerable disagreement over the upshot of the whole debate, and especially over
whether the discussion of the Friends of the Forms' views concludes with the
Stranger advocating a radical departure from the treatment of Forms in the middle
dialogues: both Owen and Moravcsik advocate a reading whereby the immutability
of the Forms is abandoned.(1) Here I re-examine the Gigantomachia, asking what
philosophical moves and results it contains. In doing so, I consider what use Plato
makes of two innovations in approach which can be detected in the later dialogues,
and in particular in the Sophist." (pp. 181-182)
50.
———. 2008. "The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood." In The
Oxford Handbook of Plato, edited by Fine, Gail, 383-410. New York: Oxford
University Press.
"This essay focuses on two key problems discussed and solved in the Middle Part:
the Late-learners problem (the denial of predication), and the problem of false
statement. I look at how each is, in a way, a problem about correct speaking; how
each gave rise to serious philosophical difficulty, as well as being a source of eristic
troublemaking; and how the Eleatic Stranger offers a definitive solution to both. As
I said above, the Sophist displays an unusually didactic approach: Plato makes it
clear that he has important matter to impart, and he does so with a firm hand,
especially on the two issues I've selected." (p. 438)
51.
———. 2010. "Definition and Division in Plato' Sophist." In Definition in Greek
Philosophy, edited by Charles, David, 151-171. New York: Oxford University
Press.
"In Plato's late dialogues Sophist and Politicus (Statesman), we find the chief
speaker, the Eleatic Stranger, pursuing the task of definition with the help of the socalled method of division.
(...)
However, there are major and well-known problems in evaluating the method as
practised in the two dialogues, but especially so in the Sophist.
(...)
I investigate below some of the many scholarly responses to this bewildering
display of the much-vaunted method of division. I divide scholars into a 'nofaction', those who hold that we should not try to discern, in any or all of the
dialogue's definitions, a positive outcome to the investigation into what sophistry is
(Ryle, Cherniss), and a 'yes-faction': those who think an outcome is to be found
(Moravcsik, Cornford, and others).(2) I shall conclude that in spite of the
appearance of many answers (Moravcsik) or one answer (Cornford, Notomi), the
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reader is not to think that any of the definitions give the (or a) correct account of
what sophistry is. But while I side with the no-faction, my reasons differ from those
of Kyle and Cherniss, who, in their different ways, located the failure in the nature
of the method of division. In my view the failure lies not, or not primarily, in the
method of division itself; but in the object chosen for discussion and definition.
Sophistry, the sophist: these are not appropriate terms to be given, a serious
definition, for the simple reason that a sophist is not a genuine kind that possesses
an essence to be discerned.(3) If we try to carve nature at the joints, we cannot hope
to find that part of reality which is sophistry, for there is no such genuine kind as
sophistry-especially not under the genus of techne, art, skill, or expertise." (pp. 151153).
(2) The views of Moravcsik, Cornford, and Notomi are discussed in the text of
section III; those of the 'no-faction' in note 17.
(3) I use 'genuine kind' to indicate something with a wider extension than that of
'natural kind' familiar from Locke, Putnam, etc. I use it to mean the kind of entity
which Plato would allow to have an ousia (essence) or phusis (nature) of its own
(cf. Tht. 172b). Virtues, senses like hearing and sight, and crafts like angling would
be recognized as genuine kinds in the intended sense."
52.
———. 2012. "Negation and Non-Being: Dark Matter in the Sophist." In
Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn, edited by
Patterson, Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 233-254. Las
Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
"My aim is to try to understand what I regard as the most difficult stretch of the
Sophist, 257–259. In responding to a particularly impenetrable claim made by the
Eleatic Stranger (ES), Theaetetus announces at 258b7 that they have found τὸ μὴ ὄν
(not being), which they have been searching for on account of the sophist. He is
thinking, of course, of what sparked the long excursus into not being and being: the
sophist’s imagined challenge to the inquirers’ defining his expertise as involving
images and falsehood. Here’s that challenge: speaking of images and falsehood
requires speaking of what is not, and combining it with being, but to do so risks
contradiction and infringes a dictum of Parmenides. This heralds the puzzles of not
being, and of being, which are followed by the positive investigations of the
Sophist’s Middle Part. So Theaetetus’ eureka moment ought to signal some
satisfying clarification and closure to the discussions. But in fact the stretch it is
embedded in is singularly baffling, and the subject of continuing debate among
commentators.(2) There is little agreement about what issues Plato is discussing in
this section, let alone about any supposed solutions.
My strategy is to try to read the passage without preconceived ideas about what it
ought to contain." (pp. 233-234)
(2) I list here and in the next two notes some of the major discussions. I have
learned from them all, and from many others not mentioned: M. Frede, Prädikation
und Existenzaussage. Hypomnemata 18 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1967). G. E. L. Owen, “Plato on Not-being,” in Plato: A Collection of Critical
Essays 1, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1971), 223–267. Owen’s
essay is reprinted in Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. G. Fine (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999). E. N. Lee, “Plato on Negation and Not-being in the
Sophist,” The Philosophical Review 81.3 (1972): 267–304. D. Bostock, “Plato on
‘Is Not’,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984), 89–119. M. Ferejohn,
“Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation,” Archiv
für Geschichte der Philosophie 71 (1989), 257–282. M. Frede, “Plato’s Sophist on
False Statements,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. R. Kraut
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 397–424.
(3) J. van Eck, “Falsity without Negative Predication: On Sophistes 255e–263d,”
Phronesis 40 (1995), 20–47 (...).
(4) J. Kostman, “False Logos and Not-Being in Plato’s Sophist,” in Patterns in
Plato’s Thought, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1973) (...).
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53.
———. 2018. "Aporia in Plato’s Theaetetus and Sophist." In The Aporetic
Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Karamanolis, George and Politis, Vasilis,
91-111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Abstract: "The chief aim of this essay is to examine the development of Plato’s use
of philosophical puzzles to guide his enquiries. Labelled aporiai, they are prominent
in Sophist, but already found in Theaetetus. Section 2 identifies common features in
such puzzles, and explores how in Theaetetus they are presented but left unsolved.
In both dialogues the young Theaetetus is characterised as an ideal interlocutor,
quick to appreciate a philosophical puzzle, and to respond appropriately. By these
means Plato links the otherwise very disparate dialogues: Theaetetus, a formally
aporetic attempt to define knowledge conducted by Socrates, and Sophist, whose
new protagonist, the Stranger from Elea, confidently announces results both in the
Outer Part’s search for the sophist and in solving the problems of the Middle Part.
(1) Section 3 traces how the Sophist’s Middle Part is explicitly structured around a
series of philosophical puzzles, and notes the plentiful terminology of aporia that
signposts this. Plato shows his readers the philosophical payoffs of a serious attempt
to diagnose the source of a given aporia: herein (I suggest) lies the real difference
between the sophist and the philosopher.
But first Section I explores the famous image in Theaetetus of Socrates as a
midwife, where Plato offers what I read as a new approach to the respondent’s
subjective aporia."
(1) I follow Szaif’s classification of a formally aporetic dialogue, Chapter 2 [same
volume], Section 2. Like other formally aporetic dialogues, This has been the
subject of many doctrinal readings, cf. Sedley 2004.
References
Jan Szaif, "Socrates and the Benefits of Puzzlement", G. Karamanolis, V.Politis
(eds.), The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, 2018.
David Sedley, The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato’s Theaetetus,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
54.
Brumbaugh, Robert S. 1983. "Diction and dialectic. The language of Plato's
Stranger from Elea." In Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy, edited
by Robb, Kevin, 266-276. LaSalle: Open Court.
Reprinted in R. S. Brumbaugh, Platonic Studies of Greek Philosophy: Form, Arts,
Gadgets, and Hemlock, Albany: State University Press, 1989, pp. 103-111.
"An interesting effect of Eric Havelock's discussion has been the constant reminder
of the location of Plato at the end of a dominant oral tradition, without which there
might be the temptation to take Platonic dialogue as a discontinuous leap into
literacy, thus leading a modem reader to misread the texts. For example, we easily
assume, because we have not thought about it, that reading was done silently in
Plato's time; that there were equivalents of our copyrights and publishers; even -in
some cases- an axiom that "mature" thought must be expressed in clear,
monochrome treatise. All of this helps misunderstand
the dialogue form.
(...)
The purpose of my present comments is to relate this framework to the
interpretation of Plato's Sophist, with a passing glance at the Statesman. In
particular, I want to follow up a suggestion I made earlier, that the principal speaker,
the Eleatic Stranger, is an imported bounty-hunter, brought in to shoot the Sophist
down (or, more exactly in the absence of the rifle, to catch him in a net). The
"weapons" are, perhaps, new (or old) techniques of method and language. (For this
simile, compare Socrates' remark in the Philebus that he will now require "weapons
of a different kind" to resolve a shifted point under debate.)(2)" (p. 103)
(2) Philebus 23B5
55.
Brunschwig, Jacques. 1994. "The Stoic Theory of the Supreme Genus and Platonic
Ontology." In Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy, 92-157. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
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English translation by Janet Lloyd of La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et
l'ontologie platonicienne (1988).
"The discussion upon which I shall now embark is divided into six parts. In the
introduction (i), I shall make a few observations on various structural problems
which spring to mind once one examines the TSG doctrine [the doctrine of the τί as
the supreme genus]. In part II, which is devoted to the chronology of the TSG
doctrine, or more precisely to a kind of chronological topology of this doctrine, I
shall be analysing a number of texts which could have been and/or were used as
arguments to support the adoption of the TSG doctrine at a relatively late date in the
history of Stoic thought, and I shall try to show that these texts do not justify such a
conclusion. In the next two parts, I shall try to establish the role that may have been
played by the reading of Plato's Sophist (III) and that possibly played by critical
reflection upon the Platonic theory of Forms (IV) in the elaboration of the TSG
doctrine. In the last two parts, finally, I shall try to put together two kinds of
arguments that confirm my general thesis: to refute the idea that the TSG doctrine is
the fruit of an induction based upon an analysis of the canonical incorporeals, I shall
try to bring to light the disparities that those incorporeals present and the
discrepancies between the various arguments used by the Stoics to fix their
ontological status (V). To confirm the role played by the mediation of Platonism in
the construction of the TSG doctrine, I shall examine some of the objections put to
the Stoics by their adversaries on the subject of this doctrine and the varying
degrees of attention that the Stoics paid to those objections (VI)." (pp. 95-96)
56.
Bruseker, George. 2018. "The Metaphor of Hunting and the Method of Division in
the Sophist." In Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy Volume 2,
Section II: Classical Greek Philosophy, edited by Boudouris, Kostantinos, 55-60.
Athens: Greek Philosophical Society.
Abstract: "This paper examines the metaphor of hunting as used in Plato’s dialogue,
the Sophist. In it, we explore the idea that the example of the ‘angler’ given at the
start of the dialogue is no throw-away example, but opens up the metaphor of
hunting as an important element of understanding how to use the method of
division introduced for coming to definitional knowledge. I argue that the use of the
metaphor of hunting is a pedagogical tool that transforms the attentive student’s
understanding of the method of division from a dry science of definition, to a
manner of approaching the search for truth. Applied reflexively to the search for the
definition of the sophist, it helps reveal that the search for knowledge is a nonlinear, iterative process which requires passing-through, and abides no shortcuts. It
leaves open the suggestion that the true image of knowledge and the philosopher
may finally be found in a version of acquisitive rather than productive or separative
arts (as they are classified within the dialogue)."
57.
Buckels, Christopher. 2015. "Motion and Rest as Genuinely Greatest Kinds in the
Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 35:317-327.
"The blending of the greatest kinds (γένη) or forms (εϊδη) is one of the central
topics of Plato's Sophist. These greatest kinds, or megista gene, which seem to be
either Platonic Forms or very similar to Platonic Forms, are Being, Motion, Rest,
Sameness, and Otherness; I take them to be properties that are predicated of other
things, for reasons we will examine. Why these five kinds are greatest is not made
explicit, but immediately before taking up his investigation, the Eleatic Visitor, the
main speaker of the dialogue, says that some kinds are ‘all-pervading’, such that
nothing prohibits them from blending with every other kind, i.e., from being
predicated of every other kind (254b10-c1). One might think, then, that these five
are examples of all-pervading kinds. Almost immediately, however, the Visitor and
his interlocutor, Theaetetus, agree that Motion and Rest do not blend with each
other, which seems to cut off this explanation of their greatness (252d9-11). For this
reason, many commentators suggest that Motion and Rest are simply convenient
examples of kinds, garnered from discussions earlier in the text, and only Being,
Sameness, and Otherness are special, all-pervading kinds. On this reading. Hot and
Cold, which are also examples from earlier in the text (243d6-244b4), would seem
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to do the job just as well as Motion and Rest, since both pairs are opposites that do
not blend with each other but which are (by blending with Being), are self-identical
(by blending with Sameness), and are distinct (by blending with Otherness).
I think this reading is incorrect; Motion and Rest are carefully selected as megista
gene, greatest kinds, and are not just convenient examples (Reeve [Motion, Rest,
and Dialectic in the Sophist] 1985, 57 holds a similar position). In fact, I think the
kinds are greatest because they are all-pervading; the Visitor intends us to question
the agreement that Motion and Rest do not blend, as is suggested when Theaetetus
agrees, later, that if Motion shared in Rest, there would be nothing strange about
saying that Motion is at rest (255b6-8). Thus, I argue, Motion and Rest can blend,
i.e., they can be jointly predicated of one subject and can be predicated of each
other, just as Sameness and Otherness can. While Sameness and Otherness are
opposites, a single subject may be the same in one respect, namely, the same as
itself, and other in another respect, namely, other than other things. Thus they can
be predicated of a single subject, and they can be predicated of each other, as well,
since Sameness is other than other things and Otherness is the same as itself." (p.
317)
58.
Campbell, Ian J. 2021. "Plato, the Eristics, and the Principle of Non-Contradiction."
Apeiron no. 54:571-614.
Abstract: "This paper considers the use that Plato makes of the Principle of NonContradiction (PNC) in his engagements with eristic refutations. By examining
Plato’s use of the principle in his most detailed engagements with eristic—in the
Sophist, the discussion of “agonistic” argumentation in the Theaetetus, and
especially the Euthydemus—I aim to show that the pressure exerted on Plato by
eristic refutations played a crucial role in his development of the PNC, and that the
principle provided him with a much more sophisticated means of demarcating
philosophical argumentation from eristic than he is generally thought to have. In
particular, I argue that Plato’s qualified formulation of the PNC restricts the class of
genuine contradictions in such a way that reveals the contradictions that eristics
produce through their refutations to be merely apparent and that Plato consistently
appeals to his qualified conception of genuine contradiction in his encounters with
eristics in order to demonstrate that their refutations are merely apparent. The paper
concludes by suggesting that the conception of genuine contradiction afforded by
the PNC did not just provide Plato with a way of demarcating genuine from eristic
refutations, but also with an answer to substantive
philosophical challenges that eristics raised through their refutations."
59.
Candiotto, Laura. 2011. "The Children's Prayer: saving the Phenomena in Plato's
Sophist." Anais de Filosofia Clássica no. 5:77-85.
Abstract: "Plato builds an ontology capable of saving the Phenomena in the Sophist.
By doing so, he distances himself from Parmenides. This article analyses the
children's prayer (Soph. 249 d 5) in order to sustain this thesis and evaluate the
platonic proposal, along with the role of the negation and the heteron in the
communication of the Kinds."
60.
———. 2016. "Negation as Relation: Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's Sophist
257 b3-259 d1." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in
Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 75-94.
Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"The aim of the present chapter is to discuss and evaluate chapters 78 and 79 of
Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's Sophist, which deal with Sph. 257b3-259dl. To this
purpose, I will compare these chapters with the
more established interpretations concerning the role played by the heteron in Plato's
dialogue. Providing my own reading, my main claim is that negation is understood
by Heidegger as the foremost shape of relationality.
Moreover, negation as relation is not a dialectical tool but the disclosive power able
to show the "things themselves".
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My argument will proceed by: 1) providing a short introduction of the major themes
within the Sophist; 2) presenting Heidegger's thesis; 3) analyzing the main threads
within the Platonic text by referring to the
more established interpretations; 4) evaluating Heidegger's interpretation with a
special emphasis on where it has to be situated with regard to the text and to other
interpretations, thus pointing out the innovative elements proposed by Heidegger."
(p. 75)
61.
———. 2018. "Purification through emotions: The role of shame in Plato’s Sophist
230b4–e5." Educational Philosophy and Theory no. 50:576-585.
Abstract: "This article proposes an analysis of Plato’s Sophist (230b4–e5) that
underlines the bond between the logical and the emotional components of the
Socratic elenchus, with the aim of depicting the social valence of this philosophical
practice. The use of emotions characterizing the ‘elenctic’ method described by
Plato is crucial in influencing the audience and is introduced at the very moment in
which the interlocutor attempts to protect his social image by concealing his shame
at being refuted. The audience, thanks to Plato’s literary strategy, realizes the
failures of the interlocutor even as he refuses to accept them. As a result, his social
image becomes tarnished. Purification through shame reveals how the medium is
strictly related to the endorsement of specific ethical and political goals, making the
Platonic dialogs the tools for the constitution of a new paideia."
62.
Caplan, Jerrold R. 1995. "The Coherence of Plato's Ontology." American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly no. 65:171-189.
"In light of the so-called theory of Forms presented in earlier dialogues and the
communion of the greatest kinds in the later dialogues, it has been argued that Plato
abandoned his earlier ontology in favor of the more sophisticated scheme of his
later period. The criticism is then made that the so-called later ontology is
inconsistent with the earlier one and that the two accounts do not cohere.
I argue, to the contrary, that Plato's presentation has been consistent throughout.
One might say that the discussion in the Sophist (236-259) is a revision or a
refinement or expansion of the theory as found, for example, in the Phaedo (78-9).
Although this may suggest that there has been some sort of development in the
treatment of the Forms from early to late, it by no means implies any wholesale
abandonment of the first formulations nor any inherent inconsistency. The fact that
Plato himself raises questions about the Forms indicates the need for a clearer
articulation of the relationship between thought and being, which is precisely what
is undertaken in the later dialogues." (p. 171)
63.
Casadesús Bordoy, Francesc. 2013. "Why Is It so Difficult to Catch a Sophist? Pl.
Sph. 218d3 and 261a5." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and
Robinson, Thomas M., 15-27. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Suffice it, therefore, in conclusion to this presentation, to return to the passage
from the Republic in which the lines of the Odyssey which begin the Sophist are
commented on in negative terms, and to ask once again the question Socrates poses
in justification of his criticism of the lines of Homer:
‘Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, and of a nature to appear insidiously
now in one shape, and now in another…?’
In order to answer this question in the negative, Plato has to undertake the writing
of the Sophist, in an attempt to expose one who, due to his protean and mimetic
character, adopts all kinds of forms, even the most divine. Equipped with his
philosophical hunting weapon, the dialectical method and diaresis, he attempts, like
Menelaus, to catch the sophist.
Nonetheless, the possibility of success remains in doubt, given Socrates’ disturbing
observation that the hard-working hunter, the Stranger from Elea himself, could be
yet another of the multiple and polymorphous manifestations of the Sophist …" (p.
27)
64.
Casper, Dennis J. 1977. "Is There A Third One and Many Problem in Plato?"
Apeiron no. 11:20-26.
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"In a recent article (1), M.J. Cresswell points out that the problem of the one and the
many "gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (Parmenides, Sophist, and
Philebus) where we discover not one problem but apparently two."(2) The first
problem (I) concerns particulars, things subject to generation and perishing
(Philebus, 14D-15A); it is " the problem of how the same thing can have many
characteristics."(3) The second problem (II) concerns forms, things not subject to
generation or perishing; it is the problem how a unitary form can be in many things
which come into being ( Philebus, 15B). The first problem is "childish and easy",
the second serious and difficult.
Cresswell points out that the formal structure of (I) does not require that it concern
particulars. In a sense, forms have "characteristics" — each is one, the same as
itself, and so on. So a parallel one and many problem (III) might be raised: How can
the same form have many characteristics? Here Cresswell remarks, "However,
when Plato actually sets out the one and many problem about the forms it doesn't
have the structure of (I) at all."
Rather, it is (II) above. So Cresswell believes apparently that Plato does not set out
(III) in the passages he mentions or elsewhere in the Philebus, Parmenides, and
Sophist. I shall argue, however, that Plato does raise (III) in these works and that he
takes it as seriously as he does (II). " (p. 20, some notes omitted)
(1) 1M.J. Cresswell, "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems in
Plato?", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXII (1972), pp. 149-154.
(2) Ibid., p. 149.
(3) Ibid. In stating (1) in this way, Cresswell takes his cue from Sophist, 251A-B. In
the Philebus and at the opening of the Parmenides (127E; 129A-E), the problem
concerning particulars is how the same thing can have opposite characteristics.
65.
Cassin, Barbara. 2017. "The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the
Pseudos." In Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics, edited by
Greenstine, Abraham Jacob and Johnson, Ryan J., 13-29. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
"Barbara Cassin's "The Muses and Philosophy: Elements for a History of the
'Pseudos"' (1991; translated by Samuel Galson), investigates Plato's attempt in the
Sophist to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist. Cassin pinpoints the
slippery operation of the pseudos through the texts of Parmenides and Hesiod. Yet
Parmenides' rejection of not-being allows the sophist to claim infallibility. Plato's
Eleatic Stranger shows that Parmenides' rejection of notbeing is self-refuting (thus
the Stranger's famous parricide is just as much Parmenides' suicide). Further,
although the Stranger ultimately fails to find a criterion for truth or falsity, he
nevertheless establishes a place for the pseudos in the distinction between logos
tinos (speech of something) and logos peri tinos (speech about something).
Ultimately, Cassin argues that reality of pseudos is a condition for the possibility of
language, and indeed involves the very materiality and breath of language." (p. 5)
66.
Cataldo, Peter J. 1984. "Plato, Aristotle and προς εν equivocity." The Modern
Schoolman no. 61:237-247.
"One of the brilliant features of Father Joseph Owens' commentary on Aristotle's
Metaphysics [*] is the way that be traces the integration of the προς ενequivocity of
being in Aristotle's work. But Aristotle's concept of προς εν equivocity is not linked
with his predecessor Plato in this classic commentary.
The aim of this essay is lo indicate such a link, and one in which Plato 's
contribution is more than just an anticipation; for, it will be argued that all of the
elements which constitute προς εν equivocity per se are also present in Plato's
doctrine of being found in the Sophist.
The nature of this project requires that several texts be presented from both
thinkers, but this in no way presumes to be a comprehensive analysis of the texts. I
on! y wish to show that Aristotle's concept of προς εν equivocity is traceable to
Plato in some definite ways, all the while assuming, of course, that their doctrines
of being are essentially opposed." (p. 237)
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[*] The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A. Study in the Greek
Background of Mediaeval Thought, Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1951, Third revised edition 1978.
67.
Chan, Han-liang. 2012. "Plato and Peirce on Likeness and Semblance."
Biosemiotics no. 5:301-312.
Abstract: "In his well-known essay, ‘What Is a Sign?’ (CP 2.281, 285) Peirce uses
‘likeness’ and ‘resemblance’ interchangeably in his definition of icon. The
synonymity of the two words has rarely, if ever, been
questioned. Curiously, a locus classicus of the pair, at least in F. M. Cornford’s
English translation, can be found in a late dialogue of Plato’s, namely, the Sophist.
In this dialogue on the myth and truth of the sophists’ profession, the mysterious
‘stranger’, who is most likely Socrates persona, makes the famous distinction
between eikon (likeness) and phantasma (semblance) (236a,b).
For all his broad knowledge in ancient philosophy, Peirce never mentioned this
parallel; nor has any Peircian scholar identified it.(1) There seems to be little
problem with eikon as likeness, but phantasma may give rise to a puzzle which this
paper will attempt to solve. Plato uses two pairs of words: what eikon is to
phantasma is eikastikhn (the making of likeness [235d]) to phantastikhn (semblance
making [236c]). In other words, icons come into being because of the act of iconmaking, which is none other than indexicality. Witness what Peirce says about the
relationship between photographs and the objects they represent: ‘But this
resemblance is due to the photographs having been produced under such
circumstances that they were physically forced to correspond point by point to
nature.’ (Ibid.) Thus the iconicity which links the representamen (sign) and its
object is made possible not only by an interpretant, but also by indexisation.
Their possible etymological and epistemological links aside, the Peircian example
of photographing and the Platonic discussion of painting and sculpturing in the
Sophist, clearly show the physio-pragmatic aspect of iconicity. The paper will
therefore reread the Peircian iconicity by closely analysing this relatively obscure
Platonic text, and by so doing restore to the text its hidden semiotic dimension."
68.
Chappell, T. D. J. 2011. "Making Sense of the Sophist. Ten Answers to Ten
Questions." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum
Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 344-375. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"One notable feature of the method of division is this: every determination in a
well-performed division is a positive determination.
See Statesman, 262c9–d7, on an attempted definition by division of barbaros:
“[Our division went wrong because we did] the same sort of thing as those who are
trying to make a twofold division of the human race, and do what most of those do
who live here: they distinguish on one side the race of Greeks as separate from all
others, and then give the single name ‘barbarians’ to all the other races, though
these are countless in number and share no kinship of blood or language.
Then because they have a single term, they suppose they also have a single kind.”
A good division will not divide Greeks from non-Greeks, but Greeks from Romans,
Britons, Gauls, Teutons, Slavonic tribes, Hyperboreans, islanders of the utmost
west, etc. etc. etc. To put it another way, every step of a well-performed division
will use “other than” and not “is not”. More about this in due course." (pp. 344-345)
(...)
"In all these ways making sense of the Sophist, and (come to that) making sense of
the sophist, is very literally a matter of watching Plato making sense: creating a
theory of how, alongside the changeless world of the Forms, there can and must be
a changing world of interweavings of those Forms. Not only the gods’
interweavings, which constitute the world, but also our interweavings, which
constitute logoi about – representations of – that world: either misleading and false
images of it, like the sophist’s, or faithful and accurate images, like those created by
the person whom above all the sophist aspires to imitate: the philosopher." (p. 375)
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69.
Charlton, William. 1995. "Plato's Later Platonism." Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy no. 13:113-133.
"And although on some interpretations the analyses of negation and false statement
in the Sophist call precisely for quantification over abstract objects, those passages
have also been interpreted as requiring quantification over concrete objects like
Theaetetus.
(...)
"But the passages themselves are brief and the issues clear. In what follows I first
explain (Section I) why I prefer a Platonizing interpretation, and (Section II)
question whether Plato is willing to quantify over concrete objects at all. I then
(Section III) consider how he would wish us to understand existential claims to the
effect that 'there is' something or that something 'shares in being'. Next (Section IV)
I show how, using quantification over abstract but not over concrete objects, and
also using the five Greatest Kinds mentioned in the Sophist, Plato could analyse
various kinds of statement. He did not, of course, have the concept of quantification
logicians have today. But he had strong logical instincts, and the suggestions he
throws out lend themselves to development with the aid of quantifiers in a
perspicuous and intriguing way. Finally (Section V), I suggest that his analysis of
negation in terms of otherness reveals a sort of Platonism that is itself other than
that defined by Quine: he believes that the difference between being and not being
is independent of our thought in a way it would not be on an analysis similar to that
proposed for change in Section IV." (pp. 113-114)
70.
Cherubin, Rose. 1993. "What is Eleatic about the Eleatic Stranger?" In Platoʼs
Dialogues: New studies and Interpretations, edited by Press, Gerald A., 215-235.
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
"In this paper I would like to pose and to explore the following questions: Why is
there an Eleatic Stranger in Plato's Sophist? What if anything does this character
say or imply or do that only a "companion of those around Parmenides and Zeno"
(216a) would?
I would also like to propose that central to these concerns is the question of how
Plato read Parmenides' poem. Did Plato take the daimon's speech as a direct and
literal statement of Parmenides' views? What we can discover about this issue could
be instructive in our considerations of how we might best read Parmenides.
The Stranger's speeches and behavior include much that seems sophistic, as well as
a number of reasons to suspect that he is not, or not only, a sophist. We are led,
then, to ask what if any the differences are between Eleatic and sophist, and
especially what if any differences between them appear in Plato. (For the latter I
will focus on the Sophist.) What would account for the differences, or the lack
thereof? And if there are differences, into which group-Eleatic or sophist-does the
Stranger fall?" (p. 215)
71.
Chrysakopoulou, Sylvana. 2010. "Heraclitus and Xenophanes in Plato's Sophist:
The Hidden Harmony." Ariadne. The Journal of the School of Philosophy of the
University of Crete no. 16:75-98.
"The principal aim of the present article is to shed light on Heraclitus’ intellectual
kinship with Xenophanes. Although the overlap of fundamental patterns and themes
in both thinkers’ worldview could be partly due to the osmosis of ideas in the
archaic
era, the intertextual a!nity between them, as transmitted by the history of reception,
cannot be regarded as a mere accident of cultural diffusion. Our primary intention is
to focus on the common grounds of their criticism against the authority of the epic
poets on the theological education of the Greeks and more particularly on its
platonic appropriation." (p. 75)
(...)
"In conclusion, Plato in the Sophist uses Xenophanes’ and Heraclitus’ theological
a!nity as a trait d’union between the latter and Parmenides, inasmuch as Plato’s
ontology is presented as a response to Parmenides’ account on being." (p. 85)
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72.
———. 2018. "Xenophanes in Plato’s Sophist and the first philosophical
genealogy." Trends in Classics no. 10:324-337.
Abstract: "In this article I intend to show that Plato in the Sophist provides us with
the earliest doxographic material on pre-Platonic thinkers. In his account on his
predecessors, Xenophanes emerges as the founder of the Eleatic tribe as opposed to
the pluralists, while Heraclitus and Empedocles are presented as the Ioanian and the
Italian Muses respectively. This prima facie genealogical approach, where Plato’s
predecessors become the representatives of schools of different origins paves the
way for Plato’s project in the Sophist. In other words the monistic account
Xenophanes introduces, prepares for the synthesis between the one and the many
set forth by Heraclitus and Empedocles, which is thus presented as a further step
towards the ‘interweaving of forms’ (συμπλοκήν εἰδῶν) Plato proposes in the
Sophist."
73.
Clanton, J. Caleb. 2007. "From Indeterminacy to Rebirth: Making Sense of Socratic
Silence in Plato's Sophist." The Pluralist no. 2:37-56.
"I argue here that, in the Sophist, Plato opens up possibilities for philosophy that lie
beyond Socrates's style of discourse. Plato does so by introducing indeterminacy as
a way of salvaging determinate discourse itself. In the first section of this article, I
explore what the problem of the Sophist seems to be. It appears that in order to
preserve discourse, the characters within the dialogue must try to make sense of
non-being, which clearly is a problematic undertaking. In the second section, I
follow the characters as they try to
resolve this issue of not-being. Third, I argue that in saving determinate discourse
through resolving the issue of not-being, the characters in the dialogue incorporate
indeterminacy into the very enterprise of philosophy. With this reading of the
Sophist in mind, I try to make sense of a crucial element that Plato adds -- namely,
Socrates's absence in che dialogue. In doing so, I mean to stay closely attuned to the
dramatic features of the dialogue as they generate the questions I focus on. Finally,
in light of this reading of the Sophist,
I suggest a way to rethink what it means to do philosophy, following Plato's lead in
carrying out a philosophical project that is often deemed foreign to Plato." (p. 37)
74.
Clarke, Patricia. 1994. "The Interweaving of the Forms with One Another: Sophist
259e." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 12:35-62.
"At Sophist 259 E the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus agree that 'The loosening of
each thing from everything [else] is the complete wiping out of all λόγοι for it is
because of the interweaving of the forms with one another that we come to have
λόγος. My chief aim in this paper is to air a possible solution to the problem of how
this remark might apply to such statements as 'Theaetetus sits' and 'Theaetetus flies',
(1) in each of which only one form is referred to. The solution turns on the claim
that neither statement could be true unless forms could mix with one another in the
sense of being instantiated together in Theaetetus. I do not positively endorse it. I
wonder whether there is any definite solution to the problem; Plato does not seem to
give sufficiently clear indication of how he is thinking. However, I wish to argue
that a solution along the lines indicated cannot be dismissed as easily as has
sometimes been supposed. In the first part of my paper I give some general
consideration to the remark at 259 E, and examine briefly some alternative solutions
to the problem of its application to 'Theaetetus sits' and other such statements." (p.
35)
(1) I use these translations, rather than the more idiomatic 'Theaetetus is sitting',
'Theaetetus is flying', to reflect the fact that in the original at 263 A each example is
expressed by means of a two-word sentence composed of proper name and verb.
However, even for a statement of the form 'Theaetetus is F', expressed with copula
and predicate, a problem arises if for Theaetetus to be F is simply for Theaetetus to
partake directly of F, for then again only one form might seem to be involved."
75.
Cordero, Nestor-Luis. 2013. "The relativization of ”separation" (khorismos) in the
Sophist." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson,
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Thomas M., 187-201. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"It is a commonplace among historians of ancient thought to refer to the
“separation” (khorismos) which characterizes Platonic philosophy, and which
Aristotle criticized severely. It is true that, like any commonplace, this separation,
which is at base a type of dualism, can be the subject of very different
understandings, including that of being minimized." (p. 187)
(...)
"All aporiai stem from separation. So, one has to try to suppress it, or at any rate
relativize it, and that is going to be the task the Sophist sets itself.
Why the Sophist? Because, as we saw, khorismos separated two modes of being,
and the Sophist is a dialogue about being. Steering clear of interpretation, the
dialogue’s subtitle is peri tou ontos. And it is normal, if he is going to undertake an
in-depth analysis of the figure of the sophist, that he should see himself as obliged,
for the first time on his philosophical voyage, now that he is over seventy, to
confront his father Parmenides, the venerable and fearsome monopolizer of being,
and the confrontation concerns sophistry. This is not the time to expatiate on the
“amitiés particulières” that Plato establishes between Parmenides and sophistry. In
criticizing the great master all things are allowed, including taking literally images
in the poem which are didactic, such as the sphere, and in particular characterizing
him as a fellow traveller of sophistry, which is, all in all, a joke in poor taste. But it
is undeniable that his changing of porte-parole, in which he replaces Socrates with
the Stranger, allows Plato to take certain liberties, and to face problems that his
Socrates had never faced, among them precisely the necessity of refuting
Parmenides." (p. 191)
76.
Corey, David D. 2015. The Sophists in Plato's Dialogues. Albany: State University
of New York Press.
Chapter Eight: Plato's Critique of the Sophist?
"In this chapter, I consider four such accounts of the sophists: those of Anytus
speaking to Socrates in the Meno, Socrates speaking to Adeimantus in the Republic,
Socrates speaking to Polus in the Gorgias, and the Eleatic Stranger speaking to
Theaetetus in the Sophist. Although all these appear to stand as general critiques of
the sophists, none is successful as such, nor, I argue, does Plato mean for us to
accept them as such. These accounts are obviously defective both in their own
terms and in light of what we know of the sophists from other dialogues. At the
same time, however, I want to argue that these passages of general criticism have a
broader scope than merely attempting to criticize the sophists. They also call into
question the very lines of demarcation
between such categories as “sophistry,” “philosophy,” and “good citizenship,” thus
leading inevitably to the possibility of self-reflection, whether one understands
oneself to be a philosopher or merely a citizen.
In other words, what is usually taken rather facilely to be “Plato’s critique of the
sophists” in fact cuts more deeply into common thinking and doing than readers
may like to admit. Widely accepted and even cherished political, philosophical, and
pedagogical practices are implicated in these accounts. " (pp. 202-203)
77.
Cornford, Francis Macdonald. 1935. Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus
and the Sophist of Plato translated with a running commentary. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Co.
Contents: The Theaetetus, pp. 15-163; The Sophist pp. 165-332.
"My object was to make accessible to students of philosophy who cannot easily
read the Greek text, two masterpieces of Plato's later period, concerned with
questions that still hold a living interest. A study of existing translations and
editions has encouraged also the hope that scholars already familiar with the
dialogues may find a fresh interpretation not unwelcome. A commentary has been
added because, in the more difficult places, a bare translation is almost certain, if
understood at all, to be misunderstood.
This danger may be illustrated by a quotation from a living philosopher of the first
rank: It was Plato in his later mood who put forward the suggestion "and I hold that
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the definition of being is simply power". This suggestion is the charter of the
doctrine of Immanent Law.'(1)
Dr. Whitehead is quoting Jowett's translation. If the reader will refer to the passage
(p. 234 below), he will see that the words are rendered: 'I am proposing as a mark to
distinguish real things that they be nothing but power.'(2) A mark of real things may
not be a 'definition of being'. This mark, moreover, is offered by the Eleatic
Stranger to the materialist as an improvement on his own mark of real things,
tangibility. The materialist accepts it, 'having for the moment no better suggestion
of his own to offer'. The Stranger add that Theaetetus and he may perhaps change
their minds 0n this matter later on. Plato has certainly not committed himself here
to a 'definition of being'. So much could be discovered from an accurate translation;
but the word 'power ' still needs to be explained. It has been rendered by 'potency',
'force', 'Möglichkeit', 'puissance de relation'. Without some account of the history of
the word dynamis in Plato's time and earlier, the student accustomed to the terms of
modem philosophy may well carry away a false impression.
To meet difficulties such as this, I have interpolated, after each compact section of
the text, a commentary which aims at discovering what Plato really means and how
that part of the argument is related to the rest. There are objections to dissecting the
living body of a Platonic dialogue. No other writer has approached Plato's skill in
concealing a rigid and intricate structure of reasoning beneath the flowing lines of a
conversation in which the suggestion of each thought as it arises seems to be
followed to an unpremeditated conclusion. In these later dialogues the bones show
more clearly through the skin; and it is likely that Plato would rather have us
penetrate his meaning than stand back with folded hands to admire his art. An
interpolated commentary, giving the reader the information he needs when and
where he needs it, may be preferred to the usual plan of stowing away such
information in an introduction at the beginning and notes at the end. It is not clear
why we should be forced to read a book in three places at once. This book, at any
rate, is designed to be read straight through." (Preface, pp. VII-VIII)
(1) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, (1933), p, 165. I am not suggesting that
Dr. Whitehead fundamentally misunderstands the master who has deeply influenced
his own philosophy, but only pointing out how a profound thinker may be misled by
a translation.
(2) This rendering is itself doubtful, the construction of the words, as they stand in
the MSS, being obscure and difficult.
78.
Cresswell, M. J. 1972. "Is There One or Are There Many One and Many Problems
in Plato?" The Philosophical Quarterly no. 22:149-154.
"How can one thing be many and many things one? This perennial in Greek
philosophy gets a new twist in three of Plato's later dialogues (Parmenides, Sophist,
and Philebus) where we discover not one problem but apparently two. More
interestingly, although one of them is a serious and perplexing problem demanding
the full insight of the rigorously disciplined philosopher, the other problem is
described in the Philebus (14d, e) as commonplace and one such that "almost
everyone agrees nowadays that there is no need to concern oneself with things like
that, feeling that they are childish, obvious and a great nuisance to argument". And
in the Sophist (251b) it is relegated to providing a banquet for the young and for
"late learners of old men" who are "poorly endowed with intelligence and marvel at
such things, thinking themselves to have come upon all wisdom".
What is the difference between this trivial form and the serious form of the problem
of how one thing can be many? In the Philebus (15a) Socrates says that the trivial
problem occurs when the one in question is the sort of thing which can come into
being and pass away, i.e., is something which belongs to the physical world. The
serious problem is when the one is an eternal existent." (p. 149)
79.
Crivelli, Paolo. 1993. "Plato's Sophist and Semantic Fragmentation." Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie no. 75:71-74.
"In this journal, Band 71, Heft 3, pp. 257-282, Michael T. Ferejohn [*] proposed to
apply to the interpretation of certain parts of Plato's Sophist a methodological
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principle which I shall call 'principle of joint explanation': given the close
relationship between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, in particular
circumstances it's possible to use Aristotelian texts to interpret obscure or vague
Platonic passages. In this paper I shall criticize Ferejohn's application of the
'principle of joint explanation' to the Sophist and his interpretation of Plato's
analysis of negation and of its philosophical aims."
[*] Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and Semantic Fragmentation.
80.
———. 2012. Plato's Account of Falsehood: A Study of the Sophist. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Abbreviations of titles of Plato's works X; Note
on the text XI; Introduction 1; 1. The sophist defined 13; 2. Puzzles about nonbeing 28; 3. Puzzles about being 71; 4. The communion of kinds 102; 5. Negation
and not-being 177; 6. Sentences, false sentences, and false belief 221; Appendix:
The Sophist on true and false sentences: formal presentation 261; References 275;
Index of names 290; Index of subjects 294; index of passages cited 296-309.
"In the Sophist Plato presents his mature views on sentences, falsehood, and notbeing. These views have given an important contribution to the birth and growth of
the subjects now identified as ontology and philosophy of language. I have two
main objectives: to offer a precise reconstruction of the arguments and the theses
concerning sentences, falsehood, and not-being presented in the Sophist and to gain
a philosophical understanding of them. In this introduction I offer an overview of
the main problems addressed in i he Sophist and their solutions and then discuss the
methodology whereby I pursue my primary goals." (Introduction, p. 1)
"Almost a commentary. The close interconnection of themes and concepts invited
by the dialogue-form makes it difficult to address a Platonic dialogue by examining
some of its themes and concepts in isolation from the others: if an operation of this
sort is attempted, the impression arises that some factor essential for the
understanding of the issues under consideration is ignored. Mainly for this reason I
decided to have my examination of the Sophist unfolding in parallel with the
development of the dialogue. So the present study covers most of the dialogue and
follows its progression, almost as a running commentary.
Nevertheless, my examination of the Sophist is selective: not all the themes and
concepts emerging from the dialogue are discussed with the same care or depth.
The approach I have privileged is that of philosophy of language (in the
comprehensive sense in which it addresses also ontological matters). In particular, I
ask Plato some of the questions that a modern philosopher of language would
regard as important and I consider what answers Plato is committed to offering.
Establishing what answers Plato is committed to offering requires an accurate
historical reconstruction of what he actually does say: modern questions, Plato’s
answers. The present study therefore combines exegetical and philological
considerations with a philosophically minded attitude." (p. 11)
81.
Crombie, Ian M. 1962. An Examination of Plato's Doctrines. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Vol. 2: Plato on Knowledge and Reality; Chapter 3: Metaphysical Analysis. § V:
The Sophist, pp. 388-421; Chapter 4: Logic and Language § III: The Paradox of
False Belief pp. 486-497; § IV: Some Further Problems arising out of the Sophist:
the Copula and Existence, etc., pp. 498-516.
"The doctrine of the Sophist is continuous with that which we have been examining.
The fact that I have relegated the Sophist to a section of its own must not be
allowed to give a contrary impression.
I have given the Sophist a section on its own partly because it is very difficult, and
partly because it adds something to the doctrine sketched in the Cratylus and
common to the Phaedrus, Statesman and Philebus. There are two parts to this
additional material. One of these parts deals with matters which are perhaps more
properly called logical than metaphysical, namely the meaning of the verb einai or
"to be", and the nature of negation. The discussion of these topics is entangled with
that of the others and can only be separated by violence. I shall use violence,
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however, and postpone the detailed consideration of these topics to the next chapter.
The other part of the additional material can perhaps be described as follows. So far
the "kinds" whose "sharing" we have been considering have been, on the whole,
material or limiting properties. I call, for example, animality a limiting property,
because there are certain limits which cannot be transgressed by anything which is
to have the property.
We recall however that the discussion in the Parmenides was concerned with the
formal or non-limiting property unity—non-limiting in the sense that to be told that
X is one is to be told nothing whatever about the nature of X. It is clear that the
relation of non-limiting to limiting properties was an important question in Plato's
latest phase, and it is in the Sophist that this is first discussed in connection with the
sharing of kinds. This is the special material with which this section will be
primarily concerned. I may add that it will be impossible in a discussion of this—
perhaps of any—length to justify an interpretation of the Sophist." (p. 388)
82.
Curd, Patricia Kenig. 1988. "Parmenidean Clues in the Search for the Sophist."
History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 5:307-320.
"Does the Parmenides hold clues to a proper understanding of the Sophist? It seems
to me that it does; in this paper I shall explore a number of issues that link the two
dialogues, arguing that understanding Plato's treatment of these issues in the
Parmenides can help us correctly interpret the arguments of the Sophist.
Influential interpretations of Plato's later work hold that there are serious confusions
about identity and predication in that work. According to these interpretations some
of the arguments in the antinomies of Part II of the Parmenides exhibit this
confusion; further, according to these views, it is not until the Sophist that Plato
sees his way to distinguish identity and predication adequately, and that it is this
that allows him finally to solve the problems of Being and Not Being in that
dialogue.(1)
In this paper I want to challenge this view: I shall claim that the arguments of Part II
of the Parmenides are not infected with an identity/predication (I/P) confusion.
Further, I shall argue that in the second part of the Parmenides Plato explores and
investigates certain ideas that are crucial to his solution of the problem of NotBeing in the Sophist (a solution that does not depend on distinguishing identity and
predicative "senses" or "uses" of the verb "to be"). (2) I shall begin with some
preliminary remarks about the I/P confusion and the earlier dialogues before turning
to the Parmenides and the Sophist." (p. 307)
(1) The interpretations I have in mind are primarily those of G. E. L. Owen (in
"Notes on Ryle's Plato," in Logic, Science and Dialectic, ed. G. E. L. Owen and M.
C. Nussbaum (Ithaca, 1986), pp. 85-103; hereafter NRP; and in "Plato on NotBeing," in LSD pp. 104-137; hereafter PNB); and Malcolm Schofield (in "The
Antinomies of Plato's Parmenides," Classical Quarterly, vol. 21 [1977], pp. 139158). See also M. Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage (Gottingen, 1967).
(2) Here I shall follow the interpretation of the arguments of the Sophist suggested
by Jean Roberts in "The Problem about Being in the Sophist," History of
Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 3 (1986), pp. 229-243 (hereafter PBS). What I shall say
here about the Sophist is based on an acceptance of Roberts' arguments (which I
shall not repeat here) and owes much to her work.
83.
Dancy, Russell M. 1999. "The Categories of Being in Plato's Sophist 255c-e."
Ancient Philosophy no. 19:45-72.
"Sophist 255c-e contains a division of beings into two categories rather than a
distinction between the "is" of identity, existence, and/or predication; this emerges
from an analysis of the argument that employs the division. The resulting division is
the same as that ascribed to Plato in the indirect tradition among the so-called
"unwritten doctrines"; there the two categories are attached to the One and the
Indefinite Dyad." (p. 45)
(...)
"Conclusion. Perhaps it is not so bad if the later Plato sounds more like Aristotle.
But there remains an enormous difference of ontology between Plato and Aristotle,
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if any of the reports of Plato's 'unwritten doctrines' can be believed.
We have already noticed that Plato thinks the distinction between beings and others
can be put by saying that while beings partake of both the Forms Standalone and
Relative, others partake only of the Form Relative. The partition of beings into
Standalone ones and Relative ones, as I have construed it, is a categorial scheme:
the scheme of Old Academic Categories adverted to in the introductory section of
this article. Hermodorus (or whoever) was there quoted as saying that Plato says 'of
the beings, some are by virtue of themselves, and some are relative to something';
that much we have the Eleatic Stranger saying in 255c13-14. But Hermodorus gives
us examples, where the Stranger does not: a man and a horse are by virtue of
themselves; large and small [things] are relative to things. If we unpack these
examples, we presumably find ourselves saying: Bucephalus is a horse by virtue of
himself; it is because he is Bucephalus that he is a horse, or, perhaps better, it is not
because of some other thing that Bucephalus counts as a horse, whereas the fact that
Bucephalus is large is something whose explanation requires us to introduce other,
relatively smaller, horses which are the norm for horses as far as size goes. This
then leads to categorizations of the terms man and horse under the heading
Standalone and large, small, good, and bad under the heading Relative. And it
seems a sound conjecture that where I am speaking of 'terms', Plato would speak of
'forms': the division is a division of forms, if that is right.
But that is not the end of the story. The Hermodorus text, along with other texts, (1)
would have us believe that Plato rooted the two categories Standalone and Relative
in two super-Forms that stood above all the others: the mysterious entities known as
the One and the Indefinite Dyad, from which the more ordinary Forms derived as
numbers. I think this, too, should be taken seriously. But that is a large undertaking,
not to be entered on here." (pp. 69-70)
(1) Including, besides the others quoted in I, many in Aristotle, and also the rather
strange and somewhat garbled stretch of text in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus
Mathematicos X 257-276 purporting to report on the views of 'Pythagoras and his
circle'.
84.
De Brasi, Diego, and Fuchs, Marko J., eds. 2016. Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and
Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25). Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge
Scholars Publishing.
Table of Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Diego De Brasi and Marko J. Fuchs:
Introduction. Heidegger’s Lectures on Plato’s Sophist and their Importance for
Modern Plato Scholarship 1; Jens Kristian Larsen: Plato and Heidegger on
Sophistry and Philosophy 27; Catalin Partenie: Heidegger: Sophist and Philosopher
61; Laura Candiotto: Negation as Relation: Heidegger’s Interpretation of Plato’s
Sophist 257b3–259d1 75; Nicolas Zaks: Is the ‘In-Itself’ Relational? Heidegger and
Contemporary Scholarship on Plato’s Sophist 255c–e 95; Argyri G. Karanasiou:
The Term symplokē in Symposium 202b1 and in Sophist 240c1ff, 259d-261c:
Heidegger's Interpretation of the Concept of "Interconnection" in Platonic Thought
113; Maia Shukhoshvili: Tékhnē in Plato's Sophist (Discussing Heidegger's
Opinion) 131; Olga Alieva: Ὀρθολογία περὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν: Heidegger on the Notion of
Falsehood in Plato's Sophist 143; Contributors 157.
"This volume offers a selection of papers presented at the international Symposium
“Sophistes: Plato’s Dialogue and Heidegger’s Lectures in Marburg (1924–25)” held
at the University of Marburg in April 2013. At
that meeting young classicists and philosophers discussed the possibility of a reevaluation of Heidegger’s hermeneutics of the Sophist, and argued for a more
nuanced reconstruction of his relationship with Plato." (p. VII)
85.
———. 2016. "Introduction. Heidegger’s Lectures on Plato’s Sophist and their
Importance for Modern Plato Scholarship." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and
Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs,
Marko J., 1-26. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"This introductory essay hence focuses on four aspects. First of all, it will offer an
overview on the current state of research. Second, it will argue for a relativization
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of Heidegger’s alleged misunderstanding of Plato. This will be achieved by arguing
against some of the criticism expressed by Werner Beierwaltes [*] towards
Heidegger’s reading of Plato. Third, it briefly examines the “Transition” in the 1924
Marburg Lectures between Heidegger’s analysis of the Nicomachean Ethics and the
interpretation of Plato’s Sophist, the “Preliminary Remarks” and the “Introduction”
to the actual interpretation of the dialogue, describing Heidegger as a somehow
unconscious ‘forerunner’ of the modern dialogical approach. Finally, it will present
an overview of the contributions in the volume and suggest further possible
research developments." (p. 2)
[*] Beierwaltes, Werner. “EPEKEINA. A Remark on Heidegger’s Reception of
Plato.” Trans. Marcus Brainard, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 17, no. 1-2
(1994): 83–99 (orig.: “EPEKEINA. Eine Anmerkung zu Heideggers PlatonRezeption.” In Transzendenz: zu einem Grundwort der klassischen Metaphysik.
Festschrift für Klaus Kremer, edited by Ludger Honnefelder and Werner Schüßler,
39–55. Paderborn: Schöning, 1992).
—. “Heideggers Rückgang zu den Griechen.” Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, Jg. 1995, Heft 1 (Munich: Beck).
—. “Heideggers Gelassenheit.” In Amicus Plato magis amica veritas. Festschrift für
Wolfgang Wieland zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Rainer Enskat, 1–35. Berlin: de
Gruyter, 1998.
The three essays are reprinted in:
Beierwaltes, Werner. Fußnoten zu Platon. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 2011.
86.
De Garay, Jesús. 2013. "Difference and Negation: Plato’s Sophist in Proclus." In
Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 225245. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"We do not have a specific commentary on the Sophist, and it is doubtful whether
he ever wrote one. What we do have is the Commentary on the Parmenides, from
which some have hypothesized that he also wrote one on the Sophist. Whatever the
case, the explicit references to this dialogue are many, and they affect crucial issues
in Proclus’ thought. In particular, The Elements of Theology aside (which, because
of its axiomatic treatment does not include textual references of any kind), allusions
to the Sophist are very frequent in his three most relevant systematic works: the
Commentary on the Parmenides, the Platonic Theology, and the Commentary on the
Timaeus (9)." (p. 227)
(...)
"However, as has been pointed out by Annick Charles-Saget, to understand Proclus’
interpretation of the Sophist we cannot pay attention solely to explicit quotations
from the dialogue; but we must also consider his silences and significance shifts. In
other words, on the one hand there are important questions in the dialogue which
Proclus hardly adverts to: for example, the sophist as deceiver, and purveyor of
falsehood in general; on the other hand, there are matters which Proclus presents in
a different way, such as the vindication of poetic production in light of the
definition of the sophist. Also significant is the way in which a number of very
short passages from the Sophist are adduced over and over and again in support of
his thesis." (p. 228)
(9) An exhaustive documentation of references to the Sophist can be found in
Guérard (1991). My own exposition will focus strictly on the Commentary on the
Parmenides and Platonic Theology.
References
Charles-Saget, A., “Lire Proclus, lecteur du Sophiste”, in P. Aubenque (éd.), Etudes
sur le Sophiste de Platon (1991), 475 – 494 = Charles-Saget (1991).
Guérard, Ch., “Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus”, in P.
Aubenque (éd.), Etudes sur le Sophiste de Platon, 1991, 495 – 508 = Guérard
(1991).
87.
de Harven, Vanessa. 2021. "The Metaphysics of Stoic Corporealism." Apeiron:127.
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Abstract: "The Stoics are famously committed to the thesis that only bodies are, and
for this reason they are rightly called “corporealists.” They are also famously
compared to Plato’s earthborn Giants in the Sophist, and rightly so given their
steadfast commitment to body as being. But the Stoics also notoriously turn the
tables on Plato and coopt his “dunamis proposal” that being is whatever can act or
be acted upon, to underwrite their commitment to body rather than shrink from it as
the Giants do. The substance of Stoic corporealism, however, has not been fully
appreciated. This paper argues that Stoic corporealism goes beyond the dunamis
proposal, which is simply an ontological criterion for being, to the metaphysics of
body. This involves, first, an account of body as metaphysically simple and hence
fundamental; second, an account of body as malleable and continuous, hence fit for
blending (krasis di’ holou) and composition. In addition, the metaphysics of body
involves a distinction between this composition relation seen in the cosmology, and
the constitution relation by which the four-fold schema called the Stoic Categories
proceeds, e.g. the relation between a statue and its clay, or a fist and its underlying
hand. It has not been appreciated that the cosmology and the Categories are distinct
— and complementary — explanatory enterprises, the one accounting for
generation and unity, the other taking those individuals once generated, and giving a
mereological analysis of their identity and persistence conditions, kinds, and
qualities. The result is an elegant division of Plato’s labor from the Battle of Gods
and Giants. On the one hand, the Stoics rehabilitate the crude cosmology of the
Presocratics to deliver generation and unity in completely corporeal terms, and that
work is found in their Physics. On the other hand, they reform the Giants and “dare
to corporealize,” delivering all manner of predication (from identity to the virtues),
and that work is found in Stoic Logic. Recognizing the distinctness of these
explanatory enterprises helps dissolve scholarly puzzles, and harmonizes the Stoics
with themselves."
88.
de Vries, Willem. 1988. "On "Sophist" 255B-E." History of Philosophy Quarterly
no. 5:385-394.
"At Sophist 255b7-e the Eleatic Stranger gives two arguments, one to show that
being and identity are not the same, and one to show that being and otherness are
not the same. Scholars have not paid them particularly close attention, but it seems
generally agreed that the two arguments are quite different. In this paper I shall
offer an interpretation which shows that the two arguments, though superficially
quite different, are intrinsically and importantly related. Specifically, in the first
argument the Stranger elicits an obvious falsehood from the hypothesis that being
and identity are the same. I claim that in order to distinguish being and otherness an
exactly parallel argument could have been given instead of the second argument we
actually find. However, there are sound dramatic reasons why this was not done, for
in this case the falsehood would not be obvious.
Instead, the argument we are given takes us deeper and analyzes the source of the
falsehood by introducing a distinction between absolute and relative uses of
"being." This distinction, which has been misinterpreted in the literature, is then
applied to the problem at hand and is used to distinguish being from otherness.
Thus the fuller and apparently different argument to distinguish being and otherness
succeeds by giving the deeper reasons for the success of the argument to distinguish
being and identity.
As a corollary to my interpretation, we can see that in these arguments other senses
of "is," whether the "is" of existence or the "is" of identity, do not come into play, as
other commentators have held.
The first section will discuss the first argument of our text, along with a recent
interpretation of it. In the second section I shall introduce the argument to
distinguish being and otherness and argue against Owen's interpretation.
The third section contains my interpretation of this argument, and is followed by a
summary fourth section." (p. 385)
89.
Delcomminette, Sylvain. 2014. "Odysseus and the Home of the Stranger from
Elea." Classical Quarterly no. 64:533-541.
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"Not very long ago, Plato’s Sophist was often presented as a dialogue devoted to the
problem of being and not-being, entangled with limited success in an inquiry into
the nature of the sophist. Thanks to the renewal of interest in the dramatic form of
Plato’s dialogues, recent works have shown that this entanglement is far from ill
conceived or anecdotal.(1) However, the inquiry into the sophist is itself introduced
by another question, concerning the nature of the Stranger from Elea himself. I
would like to show that this question and the way in which it is raised in the
prologue may themselves shed light on the relations between the many threads
which run across this very complex dialogue."
(1) See especially N. Notomi, The Unity of Plato’s Sophist (Cambridge, 1999).
90.
Denyer, Nicholas. 1991. Language, Thought and Falsehood in Ancient Greek
Philosophy. London: Routledge.
"How can one say something false? How can one even think such a thing?
Since, for example, all men are mortal, how can one either say or think that some
man is immortal? For since it is not the case that some man is immortal, how can
there be any such thing for one to say or think? That, in a nutshell, is the problem of
falsehood. It, and some of its many ramifications in ancient philosophy, will be the
topic of this book." (p. 14)
(...)
"In the Sophist Plato sorts out, once and for all, the problems about falsehood that
still lingered in the Theaetetus. His strategy is one of unite and conquer. What has
made falsehood so problematic hitherto is, he suggests, the fact that it has been
treated in isolation. We have thought that not being was uniquely difficult to
understand, not realising how wrong we are to think that we understand being (243
b 7 - c 5, 245 e 8 - 246 a 2). Once however we realise that both being and not being
should by rights be found equally difficult, we will be able to make progress (250 e
5 - 251 a 3). Plato thus examines all the many and diverse questions and answers
about being that were bequeathed him by his philosophical predecessors. How
many things are there? Just one? Just two? Or more? What sorts of things are there?
Only changing and tangible things? Only changeless and intangible ones? Or are
there things of both sorts? If we are to speak and think at all, argues Plato, we must
acknowledge the existence of many things, both tangible and intangible.
Above all, we must acknowledge the existence of the five Greatest Kinds: Change,
Rest, Being, Same and Other. By the end of Sophist 255 those kinds have been
isolated and distinguished from one another. Plato thereupon puts them to work. He
starts to explore some of the connections between them, and in so doing solves the
problem of how we can speak of that which is not." (Chapter 8, p. 147)
(...)
"Plato has explained how we can negate both predications and identifications. He
has explained how both those ways of speaking about what is not are perfectly
legitimate and free from paradox. His explanations seemed plausible enough, so far
as they went. But did they go far enough? In particular, did they go far enough to
solve our problem about falsehood? Plato thought not. By Sophist 258 b 7 he has
legitimated talk of what is not. It is not however until Sophist 263 d 4 that he takes
himself to have legitimated talk of falsehood. In the meantime, much other work is
done; and even though the problem of falsehood was that to charge someone with
falsehood requires talk of what is not, nevertheless the eventual solution to that
problem is not a simple application of the earlier result that talk of what is not can
make perfectly good sense. Why does Plato proceed in this way? Why does he not
declare the problem of falsehood solved the moment he has given his account of
negation?" (Chapter 9, p. 166)
91.
Desmond, William. 1979. "Plato's Philosophical Art and the Identification of the
Sophist." Filosofia oggi no. 2:393-403.
Summary: "The author starts from an interpretation of continuity in the dramatic
character of Plato's dialogue (a trait to be found in the Sophist as well, also in
account of those images helpful to outline the nature of the philosopher), thus
bringing forward a reading of the dialogue based on the statement that Plato's
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philosophical purpose cannot be either dried up or fulfilled on the range of logical
analysis."
92.
Diggle, James. 2020. "Two Conjectures in Plato (Laches 183e, Sophist 261a)."
Hermes. Zeischrift für Klassische Philologie no. 148:381-382.
93.
Dinan, Matthew. 2013. "On Wolves and Dogs. The Eleatic Stranger’s Socratic Turn
in the Sophist." In Socratic Philosophy and Its Others, edited by Dustin, Christopher
and Schaeffer, Denise. Lanham: Lexington Books.
" I argue that in adopting a kind of Socratic “virtuosity,” the shortcomings of the
Eleatic alternative to Socrates are put in dramatic relief. Not only does the
Stranger’s appropriation of Socratic elenchos ultimately fail to produce clarity with
respect to the sophist, but the drama of the dialogue suggests that the Stranger is
critically lacking in self-knowledge. We see this most clearly in the Stranger’s
philosophical parricide of “Father” Parmenides; certainly, it is through this parricide
that the Stranger is able to produce an internally consistent account of being and
logos, but the Stranger’s consistency only serves to attenuate his abstraction from a
satisfactory account of the human things. At the end of the dialogue the Stranger
thus produces a conclusion no more satisfying than the Athenian jury of the
Apology—that Socrates looks awfully similar to a sophist. The specific ways in
which Plato problematizes the Stranger’s investigation and conclusions, however,
provide us with some insights into why Plato made Socrates the philosophical hero
of the dialogues, particularly insofar as the Stranger seems lacking in Socrates’
characteristic self-knowledge. In the last analysis, while Plato opens the Sophist by
dividing philosophy like from like, he closes it by dividing it better from worse,
vindicating Socrates." (p. 117)
94.
Dominick, Yancy Hughes. 2018. "The Image of the Noble Sophist." Epoché: A
Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 22:203-220.
Abstract: "In this paper, I begin with an account of the initial distinction between
likenesses and appearances, a distinction which may resemble the difference
between sophists and philosophers. That distinction first arises immediately after
the puzzling appearance of the noble sophist, who seems to occupy an odd space in
between sophist and philosopher. In the second section, I look more closely at the
noble sophist, and on what that figure might tell us about images and the use of
images. I also attempt to use the insights provided by the noble sophist in an
investigation of the kind of images that Plato the author produces. This raises the
question of the general notion of image as it appears in the Sophist, and especially
of the dual nature of all images, which in turn invites reflection on certain features
of the examination of being and non-being late in the dialogue. Finally, I return to
the deception inherent in images, and I argue that this dialogue does not present the
possibility of completely honest images. Nevertheless, I hope to show that some
uses of deceptions and images are better than others."
95.
Dorter, Kenneth. 1990. "Diairesis and the Tripartite Soul in the Sophist." Ancient
Philosophy no. 10:41-61.
"It has not generally been observed that there are remarkable differences between
the way that the Eleatic stranger defines the sophist in the dialogue of that name,
and the way that Socrates had characterized him in the earlier dialogues. These
differences entail some serious consequences, and by paying attention to these we
will be able to notice important implications of the Sophist's treatment of its theme.
More generally, it will help us evaluate the claim that the dialogue represents a
fundamental departure from Plato's earlier thinking." (p. 41)
96.
———. 1994. Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues: the Parmenides,
Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. Berkeley: University of California Press.
"The four dialogues examined here form a natural group with sequential concerns.
Since the aim of the present study is to try to understand the group as a whole, I
have sacrificed the advantage of greater detail that book-length commentaries
would provide, in order to present a more synoptic picture. But although the
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treatment of individual dialogues will not be as extensively detailed as in booklength studies, I have tried to pay careful attention both to the conceptual arguments
and to the dramatic and literary events, and have tried to ensure that the lessening of
detail would not mean a lessening of attentiveness." (from the Preface, p. IX)
(...)
"In the middle dialogues such as the Phaedo and Republic, Plato defines reality with
reference to the criterion of rationality. Reason apprehends what is universal and
unchanging, but not what is particular and in flux. The senses apprehend what is
particular and in flux, but not what is universal and unchanging. Since reason is a
more trustworthy guide to truth than are the changeable and deceptive senses, true
reality is to be identified with "being" (the universal and unchanging) rather than
"becoming" (the particular and fluid). This is the dichotomy represented later in the
Sophist by the gods (friends of the forms) and giants (materialists), respectively.
The former maintain against the materialists that "through the body we have
intercourse with becoming by means of the senses, and by means of reason through
the soul we have intercourse with real being, which always remains the same in the
same respects, whereas becoming is different at different times" (248a). The leader
of this dialogue is not Socrates but an unnamed stranger from Elea, who apparently
is proposing to give up this dichotomy by neutralizing the difference between the
gods and giants—in which case he would destroy the theory of forms in one of its
most fundamental features.
Consequently it is more important in the case of the Sophist than with most other
dialogues to consider its standpoint in relation to that of its predecessors. There are
in fact notable differences between the way sophistry—the defining focus of the
present dialogue—is portrayed here and in the Socratic dialogues." (pp. 121-122)
97.
———. 2013. "The Method of Division in the Sophist: Plato’s Second deuteros
plous." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas
M., 87-99. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"I have suggested that the trilogy [Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist], like the
Phaedo, approaches the good indirectly, by a deuteros plous. The reason the good
cannot be presented directly is indicated in the final definition. The visitor concedes
that it is difficult to know in which of the two species of images – distorted
“semblances” or accurate “likenesses” – the sophist’s products belong (Sophist
236c – d). He goes on to locate that difficulty in the problem that to say what is
false is to attribute existence to “what is not”, and although at first he raises this
point with regard to semblances rather than likenesses (236e– 239e), he proceeds to
broaden the problem: since any image (ειδωλον) differs from the true thing
(άληθινον) that it imitates, it must be not true (μή άληθινον), which means it really
is not (ούκ όντος). When Theaetetus points out that it “really is a likeness (εικόν),”
the visitor replies, “Without really being, then, it really is what we call a likeness
(εικόνα)?” (239d – 240b). Although the passage began as if only semblances were
problematic, the problem was eventually extended to images in general, and by the
end even likenesses were expressly included." (p. 97)
98.
Driscoll, John. 1979. "The Platonic Ancestry of Primary Substance." Phronesis.A
Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 24:253-269.
"In this paper I will not examine the three-sided relationship between the
Receptacle, primary substance, and primary matter. Such an examination would
afford an interesting perspective from which to study the development of Aristotle's
theory of substance from the Categories to the Metaphysics, but it would raise many
difficult issues not easily resolved in a short paper. I will instead simply list the
properties shared by the Receptacle and primary substance and discuss one
important consequence of the link thereby established between Timaeus 49-52 and
Categories V: that the well-known controversy between G. E. L. Owen and Harold
Cherniss over the dating of the Timaeus must be decided in favor of Owen, at least
with respect to the relative dating of the Timaeus and the Sophist. I propose to
show, in other words, that Categories V owes a much greater debt to Plato than is
usually thought and that an examination of this debt increases our understanding not
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only of Aristotle's theory of substance but also of the development of Plato's later
philosophy." (pp. 253-254)
99.
Duerlinger, James. 1988. "The ontology of Plato's Sophist: I. The problems of
falsehood, non-being and being." The Modern Schoolman no. 65:151-184.
Second part: The Modern Schoolman, LXV, March, 1988, 170-184.
"This is the first part of a two-part article in which Plato's discussion of the
problems of falsehood, non-being and being, as presented in his Sophist, 236D925908, is explained from an ontological perspective. A new, unifying account of
Plato's discussion is introduced that place it squarely within the framework of his
theory of forms as it was understood by Aristotle and the ancient Platonists instead
of the linguistic frameworks in which it has been placed by modern scholars.
Because these linguistic frameworks have dominated both the modern translations
and interpretations of Plato's text, readers will need to take special care not to
presuppose the correctness of one or another of them when assessing this
explanation. In particular to understand what is said here readers must free
themselves of the habit of assuming that we are concerned with interpretations of "
is" in positive statements of existence, predication, or identity, or with
interpretations of "is not" in negative statements of existence, predication, or
identity. The result of their effort, I believe, will be a clearer understanding of the
novelty of my account, and consequently, a better understanding of the place of
Plato's discussion within the history of ancient Greek ontology.
In the first part of this article I shall explain Plato's presentations of the problems of
falsehood, non-being, and being, and in the second I shall explain his solutions t0
these problems in the context of his reply to those who deny that something can be
both one and many. As Plato presents the problems of falsehood and non-being, I
claim, he intends that we should realize that they rely on the assumption that
because non-being is the contrary of being nothing can be both a being and a nonbeing. For this reason his solution to these problems is to argue, first of all, that
non-being is not the contrary of being, but instead the form of otherness than
another being, and secondly, that because every being, including being itself,
partakes of this form, something can be both a being and a non-being." (p. 151)
100.
Duncombe, Matthew. 2012. "Plato's Absolute and Relative Categories at Sophist
255c14." Ancient Philosophy no. 32:77-86.
"Beginning at Sophist 255c9 the Eleatic Stranger attempts a proof that ‘being’ (τὸ
ὄν) and ‘other’ (τὸ θάτερον) are different very great kinds. The key step in this
proof is to group beings (τῶν ὄντων) into those that are themselves in themselves
(αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά) and those that are in relation to other things (πρὸς ἄλλα). Much
effort has been made to understand this distinction between αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά and
πρὸς ἄλλα. The prevailing approach takes the former to name the class of ‘absolute’
terms and the latter to name the class of ‘relative’ terms, categories described in
Diogenes Laertius’ Life of Plato. Some, however, have argued that this category
approach fails because it cannot say into which class some terms, such as
‘sameness’, fit. This represents a longstanding interpretive impasse. In this paper I
show that an alternative manuscript reading can preserve the general category
approach, whilst allowing ‘sameness’ to fit into the scheme, and thereby end the
interpretive deadlock. I then defend my alternative reading against the possible
objection that certain terms do not fit into the new scheme by appealing to a range
of texts where Plato discusses relative terms." (p. 77, notes omitted)
"For a good overview of the literature on this distinction, see John Malcolm, "A
Way Back for Sophist 255c12-13", Ancient Philosophy 26: 275-289. 2006, p. 276."
101.
Eisenberg, Paul D. 1976. "More on non-being and the one." Apeiron no. 10:6-14.
"In a recent issue of this journal, Prof. William Bondeson has argued(1) that
previous translations of το μηδαμώς ου will not do (or, in some cases, are even
seriously misleading); and he proposes to translate that phrase by 'that which has no
characteristics at all'. In the second section of his paper, he seeks to show that there
is "a close resemblance" (p.17) — indeed, "a direct parallel" (p. 18)—between the
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Sophist's το μηδαμώς όν and the ostensible subject of the first and sixth hypotheses
of the second part of the Parmenides. Although, to be sure, he raises a number of
other points as well—and although I am inclined to agree
with much else that he says or suggests in his paper—what I have just indicated
seem to me to be the principal theses in his paper. In any case, in this paper I shall
deal almost exclusively with them—and I shall take issue with both of them. Or,
more exactly, I shall argue that Bondeson's proposal for a new translation is quite
untenable; and, while agreeing that there is indeed a "direct parallel" between the
materials in the two dialogues that he considers, I shall question what seems to be
his interpretation of the significance of those materials or arguments." (p. 13)
(1) "Non-Being and the One." Apeiron, Vol. VII, No. 2 (1973). 13-21.
102.
El Murr, Dimitri. 2006. "Paradigm and Diairesis: A Response To M.L. Gill’s
'Models In Plato’s Sophist and Statesman'." Plato: The Internet Journal of the
International Plato Society no. 6:1-9.
"In her interesting and stimulating paper, Mary-Louise Gill addresses one of the
central issues in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman: what is a model (paradeigma) and
how does one become useful in a dialectical inquiry? Gill’s main thesis is clear: a
paradeigma becomes truly useful when not only the sameness between the example
and the target but also their difference are recognized (“the inquirers need to
recognize, not only the feature that is the same in the example and the target, but
also the difference between the two embodiments and the procedural difference
those different embodiments entail”)." (p. 1)
103.
El_Bizri, Nader. 2004. "On και κώρα. Situating Heidegger between the Sophist and
the Timaeus." Studia Phaenomenologica no. 4:73-98.
Abstract: "In attempting to address the heideggerian Seinsfrage, by way of situating
it between the platonic conception of ̉όν in the Sophist and of χώρα in the Timaeus,
this paper investigates the ontological possibilities that are opened up in terms of
rethinking space. Asserting the intrinsic connection between the question of being
and that of space, we argue that the maturation of ontology as phenomenology
would not unfold in its furthermost potential unless the being of space gets clarified.
This state of affairs confronts us with the exacting ontological task to found a
theory of space that contributes to an explication of the question of being beyond its
associated temporocentric determinations. Consequently, our line of inquiry
endeavors herein to constitute a prolegmenon to the elucidation of the question of
the being of space as “ontokhorology.”
104.
Ellis, John. 1995. "Δύναμις and Being: Heidegger on Plato's Sophist 247d8-e4."
Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 3:43-78.
"This definition of being is proposed by the Stranger in the course of his discussion
of the "gigantic battle."
One side maintains that only tangible, visible bodies have being (οὐσία), while the
other claims that being is limited to only incorporeal, invisible Forms, the bodies of
the opponents being relegated to the realm of becoming (δύναμις)." (p. 43)
(...)
"There is hardly a line in the above summary of the setting for 247d-e that is
uncontroversial. The crux of the controversy is of course whether Plato is offering a
definition of being as δύναμις;. Should we take this seriously, or is it merely a mark
of being, used to refute the corporealists? After all, it looks as if the Stranger merely
suggests that the known is changed by the knower-it is in fact one of three options
mentioned so
the friends of the Forms may not be forced to accept it. And if we do take the
definition seriously, this surely entails that Plato has radically altered his view on
the nature of the Forms.
The issue still divides scholars. Heidegger's interpretation of this passage in his
lecture course on the Sophist is one that takes the definition seriously.
(...)
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What is most interesting, however, is his relation to an unnamed interpreter, whom,
as we shall see, Heidegger no doubt wants to take issue with, but who also
fundamentally shaped Heidegger's own reading. This
kind of problematic relationship is even more so because he remains unnamed. He
is none other than Paul Natorp, whose name explicitly occurs only one other time in
the course of the lecture (with the obvious exception of the eulogy at the very
beginning), and that is with respect to his article on Antisthenes [*]." (p. 44)
(...)
"The essay is divided into three subsequent sections. I will give a review of Natorp's
interpretation in section II. In section III, we shall turn to Heidegger's reading in the
Sophist lecture, pointing out, along the way, influences of, and divergences from,
Natorp. And in section IV, we will briefly consider the issue of destruction." (p. 45)
References
[*] Natorp, Antisthenes, Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft I
2, (1894), 1538-1545.
Natorp, Paul. Platos ldeenlehre. 1903. Reprint of the 2nd (1921) edition. Hamburg:
Felix Meiner, 1961
105.
Esposti Ongaro, Michele. 2009. "The Ontological Ground of Syntax: An Analysis
of Plato's Sophist, 262c2-5. A Reply to Bruno Centrone." Les Études Platoniciennes
no. 6.
"In his most recent translation of the dialogue, B. Centrone(1) argues that the
expressions οὐσία ὄντος and οὐσία μή ὄντος can be interpreted in different ways,
according to how we interpret the noun οὐσία, either as an indication of what a
thing is or as an indication of the fact that it is.
Therefore, Centrone remarks that the meaningful λόγος can assert (a) that a thing
which is, or a thing which is not, are (the horse is; the chimera is); (b) what a thing
which is (exists) is, or what it is not (the horse is a quadruped, it isn’t a biped); (c)
what a thing which is (exists) is, or what a thing which is not (doesn’t exist) is (a
swallow is winged; a chimera is winged); or (d) that a particular nature is or is not.
Centrone suggests that the first is the right interpretation. Nevertheless I am not sure
that he really gives a complete range of choices. I don’t believe that the expression
οὐσία μή ὄντος could refer to a non-existing entity like “a chimera”, for the simple
reason that Plato had previously excluded not being as an entity: “not being” is
rather an expression which means the idea of Difference, in relation to a subject. I
will therefore try to demonstrate that the expressions ὄντος and οὐσία μή ὄντος
aren’t equivalent and that the first refers to a particular entity, while the second has
a completely different function." (p. 178)
(1) Platone, Sofista, Translation of B. Centrone, Torino, Einaudi, 2008, note 146 p.
223.
106.
Esses, Daniel. 2019. "Philosophic appearance and sophistic essence in Plato’s
Sophist. A New Reading of the Definitions." Ancient Philosophy no. 39:295-317.
"Why does the Eleatic Visitor present so many definitions of sophistry in Plato's
Sophist? Is the final definition complete, or should it be qualified and supplemented
with further research'! These arc long-standing questions in scholarship on Plato·s
Sophist, and they have been the subject of lively debate.(1) I develop a new reading
of the dialogue's definitions and provide fresh answers to these questions.
The distinguishing features of my reading are the following. First, I read the Sophist
as a drama, paying special attention to how the dialogue's participants are portrayed
and its place in a trilogy that also includes the Theaetetus and the Statesman.
Second, rather than simply casting aside the first six definitions of sophistry as
erroneous and irrelevant due to the success of the seventh definition, I examine
what they each contribute to !he search for the sophist. The multiple definitions not
only help highlight the sophist's deceptiveness and manifold appearances, but they
also though subtly and gradually turn our attention to the challenge of
distinguishing Socrates and sophists. Last, I strike, middle course in my assessment
of the Visitor's final definition. I accept it as an adequate disclosure of the sophist's
essence, but I also grapple with the possibility that it fails to provide adequate
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guidance for differentiating between Socratic philosophizing and sophistry." (p.
295)
(1) See Rickless 2010 for a recent intervention in this debate. Brown 2010 and Gill
2010 are also notable for their focus on the dialogue's divisions and definitions.
Though studies focusing on this particular aspect of the dialogue are relatively
recent, interpretations of the dialogue as a whole generally address the status and
significance of the definitions, with varying conclusions.
References
Brown, Lesley 2010. "Definition and Division in Plato' Sophist ." In Definition in
Greek Philosophy , edited by Charles, David, 151-171. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Gill, Mary Louis. 2010. "Division and Definition in Plato's Sophist and Statesman
." In Definition in Greek Philosophy , edited by Charles, David, 172-199. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Rickless, Samuel C. 2010. "Plato's Definition(s) of Sophistry." Ancient Philosophy
no. 30:289-298.
107.
Ferejohn, Michael T. 1989. "Plato and Aristotle on Negative Predication and
Semantic Fragmentation." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 71:257-282.
"This paper opened with the proposal of a somewhat unorthodox approach to
reading the Sophist (as a close companion to certain Aristotelian texts), to which
can now be added a further methodological prescription which needs no apology
whatsoever. Simply put, it is that the Sophist should be read as a single and
continuous whole. This may not seem to need saying, but in fact it is all too
tempting (and has been too common) to think of the dialogue almost as if it were
two separate works: an "outer shell" (216 — 36 and 264 — 8) in which Plato is
concerned primarily to show off his method of division (and secondarily to continue
his sustained invective against the sophists), and a more philosophical "inner core"
(237 — 64) where the aim is to vindicate the possibility of false thought and speech
against Eleatic attack. This bifurcation is an excessive reaction to an
unexceptionable fact.
For one can quite readily agree that there is a vast difference in philosophical
content between the two parts of this alleged division without committing the
correlative errors of regarding the "inner" section as self-contained, and dismissing
the "outer" sections as so much optional reading when trying to puzzle out the
discussion of negation, falsity, and related topics which occurs at 237 — 64.
Besides the general point that this false partition denies justice to Plato both as a
philosopher and as a master of the dramatic craft, there are very powerful reasons
pertaining to the specific issues involved for suspecting that the parts in question
must be more connected than the explicit transitions at 236,7 and 264 make it seem.
Chief among these is the fact that whereas the particular application of the method
of division to the very special case of the sophist might depend on the intelligibility
of false statement, Plato's very conception of the method itself presupposes the
coherence of negative predication." (pp. 264-265)
108.
Ferg, Stephen. 1976. "Plato on False Statement: Relative Being, a Part of Being,
and Not-Being in the Sophist." Journal of The History of Philosophy no. 14:336342.
"Recently Plato's account of not-Being in the Sophist has received considerable
attention, notably in papers by David Wiggins, (1) G. E. L. Owen, (2) and Edward
N. Lee. (3)
Lee's discussion is especially important because it emphasizes (in my opinion,
correctly) the analogy of the partitioning of Knowledge at 257c-d. Nevertheless
even Lee seems to me to fail to give a correct explanation of the Sophist's
discussion of this matter." (p. 336)
(1) David Wiggins, "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of NonBeing," in Plato, A Collection of Critical Essays, Vol. I: Metaphysics and
Epistemology, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp.
268-303.
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(2) G. E. L Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," also in Vlastos, pp. 223-267. (Henceforth
referred to as "Owen.')
(3) Edward N. Lee, "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist,"
Philosophical Review, LXXXI, 3 (July, 1972), 267-304. (Henceforth referred to as
"Lee.")
109.
Ferreira, Fernando. 2001. "A Two-Worlds, Two-Semantics Interpretation of Plato's
Sophist." In Greek Philosophy and Epistemology. Vol. II, edited by Boudouris,
Costantin, 61-68. Athens: Ionia Publications.
"The avowed purpose of Plato’s Sophist is to characterize the sophist. In the first
part of his book, Plato employs the method of divisions to obtain this
characterization, and eventually arrives at the conclusion that the sophist is an
imitator and that “there is an art, concerned with speeches, by which it is possible to
beguile the young” (234c). From here it is short shrift to arrive at the problem of
falsity. This problem is, I claim, the philosophical leitmotiv that drives the
discussions in the second part of Plato’s Sophist (after 236d). One should be clear
about what exactly this problem consists of. In the Sophist, Plato is not concerned
with the problem of the meaningfulness of false statements concerning some highminded realm of objects (e.g., forms) - quite to the contrary (see the epilogue). Plato
is concerned with falsity in ordinary statements. This is worth emphasizing: Plato’s
main problem in the Sophist is to account for the meaningfulness of such simple
and prosaic (false) statements as ‘Theaetetus is flying’ (263a)." (p. 61)
110.
Figal, Gunter. 2000. "Refraining from Dialectic: Heidegger's Interpretation of Plato
in the Sophist Lectures (1924/25)." In, edited by Scott, Charles E. and Sallis, John,
95-109. Albany: State University of New York Press.
"We should begin with a general characterization of the Sophist and Heidegger's
reading of the dialogue. The aim of the long and extremely difficult discussion
between the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetos is to find out how something like
sophistry is possible. To find an answer to this question is equivalent to
investigating the human way of being in the world. In this way Plato's dialogue is a
contribution to ontology. Nearly needless to say that it is an ontology of a very
special kind and that the ontological investigation also turns out to be very special
because of the nature of its subject. As Heidegger puts it, from the attempt to hold
up a mirror "to the sophist's concrete Dasein within Greek life" (GA, 19:189) soon
arises the suspicion, that sophists are connected with "deception and fraud," and so
the investigation has to determine the status of deception and fraud. A quite simple
reflection makes clear that every deception makes a pretense of being something
that it is not, it passes off "non-being for being." Accordingly, the question of the
being of the sophist's form of life is the question of the being of non-being. And, as
Heidegger stresses, this means "a revolution in the previous way of thinking, even
in the previous way in which Plato himself put forward the meaning of being"; the
demonstration of non-being in being "is nothing less than the more radical
conception of the meaning of being itself' (GA, 19: 192)." (pp. 96-97)
References
GA 19 = Martin Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, edited by Ingeborg Schüßler,
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992.
111.
Fine, Gail. 1977. "Plato on Naming." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 27:289-301.
"Plato is sometimes criticized for having failed to distinguish names and sentences,
and naming and stating, until the Sophist, and this failure is thought to underlie both
his supposed perplexity about false belief in the Cratylus, Theaetetus, and
elsewhere, and his claim, in the Cratylus, that names can be true and false" (p. 289)
(...)
"This does not imply that Plato is clear about the differences between names and
sentences; but we shall at least find that there is no evidence committing him to any
confusion here. Nor, as we shall see, does Plato conflate stating and naming, in
either of the alleged ways. Finally, we shall see that neither his account of true
names nor his account of false belief in the Cratylus rests on the crude views
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ascribed to him. The account of true names says no more than that names are true or
false of things, and that correct assignments of names depend upon the descriptive
content of names. The account of false belief, so far from depending on the atomist
"hit or miss" model, in fact matches the Sophist's later, supposedly more mature,
account." (pp. 290-291)
112.
Flower, Robert. 1980. "G. E. L. Owen, Plato and the Verb To Be." Apeiron no.
14:87-95.
"When it comes to Plato, the question which Aristotle tells us has plagued
philosophers from the beginning — namely, "What is being?" (1) — has been
reduced by certain contemporary commentators to the question, "How many
syntactically distinct uses of the verb "to be" can be discerned in Plato's Sophist.(2)
Over this latter question there has arisen something of a controversy of
interpretation between two camps, so to speak. The first camp, from which I have
chosen as representative, J.L. Ackrill (3), claims to have discerned three distinct
uses: the "is" of identity, the "is" of the copula, and the "is" of existence. The second
camp, represented here by G.E.L. Owen,(4) claims that there are only two uses of
the verb "to be" in the Sophist: the "is" of identity and the "is" of the copula. To
quote Professor Owen,
"The Sophist will turn out to be primarily an essay in problems of reference and
predication and in the incomplete uses of the verb associated with these. The
argument neither contains nor compels any isolation of an existential verb."(5)
I should like to argue in this paper that both camps are mistaken. There is only one
use of the verb "to be" in the Sophist — namely, the "is" of participation — and it is
this and this use alone that constitutes Plato's answer to Aristotle's question.
Being, for Plato of the Sophist, is participation or, perhaps better, the "power of
participating". Thus, while Owen is, I shall argue, quite correct when he inveighs
against discerning a substantive, existential use of the verb "to be" in the Sophist,
his own account (and the arguments he offers in favor of it) warrants, shall we say, a
"friendly amendment".
Whether one has adopted Ackrill's position or been persuaded by Owen, the
evidence in question is minimally two-fold. Either interpretation must account for,
first, the various passages wherein Plato either employs or seems to imply the
expression, "participates in being" and, second, the passage from 255b7 to 255e
where the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes Being from the Same and the Other."
(1) Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z 1.7, 1028b3-8.
(2) While this is not the time to argue about the advisability of such a "reduction". I
must admit to the suspicion that the approach to Plato inherent in such a reduction
does generate certain confusions; if only because it fails to preserve the issue of the
initial question.
(3) J.L. Ackrill, "Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-259", Plato I: Metaphysics and
Epistemology ed. Gregory Vlastos (Garden City, 1971), pp. 210-222. For further
representatives of AckrilPs position see P.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of
Knowledge (London, 1935),
p. 296; P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933), p.298; M.K. Moravcsik, "Being
and Meaning in the Sophist", Acta Philosophica Fennica xiv (1962), pp. 23-78; I.M.
Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines (London, 1962), vol. II, pp. 498-499.
(4) G.E.L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being", Vlastos, pp. 223-267. See also Owen,
"Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology", New Essays on Plato and Aristotle ed. R.
Bambrough (London, 1965), pp. 69-95. For others who tend to share Owen's
position see J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of το v and το μη δν in the Sophist",
Phronesis xii (1967), pp. 130-146; M. Frede, "Pradikation und Existenzaussage"
Hympomnemata xviii (1967), pp. 1-99; W.O. Runciman, Plato's Later
Epistemology (Cambridge, 1962), ch, iii; C. Kahn, "The Greek Verb "To Be" and
the Concept of Being", Foundations of Language ii (1966), p. 261.
(5) Owen, op. cit., p. 225.
113.
———. 1984. "The number of being." The Modern Schoolman no. 62:1-26.
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"It is to my mind no accident that the primary interlocutor of both the Theaetetus
and the Sophist, is the young mathematician, Theaetetus. In the former dialogue
Theaetetus· in-roads into a theory of proportion that would include
incommensurables constitute the model in terms of which Plato would have us
understand the "fluid" logic of "maieutic" inquiry. I should here like to argue that
the "object" of Theaetetus' own mathematical studies - namely incommensurables offer Plato, if not the literal truth with regard to Being, at least a revealing metaphor
in terms of which the nature and logic of Being can be articulated." (p. 1)
114.
Foshay, Raphael. 2017. "Plato at the Foundation of Disciplines: Method and the
Metaxu in the Phaedrus, Sophist, and Symposium." IAFOR Journal of Arts &
Humanities no. 4:15-23.
Abstract: "This paper situates the interpretation of Plato in its 2500-year trajectory
toward a significant change in the mid-twentieth century, away from the attempt to
establish Plato’s metaphysical doctrines to a recognition of the intrinsic value of
their literary-dramatic dialogue form. I discuss the lingering presence of doctrinal
interpretation in the Nietzschean-Heideggerian tradition of Plato interpretation as it
manifests in Derrida’s reading of Plato’s Phaedrus. I then give two examples of the
transformative power of attention to the literary-dramatic structure of the dialogues
in the work of two quite different but mutually confirming kinds of contemporary
Plato interpretation, those by Catherine H. Zuckert and William Desmond,
respectively. The Plato that emerges from their work confirms the growing
recognition that the tradition of Platonism does not represent the thinking embodied
in Plato’s dialogues."
References
Desmond, W. (1979). Plato’s philosophical art and the identification of the sophist.
Filosofia Oggi, 11, 393–403.
Zuckert, C. H. (2009). Plato’s philosophers: The coherence of the dialogues.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
115.
Fossheim, Hallvard J. 2013. "Development and Not-Being in Plato’s Sophist." The
New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:318327.
Abstract: "Plato’s dialogue the Sophist seems to contribute to two separate projects
that are not easily reconciled: on the one hand, defining the sophist, and, on the
other hand, developing a theory of being and process. In this article, it is argued that
the two undertakings come together in what is a main focus for the dialogue’s
interlocutors and a major issue in Plato’s writings overall, namely, education or
development. This is an issue which in the Sophist finds expression in two separate
but intimately interconnected questions, concerning the “who” and “how,”
respectively, of the educational process."
116.
Foster, Bennett. 2018. "Platonic Agonism: A Dialogical Addendum to Plato’s
Sophist." Sophia and Philosophia no. 1:1-28.
"The following addendum to Plato’s Sophist was fabricated as a kind of
experimental answer to a specific contextual question: What is the relation of
Plato’s conception of philosophy to the practice of the agōn in Ancient Greece? For
the “contest-system,”(1) to adopt Gouldner's phrase, has long been recognized as
one of the salient features of Greek culture in the centuries leading up to Plato’s
time.(2)" (p. 1)
(...)
(1) By “contest-system,” Gouldner means to convey the sense that the agōn is a
systematic cultural entity, almost on the level of a formal institution. By agōn there
is certainly meant more here than the sum of the various types of contests in
Ancient Greece, let alone a particular type or instance of contest. Alvin Gouldner,
“The Greek Contest System,” in Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of
Social Theory (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965), 41-77.
(2) Jacob Burkhardt is credited with popularizing the notion of the “Agonal Age” of
Greek history, during which the agōn was a “motive power ... capable of working
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on the will and potentialities of each individual .... and indeed became the
paramount feature of life.” While the agōn was on the wane in Plato’s time, its
influence was formative and lasting, and it was still a live issue whether traditional
values such as the agōn represented should be retained. [Jacob Burkhardt, The
Greeks and Greek Civilization, trans. by Sheila Stern, ed. by Oswyn Murray (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 162, 166.]
117.
Frank, Daniel H. 1985. "On What there Is: Plato's Later Thoughts."
Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 6:5-18.
118.
Frede, Michael. 1992. "Plato's Sophist on False Statements." In The Cambridge
Companion to Plato, edited by Kraut, Richard, 397-424. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
"...I want in what follows to focus on the discussion of false statements. Hence I
will, only very briefly, comment on the remarks about being, and, in somewhat
more detail, consider the remarks about what it is to be not being, to the extent that
this seems necessary to understand Plato's resolution of the difficulty concerning
false statements." (p. 399)
(...)
"Conclusion. In fact one thing that is striking about the Sophist, in comparison to
the earlier dialogues, is its "dogmatic" and systematic character. It sets out carefully
constructing a series of puzzles, aporiai. In this respect its first half resembles the
early dialogues or even its immediate predecessor, the Theaetetus. But then it turns
toward a resolution of these aporiai. In this regard the procedure of the dialogue
reminds one of the methodological principle Aristotle sometimes refers to and
follows, the principle that on a given subject matter we first of all have to see
clearly the aporiai involved before we can proceed to an adequate account of the
matter, which proves its adequacy in part by its ability both to account for and to
resolve the aporiai (cf. De An. I, 2, 403b2o-21; Met. B1, 995a27 ff.). And the
Sophist proceeds to resolve these difficulties in a very systematic and almost
technical way. By careful analysis it tries to isolate and to settle an issue
definitively. In this regard it does stand out among all of Plato's dialogues. And
because of this it also is more readily accessible to interpretation. If, nevertheless,
we do have difficulties with this text, it is in good part because in his day Plato was
dealing with almost entirely unexplored issues for whose discussion even the most
rudimentary concepts were missing. Seen in this light, Plato's solution of the
difficulty presented by false statements is a singular achievement." (p. 423)
119.
———. 1996. "The Literary Form of the Sophist." In Form and Argument in Late
Plato, edited by Gill, Christopher and McCabe, Mary Margaret, 135-152. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
"If one considers the literary form of the Sophist, one is primarily interested in what
is characteristic of, or distinctive about, the literary form of this particular dialogue,
as opposed to other Platonic dialogues. But this should not make us overlook the
fact that the Sophist, first of all, is a dialogue, and that, in the case of the Sophist,
there is something particularly puzzling about this. So I will first consider the
question why Plato wrote the Sophist as a dialogue, and then turn to two other
literary features of the text.
The puzzle is this. If we look at the early aporetic dialogues, we have a number of
readily available explanations why Plato wrote them as dialogues. But, as we
proceed to the middle and then the late dialogues, these explanations become less
and less plausible. And they seem to be particularly implausible in the case of the
Sophist. For the Sophist, in a way, is the most dogmatic of all of Plato's dialogues.
And it might seem that Plato could as well have written at least the central part of
this dialogue as a treatise on falsehood." (p. 135)
120.
Friedländer, Paul. 1969. Plato. Vol. III: The Dialogues, Second and Third Period.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Second edition, with revisions (First edition 1958) Chapter XXVI: Sophist, pp. 243279.
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Translated from the German Platon: Seinswaheheit und Lebenswirklichkeit, 3 vols.
Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1954 by Hans Meyerhoff.
Publisher's note: "The first volume of this work, Plato: An Introduction (1958),
contains seventeen chapters, each an independent study of an aspect of Plato’s
thought, his creative work, and his relation to modern thinkers, and a chapter on
Plato as jurist by Huntington Cairns. A new edition is in preparation, with revisions
and additional annotation.
The second volume, Plato: The Dialogues, First Period (1964), contains Chapters IXIX, which interpret the works of Plato’s early creative period, the “ascent.”
The third volume, Plato: The Dialogues, Second and Third Periods, contains
Chapters XX-XXXI. These take up the central and late dialogues, the works of
Plato’s major creative periods. At the end of this final volume, there is an
Afterword, “On the Order of the Dialogues.”
"We know that the task of clarifying the meaning of pseudos— falsehood,
deception, and lie—occupied Plato from his beginnings as a philosopher. It did not
grow out of a special interest in a difficult logical problem. It occupied him because
(to speak in the concrete imagery of the Sophist) both sophistic and eristic hide in
this darkness and confusion—everything, in other words, that is hostile to
philosophy and that, because of its dangerously similar appearance, jeopardizes the
reputation of philosophy and the life of the philosopher. Even one of the earliest of
Plato’s works, the Hippias Minor, deals with the problem of deception, involuntary
and voluntary, sophistic and Socratic deception. Then, with the Cratylus, language
becomes the instrument of positive enlightenment. There (Cratylus 431bc; cf.
385bc) discourse is explained as the “juxtaposition” of noun and verb. In the
Sophist, it is the “combination” of the two, and this change is more than a mere
difference in expression. In the Cratylus, we are shown that just as the elements of a
sentence, the “names,” may be used wrongly, so may the juxtaposition of these
elements. The Sophist derives discourse not simply from “naming”; discourse has a
new and autonomous structure. As a unique kind of being it has the structure of
being itself, characterized by “communion.” In the Cratylus, the “names” have the
function of revealing (δήλωμα, 433b et seq.}; in the Sophist, it is the statement that
has this function. Hence, the Cratylus seeks to discover falsehood in the elements of
language; the Sophist seeks it more deeply, in the structure of language."
121.
Fronterotta, Francesco. 2011. "Some Remarks on the Senses of Being in the
Sophist." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum
Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 35-62. Praha: Oikoymenh.
Abstract: "In this paper I examine the question of the different senses of the verb "to
be" and the notion of "being" in Plato's Sophist, discussing the relevant passages
and bibliography."
122.
———. 2013. "Theaetetus sits - Theaetetus flies. Ontology, predication and truth in
Plato’s Sophist (263a-d)." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and
Robinson, Thomas M., 205-223. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"After solving the problem of “what is not” (259a–b) by elucidating the relations
between the γένη that give rise to their reciprocal κοινωνία (259d-e), the next step,
before getting back to hunting the sophist, is to clarify whether this also helps
disentangle the difficulty connected with the possibility of falsehood in λόγοι, as the
examination of what is not was introduced for precisely this purpose: once the
logical aporia of falsehood has emerged from the ontological paradox of what is
not, solving the latter would also solve the former. So, if what is not, whose form
the Stranger has succeeded in identifying, “blends with thinking and discourse”
(δοξη και λογω μειγνυται), there will be no contradiction in allowing falsehood in
λόγοι, thus making approachable the dark place of images and appearances that are
only similar to the truth, where the sophist has taken refuge; but if this were not the
case, any λόγος would always have to be considered necessarily true and the
inaccessibility of falsehood would make the sophist’s refuge safe from any threat
(260d –261b). The section of the dialogue that opens in this way contains some of
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the fundamental premises of what can fairly be seen as Plato’s philosophy of
language (259e –264b)." (p. 205)
123.
Gacea, Alexandru-Ovidiu. 2019. "Plato and the “Internal Dialogue”: An Ancient
Answer for a New Model of the Self." In Psychology and Ontology in Plato, edited
by Pitteloud, Luca and Keeling, Evan, 33-54. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.
"The theme of the dialogic relationship that the ψυχή entertains with itself appears
explicitly in the Theaetetus and the Sophist.(10) Naturally, one could argue that
“dialogicity” represents one of Plato’s main concerns throughout the dialogues.
However, I prefer to isolate the way the issue is treated in these two dialogues,
because stating explicitly that thought is the “dialogue of the soul with itself”
appears to be indicative of a particular Platonic outlook on thought and selfhood. I
claim that Plato is subtly moving away from a descriptive perspective, the way
thought has always been conceived in Greek culture, toward a prescriptive one, the
philosophical appropriation and reinterpretation of this cultural trait. I thus propose
not to treat this notion as being self-explanatory." (p. 35, a note omitted)
(...)
"In the Sophist, the description is couched in different terms, making the
distinctions more explicit and adding some other elements: “Thought (διάνοια) and
speech (λόγος), says the Visitor, are the same, except that what we call thought
(διάνοια) is dialogue (διάλογος) that occurs without the voice (διάλογος ἄνευ
φωνῆς), inside the soul (ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς) in conversation with itself. […] And the
stream of sound from the soul that goes through the mouth is called speech (λόγος)”
(263e3-8). We find out that dialogic thought and speech are not identical but of the
same kind, namely, λόγος. Διάλογος is a type of λόγος but not in the same way
uttered speech is λόγος, i.e., doxic λόγος. The dialogue “placed inside the soul”
occurs “without sound or voice,” but speech is always uttered, it is something that is
“breathed out.”
Not all speech is thought or dialogue, but all thought can become speech when it is
accompanied with sound or when it is exteriorized. Furthermore, the λόγος that is
exteriorized, “breathed out,” is not the dialogue but its “conclusion,” i.e., the δόξα.
The belief marks the cessation of the conversation, the moment when the soul
doesn't doubt anymore." (p. 40)
(10) There is a third passage about the “internal dialogue” in the Philebus (38c-e),
but this is more of an example than a description of dialogic thought.
124.
Galligan, Edward M. 1983. "Logos in the Theaetetus and the Sophist." In Essays in
Ancient Greek Philosophy: Volume Two, edited by Anthon, John P. and Preus,
Anthony, 264-278. Albany: State University of New York Press.
"In this paper I am concerned with the Theaetetus' dreamed theory [(201d-206b)]
and its refutation in that dialogue. From the vantage point of the Sophist, I ask (1)
whether and how Plato changed the theory's view of logos and (2) whether and how
he might have been able to loosen the dilemma that refutes the theory." (p. 265)
(...)
"The dreamed theory and the Sophist differ about logos in rather much the way they
differ about syllables. Though the Theaetetus contains a distinction of letters into
kinds, not much was made of these distinctions. But according to the Sophist,
vowels make non-vowels pronounceable. The latter dialogue claims part-part
asymmetry for syllables. As for logos, the dreamed theory does not clearly have any
part-part asymmetry, whereas the Sophist articulates just such a distinction. On the
other hand, concerning the whole-part aspect of logoi, the dreamed theory and the
Sophist are closer. According to the dreamed theory, by means of a statement we
can express our knowledge of complexes, but what we can only name, elements, we
can neither know nor state. According to the Sophist, we can name beings by means
of a name or a verb, but in doing so we do not state anything of anything.
The Sophist's view of both statement and syllable seems to be that they are wholes
that come to be when their parts are put together and that the wholes have a
character that their parts do not have. This suggests that syllables and statements are
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open to whatever force there is in the second horn of the dilemma brought against
the dreamed theory." (p. 270)
125.
Gerson, Lloyd. 1986. "A Distinction in Plato's Sophist." The Modern Schoolman
no. 63:251-266.
Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.), Plato: Critical Assessments Vol. IV: Plato's
Later Works, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 125-141.
126.
———. 2006. "The 'Holy Solemnity' of Forms and the Platonic Interpretation of
Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 26:291-304.
"There is a famous passage in Plato's Sophist which serves-as well as any, I believeto indicate perhaps one of the most fundamental divides among Plato scholars. The
division is between those who do and those who do not take seriously the ancient
Platonic tradition's interpretations of Plato. The passage is the Eleatic Stranger's
response to the claim of the 'Friends of the Forms' that 'real being' (τὴν ὄντως
οὐσίαν, 248a11) is immovable."
(...)
"The argument leading up to this rhetorical question is this: if knowing is a case of
'acting' (ποιείν) on something, then being known is a case of 'being acted upon'
(παρχειν). Since the Friends of the Forms agree that real being is known, they
would seem to be forced to admit that the Forms, insofar as they are known, are
acted upon. But that which is acted upon is 'in motion' (κινεισθαι). So, the Forms
would seem to be in motion insofar as they are acted upon. But the Friends have
maintained that Forms are not in motion; on the contrary, they are completely
immovable. So, the Friends are faced with an apparent dilemma: either Forms are
not known or else their claim that real being is immovable must be abandoned." (p.
291)
(...)
"In sum, the Platonic interpretation of Sophist maintains that the Friends of the
Forms - both ancient and modern - do not grasp full-blown Platonism. Perhaps
Plato himself at one time in his career did not grasp its nature either. Platonism is,
among other things, the view that οὐσία must never be supposed to have its own
separate reality. It is always and necessarily understood as embedded in the matrix
Demiurge-οὐσία-Idea of the Good. From the Platonists' perspective, Aristotle
wrongly collapsed or telescoped this matrix into the Prime Unmoved Mover,
thereby making it unsuitable to be the absolutely simple first principle of all. The
inseparability of ontologically primary thinking and being is a doctrine shared by
Plato and Aristotle." (p. 302)
127.
Giannopoulou, Zina. 2001. ""The Sophistry of Noble Lineage" Revisited: Plato's
Sophist 226 b1 - 231 b8." Illinois Classical Studies no. 26:101-124.
"This paper deals exclusively with the sixth logos of sophistry, which depicts the
sophistic art as "noble" and its practitioner, the sophist, as a teacher with apparently
similar educational characteristics as those possessed by Socrates, the greatest
enemy of sophistic practices. My aim is to shed some new light on the identity of
the "sophist of noble lineage." Some of the methodological questions which will
shape my argumentation are the following: is "noble sophistry" a suitable
characterization of Socrates' elenctic method? If the answer to this question is
positive, then how can one explain the fact that the Socratic method seems to be
reflected in otherwise straightforward definitions of the sophists which condemn
and repudiate their practices? If, on the other hand, the sixth definition does not
intend to present Socrates as a "noble sophist" but simply reveals a more positive
aspect of the σοφιστική τέχνη which could be seen as Socratic, what are the
distinctive boundaries that clearly separate the elenchos from even the noblest
eristic? In order to conduct my examination, I have divided this paper into three
parts. In Part I, I attempt a close reading of the method used by the Eleatic Stranger
and demonstrate its limitations; it is, I suggest, the nature of these limitations which
contributes significantly to the ambiguity of the logos provided in the sixth
definition. In Part II, I explore the main methodological tool of the definition,
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namely the "body and soul" analogy, and assess its impact on the quality of the
logos provided. Finally, in Part III, I offer my own interpretation; its novelty lies in
the fact that it contextualizes this part of the Sophist in the broader frame of the
dialectical quest conducted by the Stranger and attempts to account for its
intentional definitional ambiguity." (pp. 101-102)
128.
Gibson, Twyla. 2009. "The Code of Ethics in Medicine: Intertextuality and
Meaning in Plato's Sophist and Hippocrates' Oath." In Critical Interventions in the
Ethics of Healthcare: Challenging the Principle of Autonomy in Bioethics, edited
by Holmes, David and Murray, Stuart J., 183-198. London: Routledge.
"I develop a set of criteria for identifying connections between Hippocrates and
Plato by drawing upon media and information theory to adapt the principles devised
by researchers working on intertextuality in other ancient Greek collections. Next, I
turn to
Plato's Sophist, a dialogue that explains the procedure for distinguishing multiple
sequences of classifications that make up the different branches of the definition of
art or technique (techne). I delineate the topics in the definition of the Merchant of
Learning, and then use this Platonic sequence as a template for comparing the
organization of topics and ideas in the Oath. I show that the sequential order of
topics in the Oath corresponds point by point to the serial order of the topics in the
various classifications of the definition explained in Plato's Sophist. The presence in
the Oath of the same sequence described in Plato makes it possible to line up the
classifications in the two works and to cross-reference and compare information in
corresponding categories. Cross-referencing of topics and ideas allows us to bring
information presented in Plato to bear on the interpretation of the Oath. This new
information provides the· resources for dealing with issues of interpretation that
have gone unresolved due to lack of evidence concerning the meaning and context
of words and ideas. The discovery of connections between Plato and Hippocrates
adds to our understanding of the meanings communicated in the Oath by linking the
Greek medical tradition to the wider context of ancient thought and expression.
This broadened context sheds new light on the foundations of Western medical
ethics and provides the evidence and insights needed to reconstruct and reassess the
history of our ethical tradition. It is my argument that the expanded horizons of
meaning gained though the study of intertextual connections among Hippocratic
and Platonic texts and traditions provides a rich resource for reevaluating the
history of Western medical ethics, and for defending and critiquing the possibilities
entailed by biomedical technologies today." (p. 184)
129.
———. 2010. "The Fisher: Repetition and Sequence in Plato’s Sophist, Statesman,
and Ion." The McNeese Review no. 48:84-112.
"In this study, I address the question of a coherent philosophical system in Plato's
collected dialogues as well as the problem concerning the meaning and function of
Plato's method. Is there evidence of a consistent set of principles in Plato's
dialogues that pertain to all the disparate discourses in the collection?
What is the purpose of the method of division and of the sequences of topics and
ideas that make up the classifications spelled out by the characters in Plato's Sophist
and Statesman? This study proposes new answers to these questions." (pp. 86-87)
(...)
"Comparing passages from several important dialogues in light of one definition
suggests that the Sophist does offer a technical explanation and demonstration of
Plato's method. Tracing the definition of the fisher across three books highlights a
number of consistencies that point to the presence of a system, and shows how
repetition and sequencing are principles that may be applied to different texts in the
collection. Moreover, finding the definition in four works makes it possible to
transfer findings from the case studies to Plato's dialogues more generally.
Generalizing from the examples to the dialogues as a whole suggests that the
"Forms" are the system of rules and conventions that govern the order, shape, and
organization of all of Plato's dialogues." (pp. 108-109)
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130.
———. 2011. "The Philosopher’s Art: Ring Composition and Classification in
Plato’s Sophist and Hipparchus." In Orality and Literacy: Reflections across
Disciplines, edited by Carlson, Keith Thor, Fagan, Kristina and Khanenko-Friesen,
Natalia, 73-109. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
"With Plato, argued media theorist Marshall McLuhan, the Greeks 'flipped out of
the old Homeric world of the bards into this new, rational ... civilized world.'(1)
McLuhan and other scholars associated with the foundations of media studies cite
Plato's writings as evidence for dating the shift from primary orality to literacy in
ancient Greek culture.
Further research has demonstrated that the 'great divide' of orality versus literacy is
untenable; traditional oral modes of communication persist alongside and into
written texts.
This study re-examines Plato's dialogues in light of recent research concerning ring
composition, an oral formulaic technique found in Homer. Comparative analysis of
two exemplary dialogues - Plato's Sophist and Hipparchus - shows that these works
manifest the ring pattern associated with oral traditional modes of communication.
This comparative evidence suggests that the dialogues are transitional
compositions, and that Plato's writings represented not a break with the oral
tradition but rather its transposition to written texts. I explain the implications of
these findings for the interpretation of the history and philosophy communicated in
Plato's dialogues, in other ancient oral derived works, and for the study of oral
histories and traditions today." (p. 73)
(1) Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Me: Lectures and Interviews, ed. Stephanie
McLuhan and David Staines (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2003), 227.
131.
Gili, Luca. 2017. "Plato, Soph. 216 a3–4." Méthexis no. 29:171-173.
"N.-L. Cordero has persuasively argued that there is no reason to delete ἑταίρων (l.
4) if one were to choose the reading ἔτερον (l. 3), that all manuscripts preserve,
instead of ἑταῖρον.(2)" (p. 171)
(...)
"My reading turns the reference to the followers of the Eleatics as a piece of
Platonic irony – they are philosophers, but definitely not as good as the stranger –
Plato’s alter ego? – nor, we can suppose, as their masters Parmenides and Zeno." (p.
173)
(2) Cf. N.-L. Cordero, El Extranjero de Elea, ‘compañero’ de los Parmenídeos…
desde 1561, Méthexis xxiii (2013), 51–58. Cordero, however, seems to be unaware
of the fact that Y, the earliest source for ἕτερον, does not have a primary status. On
this issue see A. D’Acunto, “Su un’edizione platonica di Niceforo Moscopulo e
Massimo Planude: il Vindobonensis Phil. Gr. 21 (Y),” Studi classici e orientali 45
(1996), 261–279. Accordingly, Cordero’s intervention, whose rationale I fully
endorsed, should not be understood as an emendation ope codicum, but rather as an
emendation ope ingenii that at least one Byzantine reader already suggested. The
text that Cordero and I defend is not an ancient variant.
132.
Gill, Mary Louise. 2006. "Models in Plato's Sophist and Statesman." Journal of the
International Plato Society no. 6:1-9.
"Plato’s Sophist and Statesman use a notion of a model (paradeigma) quite different
from the one with which we are familiar from dialogues like the Phaedo,
Parmenides, and Timaeus. In those dialogues a paradeigma is a separate Form, an
abstract perfect particular, whose nature is exhausted by its own character. Its
participants are conceived as likenesses or images of it: they share with the Form
the same character, but they also fall short of it because they exemplify not only that
character but also its opposite. Mundane beautiful objects are plagued by various
sorts of relativity—Helen is beautiful compared to other women, but not beautiful
compared to a goddess; she is beautiful in her physical appearance, but not in her
soul or her actions; she is beautiful in your eyes, but not in mine, and so on. The
Form of the Beautiful, which is supposed to explain her beauty, is simply and
unqualifiedly beautiful (Symp. 210e5-211d1).
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In the Sophist and Statesman a model involves a mundane example whose
definition is relevant to the definition of some more difficult concept under
investigation, the target. The steps taken to define the example also reveal a useful
procedure to be transferred to the more difficult case. This much should be fairly
uncontroversial. In my view it is important to recognize that a paradeigma is not
merely an example (or paradigmatic example) of some general concept." (p. 1)
133.
———. 2010. "Division and Definition in Plato's Sophist and Statesman." In
Definition in Greek Philosophy, edited by Charles, David, 172-199. New York:
Oxford University Press.
"In this paper I will argue that dichotomous division yields a good definition of a
target kind only in the simplest and most uncontroversial cases. Plato also uses
division in defining more complex kinds, but then it serves as a preliminary
strategy, which undertakes to expose some puzzle about the kind under
investigation, which the enquirers must resolve in some other way, or at least in
conjunction with some other method.
We have trouble catching the sophist, because we find him, not at the end of a
single branch, but at many different termini, allowing multiple definitions. We find
the statesman at a single terminus, but he has many rivals there, who claim to share
his expertise; the definition of the statesman reached by dichotomous division,
though very detailed, turns out to be much too general. These disappointing results
serve a purpose. Plato wants us to see that something about the sophist explains
why he turns up all over the map, and that something about the statesman explains
why he has company at the terminus. In each dialogue, reflection on the peculiar
outcome of division enables the enquirers to recognize something about the kind in
question which helps to explain the peculiarity. The enquirers aim to discover a real
definition that applies to all and only instances that fall under a kind, and which
specifies its essence -- the feature or complex of features that explains why in the
case of the sophist he turns up in too many places, and why in the case of the
statesman he is not alone at the terminus." (p. 173)
134.
———. 2012. Philosophos: Plato’s Missing Dialogue. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Contents: Introduction 1; 1. Forms in Question 18; 2. A Philosophical Exercise 45;
3. The Contest between Heraclitus and Parmenides 76; 4. Knowledge as Expertise
101; 5. Appearances of the Sophist 138; 6. Refining the Statesman 177; 7. The
Philosopher’s Object 202; Works Cited 245; Index Locorum 263; Index of Names
274; General Index 278-290.
"The only thing that does not exist is something indescribable, something with no
features at all: nothing—or to use Owen’s colorful phrase, “a subject with all the
being knocked out of it and so unidentifiable.”(12) I take it that not-being, so
understood, is the focus of the first three puzzles about not-being in the Sophist and
of the sixth deduction in the Parmenides, so it could be that Plato restricts nonexistence to an unidentifiable non-thing: Plato’s notion of existence need not
correspond to our own. Even so, he talks about fictional entities in several dialogues
(centaurs and other mythical creatures), and the Sophist itself begins and ends with
a discussion of production, defined by the Stranger as bringing into being
something that previously was not (219b4–6, 265b8–10).(13) Furthermore, the
Battle of the Gods and Giants at the center of the dialogue treats two distinct views
about what is real (tangible things or immaterial forms), a dispute that surely
concerns actual being or existence (a monadic property), what things have it and
what things do not. The items rejected on each side are describable, even as the
opponents on the other side (Gods or Giants) deny their being. The Stranger tries to
settle the feud with his definition of being as dunamis (the capacity to act on or to
be affected by something else). Moreover, this same monadic being—the nature of
being (250c6–7)—is the property that becomes mysterious in the Aporia about
Being (249d9–250d4) directly following the Battle of the Gods and Giants.14 Plato
is clearly interested in monadic being in the Sophist — what things have this
feature, and what things, though describable, do not. In Chapter 5 I take the first
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steps toward an alternative interpretation of being, one indebted to Lesley Brown
and Michael Frede, which aims to preserve the virtues of their different proposals
without the shortcomings." (p. 176)
(12) Owen (1971: 247).
(13) Cf. E. N. Lee (1972: 300) and Heinaman (1983: 12).
14 Discussed below in Chapter 7 secs. 7.2 and 7.6.
References
Heinaman, R. 1983. “Being in the Sophist.” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
65: 1–17.
Lee, E. N. 1972. “Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist.” Philosophical
Review 81: 267–304.
Owen, G. E. L. 1971. “Plato on Not-Being.” In G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato 1:
Metaphysics and Epistemology. Garden City: Doubleday. 223–67. Repr. in G. E. L.
Owen, 1986. 104–137.
Owen, G. E. L. 1986. Logic, Science and Dialectic. M. C. Nussbaum (ed.). London:
Duckworth/Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
135.
———. 2021. "Images of Wisdom in the Prologue of Plato’s Sophist." The Journal
of Greco-Roman Studies no. 60:137-152.
Abstract: "This paper examines the prologue of Plato’s Sophist in light of
interpretive claims by Proclus, and revived by Myles Burnyeat,[*] that Plato
imaged in the opening scene of his dialogues the main philosophical themes of the
work.
This paper applies that insight to the prologue of the Sophist and argues that Proclus
is right but that the work in which this prologue is embedded is much larger than
the dialogue it introduces. A close reading of the Sophist’s prologue reveals it to
image, in a literary way, the whole series of dialogues—Theaetetus, Sophist,
Statesman, and missing Philosopher—of which the Sophist is a member. At the end
of the Sophist, the sophist is identified as imitator of the wise man. The paper
explores the sophist in relation to the kinds it imitates, including two sorts of wise
men, the philosopher and the statesman, and asks whether there is a wide kind
covering all of them, both genuine experts and their benign and dangerous
imitators. If there is such a kind, what is its status as a kind? The paper considers a
genealogical family, descended from a common ancestor (intelligence or
cleverness) with derivative kinds differentiated from one another by their object and
their aims, either beneficial or harmful."
[*] Burnyeat, M. F., 1997, “First Words,” Proceedings of the Cambridge
Philological Society 43, 1-20. (reprinted as Chapter 16 in F. M. Burnyeat,
Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge Univerist
Press 2012, p. 305-326.
136.
Giovannetti, Lorrenzo. 2021. "Between Truth and Meaning. A Novel Interpretation
of the Symploke in Plato’s Sophist." Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico
no. 42:261-290.
Abstract: "In this paper, I provide an interpretation of the symploke ton eidon at
Soph. 259e. My goal is to show that the specific metaphysical view expressed by
the interweaving of forms best accounts for Plato’s explanation of truth and
falsehood.
In the first section, I introduce the fundamentals of the interpretation of the greatest
kinds and their functions. After that, I propose an interpretation of the assertion at
259e, the upshot of which is that the interweaving of forms only deals with extralinguistic items, that it is related to both truth and meaning of linguistic items, in a
very complex way which I aim to explain throughout the paper, and that it never
involves sensible particulars. In the second section, I put forward my reading of the
Stranger’s description of how logoi are structured and how they work. I pay
particular attention to the view that words reveal being when they intertwine to
form a statement. In the third section, I interpret the statements concerning
Theaetetus. My goal is to advance a new reading of the specific role that kinds and
their interweaving play with regard to the truth and falsehood of the statements
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concerning Theaetetus. The result is the very specific view that the kinds, which are
the separated ontological cause of what happens in space and time, are the grounds
of both the truth and the meaning of statements."
137.
Gómez-Lobo, Alfonso. 1977. "Plato's Description of Dialectic in the Sophist
253d1-e2." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 22:29-47.
"In the Sophist there is an obscure and much disputed passage (253 d 1-e 2) which
professes to say something about what is proper to the science of Dialectic (... μῶν
οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι ; 253 d 2-3). The communis opinio is
that we are offered there a description of the Method of Division. The facts that the
passage is introduced by the expression τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι , that it appears in
a late dialogue and moreover in a dialogue where that method is explicitly practiced
(218 b 5-236 c 8 and 264 b 9-268 d 5) seem to be very strong reasons for suspecting
that here Plato must have in mind the Diaeretic Method. This conviction seems to
be almost unavoidable when one takes the lines as an "ausführliche Definition des
Dialektikers" (Stenzel). (2) If it is such an exhaustive definition, how could
Division be missing from it? I would like to challenge the generally accepted view
and show that another quite different interpretation gives a better sense to the text
and solves some problems which otherwise must remain puzzling. Since nearly all
recent interpretations depend on Stenzel's, I shall discuss it first (I). Then (II) I shall
put forward the main theses of my interpretation and lastly (III) I shall paraphrase
the whole text." (p. 29)
(...)
"Summary: Soph. 253 d 1-e 2 does not describe Division, it anticipates the
comparison Being and Not-Being with other Forms which will ultimately provide
Plato's answer to the dilemma of Parmenides." (p. 47)
(2) Julius Stenzel, Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates
zu Aristoteles, 2. Auf., Leipzig, 1931 (reprint Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1961), English translation by D. J. Allan, Plato's Method of
Dialectic, Oxford, 1940. Quotations or my own translations from the German
original will be identified by 'orig.' Quotations from Allan's translation are
identified by 'trans.' Occasionally Allan's version is inaccurate; in such cases I have
referred to the original German text.
138.
———. 1981. "Dialectic in the Sophist: a reply to Waletzki." Phronesis.A Journal
for Ancient Philosophy no. 26:80-83.
Reply to Waletzki (1979).
"In "Platons ldeenlehre und Dialektik im Sophistes 253d" (Phronesis 24 (1979)
241-252) Wolfgang Waletzki has criticized an earlier article of mine on that passage
(Phronesis 22 (1977) 29-47). Although I have benefitted from a number of his
observations, I am not in a position to accept his interpretation as a whole. Instead
of arguing piecemeal against each of his claims, I would here like to embark first on
a task which I believe to be more rewarding: the working out of criteria which
would have to be satisfied by a correct interpretation of the disputed passage. In the
light of these criteria I hope to show that Waletzki's approach is unsatisfactory, thus
vitiating his specific claims." (p. 80)
139.
Gonzalez, Francisco J. 1997. "On the Way to Sophia: Heidegger on Plato's
Dialectic, Ethics, and Sophist." Research in Phenomenology no. 27:16-60.
"The great lacuna in the Heideggerian Gesamtausgabe has been a detailed
interpretation of an entire Platonic dialogue. This situation has changed with the
publication of the lecture course on Plato's Sophist ( 1924/25) .(1) This text does
not disappoint for lack of thoroughness or scope: Heidegger takes the task of
interpreting this major Platonic dialogue so seriously that he devotes over two
hundred pages to preparing his interpretation and almost four hundred pages to
detailed, almost line by line exegesis of the text, from the dramatic prologue to the
explanation of the possibility of falsehood. With this course, therefore, we are
finally in a position to assess the extent to which Heidegger succeeded in coming to
terms with Plato's thought.
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In this paper I argue that, despite some important insights, this attempted
"philosophical appropriation of Plato"(2) fails. I also suggest that this failure
exposes certain limitations of Heidegger's thought,
specifically with regard to the relation between ethics and ontology." (p. 16)
(1) Platon: Sophistes, vol. 19 of Gesamtausgabe, ed. Ingeborg Schussler am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, hereafter GA 19.
(2) To use Heidegger's own characterization of what Friedrich Schleiermacher
failed to achieve: "die philosophische Aneignung Plato" (GA 19: 313). All
translations of Heidegger and Plato in this paper are my own.
140.
———. 2000. "The Eleatic Stranger: His Master's Voice? ." In Who Speaks for
Plato? Studies in Platonic Anonymity, edited by Press, Gerald A., 161-181.
Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
"Interpreters of the Sophist and the Statesman almost universally assume that the
Eleatic Stranger speaks for Plato. This is surprising, given how little speaks in favor
of this assumption and even how intuitively implausible it is." (p. 161)
(...)
"Yet, interpreters are apparently willing to live with some implausibility here
because they consider it even more implausible that the Stranger should not speak
for Plato. Their argument, insofar as it can be reconstructed, assumes that the only
positive assertions made in the two dialogues are the Strangers and that therefore
one could, without losing anything essential, eliminate the dialogue form by putting
what the Stranger says into the form of a treatise authored by Plato. The aim of the
present chapter is to refute this specific assumption and therefore the interpretation
that depends on it. Socrates does speak in both dialogues, and what he says is of
extraordinary importance; furthermore, a major, perhaps the major event of
Socrates' life, namely, his trial, forms the dramatic context. These words and deeds
of Socrates are not peripheral curiosities added to relieve the tedium of an otherwise
highly abstract discussion. Instead, as I will show, what Socrates says and who he
is, even his silence in the dialogue, expose serious problems in what the Stranger
says. If Plato in this way uses Socrates against the Stranger, the assumption that the
Stranger speaks for Plato, already implausible on the surface, is rendered untenable.
On the other hand, we are not thereby required to conclude that Plato rejects
everything the Stranger says and chooses Socrates instead as his mouthpiece. What
we have here, as elsewhere, is not a disguised author expounding doctrines in a
disguised treatise, but rather a drama in which two opposed and limited
perspectives confront each other and in that confrontation leave us with a problem."
(pp. 161-162, notes omitted)
141.
———. 2003. "Confronting Heidegger on Logos and Being in Plato's Sophist." In
Platon und Aristoteles - sub ratione veritatis. Festschrift für Wolfgang Wieland zum
70. Geburstag, edited by Damschen, Gregor, Enskat, Rainer and Vigo, Alejandro
G., 102-133. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
"In his WS 1924-25 lecture course on Plato's Sophist, Heidegger charges that,
because in this dialogue the method of separation and division is applied not only to
objects in the world, such as the angler, but also to Being itself and its structures,
Plato recognized no distinction between the way of dealing with beings
(Behandlungsart des Seienden) and the way of dealing with Being (Behandlungsart
des Seins). What underlies this charge is Heidegger's conviction, which he seeks to
support in the present course, that to address Being by way of λόγος and its
structure, which is what the method of διαίρεσις does, is inevitably to collapse the
distinction between Being and beings. Heidegger further suggests that Plato's Ideas
or Forms are a product of this approach to Being and the confusion it produces
(287). The goal of this paper is to defend Plato against this charge by arguing the
following: 1) Plato fully recognizes both the ontological difference itself and the
inability of λόγος, and any λόγος-centered approach, to preserve and do justice to
this difference; 2) Plato's response to this "weakness" of λόγος is, in the Sophist, to
distance himself from the λόγος of Being (and non-being) presented there by means
of various strategies, most generally the dialogue
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form itself; 3) though the εἰδη are unavoidably objectified in discourse, Plato did
not understand the εἰδη as objectively present things: indeed, it was precisely in
order to avoid objectifying the εἰδη that Plato refrained from offering a "theory of
Forms"; 4) Heidegger's attempt to reduce the dialogue's characterization of Being as
δύναμις to a characterization of Being as presence is unacceptable; 5) despite
Heidegger's insistence to the contrary, even the account of Being as δύναμις is
presented in the dialogue not as final, but as aporetic and necessarily so. In pursuing
this goal it is neither my intention nor even possible in the present context to give a
detailed, step-by-step exposition of Heidegger's course, much less of the Sophist
itself. Instead. I will assume some acquaintance with both in focusing on only those
moments where Heidegger explicitly sets himself apart from Plato, with the aim of
encouraging us to set ourselves apart from Heidegger's reading of Plato." (pp. 102103, notes omitted)
142.
———. 2011. "Being as Power in Plato's Sophist and Beyond." In Plato's Sophist:
Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by Havlíček,
Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 63-95. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"In the literature on Plato's metaphysics one finds much discussion of what kinds of
beings exist for Plato, what makes one class of beings 'more real' than another, what
relation exists between these different levels of beings, and what ultimate principles
or causes can be invoked to explain the nature of these beings. What is much harder
to find is reflection on what this word 'being' actually means for Plato. If both
sensible objects and the Forms can be said to be, if the latter must nevertheless be
said to be more truly, or 'more beingly', than the former, then what exactly is meant
by this word 'be'? If this fundamental question has been neglected in the literature,
the reason is not that Plato fails to address it In the Sophist this question is not only
addressed, but given an answer. Since the passage in question (247d8-e4) is the
only place in the Platonic corpus where this question is directly raised and answered
- and this in a context that stresses the great importance and indispensability of the
question - one would expect it to be the subject of a voluminous literature.
Strangely, the exact opposite is the case. Not only the literature on Plato's ontology,
but even the literature devoted specifically to the Sophist, displays little interest in
the definition of being this dialogue offers. Those scholars who have discussed the
definition at all have tended to dismiss it as purely provisional, ad hominem, and in
the end unPlatonic. Other scholars, particularly in more recent works on the
Sophist, quickly pass over the definition with little or no comment.' What explains
this neglect? The first set of scholars presumably have interpretative grounds for
denying that the definition is Plato's, but many devote little effort to making this
case and all fail to suggest what might be a better definition in Plato's eyes.
The second set of scholars, in simply passing over the definition with no comment,
perhaps have deeper philosophical reasons for just not being interested in the
question, though these reasons are left unarticulated.
Ironically, many scholars writing on the Sophist today are in this way like those
tellers of muthoi or those figures of muthos (the Giants and Gods) which the Eleatic
Visitor criticizes for only talking about the number and kinds of beings without
addressing the more fundamental question of what it means for any of these things
to be.
My object in the present paper is to go against this trend by showing that the
definition of being, far from being merely provisional and negligible, is absolutely
indispensable not only to the argument of the Sophist, but to a proper understanding
of Plato's metaphysics in both this and other dialogues. Specifically I wish to show
that the characterization of being as "nothing other than dunamis" is incompatible
with attributing to Plato a conception of the "really real" as static and immutable."
(pp. 63-65, notes omitted)
143.
Gooch, Paul W. 1971. ""Vice is ignorance": The interpretation of Sophist 226a231b." Phoenix no. 25:124-133.
"It is often held by Plato's commentators that the famous Socratic paradox "Virtue is
Knowledge" has as its complement the doctrine that vice is ignorance. While Plato's
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readers never find such an aphorism as "Vice is Ignorance" stated categorically in
the texts, it is interpreted to mean that in Plato's view moral evil is the result of
ignorance. And from this it is an easy step to the "intellectualist" Plato, who thought
that knowledge of the right thing to do was a sufficient condition of virtue." (p. 124,
notes omitted)
(...)
"My own reading of this section [Sophist 226a-231b] is that Plato, not popular
opinion, is responsible for the division of evils into two branches, and that the
division therefore cannot be considered unimportant for his ethics. Yet I cannot feel
as sure as Dodds that the classification places ignorance and vice into two
watertight compartments; there are indications that at least one kind of ignorance is
a vice, and that its treatment cannot leave the irrational parts of the soul untouched.
This in turn means that while Hackforth is probably right to say that Plato's real
belief was that wrongdoing always involves ignorance, I hope to provide some
evidence that this belief is not as obscured by the Sophist passage as Hackforth
seems to think. With these claims in mind we may now turn to an analysis of the
passage. After purification has been introduced as a negative art whose function is
to throw out the evil and undesirable, the discussion develops various divisions
within the art until the following schema becomes evident." (p. 126)
References
E. R. Dodds says that Plato "no longer makes ignorance the sole cause of
wrongdoing, or increased knowledge its sole cure" ("Plato and the Irrational,"
Journal of Hellenic Studies 65 [1945] 18).
R. Hackforth claims that for Plato all moral evil involves ignorance ("Moral Evil
and Ignorance in Plato's Ethics," Classical Quarterly 40 [1946] 118.
144.
Grams, Laura W. 2012. "The Eleatic Visitor’s Method of Division." Apeiron no.
45:130-156.
"The method of division (diairesis) employed by the Visitor from Elea in Plato’s
Sophist and Statesman is often interpreted as a hierarchical classification, in which
each cut divides a kind (genos) into smaller parts that are fully contained within it
and each subsequent kind entails all of the previous kinds in the sequence. On this
view, division begins with one large class and continues separating it into
successively smaller portions, until no further cuts can be made and an infima
species is reached. I argue that a strictly hierarchical interpretation of diairesis
cannot adequately explain the Visitor’s method for several reasons. First, division
often produces kinds that are neither determined by nor fully contained within the
intension or extension of the previous kinds, and division occasionally separates
pairs of kinds that overlap in scope. In addition, division does not always move
from general to more particular kinds, so the order in which a series of divisions is
made often has no effect on the outcome. The same kinds may be divided in
different ways in different contexts, which means that multiple paths may lead from
a given starting point to the destination." (p. 130, note omitted)
145.
Granieri, Roberto. 2019. "Xenocrates and the Two-Category Scheme." Apeiron:125.
Abstract: "Simplicius reports that Xenocrates and Andronicus reproached Aristotle
for positing an excessive number of categories, which can conveniently be reduced
to two: τὰ καθ᾽αὑτά and τὰ πρός τι. Simplicius, followed by several modern
commentators, interprets this move as being equivalent to a division into substance
and accidents. I aim to show that, as far as Xenocrates is concerned, this
interpretation is untenable and that the substance-accidents contrast cannot be
equivalent to Xenocrates’ per se-relative one. Rather, Xenocrates aimed to stress the
primacy of Plato’s binary distinction of beings, as presented at Sophist 255c13–4,
over Aristotle’s list of the categories."
146.
Greenstine, Abraham Jacob. 2019. "Accounting for Images in the Sophist." In Plato
and the Moving Image, edited by Biderman, Shai and Weinman, Michael, 19-36.
Leiden - Boston: Brill Rodopi.
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Abstract: "Plato’s Sophist is a critical dialogue for the question of images, for here
the interlocutors divide images into two kinds – likenesses and apparitions – in their
hunt for an account of sophistry. Yet much of the recent scholarship on the Sophist
does not make much of this division. This chapter defends the continuing
significance of the distinction between likeness and apparition. It argues for its
importance in Plato’s analysis of images, in his theory of accounts, and in his
endeavor to differentiate philosophy from sophistry. It further contends that one can
only distinguish likenesses from apparitions by establishing a correct perspective on
both the image and the original. Thus, the Sophist exhorts us differentiate likenesses
from apparitions, even as we struggle to consistently find the right perspective for
this task. Living in the cinematic age only intensifies the need to distinguish
likeness from apparition. Over the course of this chapter, we consider two films that
advance our questions about perspectives, images, and falsity: Carol Reed’s The
Third Man (1949) and Orson Welles’ F for Fake (1974). Like the Sophist, both
films reveal a world of apparitions, where names are confused, lies are constant,
and the truth is elusive."
147.
Griswold, Charles. 1977. "Logic and Metaphysics in Plato's Sophist." Giornale di
Metafisica no. 6:555-570.
Abstract: "In part one of this essay I defend the thesis that the "greatest genera" of
the "Sophist" are not the metaphysical ideas of the earlier dialogues, and that the
"participation" of these genera in each other is to be understood from a linguistic or
logical, rather than metaphysical, perspective. The genera are like concepts, not
essences. In part two I argue that the Stranger's doctrine of the genera means that
they cannot be unified, self-predicative, separable, and stable; the doctrine
deteriorates for reasons internal to itself. I suggest throughout that the Stranger's
philosophical orientation is more "subjectivistic" than that of (Plato's) Socrates;
unlike the ideas, the genera are subject to the soul's intellectual motion and
productive capacity. finally, I suggest that there is no convincing reason for holding
that the Stranger's views are superior to those of Socrates."
148.
Grönroos, Gösta. 2013. "Two Kinds of Belief in Plato." Journal of The History of
Philosophy no. 51:1-19.
"In the Sophist (263e10–264b4), Plato distinguishes between two kinds of belief.
On the one hand, there is a kind of belief that occurs “according to thinking” (κατὰ
διάνοιαν), being “the completion of thinking” (διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις). This kind
is called ‘doxa.’ On the other hand, there is another kind of belief that occurs
“through sense perception” (δι αἰσθήσεως). This kind is called 'phantasia,’ perhaps
best rendered as “appearing.” The purpose of this paper is to uncover the distinction
between these two different kinds of belief." (p. 1)
(...)
"The failure to recognize this distinction between two kinds of belief in Plato,
despite the enormous scholarly effort devoted to the Theaetetus and the Sophist, is
probably due to the fact that we do not operate with such a distinction any longer.
We may admit that beliefs are more or less justified, but this observation suggests
that beliefs differ in degree (of justification), rather than in kind. Moreover, if we
embrace the view that the formation of any belief requires the possession of
concepts and the capacity for propositional thought, and that these capacities are the
hallmarks of thinking and rationality at large, then it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that even a phantasia is formed through thinking, and that it is a
disposition of reason in precisely that sense. But attributing such an anachronistic
starting point to Plato overshadows a more specific notion of thinking, and a
different way of accounting for the role of thinking in belief formation. As Plato’s
unfolding of the disguise of the sophist shows, this kind of thinking, giving rise to a
qualified kind of belief, may well be worth serious consideration." (p. 18)
149.
Gulley, Norman. 1962. Plato's Theory of Knowledge. London: Metheuen & Co.
Chapter III: Knowledge and Belief; § 4: The Sophist's Account of Statement and
Belief, pp. 148-168.
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150.
Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. 1978. A History of Greek Philosophy V: The
later Plato and the Academy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
On the Sophist: Chapter II, 3, pp. 122-163.
151.
Hackforth, Reginald. 1945. "False Statement in Plato's Sophist." The Classical
Quarterly no. 39:56-58.
"Plato's examination of False Statement (Sophist 259 D-263 D) is, like many of his
discussions in the later dialogues, a mixture of complete lucidity with extreme
obscurity. Any English student who seeks to understand it will of course turn first to
Professor Cornford's translation and commentary(1); and if he next reads what M.
Diès has to say in the Introduction to his Budé edition of the Sophist he will, I
think, have sufficient acquaintance with the views of modern Platonic scholars on
the subject. For myself, at least, I have not gained any further understanding from
other writers than these two." (p. 56)
(...)
(1) Plato's Theory of Knowledge, pp. 298-317.
152.
Hamlyn, David W. 1955. "The Communion of Forms and the Development of
Plato's Logic." The Philosophical Quarterly no. 5:289-302.
"The impression given by many accounts of Plato's philosophy is that the doctrine
of the communion of forms (or kinds) which is introduced in the Sophist is new and
revolutionary. It may well be true that the use to which Plato puts this doctrine is
revolutionary, but there are unmistakable hints of it much earlier. In the Republic
476a we are told of the communion of forms with actions, bodies, and one another,
and, as Ross points out,(1) the doctrine is implicit in the account of the theory of
forms given in the Phaedo 102b ff., in the sense that we are told that certain forms
exclude each other." (p. 289)
(...)
"The doctrine of the communion of forms is an attempt to do two things at once - to
characterise predicates as names referring to a kind of particular, and also to relate
such names to those occurring as the subjects of assertions by means other than that
of identity and difference. Consequently the assertion that Plato looked on proper
names as disguised descriptions should be qualified by saying that for him
descriptions were only another kind of name-names of forms rather than names of
sensible particulars. Hence the doctrine of ' communion ' is still vitiated by the fault
from which Plato was trying to free himself. That it was an important advance
nevertheless is clear." (p. 302)
153.
Harte, Verity. 2002. Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Contents: 1. The Problem of Composition 1; 2. Composition as Identity in the
Parmenides and the Sophist 48; 3. A New Model of Composition 117; 4.
Composition and Structure 158; 5. Plato's Metaphysics of Structure 267; References
293; General Index 300; Index of Names 300; Index Locorum 304-311.
"In my view—a view for which the book as a whole constitutes a defence—Plato's
discussions of part and whole in the works I shall consider may be divided into two
distinct groups: those in which Plato explores a model of composition which he
does not endorse; and those which work towards building an alternative to the
rejected model. This book is organized around discussion of these two groups. §1.6
to Chapter 2 examine the discussions of the first group, Chapters 3 and 4 those of
the second.
The division between these two groups does not coincide with the division between
different works. To the first group—those which focus on the model which Plato
does not endorse—belong passages of the Parmenides, the Theaetetus, and a
passage of the Sophist. To the second group—those which develop an alternative to
the rejected model—belong other passages of the Parmenides and of the Sophist,
and passages of the Philebus and Timaeus. The Parmenides as a whole enacts the
contrast between the two groups and provides an illustration of the framework I
propose for understanding their relation. Over the course of the Parmenides
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arguments involving the rejected model of composition are used to expose the
problems that arise from its adoption; problems to which the alternative model of
composition is framed as a solution." (pp. 2-3)
154.
Havlíček, Aleš, and Karfík, Filip, eds. 2011. Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the
Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense. Praha: Oikoymenh.
Contents: Preface 7; Thomas Alexander Szlezák: Die Aufgabe des Gastes aus Elea
Zur Bedeutung der Eingangsszene des Sophistes (216a–218a) 11; Francesco
Fronterotta: Some Remarks on the Senses of Being in the Sophist 35; Francisco J.
Gonzalez: Being as Power in Plato’s Sophist and Beyond 63; Walter Mesch, Die
Bewegung des Seienden in Platons Sophistes 96; Filip Karfík: Pantelôs on and
megista genê (Plato, Soph. 242C–259b) 120; Noburo Notomi: Dialectic as Ars
Combinatoria: Plato’s Notion of Philosophy in the Sophist 146; Luc Brisson: Does
Dialectic always Deal with the Intelligible? A Reading of the Sophist (253d5–e1)
156; Aleš Havlíček: Die Aufgabe der Dialektik für die Auslegung des Seins des
Nichtseienden 173; Nestor-Luis Cordero: Une conséquence inattendue de
l’assimilation du non-être à « l’Autre » dans le Sophiste 188; Denis O’Brien, The
Stranger’s “Farewell” (258e6–259a1) 199; Štěpán Špinka: Das Sein des NichtSeins. Einige Thesen zur strukturellen Ontologie im Dialog Sophistes 221;
Christoph Ziermann: La négativité de l’être chez Platon 240; David Ambuel: The
Coy Eristic: Defining the Image that Defines the Sophist 278; Francisco Lisi:
Ποιητικη τέχνη in Platons Sophistes 311; Jakub Jinek: Die Verschiedenheit der
Menschentypen in Platons Sophistes 328; T. D. J. Chappell: Making Sense of the
Sophist: Ten Answers to Ten Questions 344; Index locorum 377.
155.
Heidegger, Martin. 1997. Plato's Sophist. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger's lecture course at the University of Marburg in the Winter Semester of
1924-25.
Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer.
Original German edition: Platon, Sophistes, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann,
1992, edited by Ingeborg Schüssler (Gesamtausgabe, II, 19).
156.
Heinaman, Robert E. 1981. "Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie no. 65:1-17.
"There is an influential view, developed during the last fifteen years, concerning the
relationship between the concept of existence and the notion of Being in Plato's
Sophist. (a)
Three distinguishable claims are involved in this account:
(1) Plato does not wish to isolate the existential use of 'to be' from its other uses.
(2) Plato's discussion of being concerns syntactically incomplete uses of 'to be,' not
syntactically complete uses of the verb. (b)
(3) The concept of existence plays no role in the philosophical problems discussed
or their solutions. Plato operates with a "scheme of concepts which lacks or ignores
an expression for 'exist.' (c)
I have no quarrel with (1). But (1) must be clearly distinguished from (3) since
Plato may have failed to mark out the existential use of 'to be' while nevertheless
using the word to mean existence with this latter concept playing an important role
in the argument. In this paper I will try to show that there are no good reasons to
accept (2) or (3). Although I shall deal with points raised by John Malcolm and
Michael Frede, the focus will be on Professor Owen's paper. The first section will
argue that Owen's interpretation of the Sophist is untenable and the second section
will show that his arguments for (2) and (3) are unsuccessful. Finally, the third
section explains how the position I defend is compatible with Plato's employment of
negative existentials.
The position I defend is that the concept of existence does not monopolize but is
part of the notion of Being in the Sophist." (pp. 1-2)
(a) G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos (ed.) Plato I (New York,
1971), pp. 223-67; Michael Frede, Prädikation und Existenzaussage (Göttingen,
1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of tò ón and tò me ón in the Sophist,"
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Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46. Also cf. W. Bondeson, "Some Problems about Being
and Predication in the Sophist," Journal of the History of Philosophy (1976), p.7, n.
15; A. P. D. Mourelatos, " 'Nothing' as 'Not-Being'," in G. Bowersock, W. Burkert,
M. Putnam (eds.) Arktouros (New York, 1979), pp. 319-29.
(b) Owen, pp. 225, 236, 240-41. Frede makes the still stronger claim that every use
of 'to be' in the Sophist is incomplete (Frede, pp. 37, 40, 51). I discuss Frede's
interpretation in an appendix.
(c) Owen, p. 263.
157.
———. 1981. "Self-Predication in the Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient
Philosophy no. 26:55-66.
"A major problem in the interpretation of Plato's metaphysics is the question of
whether he abandoned self-predication as a result of the Third Man Argument in the
Parmenides. In this paper I will argue that the answer to this question must be 'no'
because the self-predication assumption is still present in the Sophist.(1)" (p. 55)
(...)
"It has often been said that 250c confuses identity and predication. But since 255
establishes Plato's commitment to self-predication, it is preferable to see the mistake
as occurring a few lines later (250c 12-d3) where the Stranger concludes that, since
Being does not rest or move according to its own nature, it does not rest or move at
all (cf. Parm. 139c6-d1). It is plausible to suppose that Plato believes that this error
is corrected by the doctrine of the communion of Forms (cf. 252b8-10, 255e4-6,
258b9-c3)." (p. 63)
(1) The claim that the Sophist is committed to self-predication has been made
before. W. F. Hicken, "Knowledge and Forms in Plato's 'Theaetetus'," in R. E. Allen
(ed.) Studies in Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965), p. 192; R. S. Bluck, "False
Statement in the Sophist, " Journal of Hellenic Studies (1957), p. 186, n. 2; G.
Striker, Peras und Apeiron (Gottingen, 1970), p. 37; W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of
Greek Philosophy V (Cambridge, 1978), p. 43, n. 1. Cf. W. G. Runciman, Plato's
Later Epistemology (Cambridge. 1962), pp. 80,95, 102; R. Marten, Der Logos der
Dialektik (Berlin, 1965), p. 214, n. 134.
158.
———. 1983. "Communion of Forms." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society no.
83:175-190.
"At Sophist 259e5-6 Plato says: 'Logos exists for us on account of the interweaving
of Forms'. It appears to be an important claim, and various suggestions have been
made as to why Plato believed logos depends on the communion of Forms. It has
often been thought that the communion of Forms referred to in 259e5-6 lays down
conditions for meaning, not truth. Thus, in a well known paper Professor Ackrill
has suggested that the communion of Forms covers relations of compatibility,
incompatibility, and presumably other relations which determine the meaning of
words. (1) I believe that such an interpretation is too optimistic and that Plato's view
is less sophisticated than scholars would like to admit. I will argue that the
communion of Forms does not provide an explanation of meaning but of an entity's
being characterized by a property. It is simply the relation of participation which in
earlier dialogues related individuals to Forms. (But I make no claims about
resemblance.)
259e5-6 occurs in a context (259d9-260a3) where the Eleatic Stranger refers back
to an earlier argument for the conclusion that some Forms combine and some do not
(25 1d5-252e8). And that earlier passage had been followed by a discussion where
five 'Great Kinds' had been distinguished (254d4-255e1) and some relations of
communion had been pointed out (255e8-257a12; cf. 254c4-5). If we want to
determine what Plato means by 'communion of Forms' we must examine 251d-252e
where Plato presents his arguments in support of the claim that some Forms
combine and some do not.
One preliminary problem is the question of how to translate 'logos' in the statement
that logos has come to be on account of the communion of Forms. The answer is
provided by the context. 'Logos' also occurs in 260a5 and 260a7 where it possesses
the same sense as 'logos' in 259e6. 260a7 says that we must determine what logos
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is, and when the explanation of logos is finally given (261d-262e) an explanation of
statements is provided. So 259e5-6 is saying that statements exist because of the
communion of Forms." (pp. 175-176)
(1) J. L. Ackrill, 'XYMJI-AOKHE IAQN', in G. Viastos (ed.) Plato I (New York,
1971), pp. 201-9. Also cf. his 'In Defense of Platonic Division', in 0. Wood and G.
Pitcher (eds.) Ryle (London, 1971), pp. 376, 391-92.
159.
———. 1986. "Once More: Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie no. 68:121-125.
"According to what I will call the 'new' interpretation, the meaning of 'being' which
plays an important role in the philosophical argument of the Sophist is not
'existence' but 'being such and such,' what is expressed by syntactically incomplete
uses of 'to be. (a) In an earlier paper I claimed, to the contrary, that 'being' is used to
mean existence in the Sophist's argument, although its meaning corresponds to the
other uses of the verb as well. (b) Against the new interpretation I argued as
follows:
(1) The aporiai of 237-41 are solved in 251-59 by rejecting 237-41's assumption
that 'not-being' means 'contrary to being' and claiming that 'not-being' instead means
'different from being.'
(2) On the new interpretation, 'the contrary of being' means 'what is (predicatively)
nothing.'
(3) The aporia of 240c-241b cannot be given a coherent interpretation if 'not-being',
as there used, is understood to mean 'what is (predicatively) nothing.'
(4) Hence the meaning of 'not-being' required by the new interpretation is
unacceptable, and the new interpretation should be rejected.
In a recent note John Malcolm has replied to this argument and raised some other
objections to my paper. (c) Here, I will limit myself to explaining why Malcolm's
objections have no force, and why his reply to my argument. simply exchanges one
absurdity for others." (p. 121)
(a) Its main proponents are G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being," in G. Vlastos
(ed.) Plato I (New York, 1971), pp. 223-67); Michael Frede, Prädikation und
Existenzaussage (Göttingen, 1967); J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of tò on and tò
mé on in the Sophist," Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46.
(b) "Being in the Sophist," Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (1983), pp. 1-17.
(c) "Remarks on an Incomplete Rendering of Being in the Sophist," Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie (1985), pp. 162-65. Ensuing references to Malcolm will
be to this paper.
160.
Hermann, Arnold. 2011. "Parricide or Heir? Plato’s Uncertain Relationship to
Parmenides." In Parmenides, 'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e),
edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis, 147-165. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "Most scholars view Plato’s critique of Parmenides in the Sophist,
particularly the observations surrounding the “parricide” remark, as quite apt and
justified. The theory is that Parmenides deserves to be rebuked for failing to
recognize that “What Is Not” can be understood in more ways than one, namely, not
only in an existential sense, but also predicatively or, in the language of the Sophist,
as indicating “difference.” I aim to show, nevertheless, that Plato’s indictment of
Parmenides misses the mark in significant ways, allowing Parmenides to escape the
so-called threat of parricide not once but twice.
For example, Parmenides' abundant use of alpha-privatives (e.g., ἀγένητον)—as
well as the negative οὐ (or οὐκ) when there is no a-privative form available—
indicates that he was well aware of the difference between indicating “is not”
predicatively versus existentially. Moreover, the Poem nowhere suggests that his
strictures regarding the use of What Is Not are to be taken in the broadest possible
sense, disallowing, in effect, the discrimination between the existential and the
predicative case. Only when sought after as a “way of inquiry” does What Is Not—
in contrast to the Way of What Is—fail to provide us with a graspable, expressible
object. After all, the “Way of What Is Not,” lacks any sort of sēmata, or signs, that
can be used to navigate it. As a “way of inquiry for thinking” (B2), it leads
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nowhere, lacking any sort of expressible or knowable object or goal. The complete
absence of an object or result, however, does not hinder us from making statements
to this effect, nor from uttering the words “What Is Not” or “Not Being.” Yet this
fine distinction is lost to many who have criticized Parmenides for being
inconsistent, careless, or simply ignorant. The move from the intellectual
unavailability of an object that marks a defunct way of inquiry, to the claim that to
even speak of such a “way” is both illegitimate and impossible—all the while
insisting that Parmenides himself is to be blamed for such a monstrous fallacy—
seems an egregious gloss-over, even if the perpetrator is someone of Plato’s stature.
If my arguments prove sound, then Parmenides should be absolved of the charges
leveled against him."
161.
Hermann, Fritz Gregor. 1998. "On Plato's 'Sophist' 226b-231b " Hermes no.
126:109-117.
"The sixth attempt to show what it is to be a sophist (226 b-231 b) marks a fresh
starting point in the discussion by Theodorus' guest-friend from Elea and
Theodorus' young pupil Theaetetus. The first five attempts were closely modelled
on the exemplary search for the angler (218 e-221 c), and started from the division,
διαίρεσις, of all the arts and crafts into acquisitive, κτητική, and productive,
ποιητική. Unlike the previous sections whose divisions were arrived at by abstract
consideration, the passage commencing at 226 b starts with the enumeration of
concrete examples of household activities. Adduced by the Elean, they serve as
illustrations of the art of separation, διακριτική (1)." (p. 109)
(1) Cf. e.g. F.M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London 1935, p. 177f
162.
Hestir, Blake E. 2003. "A "Conception" of Truth in Plato's Sophist." Journal of The
History of Philosophy no. 41:1-24.
" Plato's solution to the problem of falsehood carries a notorious reputation which
sometimes overshadows a variety of interesting developments in Plato's philosophy.
One of the less-noted developments in the Sophist is a nascent conception of truth
which casts truth as a particular relation between language and the world. Cornford
and others take Plato's account of truth to involve something like correspondence;
some find the origin of Aristotle's "correspondence" account of truth in Plato's
Sophist. But all this assumes a lot about Plato, much less Aristotle. For one, it
assumes that to claim that the statement 'Theaetetus is sitting' is true is to claim that
it is true because it corresponds with the fact that Theaetetus is sitting. Other
scholars have been reluctant to accept Cornford's view, but few offer any
explanation of what sort of account of truth we might ascribe to Plato by the end of
the Sophist. Tarski has argued that truth is a simpler notion than that of
correspondence. In fact, he claims his own "conception" of truth is similar to the
classical conception we find in Aristotle's Metaphysics -- a conception of truth
formulated in Greek in much the same way Plato formulates it in the Sophist.
Unfortunately, Tarski never sufficiently explains what it is about the classical
conception that makes it closer to his own. I argue that Tarski is generally right
about the ancient conception of truth, but this is not to claim that Tarski's own
conception is in Plato. By interpreting Plato's solution to the paradox of not-being
and his solution to the problem of falsehood, I argue that Plato's account of truth
implies a simpler notion of truth than correspondence. I outline various types of
correspondence theory and show that none of these fits what Plato says about truth,
syntax, and meaning in the Sophist." (pp. 1-2)
163.
———. 2016. Plato on the Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning and Truth.
Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments page IX; Note on the text XII; List of abbreviations
XIII; 1 Introduction 1; Part I Stability 17; 2 Strong Platonism, restricted Platonism,
and stability 19; 3 Concerns about stability in the Cratylus 39; 4 Flux and language
in the Theaetetus 57; 5 The foundation exposed: Parmenides 135bc 84; Part II
Combination 105; 6 Being as capacity and combination: a challenge for the Friends
of the Forms 107; 7 The problem of predication: the challenge of the Late-Learners
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144; Part III Truth 181; 8 Predication, meaning, and truth in the Sophist 183; 9
Plato’s conception of truth 209; 10 Truth as being and a substantive property 234;
Bibliography 243; Index locorum 259; General index 265.
"My project is motivated by my interest in understanding the following two
passages from Plato’s Sophist. In the first passage, the so-called Stranger from Elea
presents Theaetetus with an account of true and false statement.
In the second, he relates that account to thought and judgment, although my project
concerns only that aspect of it that is an extension of the first.(2) He describes
thought as “discourse without voice” (dialogos aneu phônês) and judgment as the
end result of thought. Statement and judgment involve doing something with words
and thoughts, respectively, namely asserting or denying, and assertions and denials
are either true or false:
I [Sophist (263b4–12)]
II [Sophist (263e3–264b4)]
"Together these passages stand as what I consider to be the quintessential
expression of Plato’s account of truth and falsehood, yet they do not by themselves
constitute a complete account of his conception of truth. I am interested in that
conception and its relation to Plato’s semantics and metaphysics.
This project aims to fill several gaps in the current scholarship on ancient Greek
conceptions of truth, meaning, and language. What is missing is a detailed
investigation into how the development of Plato’s understanding of the
metaphysical foundation of meaning plays an integral role in his conception of truth
in the Sophist. The two aforementioned passages follow on the heels of a discussion
of language and signification that emerges, I argue, from a systematic approach to
semantics that Plato commences in the Cratylus and continues through the
Parmenides and Theaetetus, each of which is commonly taken to precede the
Sophist. The Sophist supplies something of an explanation of how being grounds
meaning and truth. However, more needs to be said about the mechanism of being,
its relation to meaning and truth, the relation between the latter two, and what sort
of conception of truth emerges from all this. It is also the case that more could be
said about how this conception of truth complements the account of truth as being
in “middle-period” dialogues such as the Phaedo and Republic. Moreover, there has
not been a detailed treatment of the striking parallels between Plato’s and Aristotle’s
conceptions of meaning and truth. This book contributes to the developing
scholarship in these areas. (pp. 2-3)
(2) So, for example, I will not be discussing Plato’s account of concept acquisition
and cognition.
164.
Hopkins, Burt C. 2013. "The Génos of Lógos and the Investigation of the Greatest
Genê in Plato’s Sophist." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and
Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:353-362.
Abstract: "It is argued that once the negative criterion for distinguishing eikones
from phantasmata in lógos about the originals in the intelligible realm appears in
the Sophist, the Stranger’s claim in the final divisions that “we now indisputably
count off the kind of image-making as two” (266e), i.e., likeness making and
semblance making, becomes problematical.
Specifically, what becomes a problem is whether the distinction in question is a
mathesis (learning matter) and therefore something capable of becoming epistême.
Consequent this, it is also argued that the eidetic-arithmoí that appear in the
dialectical investigation of the greatest kinds rule out precisely the power of lógos
to make the kind of clean cut the Stranger proposes regarding the sophist and
philosopher belonging to different gene, given the incomparable nature of the gené
and eidê being divided."
165.
Horan, David. 2019. "Plato’s Parmenides in Plato’s Sophist." Etudes platoniciennes
no. 15:1-23.
Abstract: "I wish to argue in this article that Plato, in considering the position of the
monists in the Sophist, relies heavily upon arguments carried forward from the
Parmenides. Accordingly, I argue, he invokes, in turn, three understandings of what
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one means, imported from the Parmenides, and finds that all of them fall short, and
generate aporiai, when they are used in the Sophist as the basis for an account, not
of the one, as in the Parmenides, but of being, or “what is”. In fact I shall argue in
this paper that an entirely coherent reading of the overall challenge to the monists in
the Sophist, beginning with the naming argument, or names’ argument, through to
the argument about the whole, only emerges if we take account of the arguments of
the Parmenides, and three conceptions of what “one” is, taken from that dialogue."
166.
Hoseup, Rhee. 2021. "The Division of Images and the Deception of the Sophist."
The Journal of Greco-Roman Studies no. 60:153-167.
Abstract: "This article discusses the division of images (eidōla) presented in
Sophist, and explores how the sophist’s verbal deception is made based on this
division. In Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes between two types of
images: likenesses (eikones) and apparitions (phantasmata). If the likeness is an
image that actually resembles the original, the apparition is an image that does not
actually resemble the original but appears to resemble it. How exactly should this
distinction be understood? Cornford’s argument that the distinction between
likenesses and apparitions is made according to the ‘degree of reality’ leads to the
conclusion that Plato uses the concept of ‘image’ inconsistently. Bluck criticizes
Cornford on the grounds that likenesses and apparitions are both related to
falsehood as branches of images.
This criticism is reasonable but does not help us to understand the distinction.
According to Notomi, given the metaphysical distinction between reality and
appearance, if the likeness is a correct image that truly resembles the original and
represents its appearance, then the apparition is an incorrect image that only appears
to resemble it by points of view. I basically agree with Notomi’s view, but his
interpretation does not accurately reveal the falsehood particular to the apparition,
nor does it accurately account for the deception of sophists, other than painters. It is
because, according to Notomi’s interpretation, apparitions will appear as likenesses,
i.e., they will represent the same appearance as likenesses even in the ‘unbeautiful
point of view.’ This, contrary to Notomi’s assertion that the apparition is an
incorrect image, seems to allow for the possibility that it can represents ‘true
appearances.’
Moreover, unlike painters, the deception of sophists occurs when the original is not
well known, and therefore it is difficult for the observer to determine which is a
likeness, that is, when he does not know which image represents true appearances.
For this reason, I argue that the falsehood particular to the apparition arise on the
one hand by accidental resemblance irrelevant of the essence of the original and, on
the other hand, by aesthetic and emotional effect. Thus, the sophist’s verbal
deception can be achieved by stimulating the emotions of the audience with flashy
rhetoric unrelated to the truth, and by imitating the appearance of a wise person in
terms of performing discourses. Furthermore, the deception of the sophist can be
discriminated into two types, according to the view on the relation between
language and Forms."
References
Cornford, F. M., 1935, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, London: Routledge and K.
Paul.
Notomi, N., 1999, The Unity of Plato’s Sophist: Between the Sophist and the
Philosopher, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
167.
Hülsz, Enrique. 2013. "Plato’s Ionian Muses: Sophist 242d-e." In Plato's Sophist
Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 103-115. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter.
"The focus of this short paper will be a couple of very famous lines at Sophist
242d–e, which constitute one of the precious few certain references to Heraclitus
within the Platonic corpus. It will be well to recall from the outset that there are
virtually no full quotations of Heraclitus in Plato’s works, with the possible
exception of two consecutive passages in Hippias Maior (289a – b) usually counted
as sources for Heraclitus fragments (DK22) B82 and (DK22) B83, which do not
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qualify as verbatim quotations but are at best mere paraphrases. What looks like the
dominant trend in current scholarship concerning Plato’s views on Heraclitus is
largely based on the Cratylus and the Theaetetus, which seem to provide a basic
sketch for the official image of the Ephesian as the main representative of the
Universal flux theory (the famous but apocryphal dictum, πάντα ῥεῖ). In spite of the
popularity of this view, surely also based on Aristotle’s authority, if Universal flux
is what allegedly defines Heracliteanism, Heraclitus was no Heraclitean." (p. 103,
notes omitted)
168.
Ionescu, Cristina. 2013. "Dialectic in Plato's Sophist: Division and the Communion
of Kinds " Arethusa no. 46:41-64.
Abstract: "This paper explores the Eleatic Stranger's use of the method of division
in the Sophist and attempts to reveal it to be a dialectical method of discovery, not
of demonstration, that proceeds tentatively while it ultimately aims to ground its
discoveries in the communion of the very great kinds. To illuminate this view, I
argue for three main theses: first, that the method of division is a method of
discovery, not of demonstration; secondly, that the much discussed passage at
Sophist 253d-e is about both the method of division and the communion of kinds;
and thirdly, that the method cannot succeed to discover natural articulations of
reality as long as it ignores considerations of value."
169.
———. 2020. "Images and Paradigms in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman." Ancient
Philosophy no. 40:1-22.
"At the heart of two Platonic dialogues, one of which is the sequel of the other, the
Eleatic Stranger draws two distinctions: one between two types of images (είδωλα):
είκασια (likenesses) and ϕαντάσματα (appearances), Sophist 234a-236d, and the
other between two kinds of paradigms (παραδείγματα): perceptible and verbal
paradigms, Statesman 277a-c, 285d-286b. My present aim is to examine the
relevance of each of these distinctions in its respective context, and to suggest a
way to understand the relation between them." (p. 1)
170.
Isenberg, Meyer W. 1951. "Plato's Sophist and the Five Stages of Knowing."
Classical Philology no. 46:201-211.
"in a well known passage in the Seventh Epistle (342 A ff.) Plato describes the five
stages (1) which one traverses on the road to the knowledge of what is real. If this
epistle was written about 353 B.C., its explanation of Plato's method, whether it is
primarily directed to the beginner or the advanced student, (2) should have an
intimate connection with the method pursued not only in the early and middle
dialogues, but especially in the works of Plato's old age. Since the Sophist is one of
the latest dialogues and has been generally considered one of the most difficult it
may not be too far from the mark to inquire whether a right understanding of Plato's
five stages of knowing in the Seventh Epistle may not be of use in the interpretation
of that dialogue. In this way, perhaps, some difficulties which that work has raised
may be solved and a more intimate acquaintance made with Plato's dialectical
method.
It is, then, the purpose of the present paper to show that the movement of thought in
the Sophist follows closely the description of method in the passage of the Seventh
Epistle referred to above. All descriptions of method, however, tend to be more
simple and more rigid than the actual application of the method itself." (p. 201)
(1) Plato does not use the word "stages." δι' ὃν (342 A 7) should be translated
"instruments." But only "name," "discourse," and "image" are instruments.
The term "stages" in the present paper is used in a loose sense to indicate the
unfolding of the dialectic.
It has no ontological significance. Various "stages" can only become definite in the
context of the Sophist and its interpretation. It is important to note, then, that the
various stages listed in this passage do not have even the apparent fixity of the
levels of the divided line in the Republic, but are rather extremely fluid terms which
flow into one another as the dialectic twists and turns. Note the term διαγωνή (343
E 1).
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(2) Harward in his excellent edition of the Epistles states that Plato is "quoting
material from some discourse addressed to a single learner, apparently a beginner in
philosophy, who has already had a grounding in mathematics" (The Platonic
Epistles [Cambridge, 1932], p. 213, n. 95). This may well be the case, but many an
advanced student may be benefited by an elementary exposition. The importance of
the passage on either count is not diminished.
171.
Jeng, I-Kai. 2017. "Plato’s Sophist on the Goodness of Truth." Epoché: A Journal
for the History of Philosophy no. 21:335-349.
Abstract: " “Late” Platonic dialogues are usually characterized as proposing a
“scientific” understanding of philosophy, where “neutrality” is seen favorably, and
being concerned with the honor of things and/or their utility for humans is
considered an attitude that should be overcome through dialectical training. One
dialogue that speaks strongly in favor of this reading is the Sophist, in which the
stance of neutrality is explicitly endorsed in 227b-c. This paper will propose a
reading of the Sophist showing that this common view of late Plato is misleading. It
will argue for three things. First, 227b-c, when contextually understood, actually
shows the limitation of being neutral. Second, that limitation compels the
interlocutors in the rest of the conversation to pursue a non-neutral way of
philosophizing about the sophist, contrary to the advice put forward in 227b-c.
Finally, the non-neutral definition of the sophist that concludes the dialogue does
not signal Plato’s preference for a non-neutral conception of philosophical
knowledge either. A careful consideration of the dramatic ending suggests that he
has reservations about it no less than he does about a neutral conception. The fact
that both these conceptions had limitations perhaps explains why Plato, even in his
late years, did not turn to the treatise format but remained within the dialogue: only
in this form is it possible to retain both in philosophical logos."
172.
———. 2019. "On the Final Definition of the Sophist: Sophist 265A10–268D5."
The Review of Metaphysics no. 72:661-684.
Abstract: "This paper defends the closing definition of the sophist in Plato’s Sophist
as a modest success. It first argues that it consistently articulates the sophist’s class
structure as someone who resembles someone wise without being in the same class
as that being. Then it explains why this structuring principle satisfies the demands
of a successful definition as stated in the Sophist 232a1-6, and how the earlier
definitions, despite being informative, nevertheless are failures. Since a number of
scholars consider the final definition to fail no less than the earlier ones, the paper
then turns to address four common objections in the literature. The conclusion
briefly discusses how this reading affects our understanding of the method of
division (diaeresis) in Plato."
173.
Johnson, Patricia Ann. 1978. "Keyt on ἕτερον in the Sophist." Phronesis.A Journal
for Ancient Philosophy no. 23:151-157.
"In his article, "Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B,"' David Keyt introduces a crucial
question for understanding the definition of false statement given by Plato in the
Sophist: What is the relation of flying to Theaetetus (or, to the attributes which
belong to Theaetetus)? The response given to this question will amount to an
interpretation of the key line, 263B11-13. Keyt mentions five interpretations and
argues briefly against each, but the major argument of his paper is devoted to
showing that the definition of falsity is vague and therefore defies specific
translation. I shall not discuss all of these possible interpretations because my
concern here is in defending what Keyt calls the Oxford interpretation. He argues
directly against this view as raising serious epistemological problems, but he also
challenges it as an interpretation by presenting counter arguments to the two most
persuasive reasons for choosing this interpretation over the others. I shall try to
respond to the more significant of these challenges." (p. 151)
174.
Jordan, Robert William. 1984. "Plato's Task in the Sophist." The Classical Quarterly
no. 34:113-129.
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"I shall argue that it is clear that Plato would himself characterize his task in the
Sophist as showing τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν (258d 5) - that what is notbeing is being.(3)
Problems arise only in the interpretation of Plato's task. We must be guided in our
interpretation by the solution Plato offers to his problems. This solution turns firstly
on his demonstration of Communion of Kinds, and secondly on his distinction
between otherness and opposition. The conclusion Plato draws from his discussion
of Communion of Kinds has sometimes been thought to lend support to the view
that Plato's task here is that of distinguishing different senses of einai. I shall argue
that this view of the passage presents serious problems for the commentator. And
this view of Plato's task in the Sophist receives no support at all from Plato's
contrast between otherness and opposition. That contrast, however, equally fails to
support the other commonly held view of the problems Plato is facing in the
Sophist, that Plato is keen to distinguish between the medamos on and the me on. In
particular, the analogy Plato draws between 'being' and 'big' presents a major
difficulty for this view.
Finally, I shall introduce a new interpretation of Plato's task, via a consideration of
his stated intention to commit patricide and refute Parmenides' criticism of the road
of enquiry followed by mortals. Once we have seen that Plato promises to refute
Parmenides, but does not accomplish this task by distinguishing between different
senses or uses of einai, nor yet by a distinction between being in no way and simply
not being, only one possibility remains: Plato thinks the refutation of Parmenides
achieved if he can show that being (F) is not opposed to notbeing (G). This
interpretation of Plato's task is then shown to fit well, both with the puzzles that
introduce the central section of the Sophist, and with Plato's resolution of those
puzzles by way of his demonstration of Communion of Kinds, and his distinction
between otherness and opposition. It is compatible with what Plato says and does in
Sophist 241-56; and it accounts well for the nature of Plato's discussion of negation
and falsity in the dialogue. (pp. 113-114)
(3) We normally translate to mega as 'what is big'. I consequently translate to on as
'what is being' and to me on as 'what is notbeing', to preserve the parallel in the
Greek.
175.
Julia, Pfefferkorn, and Spinelli, Antonino, eds. 2021. Platonic Mimesis Revisited.
Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Contents: 1; Julia Pfefferkorn, Antonino Spinelli: Revisiting Mimesis in Plato: An
Introduction 7; Stephen Halliwell: The Shifting Problems of Mimesis in Plato 27;
Michael Erler: Performanz und Analyse. Mimesis als Nachmachen – ein Element
traditioneller Paideia in Platons früheren Dialogen und seine Analyse in den Nomoi
47; Andrea Capra: Imitatio Socratis from the Theatre of Dionysus to Plato’s
Academy 63; Anna Pavani: The Essential Imitation of Names: On Cratylean
Mimesis 81; Laura Candiotto: Mimesis and Recollection 103; Elenio Cicchini: Der
mimische Charakter. Mimus und Mimesis in der Philosophie Platons 123; Justin
Vlasits: Plato on Poetic and Musical Representation 147; Irmgard Männlein-Robert:
Mit Blick auf das Göttliche oder Mimesis für Philosophen in Politeia und Nomoi
167; Lidia Palumbo: Mimêsis teorizzata e mimêsis realizzata nel Sofista platonico
193; Michele Abbate: Der Sophist als mimêtês tôn ontôn (Sph. 235a1 f.).
Ontologische Implikationen 211; Alexandra V. Alván León: Wolf im Hundepelz:
Mimesis als Täuschung in der Kunst des Sophisten 225; Benedikt Strobel: Bild und
falsche Meinung in Platons Sophistes 249; Francesco Fronterotta: Generation as
μίμησις and κόσμος as μίμημα: Cosmological Model, Productive Function and the
Arrangement of the χώρα in Plato’s Timaeus 275; Antonino Spinelli: Mimoumenoi
tas tou theou periphoras. Die Mimesis des Kosmos als menschliche Aufgabe im
Timaios 291; José Antonio Giménez: Gesetz und Mimesis im Politikos 313; Julia
Pfefferkorn: Plato’s Dancing City: Why is Mimetic Choral Dance so Prominent in
the Laws? 335; Index Locorum 359–376.
176.
Kahn, Charles H. 1988. "Being in Parmenides and Plato." La Parola del Passato no.
43:237-261.
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Reprinted in C. H. Kahn, Essays on Being, New York: Oxford University Press,
2009, pp. 167-191.
"Despite the silence of Aristotle, there can be little doubt of the importance of
Parmenides as an influence on Plato’s thought. If it was the encounter with Socrates
that made Plato a philosopher, it was the poem of Parmenides that made him a
metaphysician. In the first place it was Parmenides’ distinction between Being and
Becoming that provided Plato with the ontological basis for his theory of Forms.
When he decided to submit this theory to searching criticism, he chose as critic no
other than Parmenides himself. And when the time came for Socrates to be replaced
as principal speaker in the dialogues, Plato introduced as his new spokesman a
visitor from Elea. Even in the Timaeus, where the chief speaker is neither Socrates
nor the Eleatic Stranger, the exposition takes as its starting point the Parmenidean
dichotomy.(1) From the Symposium and Phaedo to the Sophist and Timaeus, the
language of Platonic metaphysics is largely the language of Parmenides." (p. 237)
(...)
"My aim here has not been to analyze Plato’s use of to be in the formulation of his
own ontology, but only to demonstrate how faithfully Parmenidean he is in his
progression from an initial, quasi idiomatic use of ἐστι for truth and reality to more
philosophically loaded, ‘ontological’ uses of the verb in which existential and
predicative functions are combined with connotations of truth, stability, and
permanence." (p. 257)
(...)
"In the Sophist veridical being is carefully analyzed as ‘saying of what is that it is
concerning a subject’ (236b), whereas the problematic concept of not-being is
dissolved into distinct negations for falsehood, identity, and predication. A long and
laborious effort of analysis was required to bring to light the confusions hidden in
Parmenides’ argument. But these confusions infect only the negative concept of
what is not. The positive conception of Being emerges unscathed, to dominate the
metaphysical tradition of the West for many centuries to come." (p. 258)
(1) Timaeus 27d5: ‘The first distinction to be made is this: what is the Being that is
forever and has no becoming, and what is that which is always becoming but never
being?’.
177.
———. 2007. "Why is the Sophist a sequel to the Theaetetus?" Phronesis.A Journal
for Ancient Philosophy no. 52:33-57.
Abstract: The Theaetetus and the Sophist both stand in the shadow of the
Parmenides, to which they refer. I propose to interpret these two dialogues as
Plato’s first move in the project of reshaping his metaphysics with the double aim of
avoiding problems raised in the Parmenides and applying his general theory to the
philosophy of nature. The classical doctrine of Forms is subject to revision, but
Plato’s fundamental metaphysics is preserved in the Philebus as well as in the
Timaeus. The most important change is the explicit enlargement of the notion of
Being to include the nature of things that change.
This reshaping of the metaphysics is prepared in the Theaetetus and Sophist by an
analysis of sensory phenomena in the former and, in the latter, a new account of
Forms as a network of mutual connections and exclusions. The division of labor
between the two dialogues is symbolized by the role of Heraclitus in the former and
that of Parmenides in the latter. Theaetetus asks for a discussion of Parmenides as
well, but Socrates will not undertake it. For that we need the visitor from Elea.
Hence the Theaetetus deals with becoming and flux but not with being; that topic is
reserved for Eleatic treatment in the Sophist. But the problems of falsity and NotBeing, formulated in the first dialogue, cannot be resolved without the
considerations of truth and Being, reserved for the later dialogue. That is why there
must be a sequel to the Theaetetus."
178.
———. 2013. Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue: The Return to the Philosophy
of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 3. Being and Not-Being in the Sophist, pp. 94-130.
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"In the Theaetetus Socrates insisted on avoiding the discussion (which Theaetetus
had requested) of Parmenides’ doctrine of Being. As the promised sequel to the
Theaetetus, the Sophist is designed to fill that gap. A significant change in style
suggests that a considerable lapse of time may have occurred between the
composition of these two dialogues.
Nevertheless, the reappearance of Theaetetus as interlocutor in the Sophist is a clear
reminder of continuity in this project.
It was presumably with these Parmenidean issues in view that Plato chose to
replace Socrates as chief speaker with a visitor from Elea. One of Plato’s principal
tasks in this dialogue will be to correct Parmenides’ account of Not-Being. The
choice of a spokesman from Parmenides’ own school will serve to guarantee an
atmosphere of intellectual sympathy for the doctrine to be criticized." (p. 94)
179.
Kalligas, Paul. 2012. "From Being an Image to Being What-Is-Not." In Presocratics
and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of Charles Kahn, edited by Patterson,
Richard, Karasmanis, Vassilis and Hermann, Arnold, 391-409. Las Vegas:
Parmenides Publishing.
"As Cornford has formulated it,(5) “the class of ‘images’ (εἴδωλα) we are
concerned with—semblances—imply two relations between image and original.
The image is more or less like the original, though not wholly like it, not a
reproduction. But it is also conceived as possessing in some sense a lower grade of
reality, as illusory, phantom-like” (author’s emphasis). Thus it is not unusual to find
Plato being accused of abandoning the world of concrete sensible reality in favor of
a nebulous region of intangible presumed “prototypes” of the items encountered by
our everyday experience, of assuming as properly real what—to every sober
minded naturalist—seem to be no more than abstractions from things or features
existing in the world of our common, and commonly shared, experience.
In what follows, I wish to challenge certain aspects of this interpretation of the
analogy of the image and to suggest that Plato did not intend to question the reality
of sensible existence, but only to deny that we can be confident about the truth of
any statements we make in reference to it. In my view, in interpreting the image
analogy we have to take seriously into account the extended analysis Plato offers
with respect to the various kinds of imaging in the Sophist, where a great amount of
energy is given to an ex professo examination of this, at first glance, rather
inconsequential or, at best, marginal topic." (pp. 392-393)
(5) See F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (London: Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trübner, 1935), 199.
180.
Karanasiou, Argyri G. 2016. "The Term symplokē in Symposium 202b1 and in
Sophist 240c1ff, 259d-261c: Heidegger's Interpretation of the Concept of
"Interconnection" in Platonic Thought " In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and
Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs,
Marko J., 113-130. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"The pivotal question raised in this study is, whether Socrates's presentation of Eros
in the Symposium could serve as an allegory of the concept of symploke(2) of
Forms anticipating the exclusive and exhaustive distinction of a thing, its polar
contrary, and its different (the tertium quid or third alternative) as presented in the
relevant discussion of the Sophist (240c1; 259e5f; 260a1-6; d5).(3) Heidegger (GA
19, 572) argues that although Plato has seen the heteron early (in the Symposium),
he only conceived the difference between heteron and enantiosis (mere negation)
later referring to symploke as a logical possibility of something 'being' and 'notbeing' at the same time; existing, even if it is other than itself (GA 19, 431-32; 56975; 580). Relating to this topic in his Lectures on the Sophist Heidegger refers to a
passage (Smp. 202b1) where the idea of otherness (heteron) is probably defined as
signifying not necessarily opposition (enantion, GA 19, 572).4 Both the discovery
of the heteron as a category in the Symposium and the resolution of the problem of
negation through the notion of interconnection (symploke) in the Sophist laid the
foundation of dialectical logic ( cf. Sph. 253d; 259c4ff)." (pp. 113-114)
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(2) The term is rendered either as 'combination', 'dependency' or 'interrelation'. The
verb sympleko means in general 'plait together' and it is usually used with the verb
syndeo which at Rsp. 309b means 'bind together' or 'unite'. Both verbs occur at Sph.
268c5-6 when a reverse recapitulation of the definition (toúnoma) of the sophist is
concisely mentioned (beginning at the end and closing at the opening of the
dialogue).
(3) Cf. Seligman (1974), 18-9.
(4) Patt (1997), 23 7.
References
GA = Heidegger Gesamtausgabe
Patt, Walter. Formen des Anti-Platonismus bei Kant, Nietzsche und Heidegger.
Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1997.
Seligman, Paul. Being and Not-Being: An Introduction to Plato's Sophist.
Dordrecht: Springer, 1974.
181.
Karfík, Filip. 2011. "Pantelôs on and megista genê (Plato, Soph. 242C–259b) " In
Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense,
edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 120-145. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"About the middle of Plato’s Sophist a perplexity (ἀπορία) emerges out of a lengthy
discussion as to how to catch the “tribe” of sophists with a definition. It turns out
that to define a sophist as somebody who has to do with falsehood implies the
existence of not-being.(1)
Such a hypothesis clearly infringes the ban placed on not-being by Parmenides in
his celebrated poem.(2)"
(...)
"The inquiry into this question, which eventually leads to a solution of the question
about not-being, fills out the rest of the central part of the dialogue.7 Both these
questions having been solved, the interlocutors take up the interrupted job of
defining the sophist and bring it to a successful conclusion. The Sophist, unlike the
Theaetetus, thus ends up with a positive answer to the question it has initially
raised, namely: “What is a Sophist?”8 But the way to get there is anything but
straightforward and raises more questions than it solves. Formally, both
subordinated questions, about not-being and about being, receive due answers, the
first one via the second one.
But especially the answer to the question “What does it mean ‘to be’” is itself far
from being clear. Modern interpreters do not agree about its general meaning and
there are several more particular points in Plato’s presentation which are in dispute.
In this paper I would like to enquire once again into these vexed issues in order to
get clearer about the general meaning of Plato’s answer to the question: “What is
being?” (pp. 120-121)
(1) Cf. Plato, Soph. 236d8–237a4.
(2) Cf. ibid., 237a4–b1, line a8–9 = Parmenides, fr. 7 Diels – Kranz
182.
Keane, Niall. 2010. "Interpreting Plato Phenomenologically: Relationality and
Being in Heidegger's Sophist." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
no. 41:170-192.
"... this paper sets out to examine the phenomenological import of Heidegger’s
subsequent interpretation and appropriation of relationality (pros ti) and logos in his
analyses of the megista gene in the Sophist. This paper addresses some of the more
philosophically salient points of Heidegger’s ‘phenomenological interpretation’ and
addresses what were, according to him, both the philosophical merits and
limitations of Plato’s ‘late ontology’. To this end, I will attempt to explicate the
phenomenological issues that inevitably remained unthematized in Plato’s Sophist.
In this respect, I shall largely focus on Heidegger’s early interpretation of Plato’s
analysis of ‘movedness’ (kinesis), ‘otherness’ (heterotes) and ‘relationality’ (pros
ti); each of which will then be considered with respect to the role of the logos.
The ancillary aim of this article will be to disentangle these specific issues from the
perspective of the limits and ground of the pros ti and it will subsequently examine
how Heidegger’s early reading of ‘relational movedness’ in the Sophist inspired his
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later Being and Time analysis of the disclosive negativity of Dasein’s “Being-inthe-world” (In-der-Welt-sein). By way of conclusion, I argue, against what I
consider to be a renewed case of ‘Platonic apologetics’, that Heidegger’s reading of
Plato is best understood when approached from a purely ‘phenomenological
perspective’. I contend that it is only by approaching Heidegger’s ‘deconstructive’
interpretation of Plato’s highest kinds from the standpoint of his nascent existentialontology of Dasein, that one can both meaningfully defend and contextualise his
interpretation of the Sophist against the above reproach. In contrast to what I have
called a ‘Platonic apologetics’, I would like to argue that Heidegger’s compelling
interpretation of the Sophist offers us an unconventional (yet nonetheless valid) way
of responding to Plato’s thought, a response which is thoroughly evinced in the
1924/25 interpretation which I shall now pursue." (p. 170)
183.
Kerferd, George B. 1954. "Plato's Noble Art of Sophistry (Sophist 226a-231b)."
The Classical Quarterly no. 4:84-90.
"Plato's Sophist begins with an attempt to arrive by division at a definition of a
Sophist. In the course of the attempt six different descriptions are discussed and the
results summarized at 231 c-e. A seventh and final account may be said to occupy
the whole of the rest of the dialogue, including the long digression on negative
statements. The first five divisions characterize with a considerable amount of satire
different types of sophist, (1) or more probably different aspects of the sophistic art.
(2) The sixth division (226 a-231 b) is very different. To quote Cornford's words,
'satire is dropped. The tone is serious and sympathetic, towards the close it becomes
eloquent.' (3)
(...)
"It is the purpose of this paper to argue that the natural meaning of the passage is
the right one the persons referred to are sophists and Plato was aware that one
aspect of their activities was not only extremely valuable but was a necessary
preliminary to his own philosophy." (p. 84)
(...)
"There is thus ample evidence of the practice by sophists of a method which could
be described in the terms which Plato uses in the Sixth Definition, a method which
if used in the right way could prepare the ground for a true understanding of reality
based on the Forms. It is in this sense that Plato could speak of 'the art of sophistry
which is of noble lineage'." (p. 90)
(1) Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 173.
(2) Taylor, Plato, the Man and His Work, 379. There is nothing to support Jackson's
view (Journal of Philosophy, XIV (1885), 176-82) that Plato is describing
successive stages in the history of the sophistic movement. Soph. 232 a shows that
Plato held there was a single common element underlying the name 'sophist' and it
is for this that he is searching.
(3) Op. cit. 177.
184.
Ketchum, Richard J. 1978. "Participation and Predication in the Sophist 251-260."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 23:42-62.
"While a great deal of progress has been made in recent years in bringing to light
the philosophical sense of the Sophist one problem, or cluster of problems, has
resisted analysis.(1) The problem is that Plato seems to use a particular form of
sentence ambiguously; the fact that he does so seems to reveal a fundamental
confusion on Plato's part."
(...)
"Now it is argued that Plato uses sentences of the form "the F (is) ... sometimes to
express a Form-predication and sometimes to say something about the nature of the
F or perhaps about the nature of particular F 's. The fact Plato vacillates between
these two types of predication not only obscures whatever philosophical point he
may be making but also shows that Plato was confused about the nature of Forms.
I think, however, that there is a plausible reading of the Sophist which shows Plato
to be in no way confused as to the meaning of such sentences.
None of the first-order sentences of the Sophist, I will argue, are Form predications.
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After arguing that the text forces this conclusion on us (Part I), I will try to make
the conclusion plausible (Part II) by describing a type of predication, different from
Form-predication, in terms of which all of the first-order sentences of the Sophist
can be consistently understood. A consequence of my interpretation is the rather
surprising thesis that nowhere in the Sophist with the exception of those passages in
which the friends of the Forms are discussed, does Plato mention the Forms of the
middle dialogues. I will conclude (Part III) by explaining how I think those
passages which seem to mention Forms are to be understood." (p. 42-43)
(1) The problem has been discussed by R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2nd
Edition (Oxford, 1953), 250-264; I. M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's
Doctrine: II, Plato on Knowledge and Reality (London, 1963), 401-410; M. Frede,
"'Pradikationu nd Existenzaussage," Hypomnemata, Heft 18, (1967) 9-99; and G.
Vlastos, "On Ambiguity in the Sophist" in Platonic Studies, (Princeton, 1973), 270322, among others, while it is alluded to by G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being" in
Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, G. Vlastos, ed., (Garden City, 1971), 233,
note 20.
185.
Keyt, David. 1969. "Plato's Paradox that the Immutable is Unknowable." The
Philosophical Quarterly no. 19:1-14.
"One of the great questions that Plato considers in the Sophist is that of the number
and nature of real things (242C5-6). The protagonist of the dialogue, an Eleatic
stranger, raises problems for both the pluralist (243D6-244B5) and the monist
(244B6-246E5) without resolving them and then turns to the battle of gods and
giants, the battle between those who hold that "body and being are the same"
(246B1) and those who hold that "true being is certain intelligible and bodiless
Forms" (246B7-8). What the one holds is the logical contrary, not the contradictory,
of what the other holds; so it is possible that they are both wrong. This seems in fact
to be the Eleatic's conclusion (249C10-D4), although by the time he gets to the
friends of the Forms the property under examination has shifted from corporeality
to mutability. The Eleatic stranger presents the friends of the Forms with an
interesting paradox (248D1-E5). This is my subject. The friends of the Forms hold
that real being " is always invariable and constant " (248A11-12). But being is
known (248D2). And on the hypothesis that to know is to act on something, that
which is known is acted upon (248D10-E1). Further, to be acted upon is to be
changed (248E3-4). Therefore, since being is known, it is changed (248E3-4). But
this conclusion contradicts their original contention." (p. 1)
(...)
"My conclusions are that he is not deeply committed to the proposition that Forms
undergo change, but that he ought to be, and that he is deeply committed to the
proposition that Forms are completely changeless, but for insufficient reasons. A
Platonist really ought to hold that Forms are changeless in some respects but not in
others. In what respects? This is my third question. Aristotle, in commenting on
Plato's theory of Forms, provides a basis for answering it." (p. 2)
186.
———. 1973. "Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263b." In Exegesis and Argument. Studies
in Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos, edited by Lee, Edward N.,
Mourelatos, Alexander and Rorty, Richard, 285-305. Assen: Van Gorcum.
187.
Klein, Jacon. 1977. Plato's Trilogy: Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
"There can be no doubt that the Platonic dialogues entitled Theaetetus, The Sophist,
and The Statesman belong together --- in that order and are meant to be a "trilogy,"
regardless of when they were written. It is important to note that these three
conversations are supposed to take place not during three days but two, shortly
before the trial and the conviction of Socrates. (3) The conversation in the
Theaetetus is followed on the next day by two conversations, by that in the Sophist
and that in the Statesman. There is almost certainly no pause between the latter two.
(4)" (p. 3)
(...)
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"Independently of the time sequence within the dialogues, something is dealt with
in the Sophist which happens to be the fundamental premise in the Theaetetus,
namely, that the roots, the ultimate sources of everything, the "ruling beginnings"
(the αρχαί), arc these two: the 'Same' and the 'Other'. We shall, therefore, begin
witl1 the Sophist, continue with the Theaetetus, and end with the Statesman.
How shall we convey what is either said or not said explicitly but only implied in
the dialogues? We shall watch the text carefully, always remaining aware of the
playfulness --- the sister of seriousness which persists in the dialogues and
determines the way they proceed. We shall watch how the spoken words produce
the dramatic content presented to us. We shall participate in the discussions: the
paraphrase of the text of the dialogues will be interwoven with what occurs in us as
listeners." (p. 5)
(3) Theaet. 210d 1-3.
(4) Cf. Diès, Platon: Oeuvres complètes, Vol. 8, pt. 3, Le Sophiste. Paris, 1963.
188.
Kohnke, Friedrich Wilhelm. 1957. "Plato's Conception of τὸ οὐϰ ὄντως οὐϰ ὄν."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 2:32.40.
"In the neo-Platonic philosophy of the fifth century A.D. the hypostases of being
are found in connection with a four-level scale of being and non-being." (p. 32)
(...)
"Plato seems to have formulated the concept of οὐϰ ὄντως οὐϰ ὄν for the first time
in the Sophistes." (p. 38)
(...)
"We are now in a position to recognise its roots: The neo-Platonists derived a
terminology for their fourfold system of being from Plato's Parmenides, the
dialogue which they honoured as the revelation of metaphysical truth, and
combined this with their system of hypostases of the cosmos." (p. 40)
189.
Kostman, James. 1973. "False Logos and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist." In Patterns
in Plato's Thought. Papers Arising Out of the 1971 West Coast Greek Philosophy
Conference, edited by Moravcsik, Julius, 192-212. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"In the Sophist, Plato argues that false statements are possible, defending this
common-sense view against the claims of a notorious sophistic puzzle: if there are
false λόγοι, according to the puzzle, then not-Being is (237a3-4); but, as
Parmenides had testified, what is-not cannot be (237a4-b2).
After introducing this puzzle, Plato goes on to magnify the difficulties it raises
(237b7-239c3), and he asserts that, in order to refute Parmenides, we must show
both that what is-not is and that what is is-not (239c4-242b5). Plato then takes up
several traditional theories about Being (242b6-251a4), and finds that this subject
too is full of perplexity. So he attempts to resolve the whole cluster of problems he
has raised, starting with the question of how one and the same thing can be called
by many names (251a5-c7). This leads to the topic of the communion of Kinds
(251c7-257aI2). But, as we shall see, it is only at 257b1 that Plato begins
his direct reply to the original sophistic puzzle." (p. 192)
190.
———. 1989. "The Ambiguity of 'Partaking' in Plato's Sophist." Journal of The
History of Philosophy no. 27:343-363.
"In the central section of the Sophist (25o-259), as Gregory Vlastos has shown,(1)
statements about Forms or Kinds are subject to a certain structural ambiguity: 'The
F is G' may be either an 'ordinary' or a 'Pauline' predication, in Vlastos'
terminology; that is, it may either attribute being G to the F itself or assert that
necessarily whatever is F is G. For example, 'Being is at rest' may assert either that
the Form Being itself is at rest, in which case it is an ordinary predication, or that
necessarily whatever is is at rest, in which case it is a Pauline predication." A few
scholars have quibbled with Vlastos' interpretations of some of the passages on
which he bases the claim that the ambiguity exists, but I find it surprising that, in
the decade and a half since its publication, Vlastos' central thesis---that Plato was
"utterly unaware" of the ambiguity--has never been directly challenged. After
summarizing the evidence for the existence of the ambiguity in section 1 of this
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paper, I shall show in section 2 that the argument by which Vlastos concludes that
there is "positive evidence" for his thesis is fundamentally incoherent.
In the rest of this paper, I offer an argument, based on my analysis of two important
passages (255c-e and 25oa-e) and the relationship between them, that there is
additional circumstantial evidence that Plato was not only aware of the ambiguity
but allowed it to play a significant, though indirect, role in the overall argument of
Soph. 250-259." (p. 343)
(1) Gregory Vlastos, "An Ambiguity in the Sophist," in his Platonic Studies, 270322. This article will be referred to as 'AS'; all references to it and other papers in
Platonic Studies are to the first edition.
191.
Lacey, Alan Robert. 1959. "Plato's Sophist and the Forms." The Classical Quarterly
no. 9:43-52.
"The Sophist is on the face of it concerned to charge the sophist with being a mere
maker of images, and to defend this charge by showing that images, though they
'are not' what they are images of, yet in some sense 'are'. This leads to the analysis
of Not-being as being other than, but Plato makes it quite clear that the general
problem concerns Being as much as Not-being (250 e); the difficulty is that Being
is neither Rest nor Motion, and so can neither rest nor move of its own nature, but
surely it must do one of these (250 c, d). In other words Being is in danger of not
being able to have attributes except by being identical with them. The ensuing
discussion seems to point out that this is not so, and that Forms, like other things,
do have some attributes and not others, without being identical with them.
But such an interpretation will only hold if the Megista Gene are in fact all Forms.
This is denied by Dr. A. L. Peck, who argues (Classical Quarterly. 1952; cf. 1953,
1954) (2) that the whole point of the discussion is to show that Being, Not-being,
Same, and Other are not Forms, but merely empty names, and so φάντασματα
rather than the εἰκώνες which are the names of real things; the sophist raises
paradoxes by relying on linguistic habits (Dr. Peck (S p. 52) points to the frequency
of verbs of saying in the Sophist) to pervert the theory of Forms into positing
absurd Forms." (p. 43)
192.
Lanigan, Richard L. 1982. "Semiotic Phenomenology in Plato's Sophist." Semiotica
no. 41:221-246.
Reprinted in: John Deely (ed.), Frontiers in Semiotics, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press 1986, pp. 199-216.
"My essay attempts to explicate the main features of the Platonic argument in order
to establish that the model of discourse analysis is semiotic in nature and
phenomenological in function. I am using the term model in its technical theory
construction sense as an 'exemplar' (combined 'paradigm' and 'prototype') in a
theory."
(...)
"My essay does not represent an effort to claim that Plato is either a semiologist or a
phenomenologist. Rather, I argue that the dialogue Sophist offers a long neglected
textual model of binary analogue thinking that is foundational to many of the issues
current in the study of the philosophy of communication where semiology and
phenomenology intersect in the problematic of analysis. Indeed, many of the basic
elements in the Platonic investigation are being unnecessarily reinvented by
contemporary theorists. By addressing the fundamental problem of the Being of
Not-Being, Plato provides a semiotic phenomenology of discourse in which he
demonstrates the acceptability of analytic proofs as the concrete analysis of
empirical communication acts. Thus, the dialogue Sophist represents a critical, but
often ignored, theoretical foundation for an empirical examination of the sign
relationship between the ontology of the speaking subject and the epistemology of
the discourse system." (pp. 221-222, note omitted)
193.
Larsen, Jens Kristian. 2007. "The Soul of Sophistry: Plato’s “Sophist” 226a9–231b9
revisited." Filosofiske Studier no. 102:1-14.
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"It is a widespread opinion that the first part of the Sophist (216a – 237b) is
primarily concerned with the problem of finding an adequate definition of the
sophist. Within this passage six different definitions
are given, each unsatisfactory, until a seventh description leads to the main
problems of the dialogue, namely the questions concerning non-being, being, the
intertwining of forms and the problem concerning false statements. Whereas the
first five definitions are relatively unproblematic, the sixth is known to be
troublesome – it has a peculiar resemblance to the Socrates-figure of the elenctic
dialogues.
In the following I shall argue that the so-called sixth definition is not a definition of
the sophist at all, but a methodological reflection which plays a central role in the
overall composition of the dialogue. I shall further argue that this methodological
reflection shows that Plato did not change his basic notion of philosophy in the late
dialogues towards a more ‘technical’ concept, as is often maintained, but in a
fundamental way stayed true to the Socratic, ‘existential’ impulse." (p. 1)
194.
———. 2013. "The Virtue of Power." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and
Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:306-317.
Abstract: "The “battle” between corporealists and idealists described in Plato’s
Sophist 245e6–249d5 is of significance for understanding the philosophical
function of the dramatic exchange between the Eleatic guest and Theaetetus, the
dialogue’s main interlocutors.
Various features of this exchange indicate that the Eleatic guest introduces and
discusses the dispute between corporealists and idealists in order to educate
Theaetetus in ontological matters. By reading the discussion between Theaetetus
and the Eleatic guest in the light of these features, one comes to see that the primary
audience for the proposal advanced by the Eleatic guest in this passage, namely that
being is power, is not any of the participants in the “battle,” as has been commonly
assumed, but Theaetetus himself—a fact to bear in mind in any viable interpretation
of the passage."
195.
———. 2016. "Plato and Heidegger on Sophistry and Philosophy." In Sophistes:
Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De
Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 27-60. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge
Scholars Publishing.
"The present chapter investigates Heidegger's early understanding of Platonic
dialectic in its contrast to sophistry as this comes to expression in his Lectures on
Plato's Sophist." (p. 27)
(...)
"To investigate Heidegger's early understanding of sophistry is thus a challenging
task, since this understanding cannot be isolated from his broader interpretation of
Plato's understanding of philosophy or from his own understanding of philosophy,
developed in discussion with the philosophical tradition. Moreover, as Heidegger's
interpretation of Plato is primarily based on a reading of the Sophist, a text that may
not be typical of Plato, we need to look at the Sophist itself if we wish to evaluate
Heidegger's engagement with Plato. Accordingly, the chapter will have two main
parts. The first part will focus on Plato's Sophist, in particular on the connection
between arete, virtue, and the inquiry into sophistry in the dialogue. Here a now
common reading of the Sophist will be examined critically. The second part will
focus on Heidegger's interpretation of philosophy and sophistry in the light of the
Sophist and will ask what role, if any, arete plays in this interpretation." (pp. 28-29)
196.
———. 2019. "Eleaticism and Socratic Dialectic: On Ontology, Philosophical
Inquiry, and Estimations of Worth in Plato’s Parmenides, Sophist and Statesman."
Etudes platoniciennes no. 15:1-17.
Abstract: "The Parmenides poses the question for what entities there are Forms, and
the criticism of Forms it contains is commonly supposed to document an
ontological reorientation in Plato. According to this reading, Forms no longer
express the excellence of a given entity and a Socratic, ethical perspective on life,
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but come to resemble concepts, or what concepts designate, and are meant to
explain nature as a whole. Plato’s conception of dialectic, it is further suggested,
consequently changes into a value-neutral method directed at tracing the
interrelation of such Forms, an outlook supposedly documented in certain passages
on method from the Sophist and the Statesman as well.
The article urges that this reading is untenable. For in the Parmenides the question
for what entities one should posit Forms is left open, and the passages on method
from the Sophist and Statesman neither encourage a non-normative ontology nor a
value-neutral method of inquiry. What the three dialogues encourage us to do is
rather to set common opinions about the relative worth and value of things aside
when conducting ontological inquiries; and this attitude, the article concludes,
demonstrates a close kinship, rather than a significant difference, between Plato’s
Socrates and his Eleatic philosophers."
197.
———. 2020. "Differentiating Philosopher from Statesman according to Work and
Worth." Polis. The Journal for Amcient Greek and Roman Political Thought no.
37:550-566.
Abstract: "Plato’s Sophist and Statesman stand out from many other Platonic
dialogues by at least two features. First, they do not raise a ti esti question about a
single virtue or feature of something, but raise the questions what sophist,
statesman, and philosopher are, how they differ from each other, and what worth
each should be accorded. Second, a visitor from Elea, rather than Socrates, seeks to
addressed these questions and does so by employing what is commonly referred to
as the method of collection and division. Some scholars have argued that this socalled method is value neutral and therefore unable to address the question how
philosophy differs from sophistry and statesmanship according to worth. This
article contends that the procedures of collection and division does not preclude the
visitor from taking considerations of worth into account, but rather helps establish
an objective basis for settling the main questions of the dialogue."
198.
Lee, Edward N. 1966. "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist." The
Philosophical Review no. 81:267-304.
"On pages 257c-258c of the Sophist, Plato introduces a notion which he calls the
"Parts of the nature of Otherness." He then writes explicitly - in fact, he writes it
twice - that that Part of Otherness, and not merely Otherness by itself, defines the
genuine non-Being that is needed to conclude his inquiry and to trap the Sophist.(2)
But why does he say so? Just what difference is there between the not-Being
explicated by means of the Parts of Otherness and the not-Being explicated through
Otherness by itself? I am convinced that none of the existing interpretations of the
Parts doctrine adequately answer that question or accurately analyze Plato's own
meaning. My aim will be to do both. To begin (I), we will work through the details
of the difficult passage in which Plato spells out his doctrine of the Parts of
Otherness; then we shall try to clarify the philosophical role that the doctrine playsfirst (II) in Plato's analysis of negation (particularly his account of the sense of
negative predication statements), and then (III), though more briefly, in connection
with one of the wider metaphysical issues raised in the Sophist." (p. 267)
(...)
"If the account in Sections I and II above is sound, then the logical force of Plato's
theories in the Sophist proves to be much greater than the commentators have
appreciated. Not only can he analyze the sense of negative identity statements, but
he can analyze the sense of negative predication statements as well. To an extent
much greater than had earlier been recognized, he did succeed in dealing with the
problem of negation. Yet we have noted that his aims in the Sophist were not
narrowly logical or "analytical" in nature, and we need also to ask what other
substantive issues he may have hoped to illuminate by means of these analytic
achievements." (p. 299)
199.
Lee, SangWon. 2016. "The Dynamic Association of Being and Non-Being:
Heidegger’s Thoughts on Plato’s Sophist Beyond Platonism." Human Studies no.
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39:385-403.
Abstract: "This article examines Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato’s Sophist,
focusing on his attempts to grasp Plato’s original thinking of being and non-being.
Some contemporary thinkers and commentators argue that Heidegger’s view of
Plato is simply based on his criticism against the traditional metaphysics of
Platonism and its language. But a close reading of his lecture on the Sophist reveals
that his view of Plato is grounded in Plato’s questioning struggle with the
ambiguous nature of human speech or language (logos). For Heidegger, Plato’s way
of philosophizing is deeper than the metaphysical understanding of Platonism
which sees only fixed ideas of being. In the Sophist, dialectical thinking of Plato
constantly confronts the questionable force of the logos which betrays the natural
possibility of non-being based on the tension between movement and rest. Thus,
from Plato’s original insight Heidegger uncovers the dynamic association
(koinōnia) of being and non-being as a natural ground of everyday living with
others. However, although Heidegger’s understanding of the Sophist powerfully
demonstrates the lively possibility (dunamis) of being beyond the customary
perspective of Platonic metaphysics, his interpretation fails to further disclose
Plato’s political question of being emerging in the Sophist, which seeks the true
associative ground of human beings."
200.
Leigh, Fiona. 2008. "The Copula and Semantic Continuity in Plato's Sophist."
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 34:105-121.
"Lesley Brown first made a radical claim about uses of the Greek verb ‘to be’
(einai) in Plato’s Sophist some twenty years ago (1986).(1)
(...)
"In brief, Brown’s innovation is as follows: The verb ‘to be’ in Greek, unlike its
counterpart in modern English, permits a complete and an incomplete use.
Sometimes it does not take a complement, though it could, and at other times
context demands a complement (whether elided or not). In the former case, the verb
exhibits what Brown calls a ‘C2’ complete use, and in the second, an incomplete
use. Brown’s view is that the verb is not being used merely homonymously in these
cases, but, like ‘to teach’ in English, exhibits a certain continuity of meaning across
uses. The mistake has been to take complete uses of estin as C1 complete uses, i.e.
as uses that will not bear further completion.
The first critical discussion (to my knowledge) of Brown’s reading has recently
appeared in print.(6) In it John Malcolm advances several arguments against
Brown’s reading. I shall argue, however, that Malcolm’s textual considerations are
less than decisive. More significantly, I shall suggest that his conceptual arguments
miss their mark in two ways: one objection relies on a less than charitable reading
of Brown, while another involves the questionable attribution of an assumption to
the author of the Sophist. But despite my defence of Brown’s view, I do not endorse
it. On the contrary, I hope to show that Brown’s central thesis—that there is a
semantic continuity between complete and incomplete uses of einai—lacks the
textual support it requires from the Sophist. Moreover, a central argument of that
dialogue tells against it. (pp. 105-106)
(...)
"I have argued that Malcolm’s arguments against Brown’s reading of einai in the
Sophist are ultimately unconvincing. None the less, I hope to have shown that
Brown’s reading receives insufficient support from the relevant passages, and is
even rendered doubtful by a central argument of that work. If this is right, the
contention that einai has a C2 complete use in the Sophist—a use referred to in the
kath’ hauta/pros alla distinction at 255 c 14—will turn out to be at best improbable,
and at worst defeated." (p. 120)
(1) L. Brown, ‘Being in the Sophist: A Syntactical Enquiry’ [‘Being’], Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 4 (1986), 49–70; repr. with revisions in G. Fine
(ed.), Plato 1:Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford, 1999), 455–78 (all
references are to the later publication).
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(6) J. Malcolm, ‘Some Cautionary Remarks on the “is”/“teaches” Analogy’
[‘Remarks’], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 31 (2006), 281–96.
201.
———. 2009. "Plato on Art, Perspective, and Beauty in the Sophist." Literature &
Aesthetics no. 19:183-214.
"With only a few exceptions, readers of Plato’s later dialogue, the Sophist, have not
usually associated it with Platonic aesthetics. But this is to overlook two important
features of the dialogue. First, the unfavourable contrast, built up throughout the
dialogue, between the practice of sophistry – likened to the practice of the mimetic
arts (235c-236e)–and the practice of philosophy. Only the latter, the Stranger
implies, affords the possibility of what we might call an aesthetic experience, i. e.,
the experience of beauty in the soul, while the former results in ugliness (230d-e).
Second, it overlooks the argument at 235d-236c, offered by the main speaker in the
dialogue, the Eleatic Stranger, for the claim that certain artworks, such as
monuments and large paintings, are necessarily illusory."
(...)
"I mentioned above that the conception of a beautiful soul figures in the Stranger’s
remarks on the benefits of knowledge, as contrasted with the deleterious effects of
submitting oneself to the teaching of sophists.
However, the conception of beauty at work here, and its relation to truth and
knowledge, is not argued for or defended in our dialogue, but instead appears to be
presupposed: there is nothing in the Sophist that counts as an advance in Plato’s
thought on the conception of beauty. Nonetheless, as a preliminary, I want first to
review this conception in the corpus, and its connection to truth, knowledge, and
virtue, in order to provide a broader context within which to situate the importance
accorded to a beautiful soul in the Sophist. We will see that the experience of
beauty generally, and coming to have a beautiful soul in particular, is desirable
because it has moral value. We will also see, however, that aesthetic value is not
thereby reduced to moral value, since it will emerge that the soul’s beauty is for
Plato a constituent of the good life, of eudaimonia, and not simply a means towards
that end." (pp. 183-184, notes omitted)
202.
———. 2010. "Being and Power in Plato's Sophist." Apeiron no. 43:63-85.
"What should we make of the passage in the Sophist at 247d-e, in which the Eleatic
Stranger declares that being is whatever has the power (dunamis) to act or be
affected, even if only once, in the smallest way? Does this proposal about being —
the 'dunamis proposal' (2) — express the view of the Stranger's interlocutors, the
giants, or is the Stranger speaking in his own voice and so representing Plato's
view? (3) If the latter, how could the proposal be seen to survive the encounter with
the 'friends of the Forms', and be applicable to immutable Forms? Is the
employment of 'horos' and 'horizein' at 247e3 meant to indicate that a mere mark of
being is offered in the proposal, or the very definition of being? How these
questions are answered determines what role, if any, one takes the dunamis proposal
about being to play in the later constructive part of the dialogue, in which the Form,
Being, takes centre stage."
(...)
"I shall argue that in the Sophist Plato has the Stranger forge the definition — that
whatever has the power to act or be affected is a being — by distinguishing
relations of causation (or poiesis) from relations of change." (p. 63-64)
(2) L. Brown, 'Innovation and Continuity: The Battle of Gods and Giants', In J.
Gentzler, ed., Method in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon 1998), 181-207, at
184ff.
(3) Although it has been recently challenged, the orthodox position, that provided
one proceeds with care one can read off Plato's position — however partial and
provisionary — from the views expressed by the main character of a dialogue,
remains, and I shall assume it here. (For the case pro, see D. Sedley, Plato's
Cratylus, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003), 1-2; M. Frede, "The
Literary Form of the Sophist', In M. L. Gill and M. M. McCabe, eds., Form and
Argument in Late Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), 135-151. 142,150-
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1. For the case contra, see e.g., R. Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato's
Dialogues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), 18-21.)
203.
———. 2012. "Modes of Being at Sophist 255c-e." Phronesis.A Journal for
Ancient Philosophy no. 57:1-28.
Abstract: "I argue for a new interpretation of the argument for the non-identity of
Being and Difference at Sophist 255c-e, which turns on a distinction between
modes of being a property. Though indebted to Frede [Prädikation und
Existenzaussage] (1967), the distinction differs from his in an important respect:
What distinguishes the modes is not the subject’s relation to itself or to something
numerically distinct, but whether it constitutes or conforms to the specification of
some property. Thus my view, but not his, allows self-participation for Forms.
Against Frede and the more traditional interpretation, I maintain that the distinction
is not introduced by way of the pros alla/kath’ hauta distinction, or by way of uses
or senses of the verb ‘to be’, but is established prior to the argument and is deployed
in its frame. Moreover, since I read the argument’s scope as restricted to properties
in what I shall call the attribute mode, my interpretation can explain, as its rivals
cannot, why the criterion of difference at 255d6-7 does not apply to the Form,
Difference, itself."
204.
———. 2012. "Restless Forms and Changeless Causes." Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society no. 112.
Abstract: "It is widely held that in Plato's Sophist, Forms rest or change or both.
The received opinion is, however, false-or so I will argue. There is no direct support
for it in the text and several passages tell against it. I will further argue that,
contrary to the view of some scholars, Plato did not in this dialogue advocate a kind
of change recognizable as 'Cambridge change', as applicable to his Forms. The
reason that Forms neither change nor rest is that they are purely intelligible entities,
not susceptible to changing or being at rest. Since Plato continues in the Sophist to
treat Forms as causes, it follows that Forms are changeless causes. I ask what
conception of cause might allow for this view, and reject the suggestion that Plato
was some kind of proto-dispositionalist about causation. Instead I suggest that he
understood causation to incorporate a notion of structuring, such that Forms can be
seen to structure their participants and so cause them to possess the attributes they
possess."
205.
Lentz, William. 1997. "The Problem of Motion in the Sophist." Apeiron no. 30:89108.
"In the Sophist, Plato seems to introduce κίνησις, motion or change, into the
unchanging and eternal realm of being. On the face of it, this looks like an outright
contradiction; i.e., motion or change is introduced into a realm of unchanging and
perfect actualities. The introduction of motion occurs in two ways: Plato suggests
that when the soul knows its object it affects that object (248e2-4), and he claims
that motion and rest define reality (249d3-4). Neither of these claims is very clear;
both require some interpretative work.
After a brief examination of previous attempts to explain Plato's introduction of
motion into being, I suggest that a solution to these problems begins with Plato's
claim that being is defined by power. The concept of power is then filled out by
reference to the genera of motion, rest, sameness, and difference. I oppose the
tendency in the literature to reject motion and rest as essential genera. Instead I
argue that these two genera are required in order for there to be relations in being —
relations that are manifest between forms but do not affect the nature of the forms
themselves. I also reject the tendency to explain the interweaving of forms as a
function of discourse. Instead I argue that the interweaving of forms is referred to a
metaphysical state that in turn makes knowledge and discourse possible." (p. 89)
206.
Lewis, Frank A. 1976. "Did Plato Discover the "Estin" of Identity?" California
Studies in Classical Antiquity no. 8:113-143.
Summary: "(I) The notion of an is of identity in English. Some passages from Plato
suggesting the existence of the comparable notion of a special estin of identity in
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Greek. (II) What in particular would lead Plato to recognize such a special sense of
estin? Forms, participation, and predication. In the account of ordinary singular
predications, a predicate 'Y' is true of a subject X just in case X participates in the
form the Y associated with. (III) Self-participation. If nothing can participate in
itself, then for any forms X and Y, X participates in Y and so is Y only if X is not Y.
Even if self-participation is allowed, still in the majority of cases a subject is not
what it participates in. The difficulty for all theories of predication which wish to
explain how a thing can be something which it also is not. (IV) The is of identity reexamined. Some fallacies which might support the notion, and some arguments
against it. (V) Sophist 255e11-256d10. Plato does not explicitly recognize an estin
of identity. Four competing, "equally best" accounts of the grammatical theory he
may implicitly be invoking: (i) the estin of identity; (ii) relational terms; (iii) the
definite article; (iv) the not of nonidentity. (VI) Conclusion. The notion of a special
estin of identity has little basis in Plato's text."
207.
———. 1976. "Plato on "Not"." California Studies in Classical Antiquity no. 9:89115.
"Plato's account of not being can be seen as a treatment of issues connected with the
analysis of negation. It is generally agreed that his account covers at least one set of
negative assertions. We are explicitly told how to analyze such sentences as
"Motion is not rest," "Motion is not the same," which the context shows are
intended to assert the nonidentity of motion and assorted other forms. For Plato,
such assertions form a special class of sentences, which he analyzes by reference to
the form "otherness." What is less clear is whether Plato successfully distinguishes
negative sentences of this sort from negative sentences for which, on his terms, a
different pattern of analysis is appropriate: "Socrates is not beautiful," "Helen is not
wise." I shall call these sentences of negative predication proper ("NP" hereafter).
(1) I argue that Plato does recognize this second sort of sentence, and that he does in
the Sophist offer a theory to say how such sentences get their meaning. At the same
time, his theory is in many respects unlike the kind of theory we should demand for
the task at hand. These differences may help explain why the details of his account
have so often seemed so elusive.
I offer first (I) a general account of the context within which Plato's treatment of
negation takes place. I then turn (II) to a detailed examination of the passage at 25
7b3-c3, where I shall argue that we find our best evidence for what Plato regards as
the chief desiderata in an account of NP. I end (III) with some brief comments on
the aims and limits of Plato's inquiry." (pp. 89-90)
(1) By "NP," accordingly, I mean to confine my attention to simple, singular,
negative sentences other than sentences that are denials of identity. I follow Plato in
ignoring the use of negation in combination with general sentences.
208.
Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio, and Monserrat-Molas, Josep, eds.
2011. Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and Statesman.
Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Abstract: "The three dialogues, which are the object of the collected papers
included in this volume, are a unicum in the Platonic corpus. No other existing
trilogy is connected dramatically so clearly as they are.
From the formal point of view, in these texts Plato shows his brilliant literary ability
in all its facets in order to deploy all the grades of the philosophical inquiry, always
related to education: maieutikos elenchus, dialectical dihairesis and everything
entangled with allegory and myth. In the first dialogue of the trilogy Socrates
searches in Theatetus' soul for the definition of episteme, not knowledge in general,
but the specific wisdom proper of the true philosophers. In the following Sophist
and Statesman, on the other hand, a new character, the guest from Elea, offers the
science they had looked for as a gift, the diairesis. The exercises in it serve also for
distinguishing the true philosopher-statesman from his fake: the sophist and all the
historical politicians acting in the scene. Actually these dialogues develop the
subject of the excurse, which stands at the centre of the Theaetetus (172c3-177c5):
the opposition between true and false philosopher."
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Essays on the Sophist:
Milena Bontempi: Opinione e legge: l’anima e la città nella trilogia, Teeteto,
Sofista, Politico, pp. 47-58; Elisabetta Cattanei: Arithmos nel Teeteto, nel Sofista et
nel Politico di Platone, pp. 59-71; Francesco Fronterotta: Dialettica et diaíresis nel
Sofista platonico, pp.151-167; Beatriz Bossi: ¿Por qué Platón no refuta Parménides
en el Sofista?, pp. 180-192; Noburu Notomi: Where is the Philosopher? A single
project of the Sophist and the Statesman, pp. 216-236.
209.
Lloyd, A. C. 1953. "Falsehood and Significance According to Plato." In
Proceedings of the XIth International Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 12, 68-70.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
210.
Losev, Alexandre. 2020. "Plato's Quincunxes." Philosophia: E-Journal for
Philosophy and Culture no. 26:200-209.
Abstract. The Five Greatest Kinds discussed in Plato‘s Sophist are taken to be just
one instance of a fivefold structure found in various related texts. Contemporary
linguistic theories are a source for ideas about its functioning."
211.
Lott, Micah. 2012. "Ignorance, Shame and Love of Truth: Diagnosing the Sophist’s
Error in Plato’s Sophist." Phoenix no. 66:36-56.
"In the past several decades, philosophers have shown substantial interest in Plato’s
dialogue the Sophist. Much of this interest has focused on the sections of the
dialogue which provide an account of being and not-being, and of true and false
speech. The sixth definition of the sophist, however, which is developed at 226b–
231e, has received less attention." (p. 36, note omitted)
(...)
"I begin with a brief overview of the dialogue and a summary of the argument
leading to the sixth definition. I then address some of the ambiguities in that
argument and spell out some of the argument’s implications, paying particular
attention to the notions of ignorance and shame. I then show how ideas from the
sixth definition illuminate the final definition of the sophist. Although my focus in
this paper is the Sophist, in my discussion of the sophist’s condition I also touch on
some relevant cases of learning and shame from other Platonic dialogues, including
the Apology, Charmides, and the Republic. Two key assumptions that affect my
interpretation but which remain mostly unargued for are: 1) that the sixth definition
describes some kind of expertise, even if it does not accurately describe the sophist,
and 2) that the final definition of the sophist is, at least within the context of the
dialogue, an adequate definition of the sophist." (p. 37)
212.
Luce, J. V. 1969. "Plato on Truth and Falsity in Names." The Classical Quarterly
no. 19:222-232.
"Further discussion of the logical points at issue between Lorenz-Mittelstrass [*]
and Robinson [**] would involve a critique of the modern reference-theory of
names. I propose to confine myself to Platonic exegesis, and to ask which of their
theories better fits the facts of Plato's thought about names, not only as it appears in
the Cratylus, but as stated or implied in other dialogues. My general conclusion will
be that Plato in practice regards names as functioning in the sort of way required by
the Lorenz-Mittelstrass theory, though I would not be prepared to ascribe to Plato a
theory of the proposition as sophisticated as that implied in their symbolism (p. 6).
In section II of the paper I aim at showing in detail that the concept of 'stating a
name', i.e. applying a name as a predicate to its nominate, is fully accepted and used
by Plato throughout the Cratylus, that this implies that names may be vehicles of
truth or falsity, and that there is no reason to suppose that Plato was unhappy or
suspicious about the logical validity of the concept of truth/falsity in names. In
section III I shall argue that Plato treated names as descriptive predicates in earlier
dialogues, and continued to do so in late dialogues, notably in the Sophist and
Politicus, and that this is not incompatible with the fact that a doctrine of
propositional truth is developed in one section of the Sophist (261 d-263 d). In
section IV I shall consider briefly how a doctrine of truth-names and lie-names fits
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into Plato's general conception of the relations between language, truth, and reality."
(p. 223)
References
[*] KUno Lorenz, Jürgen Mittelstrass, "On Rational Philosophy of Language: the
Programme in Plato's Cratylus Reconsidered", Mind LXXVI (1967), 6.
[**] Richard Robinson, "The Theory of Names in Plato's Cratylus", Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, XXXII, 1955, 1-16.
213.
Mahoney, Timothy A. 2015. "Commentary on Planinc." Proceedings of the Boston
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 31:218-225.
Commentary on Z. Planinc, Socrates and the Cyclops: Plato’s Critique of
‘Platonism’ in the Sophist and Statesman.
Abstract: "Zdravko Planinc’s Odyssean reading of the Sophist and Statesman
presents a radical critique of claims that these dialogues present developments of
Plato’s thought. His claim that Plato intends us to see the Stranger as no more than
an outrageous sophist, however, is undermined by the quality of at least some of
Stranger’s arguments and insights."
214.
Malabed, Rizalino Noble. 2016. "The Sophist of Many Faces: Difference (and
Identity) in Theaetetus and the Sophist." Φιλοσοφια: International Journal of
Philosophy no. 17:141-154.
Abstract: "One can argue that the problem posed by difference/identity in
contemporary philosophy has its roots in the persistent epistemological imperative
to be certain about what we know. We find this demand in Plato's Theaetetus and
Sophist. But beyond this demand, there is a sense in the earlier dialogue that
difference is not a passive feature waiting to be identified. "Difference" points
towards an active differentiating. In the Sophist, difference appears in the method of
dividing and gathering deployed to hunt for the elusive "sophist." Difference is also
one of the great kinds that weaves together other kinds. Practically, difference
enables the sophist's expertise of appearance-making as he knowingly confuses
things with words. This paper then quizzes the concept of difference in all these
guises in the two dialogues."
215.
Malcolm, John. 1967. "Plato's Analysis of τὸ ὄν and τὸ μή ὄν in the Sophist."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 12:130-146.
"The main thesis I shall present is that in the Sophist Plato does not distinguish the
existential sense of εἶναι from the predicative and identifying senses. It is regarded
as a commonplace that he did so, (1) but I shall try to show that it is advisable to
translate τὸ ὄν and εἶναι in a more general way, as "being" and "to be" respectively.
This is sufficient not only to bring out the force of the paradoxes in 236e-250e, but
also to explain Plato's use of the expression μἑτέροιν τοϋ ὄντος in 251 a-259 e and
his account of τὸ ὄν as a vowel form in the same section." (p. 130)
(...)
"In short, I am suggesting that neither in Sophist 251-259 nor in 236e-250e do we
need to take τὸ ὄν to be existential. Insofar as it need not be so taken, and in certain
places it must not be so taken, it ought to be translated as 'being' rather than as
'existence'." (p. 131)
(...)
"Although I have denied that Plato distinguishes an existential sense of εἶναι, I
would agree that he does distinguish positive predication from positive identity. He
makes the latter a sub-division of the former.
To say "XpY" is to predicate Y of X. 'X is identical with Y' is written 'XpSrY.' To
identify is to predicate sameness.
Plato, however, does not distinguish negative predication from negative identity. At
256e τὸ μή ὄν is limited to non-identity (as opposed to predication which is here τὸ
ὄν), but at 263b, a parallel phrasing, τὸ μή ὄν must include predication (e.g. the
flying of Theaetetus).
Plato's account of negation holds only for negative identity. He gives no account of
negative predication as such.(30) (p. 145)
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(1) Pro Taylor pp. 60, 81; Cornford p. 296; Ackrill p. 1; Moravcsik pp. 42, 51.
Crombie, though he has reservations as to the success of Plato's undertaking,
maintains (p. 502) that it was a prime purpose of his to distinguish the existential
sense of εἶναι in the Sophist. Contra Runciman p. 84.
(30) See Taylor pp. 64-65, also Runciman pp. 98, 101, Crombie p. 500, n. 1. For a
dissenting opinion, see Moravcsik pp. 68-75.
Bibliography
Ackrill, J. L., 'Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-259,' Journal of Hellenic Studies,
vol. 77 (1957), pp. 1-6.
Cornford, F. M., Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London, 1935).
Crombie, I. M., An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, vol. 2, (London, 1963).
Moravcsik, J. M. E., 'Being and Meaning in the Sophist,' Acta Philosophica
Fennica, Fasc. 14, (1962), pp. 23-78.
Peck, A. L., 'Plato and the ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ ΓΕΝΗ of the Sophist: a Reinterpretation,'
Classical Quarterly, n.s. vol. 2, (1952), pp. 32-56.
Runciman, W. G., Plato's Later Epistemology (Cambridge, 1962).
Taylor, A. E., Plato, the Sophist and the Statesman (ed. Klibansky and Anscombe,
London, 1961).
Addendum
I note with some satisfaction that my major thesis is consistent with the results
attained by Michael Frede in his thorough study Prädikation und Existenzaussage.
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen, 1967.
216.
———. 1983. "Does Plato Revise his Ontology in Sophist 246c-249d?" Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie no. 65:115-127.
"At Sophist 248 e—249 a, while examining the doctrine of the Friends of the Forms
to the effect that real being or true reality (ή όντως ουσία) is always unchanging and
is attained by thought alone (248 a), the Eleatic Stranger forcefully poses the
rhetorical question whether we can easily be convinced that change, life, soul and
intellect are not present to true reality: is that which completely is (το παντελώς δν),
devoid of mind and changeless? Theaetetus readily agrees that we cannot exclude
mind and change from the real. The Stranger concludes (249 b) that both change
and that which is changed qualify as "beings" (οντά), and later (at 249d), that being
(reality) is both the unchanging and the changed." (p. 115)
(...)
"Although I am persuaded that the Friends of the Forms include Plato himself, I
shall not try to establish this or, indeed, to say definitively how the supposed
emendation might apply in detail to Forms, souls and sense-objects. I shall suggest,
rather, that the best way to read the passage in question is not to assume that Plato is
here categorically affirming metaphysical truths which he endorses, be they at the
expense of his earlier views or otherwise. On the contrary, given that we have here a
part of a section which aims at showing confusion in the use of the term "being," we
cannot plausibly regard it as a source of any new commitments on his part as to the
nature of the real." (p. 116)
217.
———. 1985. "Remarks on an Incomplete Rendering of Being in the Sophist."
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 67:162-165.
"In this journal, Band 65, Heft 1, pp. 1-17, Robert Heinaman has launched an attack
on those (1) who have claimed that Plato's solution to the alleged paradox of false
statement (Sophist 236-264) restricts itself to an incomplete use of "being" (identity
and predication) and is not concerned with questions of existence. It is my
contention that Heinaman 's assault miscarries in that he has totally misjudged the
position he purports to oppose."
(1) I consider pages 1-13 of Heinaman 's "Being in the Sophist". These are directed
at G. E. L. Owen, "Plato on Not-Being, in: G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato I, New York
1971, pp. 223-267 and J. Malcolm, "Plato's Analysis of τὸ ὄν and τὸ μή ὄν in the
Sophist", Phronesis (1967), pp. 130-46. An appendix, pp. 13-17, treats of M.
Frede's Prädikation und Existenzaussage, Gottingen 1967 and is beyond the scope
of this paper.
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218.
———. 1985. "On 'What is Not in any Way' in the Sophist." The Classical
Quarterly no. 35:520-523.
"To ensnare the sophist of the Sophist in a definition disclosing him as a purveyor
of images and falsehoods Plato must block the sophistical defence that image and
falsehood are self-contradictory in concept, for they both embody the proposition
proscribed by Parmenides - 'What is not, is'. It has been assumed that Plato regards
this defence as depending on a reading of' what is not' (to me on) in its very
strongest sense, where it is equivalent to 'what is not in any way' (to medamos on)
or 'nothing'.
Likewise, the initial paradoxes of not-being (237b-239c) are seen as requiring that
to me on be understood in this way, that later designated by Plato (257b, 258e-259a)
as the opposite of to on or 'being'. On this interpretation, Plato's counter-strategy is
to recognise a use of to me on which is not opposed in this strict sense to being, but
is indeed a part of it and is 'being other than'.
In a stimulating article,(1) R. W. Jordan challenges this account.(2) I shall briefly
attempt to show that his objections are not decisive and that his own interpretation
is open to question." (p. 520)
(1) R. W. Jordan, 'Plato's Task in the Sophist',Classical Quarterly 34 (1984), 113-29.
(2) Referred to by Jordan as' Malcolm's view'. Though flattered by the appellation, I
can claim to be but an adherent and not the initiator (see Jordan, p. 120, notes 14
and 15.
219.
———. 2006. "A Way Back for Sophist 255c12-13." Ancient Philosophy no.
26:275-289.
"At Sophist 255c8 the Eleatic Stranger asks whether Difference is to be
distinguished from Being. As evidence that these are two distinct items he
introduces at c12-13 two ways in which beings can be: (1) in themselves or αυτά
καθ' αυτά (hereafter, KH) and (2) with reference to others or προς αλλα (hereafter,
PA).(1)
At 255d1-7 it is then shown that Difference, unlike Being, only shares in the second
way of being, since what is different is always different in relation to something
else. Now this may be read in a straightforward and unproblematic manner since
there are many ways in which something can be said to be without this something
being said, in the surface grammar, to be in relation to something else.
Compare, for example, ‘Socrates exists’ or ‘Socrates is a man’ with ‘Socrates is
wiser than Miletus’.
Yet some of the most distinguished and deservedly influential commentators differ
radically from such a ‘naïve’ reading and see the KH/PA contrast here as germane
to such issues as replying to the late-learners, dealing with self-predication,
contrasting statements of identity with those of predication, involving different uses
of ‘is’, and discussing the so-called ‘two-level’ paradoxes.(2) There is no doubt that
these approaches have been philosophically most instructive and inspiring, but, I
shall maintain, they should not intrude into the exegesis of this particular passage.
The naïve reading is to be preferred."
(1) Line references to Plato are from Burnet 1900. The title’s passage is at lines 1314 (mislabeled 15!) in Duke et al. 1995. The Budé edition, Diès 1925, agrees with
Burnet.
(2) For this last item see Vlastos 1973, 323ff. The most discussed example is that
where Motion, qua its nature as motion, moves, but, qua Form is at rest.
References
Burnet, John. 1900. Platonis Opera. vol. 1. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Diès, Auguste. 1925. Platon: le Sophiste. Édition ‘Les Belles Lettres’. Paris: Budé.
Duke, E.A. et al. 1995. Platonis Opera. vol. 1. Oxford Classical Texts. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Vlastos, Gregory. 1973. Platonic Studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
220.
———. 2006. "Some Cautionary Remarks on the ‘Is’ / ‘Teaches’ Analogy." Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 31:281-296.
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"Ancient Greek thinkers, notably Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle, are regarded by
some as having been led into error through a failure to recognize the difference
between two uses of (their equivalent of) the verb ‘to be’: the incomplete or copula,
and the complete or existential.(1) They allegedly acted as if ‘X is F’ entailed ‘X
is’, i.e. ‘exists’.
Not everyone is convinced by this. I shall consider two responses.
The one I favour is to grant that a rigid existence/copula distinction is a legitimate
tool for the interpretation of these philosophers.
Furthermore, I suggest that their reasoning may be understood in a way that does
not leave them as vulnerable to the charge of this confusion as is sometimes
supposed. The other reaction takes a more subtle approach. It maintains that, with
respect to ‘being’, the complete/incomplete distinction is a modern contrivance,(2)
hence it is anachronistic to employ it in addressing the ancients. In the use of the
Greek equivalent of ‘to be’ the copula had some ‘built-in’ existential import. Since
writers in that language did not have two completely different uses to confuse, it is
unfair to look at them from this perspective.
Two leading proponents of this latter doctrine are Charles Kahn and Lesley Brown.
Although it was introduced some time ago, this view continues to enjoy current
endorsement(3) and I believe it is not inappropriate to examine the reasoning
offered in its support in the work of Brown, especially that of 1994.(4)" (pp. 281282, note 1 abbreviated)
(1) The charge is found in J. S.Mill, A System of Logic (London, 1843), 1. iv. i,
who mentions Plato and Aristotle and implies that they were open to this error. He
refers us to the Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 2 vols. (1829; new
edn. London, 1869), by his father James Mill.
(2) See e.g. C. Kahn, ‘A Return to the Theory of the Verb be and the Concept of
Being’ [‘Return’], Ancient Philosophy, 24 (2004), 381–405 at 385, who allows that
we should use ‘such modern distinctions’ in our ‘hermeneutical metalanguage’, but
that are (i.e. exist).’ My aim will be to help him avoid this precarious position as far
as is possible.
(3) Let me give two items from 2003: B.Hestir, ‘A “Conception” of Truth in Plato’s
Sophist’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 41 (2003), 1–24 at 6 n. 16 ; J. Szaif,
Der Sinn von ‘sein’ (Freiburg and Munich, 2003), 19 n. 13. To these may be added
two from 2002: J. van Eck, ‘Not-Being and Difference: On Plato’s Sophist 256 d 5–
258 e 3’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 23 (2002), 63–84 at 70–1; A.
Silverman, The Dialectic of Essence (Princeton, 2002), 145 n. 17, 150 n. 21.
(4) The article in question is L. Brown, ‘The Verb “to be” in Greek Philosophy:
Some Remarks’ [‘Verb’], in S. Everson (ed.), Language (Companions to Ancient
Thought, 3; Cambridge, 1994), 212–36. (Any ‘bare’ page references in my article
will be to this item.) Kahn, ‘Return’, 383, accepts Brown’s contribution
unreservedly. He writes, ‘She shows [emphasis added] that the relation between the
verb einai in sentences of the form X is and X is Y is like that between the verb
teaches in Jane teaches and Jane teaches French’. See also his 385.
221.
Marback, Richard C. 1994. "Rethinking Plato's Legacy: Neoplatonic Readings of
Plato's Sophist." Rhetoric Review no. 13:30-49.
"In what follows I will historicize the reception of the terms Platonist and sophist by
briefly exploring neo-Platonic discussions of sophistry and sophistic. As late
Roman and early Christian exegetes of the Platonic texts, the neo-Platonists might
at first seem unflinching adversaries of sophistry. While it might be unrealistic for
us to expect any sympathetic treatment of Gorgias from scholars so invested in the
authority of classical authors like Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero, we should not be
surprised to find these same scholars promoting sophistry-the contingency of
meaning in the context of expression -- in the name of Plato." (p. 31)
(...)
"To recognize that Plotinus and Proclus and Augustine discerned and grappled with
issues of sophistry raised by Plato in the Sophist is, I think, to recognize their
creative influence over the subsequent reception and impact of classical rhetoric.
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(...)
Along these lines I have attempted to show how the Sophist, as one instance, was
used and can be used to fashion sophistic or antisophistic perspectives, how
readings of it by rhetoricians, logicians, and ethicists, or by Augustine, Plotinus,
and Proclus, reiterate or reject an antagonism to sophistry. Reading Plato in this
way, I think we benefit from finding that along with the sophist whose language
skills eluded easy capture in the Stranger's philosophical net, the neo-Platonist
similarly eludes well-defined historical categories. Adding the Sophist to our Plato
makes more elusive, more sophistical, the contingent and contextual elements by
which we fashion our rhetorical terms as historical, genealogical categories. This
approach also raises questions about the kinds of textual strategies that led to the
dialogue's exclusion from Plato's rhetorical canon. Discussions of why the primary
rhetoric texts in the Platonic corpus have come to be the Phaedrus and Gorgias can
and should inform discussions of what sophistry has meant throughout the years
people have been forming this canon. Such selectivity presupposes reading and
writing and talking about the dialogues in particular ways, employing strategies and
making choices influenced by an inheritance of possible issues and conflicts as well
as settled ways of reading and representing that reading that may or may not be
identified as "sophistic." Attention to the neo-Platonists and their readings of Plato's
Sophist thus points not only, as Quandahl says, to the rhetorical elements of Plato
(347), such attention points as well to the contextual and contingent rhetorical
strategies constantly at work in the shaping of philosophy's, rhetoric's, and
sophistry's intertwined histories." (p. 47)
References
Quandahl, Ellen. "What is Plato? Inference and Allusion in Plato's Sophist",
Rhetoric Review 7 (1989): 338-51.
222.
Marcos de Pinotti, Graciela Elena. 2016. "Plato’s Argumentative Strategies in
Theaetetus and Sophist." In Plato’s Styles and Characters. Between Literature and
Philosophy, edited by Cornelli, Gabriele, 77-87. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"In Theaetetus and Sophist, Plato accomplishes a construction operation of his
adversaries which leads him to associate doctrines regularly attributed to
Heracliteans or Eleatic thinkers with different sophistical positions. However, his
primary purpose is not to refute historical positions, but to assert fundamental
theses and principles of his own philosophy. So I am not interested here in
evaluating the legitimacy of such associations, or “dialectical combinations”, as
Cornford (1935, p. 36) calls them. I will focus instead on the peculiar kind of
argument he employs for the refutation of both kinds of opponents. This is a sort of
peculiar argumentation, as I will try to show, which does not appeal to the existence
of the Forms but to the conditions of the possibility of language." (p. 77)
(...)
"To conclude, I would like to emphasize once more that the resource to the
conditions of possibility of language rather than to the thesis of the existence of the
Forms is not a defect of the argumentative strategy displayed in the passages of
Theaetetus and Sophist analyzed here. On the contrary, such resource gives rise to a
special type of argument that tries to persuade every language user and not only
those who defend the Forms. Despite this, Plato’s reader will inevitably find veiled
references to these realities in almost all of them." (p. 86)
223.
Matthen, Mohan. 1983. "Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth." Phronesis.A Journal
for Ancient Philosophy no. 28:113-135.
Abstract: "This is an essay about the ontological presuppositions of a certain use of
'is' in Greek philosophy - I shall describe it in the first part and present a hypothesis
about its semantics in the second.
I believe that my study has more than esoteric interest. First, it provides an
alternative semantic account of what Charles Kahn has called the 'is' of truth,
thereby shedding light on a number of issues in Greek ontology, including an
Eleatic paradox of change and Aristotle's response to it.
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Second, it finds in the semantics of Greek a basis for admitting what have been
called 'non-substantial individuals' or 'immanent characters' into accounts of Greek
ontology. Third, it yields an interpretation of Aristotle's talk of 'unities' which is
crucial to his treatment of substance in the central books of the Metaphysics."
(...)
"I have argued in this essay for the recognition of a sort of entity that is not familiar
in modem ontologies. I have argued on the basis of a syntactic and semantic
analysis of certain uses of 'is', and found textual support for the analysis in certain
texts of Aristotle. In addition, the recognition of predicative complexes enables us
to give a unified treatment of a number of puzzling features of Greek ontology.
It is possible that the Greeks may have regarded predicative complexes not in the
way I have presented them, namely as constructed entitles derivative from more
basic types, but as the entities given in perception, and so epistemically and even
ontologically prior. If so, we may find that in positing the Forms, Plato was making
a break with an ontology of predicative complexes, not, as is usually thought, with
an ontology of individual substances. Similarly, it is possible that Aristotle posited
individual substances against the background of an ontology composed of
predicative complexes and Platonic Forms. These possibilities offer the prospect of
a richer appreciation of the development of Greek ontology than is now customary."
(pp. 130-131)
224.
Mazur, Zeke. 2013. "The Platonizing Sethian Gnostic Interpretation of Plato’s
Sophist." In Practicing Gnosis: Ritual, Magic, Theurgy and Liturgy in Nag
Hammadi, Manichaean and Other Ancient Literature. Essays in Honor of Birger A.
Pearson, edited by DeConick, April D. , Shaw, Gregory and Turner, John D. , 469493. Leiden: Brill.
"This essay constitutes the second part of a larger investigation into the evidence of
a tacit debate between Plotinus and the Gnostics over the interpretation of Plato. In
a previous part of this study, I made the case that Zostrianos drew on a number of
specific passages describing the cyclical reincarnation of souls especially in the
Phaedrus, but also in the Phaedo and Republic, and that Plotinus and Porphyry had
tacitly responded in several locations throughout their writings.(4) Here I would
like to present a similar case for the Gnostic use of the Sophist. The specific thesis
of this essay is that the Platonizing Sethians drew at least in part upon the text of
Plato’s Sophist for central aspects of their metaphysics, and—in relation to the topic
of the present volume—they even went so far as to reconceptualize the dialectical
methods described in the Sophist in terms of their praxis of visionary ascent." (pp.
469-470)
(4) Mazur, Zeke. 2016. Traces of the Competition Between the Platonizing Sethian
Gnostics and Plotinus’ Circle: the Case of Zostrianos 44–46. In Estratégias antignósticas nos escritos de Plotino. Actas do colóquio internacional realizado em São
Paulo em 18–19 de março 2012, M.P. Marsola and L. Ferroni, eds. São Paulo:
Rosari et Paulus, pp. 125-211.
225.
McCoy, Marina. 2008. Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments VII; 1 Introduction 1; 02 Elements of Gorgianic
Rhetoric and the Forensic Genre in Plato’s Apology 23; 3 The Rhetoric of Socratic
Questioning in the Protagoras 56; 4 The Competition between Philosophy and
Rhetoric in the Gorgias 85; 5 The Dialectical Development of the Philosopher and
Sophist in the Republic 111; 6 Philosophers, Sophists, and Strangers in the Sophist
138; 7 Love and Rhetoric in Plato’s Phaedrus 167; Bibliography 197; Index 209212.
"In this chapter, I argue that part of Plato’s purpose in the Sophist and Theaetetus is
to offer two different accounts of the nature of philosophy.
Plato engages his audience in a reflection upon the nature of philosophy through the
contrast between Socrates’ and the Stranger’s ways of speaking. I focus on two
main questions about the Sophist. First, how is the Stranger’s character and way of
speaking distinct from Socrates’ character and speech in the Theaetetus? Second,
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how do the divisions and collections of the Sophist illuminate some of the
differences between Socrates and the Stranger? I argue that the Eleatic Stranger is
deliberately presented as an enigmatic figure who may alternately be identified as
either a sophist or a philosopher. While the Stranger defines sophistry in such a way
that he would separate his own activity from that of the sophists, the drama of the
dialogue suggests that Socrates would not consider the Stranger to be a philosopher.
That is, the dialogues function to draw us into the philosophical question of what
philosophy is. The Sophist and Theaetetus as a pair demonstrate that the
philosopher–sophist contrast is relative to the way in which one constructs a
positive understanding of philosophy.
I argue that the Stranger’s understanding of himself as a philosopher is inadequate
from Socrates’ standpoint, although the Stranger seems to identify himself as a
philosopher. While the Stranger identifies philosophy with a method of division and
collection, and especially with applying that method to metaphysical questions,
Socrates emphasizes self-knowledge and knowledge of the human soul and its
moral good as central to philosophical practice.4 Both Socrates and the Stranger are
interested in persuasion, but Socrates’ rhetoric is to be found in the role of a
midwife who is helping others to give birth to ideas and to grow in self-knowledge,
while the Stranger’s rhetoric is oriented toward making his interlocutor more
compliant and dispassionate." (pp. 139-140, notes omitted)
226.
McDowell, John. 1982. "Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato's Sophist." In Language
and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen, edited
by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha, 115-134. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
"For me, G. E. L. Owen's 'Plato on Not-Being' (1971) radically improved the
prospects for a confident overall view of its topic. Hitherto, passage after passage
had generated reasonable disagreement over Plato's intentions, and the disputes
were not subject to control by a satisfying picture of his large-scale strategy; so that
the general impression, as one read the Sophist, was one of diffuseness and
unclarity of purpose. By focusing discussion on the distinction between otherness
and contrariety (257B1-C4), Owen showed how, at a stroke, a mass of confusing
exegetical alternatives could be swept away, and the dialogue's treatment of notbeing revealed as a sustained and tightly organised assault on a single error. In what
follows, I take Owen's focusing of the issue for granted, and I accept many of his
detailed conclusions. Where I diverge from Owen - in particular over the nature of
the difficulty about falsehood that Plato tackles in the Sophist (§§5 and 6 below) -it
is mainly to press further in the direction he indicated, in the interest of a conviction
that the focus can and should be made even sharper." (p. 115)
227.
McPherran, Mark L. 1986. "Plato's Reply to the 'Worst Difficulty' Argument of the
Parmenides: Sophist 248a- 249d." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no.
68:233-252.
"In a previous paper I have argued that the theory of relations Hector-Neri
Castañeda has discovered in the Phaedo is clarified and extended in the Parmenides.
In particular, the paper contains an Interpretation of the 'worst difficulty' argument
(Parm. 133a —135a), an argument purporting to establish that human knowledge of
the Forms is impossible. My Interpretation showed the argument to utilize the
extended theory of relations in its premises. I also showed, contrary to previous
interpretations, how Plato's argument was logically valid.
One consideration in favor of the Interpretation I offered is that it allows the
argument at last to live up to its description as the most formidable challenge to the
early theory of Forms (in a long series of tough arguments), requiring a "long and
remote train of argument" by "a man of wide experience and natural ability" for its
unsoundness to be exposed (Parm. 133b4 —c1).
Unfortunately, the Parmenides does not contain such a reply, even though the text at
133b seems to hint that Plato had already formulated one. Did he ever entertain and
record a reply, and if so, could that reply rescue some version of the theory of
Forms from the devastating consequences of the 'worst difficulty'? In the following,
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I present my previous reconstruction of that argument and the most plausible lines
of response open to a defender of a theory of Forms. In the second section I argue
that Plato gives clear recognition to one of those replies in the Sophist, and I show
how that reply would save the theory of Forms. Finally, I will contend that this
reply is Plato's best line of response, and I will discuss the problem of actually
attributing the adoption of this solution to him." (pp. 233-234, some notes omitted)
(1) Mark McPherran, "Plato's Parmenides Theory of Relations," in F. J. Pelletier
and J. King-Farlow (eds.), New Essays on Plato, Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
Supplementary Volume IX (1983): 149 — 164 (hereafter, "Plato's Parmenides
Theory").
(2) My Interpretation dealt explicitly only with the first half of the argument
(133a11 — 134c3). The second half (134c4—135a3) attempts to establish that just
as men cannot know Forms, so the gods cannot be knowers of particulars (e. g.,
men), but only Forms.
References to Hector-Neri Castañeda:
"Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations," Journal of Philosophical Logic I (1972): 467
—480.
"Plato's Relations, Not Essences or Accidents, at Phaedo 102b — d2," Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 1 (1978): 39 — 53.
"Leibniz and Plato's Phaedo Theory of Relations and Predication," M. Hooker (ed.).
Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays (Minneapolis, 1982): 124—159.
228.
Mesquita, Antonio Pedro. 2013. "Plato’s Eleaticism in the Sophist. The Doctrine of
Non-Being." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson,
Thomas M., 175-186. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"The aporia experienced by the interlocutors in the Sophist on the notion of nonbeing is, essentially, the following:
1. That which absolutely is not cannot be thought of or spoken of (238c).
2. However, every assertion concerning that which is not, even if negative in
content, requires the mediation of an “is” in order to be expressed.
3. In effect, when we say that non-being is not thinkable or utterable, we are, in
actual fact, uttering it and, necessarily, uttering it as being, namely, as being
unutterable (239a).
4. Therefore, due not to linguistic ambiguity but to ontological requirement, to say
that non-being is not utterable is the same as asserting that it is unutterable and, in
general, to say that non-being is not is to say that non-being is non-being, which
certainly collides with what those assertions were intended to demonstrate in the
first place, that is, the absolute unutterability and the absolute non-being of nonbeing.
5. In fact, each of those assertions tacitly affirms the opposite of what it declares,
namely, that non-being is utterable (precisely as being unutterable) and, therefore,
that non-being is (precisely as being nonbeing).
The most immediate interpretation of this section would be as follows: the Eleatic
notion of non-being, here patently challenged, must be superseded; and the Platonic
notion of “other” (ἑτέρων), introduced through the novel doctrine of the κοινωνίᾱ
των ειδων, is exactly what supersedes it.
Such an interpretation has, however, the disadvantage of being external to the
argument, replacing analysis of its internal progress with the abstract assumption of
the two extreme moments that structure it, namely, the two different notions of nonbeing. As an act of supersession, it excludes the Eleatic notion of non-being to the
benefit of the Platonic one, without realizing that every act of supersession is never
simply one of negation, but also one of incorporation.
Now, this is precisely what happens with the question of non-being in the Sophist.
The Eleatic notion is not dissolved; it is, rather, interpreted in the light of another
conception of non-being which, in absorbing it, refashions it into a different shape.
The peremptory interdiction of Parmenides, according to which non-being is not,(1)
is never actually refuted: it is taken as possessing its own truth, although such truth
is understood as limited, and confined within new boundaries." (pp. 175-176)
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(1) In summary form, for the exact statement never appears as such. See DK B 2.5 –
8, B 6. 2, B 7. 1, etc.
229.
Michaelides, C. P. 1975. "The concept of not-being in Plato." Diotima.Review of
Philosophical Research no. 3:19-26.
230.
Mié, Fabian. 2011. "Plato's Sophist on Negation and Not-Being." In Parmenides,
'Venerable and Awesome' (Plato, Theaetetus 183e), edited by Cordero, Néstor-Luis,
363-372. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing.
Summary: "This brief paper develops an interpretation of Plato’s theory of negation
understood as an answer to Parmenides’ paradoxes concerning not-being. First, I
consider some aspects that result from an analysis of Sophist 257b–259d,
formulating some general theses which I then go on to unfold in more detail in the
following section. Finally, I show what exactly Plato’s so-called overcoming of the
Eleatic problem related to negation and falsehood is; and I outline some of the main
semantic and metaphysical consequences that are entailed by this overcoming."
231.
Migliori, Maurizio. 2007. Plato's Sophist: Value and Limitation on Ontology. Sankt
Augustin: Academia Verlag.
Five lessons followed by a discussion with Bruno Centrone, Arianna Fermani,
Lucia Palpacelli, Diana Quarantotto.
Original Italian edition: Il Sofista di Platone. Valore e limiti dell'ontologia, Brescia:
Morcelliana 2006.
Contents: Preface p. 9; First Lecture – Plato’s Writings and Dialectical Dialogues p.
11; Contents: Preface p. 9; First Lecture – Plato’s Writings and Dialectical
Dialogues p. 11; Second Lecture – The Sophist’s Manifold Nature p. 29; Third
Lecture – The driving force of Plato’s Philosophy p. 51; Fourth Lecture – Ontology
and Meta-ideas p. 69; Fifth Lecture – The relative importance of the Sophist p. 93;
Appendix I – The Whole-Part relation in the Parmenides and the Theaetetus p. 103;
Appendix II – The Doing-Suffering Pair p. 121; Appendix III – The Dialectics of
Being in the Parmenides (161 E - 162 B) p. 125; Exchanges with the Author 127206.
"The Philosophical Contents of the Sophist.
First of all, one should establish as closely as possible the meaning of the dialogue
in its Author’s mind. With Plato this task is far from easy, for it is one of the issues
that arouses the liveliest debate among critics. As elsewhere, I suggest following the
classification put forward by Szlezák (1) in an attempt to single out three elements
in the dialogue:
a) The overriding issue, the aggregating force that breathes life into the text and
which Plato never lets his readers forget about;
b) The thematic hub of the writing, the philosophically crucial question which
assesses the worth of the overriding issue and/or confers it legitimate meaning;
c) The foremost problem which the argumentative development must grapple with.
This model has always appeared to me as capable of yielding some kind of
clarifying effect. It is especially helpful in showing how the various facets of the
discourse are not set alongside one another but necessarily recall each other. The
aim is to identify three elements, strongly-linked yet not mutually coinciding,
among the wealth of opinions in Plato’s text. Weaving them into one another will
provide us with the thread that can guide us through the dialogue." (pp. 93-94)
(1) T. A. Szlezák, Come leggere Platone, Rusconi, Milano 1991, pp. 126-127. [in
English: Thomas A. Szlezák, Reading Plato, Translated by Graham Zanker, New
York: Routledge 2003].
232.
———. 2021. "The Use and Meaning of the Past in Plato." Plato Journal no. 21:4358.
Abstract: "This essay is based on two premises. The first concerns the vision of
writing proposed by Plato in Phaedrus and especially the conception of
philosophical writing as a maieutic game.
The structurally polyvalent way in which Plato approaches philosophical issues also
emerges in the dialogues. The second concerns the birth and the development of
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historical analysis in parallel with the birth of philosophy.
On this basis the text investigates a series of data about the relationship between
Plato and “the facts”.
1) If we compare the Apology of Socrates with other sources, we discover a series
of important “games” that Plato performs to achieve the results he proposes.
2) The famous passage of Phd. 96A-102A, which concludes with the Ideas and with
a reference to the Principles, expresses definite judgments on the Presocratics.
3) In his works Plato attributes to the sophists some merits, even if the outcome of
their contribution is overall negative.
4) However, in the fourth complicated diairesis of the Sophist, there is a “sophist of
noble stock”, an educator who can only be Socrates.
5) Plato in the Sophist shows the weakness of the Gigantomachy, and proposes an
adequate definition of the beings: the power of undergoing or acting. This reveals,
before the Philebus and the Timaeus, the dynamic and dialectical nature of his
philosophy
In summary, a multifocal vision emerges, adapted to an intrinsically complex
reality."
233.
Miller, Dana. 2004. "Fast and Loose about Being: Criticism of Competing
Ontologies in Plato's Sophist." Ancient Philosophy no. 24:339-363.
"In the Sophist, in the context of an argument designed t0 demonstrate that being
(τὸ ὄν) is as puzzling as non-being, the Eleatic Visitor embarks on a discussion of
competing views about being. It is generally thought that this discussion (242b6250e4) establishes a number of significant claims that are made in the course of the
Visitor's argument. The argument proceeds on two levels: (i) a general argument
that focuses on what the Visitor regards to be a muddle about being and the
consequences of this muddle, and (ii) specific argun1ents against specific views,
where these arguments seek both (a) to refute these views and (b) to shed light on
the muddle and consequences that are the concern of (i). Scholarship has been
largely concerned with the claims made under (iia), as for example, the claim made
in the argument against the Friends of the Forms that the objects of knowledge are
somehow moved or changed by their being known. My intent, however, is chiefly
to set out (i), the general argument, and then to examine the particular arguments
from the perspective of (iib), that is, how these arguments relate to the general
argument. Yet to get at (iib). it is necessary to examine the Visitor's arguments in
some detail and this requires approaching them from the perspective of (iia).
Because the claims made in the discussion should be understood with reference to
their context, I begin by situating the general argument within the larger argument
of the Sophist and explain the dialectical purpose that the discussion is meant to
serve. Then, in brief, l argue that the puzzle about being derives from muddled
thinking about the notion of being and that this muddled thinking lies at the base of
the various earlier views about being that the Visitor undertakes to refute. To show
how this is the case, I examine the argument against these views." (p. 339)
234.
Miller, Mitchell. 2016. "What the Dialectician Discerns: a new reading of Sophist
253d-e." Ancient Philosophy no. 36:321-352.
"At Sophist 253d-e the Eleatic Visitor offers a notoriously obscure schematic
description of the kinds of eidetic field that the philosopher practicing dialectic
‘adequately discerns’ (ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται, 253d7). My aim is to propose a fresh
reading of that obscure passage. For all of their impressive thoughtfulness and
ingenuity, the major lines of interpretation pursued so far have missed, I will argue,
the full context of the passage. As a consequence, the proponents of these lines
Statesman of interpretation have failed to avail themselves of resources that would
have freed them from otherwise unavoidable moments of force or neglect in their
readings. The key is to recognize the place of the Sophist within the trilogy of the
Theaetetus, Sophist, and, accordingly, to expand the context of Sophist 253d-e to
include the Theaetetus and the Statesman. In his schematic description at Sophist
253d-e, the Visitor refers to the eidetic fields traced by two distinct modes of logos.
At the end of the Theaetetus, Socrates offers anticipatory sketches of each of these
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modes; but in the body of the Sophist the Visitor restricts his practice of dialectic to
just one of the two—only in the second half of the Statesman does he take up the
other mode. As a consequence, only a reader who is oriented by the close of the
Theaetetus and who lets this orientation guide her in a reading of the Sophist and
the Statesman together is well positioned to recognize the referents of the Visitor’s
remarks at Sophist 253d-e." (p. 321)
235.
Mohr, Richard D. 1982. "The Relation of Reason to Soul in the Platonic
Cosmology: "Sophist" 248e-249c." Apeiron no. 16:21-26.
Reprinted as Chapter X in R. D. Mohr, The Platonic Cosmology, Leiden: Brill,
1985, pp. 178-183.
"Since Cherniss' Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy I, there has been
nearly universal agreement among critics that Plato's God or divine Demiurge is a
soul.(1) Yet the prima facie evidence is that the Demiurge is not. In all three of
Plato's major cosmological works the Timaeus, the Statesman myth, and the
Philebus (28c-30e), the Demiurge is fairly extensively described and yet not once is
he described as a soul. Rather souls, and especially the World-Soul, and what
rationality souls have are viewed as products of the Demiurge (Timaeus 35a, 36d-e,
Philebus 30c-d, Statesman 269c-d). Nonetheless, the overwhelming critical opinion
is that since the demiurgic God of these works is described as rational, this entails
that God is a soul. Three texts are adduced to prove this, Timaeus 30b3, Philebus
30c9-10, and Sophist 249a. These texts are taken as claiming A) that if a thing is
rational, then it is a soul. Proclus saw that at least the Timaeus passage can mean
only B) that when reason is in something else, what it is in must be an ensouled
thing. The rhetoric of the Timaeus sentence strongly suggests that reading Β is
correct and the argumentative context of the Philebus sentence (properly
understood) requires sense B. This leaves (as Cherniss is willing to admit, ACPA, p.
606) the Sophist passage alone as bearing the whole weight of Plato's alleged
commitment to the view A) that everything that is rational is a soul. I wish to give a
new, tentative interpretation to this passage which shows that it is, like the Timaeus
and Philebus, committed only to the weaker claim B) that when reason is in
something, it is so along with soul. This leaves the Demiurge who is not in anything
free to be rational without being a soul and to serve rather as a maker of souls." (p.
21, notes omitted)
(1) H.F. Cherniss, ACPA l (Baltimore, 1944), appendix XI, which is in part an
attack on Hackforth's "Plato's Theism" (1936) rpt. in R.E. Allen (ed.), Studies in
Plato's Metaphysics (London, 1965), pp. 439-447.
236.
Mojsisch, Burkhard. 1998. "Logos and Episteme. The Constitutive Role of
Language in Plato's Theory of Knowledge." Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch
für Antike und Mittelalter no. 3:19-28.
Abstract: "This essay first differentiates the various meanings of the term logos as it
appears in Plato's dialogues Theaetetus and The Sophist. These are: the colloque of
the soul with itself, a single sentence, a proposing aloud, the enumeration of the
constitutive elements of a whole and the giving of a specific difference; further,
opinion and imagination. These meanings are then related to Plato's determination
of knowledge (episteme) and therewith truth and falsity. One can be said to possess
knowledge only when the universal contents of thought -- dialogical thought -- are
set in relation to the perceivable, imagination or opinion. Reflections on the
principle significance of possibility as such -- a thematic not addressed by Plato -conclude the essay."
237.
Monserrat Molas, Josep, and Sandoval Villarroel, Pablo. 2013. "Plato’s Enquiry
Concerning the Sophist as a Way Towards “Defining” Philosophy." In Plato's
Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 29-39.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"The Sophist discloses the urgency of the question concerning being, and it is only
in pondering this question that the essence of philosophising comes to light and is
realised. In other words, the dialogue does not deal with the question of being
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simply because the problem of the sophist requires that it do so, but rather it deals
and has to deal with the question concerning being in that its fundamental concern,
its σκοπός, which consists in moving towards the essence of philosophy, not by way
of a formal, abstract “definition”, but rather through the consummation of
philosophising.
For this reason the Stranger of Elea later on poses the question: καὶ κινδυνεύομεν
ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηυρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον [253c8 – 9], “and
have we unwittingly found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?”.
Who, then, is the philosopher?
He is that human being who has devoted himself fully, through thinking, to
enquiring again and again into the essence of being: ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ
ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέᾳ [254a8 – 9]." (pp. 38-39, note omitted)
238.
Moravcsik, Julius M. E. 1958. "Mr. Xenakis on Truth and Meaning." Mind no.
67:533-537.
"In a somewhat breathless article Mr. J. Xenakis has presented us with a new
interpretation of Plato's theory of truth and meaning in Sophist, pp. 260-263.(1) In
this brief note I shall show that the theory which Xenakis champions is
objectionable, and toward the end I shall suggest that Plato need not be burdened
with it. Xenakis claims that all statements must satisfy four rules. According to the
third of these, all statements - if they are to be statements - must be about
something.(2) Little can be found in the article that pertains to the status of the four
rules. We are told, however, that two of them are formation rules, and two are truthconditions. Since Xenakis insists that all statements must satisfy the truthconditions, one can assume that he excludes the possibility of there being
statements which are neither true nor false. I am not sure whether he would go on to
say that any utterance which does not satisfy one of the truth-conditions is
meaningless. It may be that he would restrict himself to maintaining that if any
utterance does not meet one of the truth-conditions, then meaningful as it may be, it
cannot be true or false - and hence it cannot be a statement. In order to be on the
safe side, I shall examine rule [3] first as a criterion of meaningfulness, and then as
a mere truth-condition." (p. 533)
(1) Mind (April 1957), pp. 165-172.
(2) Ibid. pp. 168-169.
239.
———. 1960. "ΣΥΜΠΛΟΚΗ ΕΙΔΩΝ and the Genesis of ΛΟΓΟΣ." Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie no. 42:117-129.
"Διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν [For our power
of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one
another. (Translation added)] (Sophist 259e5—6)*. In these lines Plato states that
rational discourse is made possible by the interwovenness of the Forms. The task of
the Interpreter is to discover what the nature of this interwovenness is, and to
ascertain the exact nature of the relationship between the interwovenness of the
Forms and the structure of rational discourse. At present there is considerable
disagreement concerning these issues. In this paper the main difficulties of 259e5—
6 will be outlined, and some recent attempts to overcome these difficulties will be
surveyed. It will be indicated where and why I dissent from the positions taken by
several contemporary authors, and a new Interpretation will be presented which
attempts to show that a plurality of Forms, woven into a pattern, underlies each
meaningful sentence, and that the interwovenness can be explained by reference to
formal concepts. The importance which — in my opinion — Plato attaches to
formal concepts in the Sophist has implications for the Interpretation of the theory
of Forms as found in the later dialogues." (p. 117)
(...)
"In conclusion let me sum up the most important implications of what Plato says in
259e5—6. Plato believes that the changing dynamic combination of words, yielding
meaningful discourse, is based on the static interwovenness of the Forms. For
discourse is changing, man-made; and the language of 262d2—6 shows that Plato
regards it s such. But he also believes that one of the essential tasks of meaningful
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discourse is to convey Information. Fundamental to the conveying of Information is
the ability to order the elements of reality according to concepts (23). What makes
this ordering possible, according to Plato, is the general fact that the elements of
reality are identifiable and describable." (p. 129)
(*) Burnet's numbering of lines is followed throughout the paper.
240.
———. 1962. "Being and Meaning in the Sophist." Acta Philosophica Fennica no.
14:23-78.
From the Conclusion: "Communion and interweaving are the key concepts of the
Sophist. They are used on two levels; the ontological and the semantic. The two are
not sharply separated, and each helps to explain the other. The Communion of the
Forms parallels the interwovenness of words, and thus 253-256 parallels 260-262.
A similar parallel and relations of dependence are presented between the
discussions of Not-being and falsehood. Thus 257-258 and 263 go together. This
interrelatedness not only brings out the nature of Plato's philosophizing in this
period, but it also presents the interpreter with the task of working out the whole
passage as a unit, for the interpretations of the parts are interdependent. This
justifies and necessitates my lengthy analysis.
Plato's arguments show that truth and falsehood are not matters of mental sight or
blindness. Thus one should not conceive of the objects of knowledge as selfsufficient atomic units. Philosophical atomism is denied on all levels. The
paradigm-case of how not to read Plato therefore is: "each element in the statement
has now a meaning; and so the statement as a whole has meaning". (1) The notion
of Communion and the analogy with vowels lead to the conception of the Forms as
functions, as something incomplete, something which need arguments in order
really to express something. At least some of the Forms are shown to be like
functions in this dialogue. If we are willing to pursue Plato's line of thought beyond
the point to which it is carried in the dialogue, we see that what Plato says leads to
construing all Forms as functions. For what we know are truths and falsehoods, and
these are complexes which contain Forms. The constituents of these complexes are
not 'simples', or metaphysical atoms of some sort. In order to understand them we
have to know into what complexes they fit. We do not grasp them prior to all
completions.
It is small wonder that modern commentators of this dialogue have not made much
progress with it. They approach it with the 'part-sum, division-collection, genusspecies' distinctions in mind. Merely because one aspect of dialectic is said to be the
method of division they identify all of Plato's methodology with this notion, and
seek to explain the middle part of the Sophist within this framework. But these are
the wrong tools and the wrong questions. When seen in proper light, the
suggestions of the Sophist present themselves as topics the further exploration of
which is one of the more important philosophical tasks today." (p. 77-78)
(1) F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist
of Plato translated with a running commentary, p. 315.
241.
Morgan, Michael L. 1993. ""Philosophy" in Plato's Sophist." Proceedings of the
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy no. 9:83-111.
"In this paper I want to use a different approach to understand Plato's primary task
in the Sophist. I want to ask a rather large set of questions about the dialogue. These
questions arise out of the dialogue when it is viewed in terms of its relation to the
Theaetetus and Politicus, to issues Plato discusses in the Phaedo, Republic, and
Phaedrus, and to a consideration of Plato's place in fourth century Athenian culture.
Once I have stated these questions and clarified them, I shall consider how the
Sophist might be taken to answer them. All of this will be somewhat programmatic
and provisional. The Sophist is a puzzling, demanding, complex text, and to make
my case regarding the issues I have in mind would require much more evidence,
interpretation, and argument than I can provide here. This is a beginning, with a
promissory note for future development.
The questions that I want to ask about the Sophist are these: where, in the dialogue,
do we find what Plato would think of as philosophy? Where - if anywhere - does he
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engage in it? Where does he refer to it or describe it, either directly or indirectly?
Who is a philosopher in the Sophist-Socrates, the visitor from Elea, Plato, all or
none of these? And why does Plato here seek to articulate what sophistry is and
how it differs from philosophy?" (p. 84)
(...)
"Philosophy, then, differs from sophistry in purpose—as well as in method and
object, for philosophy is essential to the best human life. It is a form of intellectual
and religious transcendence that is divine because its objects are divine and hence
because its cognitive goal is pure, permanent, and comprehensive.
As the philosopher's understanding of the map of the world of Forms increases, so
does the clarity, purity, and stability of the soul.
To Isocrates Parmenides is a sophist; to Plato he is a philosopher and divine,
epithets that transfer to his followers, one a visitor to Athens, another Plato himself.
Eleatic in spirit, the visitor advocates views that are Platonic in letter, for Plato is
himself an Athenian with Eleatic convictions, and like the visitor a parricide and
disciple all at once." (p. 110)
242.
Morgenstern, Amy S. 2001. "Leaving the Verb 'To Be' Behind: An Alternative
Reading of Plato's Sophist." Dionysius no. 19:27-50.
"Equating the terms esti, to on, and ta onta with the verb "to be", understood
existentially, predicatively, or as an identity sign, cannot serve as a basis of an
illuminating approach to the Eleatic Stranger's investigation in Plato's Sophist. An
alternative reading of esti at 256 A 1, Esti de ghe dia to methexein tou ontos, allows
a more comprehensive analysis of the limitations and accomplishments of this
investigation. Here esti should be interpreted as rhema, i.e. a name that, in this
instance, says something about kinesis, the implied subject."
243.
Mourelatos, Alexander. 1979. "'Nothing' as 'Not-Being': Some Literary Contexts
that Bear on Plato." In Arktouros. Hellenic studies presented to Bernard M. W.
Knox on the occasion of his 65th birthday, edited by Bowersock, Glen, Burkert,
Walter and Putnam, Michael, 319-329. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Reprinted in: J. P. Anton, A. Preus (eds.), Essays in Ancient Greek philosophy,
Volume Two, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 59-69.
"It has often been noticed that Plato, and before him Parmenides, assimilates "what
is not" (to me ón) to "nothing" (medén or oudén).' Given that the central use of
"nothing" has important ties with the existential quantifier ("Nothing is here" ---- "It
is not the case that there is anything here"), it has widely been assumed that
contexts that document this assimilation also count as evidence that both within
them and in cognate ontological contexts the relevant sense of "being" or "to be" is
that of existence. That this assumption is not to be granted easily, has been
compellingly argued by G. E. L. Owen [Plato on Not-being, 1971]. His main
concern was to show that the assumption is particularly mischievous in the
interpretation of the Sophist, where he found it totally unwarranted. My own
concern is to attack the assumption on a broader plane. "Nothing" in English has
uses that do not depend on a tie with the existential quantifier. So too in Greek:
medén or oudén can be glossed as "what does not exist," but it can also be glossed
as "not a something," or in Owen's formulation, "what is not anything, what not-inany-way is': a subject with all the being knocked out of it and so unidentifiable, no
subject." In effect, the assimilation of "what is not" to "nothing" may-in certain
contexts-work in the opposite direction: not from "nothing" to "non-being" in the
sense of non-existence; rather from "non-being" as negative specification or
negative determination to "nothing" as the extreme of negativity or indeterminacy.
To convey the sense involved in this reverse assimilation I borrow Owen's
suggestive translation "not-being" for me on, a rendering which makes use of an
incomplete participle, rather than the complete gerund, of the verb "to be"." (p. 59
of the reprint)
(...)
"Observations made in this paper can be read as providing support, in yet a different
way, for a thesis advanced by Charles H. Kahn (22) and others. In a formulation I
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prefer, the thesis is that the dialectic of Being in classical Greek speculation focuses
not on "What there is" but on "What it is" or "How it is"; not on existence but on
physis, constitution, or form. (23)" (p. 67 of the reprint)
(22) See "Why Existence Does Not Emerge as a Distinct Concept in Greek
Philosophy," Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos. 58 (1976): 323-34; cf. Kahn, The Verb 'Be'
in Ancient Greek, Foundations of Language, suppl. ser., 16 (Dordrecht and Boston,
1973): 394-419.
244.
Mouzala, Melina. 2019. "Logos as "weaving together or communion of indications
about ousia" in Plato' s Sophist." Platonic Investigations no. 10:35-75.
Abstract: "In this paper, we set out to show that in the Sophist the interweaving of
Forms (sumplokē tōn eidōn) is the substantial presupposition of the existence of
logos, because what we do when we think and produce vocal speech is
understanding by our dianoia the way in which the Forms are interwoven, and what
we weave together in our speech are indications about ousia (peri tēn ousian
delōmata). Dianoia conceives of the relations between the Forms, and these
relations are reflected in our thought and its natural image, vocal speech. We
support the idea that we cannot interpret the Platonic conception of the relationship
between language and reality through the Aristotelian semiotic triangle, because
according to it the relation between pragmata or onta and logos becomes real
through the medium of thought (noēmata). On the contrary, logos in Plato has an
unmediated relation with reality and is itself reckoned among beings.
In parallel, we set out to show the difference between the Platonic conception of
logos and the Gorgianic approach to it, as well as the approaches of other Sophists
and Antisthenes.
Logos itself in Plato is a weaving which reflects the interweaving of Forms, while
vocal speech is a natural image of thought. Logos in its dual meaning, dianoia and
vocal speech, is illustrated in Dialectic, because as vocal speech is a mirror to
dianoia, so Dialectic is a means which clearly reflects the thinking procedures of
dianoia."
245.
Muckelbauer, John. 2001. "Sophistic Travel: Inheriting the Simulacrum through
Plato's The Sophist." Philosophy and Rhetoric no. 34:225-244.
"A single question marks our departure, a question that, while apparently
straightforward, has assumed so many shapes and disguises that it would not be
unjust to claim it has infected all of Western history. In its current manifestation,
however, we will take our cue from Plato in phrasing it thus: What is a Sophist?
When Plato first formulated the question in these terms, he well understood that its
self-evident simplicity could be deceptive and that its effects might proliferate
uncontrollably. As Jacques Derrida comments, “The question of what the Sophists
really were is an enormous question” (Olson 17). In Plato’s case, attempting to
“hunt down” the Sophist led from a disturbing journey through the world of images
to an unsettling encounter with the existence of nonbeing." (p. 225)
References
Olson, Gary. 1990. “Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition: A
Conversation,” Journal of Advanced Composition, 10.1: 1–21.
246.
Muniz, Fernando, and Rudebusch, George. 2018. "Dividing Plato’s Kinds."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 63:392-407.
Abstract: "A dilemma has stymied interpretations of the Stranger’s method of
dividing kinds into subkinds in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman. The dilemma
assumes that the kinds are either extensions (like sets) or intensions (like Platonic
Forms). Now kinds
divide like extensions, not intensions. But extensions cannot explain the distinct
identities of kinds that possess the very same members. We propose understanding a
kind as like an animal body—the Stranger’s simile for division—possessing both an
extension
(in its members) and an intension (in its form). We find textual support in the
Stranger’s paradigmatic four steps for collecting a subkind."
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247.
Naas, Michael. 2003. "For the Name's Sake." Epoché: A Journal for the History of
Philosophy no. 7:199-221.
Abstract: "In Plato's later dialogues, and particularly in the Sophist, there is a
general reinterpretation and rehabilitation of the name (onoma) in philosophy. No
longer understood rather vaguely as one of potentially dangerous and deceptive
elements of everyday language or of poetic language, the world onoma is recast in
the Sophist and related dialogues into one of the essential elements of a
philosophical language that aims to make claims or propositions about the way
things are. Onoma, now understood as name, is thus coupled with rhema, or verb, to
form the two essential elements of any logos, that is, any claim, statements, or
proposition.
This paper follows Plato's gradual rehabilitation and reinscription of the name from
early dialogues through late ones in order to demonstrate the new role Plato
fashions for language in these later works."
248.
Narcy, Michel. 2013. "Remarks on the First Five Definitions of the Sophist (Soph.
221c-235a)." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson,
Thomas M., 57-70. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"The Sophist is explicitly dedicated to the question of getting to know what
constitutes a sophist. It is, however, far from being the only dialogue where one
finds a definition of one. This is natural enough, given that, from the Apology to the
Theaetetus, a good part of Plato’s work is devoted to pointing out the difference
between Socrates and the sophists who were his contemporaries, considered less for
who they were as individuals or for the particular positions they adopted than as
representatives of a manner of thinking which Plato himself calls ‘sophistry’.(2) So
it is normal that, as part of the enterprise, Plato would have been led to clarify just
what the manner of thinking is which he condemns through the character Socrates.
The question one ought rather to answer, however, is: Why, after so many repeated
condemnations of sophistry, does Plato feel the need to devote a dialogue to it?
After the Theaetetus, and the antithesis there – which takes up the central part of the
dialogue – between the frequenter of the law courts and the philosopher,(3) is it still
necessary to ask the question whether the sophist and the philosopher are or are not
the same thing?" (p. 57)
(2) Cf. Gorg. 463b6, 465c2, 520b2; the Protagoras (316d3 – 4) talks of the
σοφιστική τέχνη. (I naturally leave aside from the calculation the occurrences of the
word in the Sophist).
(3) Theaetet. 172c3 –177b7.
249.
Nehamas, Alexander. 1982. "Participation and Predication in Plato's Later
Thought." The Review of Metaphysics no. 36:343-374.
Reprinted in: A. Nehamas, Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates,
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999, pp. 196-223.
"One of the central characteristics of Plato's later metaphysics is his view that
Forms can participate in other Forms. At least part of what the Sophist demonstrates
is that though not every Form participates in every other (252d2-11), every Form
participates in some Forms (252d12-253a2), and that there are some Forms in
which all Forms participate (253cl-2, 256a7-8). This paper considers some of the
reasons for this development, and some of the issues raised by it." (p. 343)
(...)
"Having many properties is not being many subjects. Beauty is many things in
virtue of participating in them, in virtue of bearing to them that relation which Plato
had earlier introduced in order to account for the claim of some things which are not
beautiful to be called "beautiful" nonetheless. But Plato came to see that the phrase
"are not" is illegitimate in this context.
(...)
In arriving at this realization and in extending the ability to have many names, that
is, to bear predicates, to Forms as well as to their participants, Plato finally left
behind the tradition from which he had emerged. This tradition, he realized, was
common to thinkers ranging from the sophists to the sage he most venerated and
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who was, astonishingly, discovered in the many-headed sophist's hiding place-a
place which, even more astonishingly, he had himself supplied. In the Sophist Plato
liberated himself from that tradition and showed that to have a characteristic is not
an imperfect way of being that characteristic. In this, I think, he offered us the first
solid understanding of the metaphysics of predication in western philosophy." (p.
374)
250.
Noriega-Olmos, Simon. 2012. "Plato’s Sophist 259E4-6." Journal of Ancient
Philosophy no. 6.
Abstract: "There are at least seven different well-known interpretations of Sophist
259E4-6. In this paper I show them to be either misleading, in conflict with the
context, or at odds with Plato’s project in the dialogue. I argue that 259E4-6 tells us
that in view of the fact that statements consist in the weaving of different linguistic
terms that stand for different extra-linguistic items, if there is to be statements, then
reality must consist in a plurality of items some of which mix with some and some
of which do not mix with some according to certain ontological rules. My argument
for this construal of Sophist 259E4-6 involves an analysis of the passage as well as
an assessment of how that text fits into its context."
251.
———. 2018-2019. "'Not-Being', 'Nothing', and Contradiction in Plato's "Sophist"
236D–239C." Archiv für Begriffgeschichte no. 60-61:7-46.
Abstract: "At 236D-239C, Sophist presents three arguments to the conclusions, that
the expression 'not-being' does not say or express anything, that we cannot even
conceive of the alleged entity of not- being and that we contradict ourselves when
claiming that not-being is not and that the expression 'not-being' does not express
anything at all. I intend to answer five questions concerning these arguments:
(Question 1) What does Plato mean when he says that the expression 'not-being'
does not say any- thing at all? (Q2) What sort of semantic relation does he think the
expression 'not-being' involves? (Q3) How could he possibly explain that 'notbeing' is, after all, an expression? (Q4) What does he think we are to learn about the
contradictions ensued by our talk of not-being? (Q5) And what does he think is the
ontological status of not- being? My motivation for considering these questions is
that the arguments against not-being in Sophist 236D-239C have not been
charitably discussed and therefore have not been fully explored."
252.
Notomi, Noburu. 1999. The Unity of Plato's Sophist: Between the Sophist and the
Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"The aim of this work is to clarify the topic with which the Sophist is mainly
concerned, and I do not discuss other hotly debated topics, such as the senses of the
verb 'to be', and the dialogue's relation to the theory of Forms." (p. XIV)
"About the philosopher only a few passing reflections are offered in the Middle
Part, as we saw in Chapter 7. It is a philosopher's attitude to value intelligence,
wisdom, and knowledge (249cro-d5), and it was also philosophical to admit the
proper combination of kinds, since it saved discourse, and therefore philosophy
(26oar-7). The more important passage is in the midst of the Middle Part (253c6254b6), where knowledge of dialectic is said to be rightly ascribed to the
philosopher. In that digression, the Eleatic visitor wonders whether the inquirers, in
searching for the sophist, may by chance have stumbled on the philosopher
(Passage 38: 253c6-9; cf. e4-6). Yet clearly the description of dialectic in that
digression (Passage 39) is not decisive, but rather, proleptic, and the mention of the
philosopher is just an anticipation which needs further investigation. In this way, the
question of what the philosopher is is not explicitly discussed in the Sophist.
However, this does not imply that Plato intended another dialogue, the Philosopher,
to give a fuller account and definition of the philosopher. On the contrary, the whole
project of the Sophist has already shown the philosopher in three ways." (p. 297)
"The Sophist says little about the philosopher, but the dialogue as a whole shows
something of what the philosopher really is. The inquirers try to be philosophers in
defining the sophist, by performing dialectic. Apart from this way, there does not
seem to be any other proper way of revealing the essence of the philosopher; for it
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is by our confronting the sophist within ourselves that philosophy can be secured
and established." (p. 299)
253.
———. 2007. "Plato on What Is Not." In Maieusis. Essays on Ancient Philosophy
in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, edited by Scott, Dominic, 254-275. New York:
Oxford University Press.
"What is not (τὸ μὴ ὄν) was scarcely discussed in ancient philosophy before Plato.
Although this phrase, or concept, made occasional appearances in philosophical
arguments, it did not figure as their primary subject." (p. 254)
(...)
"Modern philosophers often assume that Plato treats what is not merely as the
privation of being and that he dismisses the idea of absolute nothingness from the
inquiry altogether, although the latter always remains a real philosophical problem.
Pointing to the way in which Plato in the Sophist describes what is not as ‘different
from what is’, these philosophers fault him for reducing the problem of absolute
nothingness to that of something lacking particular properties. Against this
interpretation, which at first sight seems to give an adequate account of the
argument of the dialogue, I suggest that Plato tackles a more profound problem.
What is not is no more trivial or easy to deal with than its counterpart, what is. It is
perhaps a more perplexing concept, since it seems to prevent any discussion
(λόγος). This feature takes us to the heart of the problem that Plato faces in the
Sophist. There he works out a new strategy to overcome the difficulty: what is not
can only be clarified together with what is. The purpose of my paper is to clarify the
implication of this strategy." (pp. 255-256)
254.
———. 2008. "Plato Against Parmenides: Sophist 236d-242b." In Reading Ancient
Texts: Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien, edited by
Suzanne, Stern-Gillet and Corrigan, Kevin, 167-187. Leiden: Brill.
"Parmenides, one of the greatest and most influential Greek thinkers, is not
mentioned in Plato’s earlier dialogues. His name appears only n four dialogues:
Symposium, Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Sophist. This peculiar fact by no means
implies that Parmenides had little influence on Plato’s earlier thinking. On the
contrary, it is generally agreed that Republic V bases the theory of forms on the
Parmenidean scheme of what is and what is not. Nevertheless, that passage contains
no reference to its source. (p. 167)
(...)
"It is noteworthy that Parmenides is never mentioned again after the Sophist." (p.
168)
(...)
"In presenting his own view, O’Brien criticises my reading of the Sophist on
philological and philosophical grounds.(8)" (p. 169)
(...)
"Our disagreement concerns how we view Plato’s attitude toward Parmenides.
O’Brien suggests that Plato introduces a new distinction between two ‘kinds’ of
what is not, which is unknown to Parmenides. Consequently, according to him,
Plato’s response is oblique. From one point of view, Plato can agree with
Parmenides, while from another he is in disagreement; but from the standpoint of
Parmenides himself, Plato’s criticism is irrelevant or unanswerable. By contrast, my
reading is straightforward: Plato tackles the same philosophical difficulty that
Parmenides faces, and criticises him so forcefully in order to secure the possibility
of logos and philosophy.
In this paper, I present my arguments against O’Brien’s criticisms, first by focusing
on the key text, secondly by reconsidering Plato’s strategy, and finally in respect of
philosophical interpretation.(9)" (p. 170)
(8) O’Brien (2000), 56, 68–75, 79, 84, 93–94, 96, takes up and criticises my 1999
(esp. pp. 173–179).
(9) I have also discussed Plato’s argument on what is not, in Notomi (forthcoming).
References
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Notomi, N. (1999), The Unity of Plato’s Sophist: between the sophist and the
philosopher, Cambridge.
Notomi, N. (forthcoming), ‘Plato on what is not’, D. Scott ed., Maieusis: Festschrift
for Myles Burnyeat, Oxford. [2007]
O'Brien D. (2000), ‘Parmenides and Plato on what is not’, M. Kardaun and J.
Spruyt eds., The Winged Chariot, Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in
Honour of L.M. de Rijk, Leiden: 19–104.
255.
———. 2011. "Where is the Philosopher? A single project of the Sophist and the
Statesman." In Formal Structures in Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus, Sophist and
Statesman, edited by Lisi, Francesco Leonardo, Migliori, Maurizio and MonserratMolas, Josep, 216-236. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.
256.
———. 2011. "Dialectic as Ars combinatoria: Plato's Notion of Philosophy in the
Sophist." In Plato's Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum
Pragense, edited by Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 146-195. Praha: Oikoymenh.
257.
———. 2011. "Image-Making in Republic X and the Sophist. Plato’s Criticism of
the Poet and the Sophist." In Plato and the Poets, edited by Destrée, Pierre and
Herrmann, Fritz-Gregor, 299-326. Leiden: Brill.
"The famous phrase, ‘the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry’ (Rep. X,
607b), represents Plato’s critical attitude towards poetry. However, this phrase
might mislead us, the modern readers, in multiple ways.
I believe it as yet a matter in need of clarification what the real target of Plato’s
criticism is and how he deals with it. To re-examine his treatment of poetry reveals
how Plato conceptualizes his own pursuit, namely philosophy, in contrast to its
rivals." (p. 299)
(...)
"The Sophist is the later dialogue which finally defines the sophist as ‘the imitator
(mimêtês) of the wise’ (Soph. 268c). While this dialogue does not deal with a poet
or poetry in a direct way, it nevertheless examines the foundation of Plato’s earlier
criticism of poetry in Republic X: namely the ontological basis of the art of imagemaking. Plato’s implicit intention can be seen in remarkable correspondences
between the two dialogues."
(...)
"Republic X presents the ontological argument to criticise the poet; poetry is treated
as a special kind of making, i.e. image-making or imitation.
In a parallel way, the Sophist defines the sophist as a specific kind of making, i.e.
image-making and apparition-making in particular. Finally we should consider
some differences between the two treatments of image-making.
First of all, while, as we saw in the previous section, the Sophist confronts the
difficult challenge concerning the problematic notions of ‘image’ and ‘making’, the
Republic does not seem to worry about such a metaphysical danger. Whereas the
Sophist clarifies the concept of image in the course of defining the sophist, the
Republic simply uses it." (p. 324, notes omitted)
258.
———. 2017. "Reconsidering the Relations between the Statesman, the
Philosopher, and the Sophist." In Plato’s Statesman: Dialectic, Myth, and Politics,
edited by Sallis, John, 183-195. Albany: State University of New York Press.
"In the opening conversation of the Sophist, Socrates (just before the trial in 399
BC) raises a crucial problem about the philosopher: how to distinguish between
three kinds of people, a philosopher, a sophist, and a statesman." (p. 184)
(...)
"From this initial problem, the Sophist first engages in definition of the sophist and
finally clarifies what the sophist is. The Statesman next discusses and defines the
statesman." (p. 184)
(...)
"In the Sophist, the philosopher surprisingly appears in the middle of the inquiry.
When the art of discerning combinations and separations of kinds is discussed, the
Eleatic Visitor abruptly suggests that they may have come across the philosopher
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before finding the sophist (253c), and he gives a description of the art of dialectic,
which belongs to philosophy. However, when he says that they will see the
philosopher more clearly if they wish (254b), this is far from clear indication of a
plan for another dialogue.
Rather, it is more important that the inquirers may have encountered the
philosopher already in search for the sophist; for they are like two sides of one coin,
or, more precisely, the original and its image." (p. 185)
The Sophist does not present the definition of the philosopher, but it finally shows
the philosopher through definition of the sophist in three ways (11):
(1) First, since each feature of the sophist illuminates its opposite characteristic, the
definitions of the sophist show what the philosopher should be. In addition to the
contrast between apparition making (φανταστική) and likeness making (εἰκαστική),
which we shall see, the sophist is characterized as “ironical” in consciously
concealing his ignorance (267e–268a), while the philosopher sincerely admits it.
(2) Second, the inquiry into the sophist discusses dialectic (διαλεκτική), the art of
the philosopher, in the middle part of the dialogue. The inquirers actually practice
and demonstrate dialectical arguments, and thereby show what philosophers should
do.
(3) Third, the project of the whole dialogue, namely, to define the sophist and
thereby to show the philosopher, is itself a pre-eminent task of the philosopher. In
this way, the Sophist represents the philosopher in stark contrast to the sophist. As
for the problematic sixth definition, the “sophist of noble lineage” eventually turns
out to represent more Socrates than the sophist." (pp. 185, 186 a note omitted)
(11) Cf. Notomi, The Unity of Plato’s Sophist, 296–301.
259.
O'Brien, Denis. 1993. "Non-Being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: a Prospectus
for the Study of Ancient Greek Philosophy." In Modern Thinkers and Ancient
Thinkers, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 1-26. London: University College London
Press.
English version of "Le non-être dans la philosophie grecque: Parménide, Platon,
Plotin", in Pierre Aubenque (ed.), Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, Napoli:
Bibliopolis 1991, pp. 317-364.
"Negation and contrariety. In the Sophist, a Stranger from Elea sets out to refute
Parmenides. Or so at least he does in most modern studies of that deceptively
simple dialogue. But because Parmenides has been misunderstood, so too,
inevitably, has been the Eleatic Stranger's criticism of Parmenides. For although the
Eleatic Stranger does warn of the dangers of parricide (he may have to murder
Parmenides, the father of Greek philosophy), in fact he starts off by agreeing with
Parmenides, and that agreement, contrary to what most modern scholars will tell
you, is never withdrawn or cancelled in the course of the argument.
Let me explain. The Eleatic Stranger distinguishes between two uses of the
negation in the expression to me on, "what is not".
The negation may be used to mean "what is not in any way at all" (to medamos on,
237b7-8). "What is not in any way at all" is what would be, impossibly, the contrary
of being (d. 258e6-7).
Impossibly: for there is no contrary of being, since there is nothing entirely without
participation in being. What is entirely without participation in being is what you
might expect it to be - just plain nothing. There isn't any." (p. 5)
260.
———. 2000. "Parmenides and Plato on What is Not." In The Winged Chariot:
Collected Essays on Plato and Platonism in Honour of L.M. de Rijk, edited by
Kardaun, Maria and Spruyt, Joke, 19-104. Leiden: Brill.
"Understanding of Plato's Sophist cannot therefore be dissociated from our
understanding of the poem of Parmenides, and vice versa.
To understand the poem of Parmenides we need to appreciate that the goddess is
working with a single conception of non-being, an appreciation which we can best
arrive at by seizing the distinction between the two uses of non-being that are
established in Plato's Sophist and yet, at the same time, refusing to read back that
distinction into the poem of Parmenides.
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Understanding the Sophist requires us, on the contrary, to appreciate that the
Stranger arrives at his new definition of 'what is not' by consciously distancing
himself from the way in which Parmenides had thought of nonbeing, nearly one
hundred years before.
The distinction between the two 'kinds' of non-being is, in both cases, the same. But
where the Stranger consciously and deliberately marshals his arguments in the light
of that distinction, Parmenides, on the contrary, produces the arguments he does
because the Stranger's distinction forms no part of his conscious self. (298)" (p. 90)
(298) Some of the implications of this style of conclusion for how I understand the
history of philosophy are spelt out in O'Brien (1993).
References
O'Brien, D. (1993) 'Non-being in Parmenides, Plato and Plotinus: A Prospectus for
the Study of Ancient Greek Philosophy', in Modem Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers,
The Stanley Victor Keeling Memorial Lectures at University College London,
1981-1991, ed. R. W. Sharples (London) 1-26.
261.
———. 2011. "The Stranger's "Farewell" (Sophist 258e6-259a1)." In Plato's
Sophist: Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Platonicum Pragense, edited by
Havlíček, Aleš and Karfík, Filip, 199-220. Praha: Oikoymenh.
"‘Don’t let anyone try and tell us that we dare say of the contrary of being that it is.
We have long ago said farewell to any contrary of being, to the question of whether
it is or of whether it isn’t…’ Those are the first words spoken by the Stranger after
Theaetetus’ enthusiastic reaction (258 E 4-5: ‘absolutely so’, ‘most true’) to the
Stranger’s declaration (258 D 5-E 3) that he and Theaetetus have ‘dared’ speak of
‘the form that there turns out to be, of what is not’.
A ‘contrary of being’. A ‘form that there turns out to be, of what is not’. The
meaning of those two expressions, together with their difference of meaning, lies at
the very heart of Plato’s dialogue, of what the Sophist is all about. If the meaning,
with the difference in meaning, of those two expressions has not been understood,
then the dialogue itself has not been understood." (p. 199)
262.
———. 2013. "A Form that 'Is' of What 'Is Not' . Existential Einai in Plato's
Sophist " In The Platonic Art of Philosophy, edited by Boys-Stones, George, El
Murr, Dimitri and Gill, Christopher, 221-248. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
"Motivated by an otherwise very understandable desire to study ancient
philosophical texts philosophically, recent commentators have taken to weeding out
from Plato’s dialogues any existential use of the verb einai, seemingly in deference
to the supposedly philosophical principle that existence cannot be a predicate. The
result is disastrous. This is not only because Plato very clearly does use the verb as
a predicate complete in itself, with a meaning that can properly be described as
‘existential’, notably in his account of being and non-being in the Sophist, but also
because the principle itself is not what it is all too often thought to be." (p. 221)
(...)
"Veer to one side or another of that narrow line and you end up in one or other of
the errors portrayed in the concluding pages of this essay. Identify the form of nonbeing with a straightforward negation of the existential meaning of the verb, and the
Stranger will end up asserting, of ‘what is not in any way at all’, that it ‘is’
(Notomi’s error). Identify the form of non-being with a negation of the copulative
use of the verb joined to any and every complement, so that ‘non-being’ is so
because it is ‘other than’ and therefore ‘is not’ any one of all the vast variety of
different forms that participate in being, and you will end up asserting, of ‘being
itself ’, that it is ‘non-being’ (Owen’s error). Start from Plato’s own assumption that
an existential use of einai has to be subjected to the same analysis as ‘is the same’
or ‘is beautiful’, with one specific part of otherness, and only one, opposed to
‘being’, whether to the form or to the instantiation of the form, while at the same
time taking into account the different extension of forms that are, and forms that are
not, participated universally, and you will, if you pay close attention to both syntax
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and argument, avoid both errors. You may even come within shouting distance of
the essentials of Plato’s reply to Parmenides." (p. 248)
263.
———. 2013. "Does Plato refute Parmenides?" In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited
by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 117-155. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"I have a couple of times ventured to suggest that in the Sophist Plato does not
refute Parmenides.(2) The reaction has been, to say the least, hostile.(3) Hostile,
with more than a touch of disapproval. You might have thought I had suggested that
the Queen of England was a man. The suggestion was not only false, but foolish. A
mere eye-catcher. Absurd, and unseemly." (p. 117)
(...)
"Not only is it obvious why Plato should want to refute Parmenides; it also seems
clear enough, to many readers of Plato’s Sophist, that he no less obviously claims to
do so. When the Stranger of Plato’s dialogue introduces Parmenides (237a3 – b3),
he quotes a pair of verses giving voice to what are called elsewhere in the poem the
‘opinions of mortals’ (fr. 1.30 and 8.51 –52), summarised in the pithy sentence
‘things that are not, are’ (237a8 = fr. 7.1: εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα)." (p. 119)
(...)
"Pinned down to their context, the places where the Stranger supposedly speaks of
successfully ‘refuting’ Parmenides vanish like the morning dew on a summer’s day.
But if the Stranger doesn't claim to have ‘refuted’ Parmenides, does he then leave it
to be understood that he therefore agrees with him?
Not at all. But at the crucial moment when he prepares to trumpet his discovery of
‘the form that there turns out to be, of what is not’, the language he uses is not the
language of ‘refutation’.
The Stranger: ‘So do you think we’ve been unfaithful to Parmenides, in taking up a
position too far removed from his prohibition?’ (258c6 – 7: οἶσθ᾽ οὖν ὅτι
Παρμενίδῃ μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἠπιστήκαμεν) Theaetetus: ‘What do you
mean?’ (258c8: τί δή;)
The Stranger: ‘By pushing on ahead with the search, what we’ve shown him goes
beyond the point where he told us to stop looking’ (cf. 258c9 –10: πλεῖον ἢ 'κεῖνος
ἀπεῖπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἔτι ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.).
Just so. The metaphor of distance, of uncharted and forbidden territories, hits off the
situation very neatly. The Stranger and Theaetetus have entered a new world, far
removed from the world of Parmenides, and have survived to tell the tale. But that
does not mean that they claim to have ‘refuted’ him in any simple sense. How could
they have done?
Refutation implies contradiction. No-one in his right mind would think to contradict
Parmenides’ denial that ‘things that are not, are’, in so far as those words are taken
as meaning, or even as implying, that ‘things that do not exist, do exist’." (pp. 151152, note omitted)
(2) O’Brien (1995) 87 – 88, (2000) 94 –98.
(3) Dixsaut (2000) 269 n. 2. Notomi (2007) 167 – 187.
References
Dixsaut, M., Platon et la question de la pensée, Paris 2000 = Dixsaut (2000).
Notomi, N., ‘Plato against Parmenides: Sophist 236D-242B’, in S. Stern-Gillet and
K.Corrigan (eds.), Reading Ancient Texts, vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in
Honour of Denis O’Brien, Leiden-Boston 2007, 167 – 187 = Notomi (2007).
O’Brien, D., Le Non-être. Deux études sur le ‘Sophiste’ de Platon, Sankt Augustin
1995 = O’Brien (1995).
O’Brien, D., ‘Parmenides and Plato on What is Not’, in M. Kardaun and J. Spruyt
(eds.), The Winged Chariot. Collected essays on Plato and Platonism in honour of
L. M. de Rijk, Leiden, Boston, Köln 2000, 19 – 104 = O’Brien (2000).
264.
———. 2019. "To Be and Not To Be in Plato's Sophist." In Passionate Mind.
Essays in Honor of John M. Rist, edited by David, Barry, 93-136. Baden-Baden:
Academia Verlag.
"Surely you can no more say of something that it both is and is not (as do
Parmenides’ mortals) than you can say of it that, at one and the same time, it is non-
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being and being (as does the Stranger of Plato’s Sophist)?
3. Words and their meaning
The solution to the puzzle, if there is one, will have to depend on the precise
meaning of the words in Greek. Dictionaries and grammars will take you only so
far. The ultimate test has to be Plato’s use of the common idiom of his time,
modified, when necessary, by the context—by the meaning, however idiosyncratic,
that he has given his words in the course of an argument.
Those are the two criteria adopted in the course of this article. To steer your way
through the Greek text of the Sophist, you will need to recognise a distinction that
Plato has taken over from the common parlance of the day, while at the same time
adapting it to his own purposes.
The distinction lies between two uses of einai, its common-or-garden use as a
copula, joining a subject to an attribute, the verb and its attribute making up the
predicate (x ‘is so-and-so’), and a less common, but still well authenticated, use as a
predicate complete in itself (x ‘is’), traditionally called, for convenience, an
‘existential’ use of the verb, simply because such a use may easily lend itself, in
modern English, to translation by ‘exist’." (p. 3 a note omitted)
265.
O'Leary-Hawthorne, Diane. 1996. "Not-Being and Linguistic Deception." Apeiron
no. 29:165-198.
"Though it is certainly clear that Plato spends a great deal of time in this dialogue
[the Sophist] grappling with problems that we now place squarely in the domain of
philosophy of language, we should think carefully about the context of these
pursuits. As Owen,
Wiggins, Pelletier and countless others would have it, Plato is concerned with the
nature of language, with the structure of sentences, with negation, with truth and
with falsity simply because these problems are important and Plato was aware of
their importance. Reluctant as I am to place any obstacles in the way of Plato's
unstable popularity, I submit that we must think again about the relevance that these
problems had for Plato." (p. 167)
(...)
"At the very least, even if we are skeptical about attributing a mistrust of language
to Plato, there are certainly grounds here for caution. If indeed Plato has devoted
himself in the Sophist to repairing 'the naive semantics of natural language' or some
similar project, it is
unlikely that he will have done so without some hint as to how these issues might fit
into his broad scheme of philosophical knowledge. At best Plato is concerned with
linguistic matters in the Sophist precisely because he wants to examine and explain
what underlies the linguistic skepticism that runs through the dialogues. In what
follows I shall argue that beneath the glistening surface of debate about reference
and truth in the Sophist there does lie a beautifully simple, though highly rigorous,
account of the disparity between language and the world it purports to represent.
Embedded within the Stranger's most technical linguistic pursuits is something we
should have been missing in the Platonic corpus, that is, an explanation of Plato's
persistent suggestion that language is not a good place to turn for philosophical
insight." (p. 168)
266.
O'Rourke, Fran. 2003. "Plato's Approach to Being in the Theaetetus and Sophist,
and Heidegger's Attribution of Aristotelian Influence." Diotima.Revue de recherche
philosophique no. 31:47-58.
"Olympiodorus reports the last dream of Plato: «Shortly before he died, Plato
dreamt that he had become a swan which flew from tree to tree, thereby causing the
utmost trouble to the archers who wanted to shoot him down.
Simmias the Socratic interpreted the dream as meaning that Plato would elude all
the pains of his interpreters. For to archers may be likened those interpreters who
try to hunt out the hidden meanings of the ancients, but Plato is elusive because his
writings, like those of Homer, must be understood in many senses, both physically,
and ethically, and theologically, and literally»(1)" (p. 47)
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"It is significant to note that in the three dialogues we have examined, the Phaedrus,
Theaetetus and Sophist, Plato brings the reciprocal, dynamic, distinction and
relation «to act and act upon» to bear in his reflections, respectively, on φύσις,
κίνησις, and είναι: these themes are inseparable; they refer to the intrinsic principles
of every reality in its constitution, operation and foundation. The distinction and
relation are clearly for Plato of central and lasting importance. In further support of
Plato's own discovery of δύναμις it is worth noting that for Plato in the Republic,
the Good which is the principle of all things, the source of their Being and
intelligibility, is not itself Being, but «lies beyond Being, surpassing it in dignity
and power» (509 b: ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.). This
is to place power at the heart of being, suggesting that for Plato the dignity or value
of being is its power to act or be acted upon! Επέκεινα is indeed an unresolved
dilemma.
Despite the criticisms offered earlier, we must conclude that Plato contributed
immeasurably to the early development of the philosophy of being. His selfreproach, that the discussion in the Sophist concerning nonbeing was lengthy and
irrelevant, is not only harsh but untrue. To quote Solon, as he does himself:
x.χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά [beautiful/goods things are difficult]. The Sophist is a worthy
contribution to this most difficult and rewarding of questions. It offers rich insights
and distinctive signposts on a path of far reaching discovery. To refer again to
Olympiodorus (32): whereas Aristotle wrote that all men seek wisdom, he suggests
that all philosophers seek Plato as a source which overflows with wisdom and
inspiration. Plato deserves our praise and, in words which he placed in the mouth of
Socrates, in Athens it is easy to praise an Athenian." (pp. 57-58)
(1) Olympiodorus, Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, ed. L. G.
Westerink, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1956, p. 6.
(32) Loc. cit., cf. supra and n. 1.
267.
Oberhammer, Arnold. 2021. "Dialectic in Plato’s Sophist and Derrida’s ‘Law of the
Supplement of Copula’ " In Platonism: Ficino to Foucault, edited by Rees, Valery,
Corrias, Anna, Crasta, Francesca M., Follesa, Laura and Giglioni, Guido, 314-324.
Leiden: Brill.
"Derrida [*] refers to Sophist 253d, where the Eleatic Stranger determines being to
be the ability (δύναμις) to connect. He sees being (ὄν), in addition to motion and
rest, as the third ‘in the soul’ (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ).(12) The progress of the Eleatic Stranger,
as opposed to the older aporetic ontologies where either motion or rest were
considered to be, is based on the concept of ‘otherness’, ἕτερον. Being is different
(ἕτερον) to motion and rest with the result that, ‘according to its own nature’ (κατὰ
τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν), it is neither one nor the other.(13) Plato’s definition of being as
disposition (δύναμις) or commonality (κοινωνία) takes place with reference to ‘the
most general classes’ (μεγίστα γένη), which are connected because they are
different to each other. In line with the critique of some ‘old men who came by
learning late in life,’ it is impossible for one to be many.
Here the relationship between λόγος and ὄν takes centre stage.(14)" (pp. 316-317)
(12) Plato, Sophist, 250b7–10: ‘τρίτον ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὂν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθείς,
ὡς ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου τήν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχομένην, συλλαβὼν καὶ ἀπιδὼν
αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπας ἀμφότερα.’
(13) 13 Ibid., c3–7: ‘οὐκ ἄρα κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶ συναμφότερον τὸ ὂν ἀλλ᾽
ἕτερον δή τι τούτων. […] κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὂν οὔτε ἕστηκεν οὔτε
κινεῖται.’
(14) Ibid., 251b6: ‘τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι.’
[*] Derrida, Jacques. ‘Le supplément de copule: La philosophie devant la
linguistique,’ in
J. Derrida, Marges de la philosophie. Paris: Les Éditiones de Minuit, 1972, 209–46.
268.
Oscanyan, Frederick S. 1973. "On Six definitions of the Sophist: Sophist 221c231e." Philosophical Forum no. 4:241-259.
Abstract: "The paper shows that the definitions of the Sophist on 221c-231e refer to
specific contemporaries of Socrates: Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus,
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Euthydemus and Thrasymachus. Produced by the method of divisions, each
definition consists of a nesting class of attributes. An examination of the Platonic
corpus reveals that these same characteristics are used to satirically describe the
sophists listed above. As the final definition equally describes Thrasymachus and
Socrates, it is shown why Plato viewed the method of divisions as inadequate for
obtaining the proper definition of sophistry: a good Platonic definition must have
ostensive truth as well as essential validity."
269.
Owen, Gwilym Ellis Lane. 1966. "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present."
Monist:317-340.
Reprinted in: Alexander Mourelatos (ed.), The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of
Critical Essays, Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974 and in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic,
Science, and Dialectic. Collected Papers in Greek Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986 pp. 27-44.
"In sum, it is part of the originality of Plato to have grasped, or half-grasped, an
important fact about certain kinds of statement, namely that they are tenseless
whereas others are tensed. But he tries to bring this contrast under his familiar
distinction between the changeless and the changing. So he saddles the familiar
distinction with a piece of conceptual apparatus taken from Parmenides, a tenseform which retains enough of a present sense to be coupled with expressions for
permanence and stability, yet which has severed its links with the future and the
past. Armed with this device Plato is able to turn the distinction between tensed and
tenseless statements into a more congenial distinction between timebound and
timeless, changing and immutable, objects.
But at a price. The concept of stability has been stretched so that stability is no
longer a function of time. And the interesting propositions, so far from staying
tenseless, are restated in an artificial and degenerate tense-form. The theory for
which we are asked to tolerate these anomalies will need to hold firm against
scrutiny. But on scrutiny there seems to be something wrong at its roots.
What is wrong, I think, can be put very shortly. It is that to be tensed or tenseless is
a property of statements and not of things, and that paradoxes come from confusing
this distinction; just as they come from trying to manufacture necessary beings out
of the logical necessity that attaches to certain statements. But how is the distinction
to be recognized? One way, a good way, is to notice that tenseless statements are
not proprietary to one sort of subject and tensed statements to another. And there
seems to be evidence in another work of Plato that he did notice this, and brought
the point home by a valid argument.
I want to end by discussing that evidence. It occurs in the Sophist, in the criticism
that the chief speaker brings against the so-called "friends of the Forms.(15)" (pp.
335-336)
(15) My account of this argument lies close to that given by J. M. E. Moravcsik
[Being and Meaning in the Sophist] in Acta Philosophica Fennica, 14 (1962), 3540, which should be consulted for its criticism of alternative views.
270.
———. 1971. "Plato on Not-Being." In Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I:
Metaphysics and Epistemology, edited by Vlastos, Gregory, 104-137. Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University Press.
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in
Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 104-137 and
in: Gail Fine (ed.), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999, pp. 416-454.
"Platonists who doubt that they are Spectators of Being must settle for the
knowledge that they are investigators of the verb 'to be'. Their investigations make
them familiar with certain commonplaces of the subject for which, among Plato's
dialogues, the Sophist is held to contain the chief evidence. But the evidence is not
there, and the attempt to find it has obstructed the interpretation of that hard and
powerful dialogue. The commonplaces that I mean are these: In Greek, but only
vestigially in English, the verb 'to be' has two syntactically distinct uses, a complete
or substantive use in which it determines a one-place predicate ('X is', 'X is not Y')
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and an incomplete use in which it determines a two-place predicate ('X is Y' , 'X is
not Y'). To this difference there answers a semantic distinction. The verb in its first
use signifies 'to exist' (for which Greek in Plato's day had no separate word) or else,
in Greek but only in translators' English, 'to be real' or 'to be the case' or 'to be true',
these senses being all reducible to the notion of the existence of some object or state
of affairs; while in its second use it is demoted to a subject-predicate copula (under
which we can here include the verbal auxiliary) or to an identity sign. Plato's major
explorations of
being and not-being are exercises in the complete or 'existential' use of the verb.
And, lest his arguments should seem liable to confusion by this versatile word, in
the Sophist he marks off the first use from the verb's other use or uses and draws a
corresponding distinction within the negative constructions represented by to me
on, 'not-being' or 'what is not'. For the problems which dominate the central
argument of the Sophist are existence problems, so disentangling the different
functions of the verb 'to be' is a proper step to identifying and resolving them." (pp.
104-105, notes omitted)
271.
———. 1973. "Plato on the Undepictable." In Exegesis and Argument. Studies in
Greek philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos, edited by Lee, Edward N.,
Mourelatos, Alexander and Rorty, Richard, 349-361. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Reprinted in: G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science and Dialectic. Collected Papers in
Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 138-147.
272.
Pacitti, Domenico. 1991. The Nature of the Negative. Towards an Understanding of
Negation and Negativity. Pisa: Giardini editori.
Contents: Preface IX-X; On the nature of the Negative 1; Epilogue 77; Notes 79;
Bibliographical references 103; Index nominum 115-118.
On Plato's Sophist see in particular pp. 63-75.
"The immensity of the 'tours de force' necessary in the Parmenides and Sophist for
the admission of nonbeing on a par with being reflects the enormous hold that
Parmenides must have exerted over the Greeks. His writing in verse, like the
monotheist Xenophanes, reflects divine inspiration and the transcendent powers of
thought. Thus it is not he but the goddess who speaks throughout.
The style of Parmenides fr. B8, 12-21 is strikingly reminiscent of the Vedic hymn
and may easily be read as a solution to the anonymous poet's riddle. But his answer
that there is only 'is' and no 'is not' cannot, I think, be understood as meaning that
Parmenides wished to reject negative predication out, as Anscombe (Parmenides,
Mystery and Contradiction, 1969) would have in the first place, Parmenides himself
consistently uses negatives, which would be highly implausible if that was what he
wished to outlaw, and secondly, his position on the illusory nature of 'opinion' and
the nonexistence of what is not is quite compatible with the use of the negative.
For in Parmenides (fr. B2, B6, 1-2, & B8 34-36) thought and reality are probably
even more closely bound together than in Plato, in that reality - or at least true
reality - can be thought, and if 'opinion' is part of what is not, then the result of
thinking that is what he calls a non-thought, which must be taken to mean
something that is not a true or authentic thought. We find Aristotle (Posterior
Analytics 89a) still pondering over this problem of how true knowledge and mere
opinion could have the same object of reference.
Similarly, Parmenides' convincing rebuttal (fr. 3) of what is having been produced
out of what is not, which would then mean what is being in some sense what is not,
led Aristotle (De Anima 417a and Metaphysics 1051b) to his theory of potentiality
in order to bridge the gap somehow between nonbeing and being.
And this is a radical challenge to the common concept of time: the unreality of past
and future which are illusory, the present which is all there is, timeless and eternal.
For Parmenides, then, reason, namely the correct use of thought in contact with
reality - not the world of appearance but the real world - will alone lead to truth."
(pp. 73-74)
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273.
Painter, Corinne. 2014. "The Stranger as a Socratic Philosopher: The Socratic
Nature of the Stranger’s Investigation of the Sophist." The St. John's Review no.
56:65-73.
"Much of the secondary literature on Plato’s Sophist considers the Stranger to be a
non-Socratic philosopher, and regards his appearance in the dialogues as a sign that
Plato had moved on from his fascination with Socrates to develop a more “mature”
way of philosophizing.(2) This essay will argue, on the contrary, that the
investigation led by the Stranger in the Sophist demonstrates an essentially Socratic
philosophical stance. In order to do this, I will consider carefully some dramatic
evidence in the Sophist that allows us to notice a philosophical “transformation” in
the Stranger.
My consideration focuses upon the Stranger’s rejection of the Parmenidean way of
philosophizing followed by his acceptance of the Socratic way of practicing
philosophy. This is revealed most decisively by the Stranger’s willingness to pursue
truth and justice at the expense of overturning the practices of his philosophical
training, and, secondarily, by his genuine concern with showing that Socrates is not
guilty of sophistry."
(2) There are far too many accounts to list here; but see, for example, Stanley
Rosen, Plato’s Sophist: The Drama of the Original and Image (South Bend, Indiana:
St. Augustine’s Press, 1999). Just as Rosen argues in his text, most of the accounts
in the literature that treat this issue view the Stranger as non-Socratic and advance
the position that he represents at least a change, or perhaps even a progression, in
Plato’s thinking away from, for instance, emphasis on the Socratic elenchus, to a
more developed, mature philosophical practice that emphasizes dialectic."
274.
Painter, Corinne Michelle. 2005. "In Defense of Socrates: The Stranger's Role in
Plato's Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 9:317-333.
Abstract: "In this essay I argue that the Stranger's interest in keeping the
Philosopher and the Sophist distinct is connected, primarily, to his assessment of the
charges of Sophistry advanced against Socrates, which compels him to defend
Socrates from these unduly advanced accusations. On this basis, I establish that the
Stranger's task in the Sophist, namely to keep philosophy distinct from sophistry, is
intimately tied to the project of securing justice and is therefore not merely of
theoretical importance but is also -- and essentially - of political and ethical
significance."
275.
Palmer, John. 1999. Plato's Reception of Parmenides. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
"The Gorgianic perspective on Parmenides' philosophy also figures crucially in the
First Deduction of the subsequent exercise in which Parmenides undertakes an
examination of his own theory. Plato has Parmenides reject this reductive
perspective, thereby providing us with a crucially important instance of how Plato
is concerned with combating certain sophistic appropriations of Parmenides so as to
recover him for the uses he himself wants to make. This dynamic of reappropriation
becomes increasingly important as we continue to examine Plato's later period
reception.
This theme in fact guides my discussion of the complex representation of
Parmenides in the Sophist, where I argue that Plato's efforts to define the Sophist so
as to discriminate between this figure and the Philosopher are accompanied by an
attempt to recover Parmenides from sophistic appropriations that challenge certain
of the key distinctions of Plato's middle period metaphysics. I therefore take
issue with the common view that Plato in the Sophist is determined to 'refute'
Parmenides. The Sophist's denial of the viability of the distinctions between truth
and falsehood and between reality and
appearance employ the logic of Parmenides in ways Plato himself finds
unacceptable. Plato's own view of Parmenides in this dialogue emerges in the
ontological doxography in which Parmenides is significantly associated with
Xenophanes and in the subsequent interrogation of this doxography's first two
groups. The interrogation of the Eleatics in particular has important connections
with various deductions in the Parmenides's dialectical exercise. These connections
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make it possible to see where in each dialogue Plato is concerned with sophistic
appropriations of Parmenides and where he is engaging with him in ways that
reflect his own understanding. This understanding is reflected to some extent in
portions of the Timaeus but most directly and importantly in the Parmenides's
Second Deduction. I therefore conclude this study by describing how Plato will
have understood Parmenides' account of the attributes of Being in B8 and the
relation of this account to the cosmology he presented alongside
it, and I explain how this understanding is reflected in the Second Deduction." (p.
16)
276.
Palumbo, Lidia. 2013. "Mimesis in the Sophist." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited
by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 269-278. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Mimesis is the production of images (Soph. 265b1 – 3). These cover a very wide
semantic field, including the meanings of “opinion” and “viewpoint”. A false image
is a wrong opinion that says the things that are not: in believing, we imagine; in
thinking, we represent what we think. The false belief is therefore a mental scene,
an image that possesses neither a corresponding reality nor a model, although it is
perceived as a real scene. The virtue of an image (the arete eikonos) lies in its being
similar to what is true, whereas the similarity between false and true can produce a
deception similar to that caused by a dream or by poetry.
The aim of this paper is to show that in the Sophist falsity is closely linked to
mimesis. This is not because every mimesis is false, but because all falsity is
mimetic. That not every mimesis is false is shown at 235c – 236c. The crucial
distinction between eikastike and phantastike must be understood as the distinction
between true and false mimesis. That every falsity is mimetic is a far more complex
issue, which I shall be discussing in this paper. I shall claim that falsity does not
consist in confusing something for something else, but, more specifically, in
confusing an image for its model." (p. 269)
277.
Panagiotou, Spiro. 1981. "The 'Parmenides' and the 'Communion of Kinds' in the
'Sophist'." Hermes no. 109:167-171.
"The section on the Communion of Kinds in the 'Sophist' is prefaced with an outline
of the view that in calling the same thing by many names we make it 'many', and are
thus guilty of contradiction: we make what is 'one' to be 'many' and vice versa (251
A - C). The language here leaves no doubt that this aspect of the 'one and many'
problem ought to be regarded as specious (cf. 251 B 5 - 6; C 4), although the
Stranger does not explain why it should be so regarded. After making some
derogatory remarks on those who are impressed by this aspect of the problem, the
Stranger abruptly turns to the section on the Communion of Kinds. Though we are
not told so, we may be certain that the two sections are related and that the
Communion of Kinds has something to do with problems of the 'one and many'
variety. We may, furthermore, fill in some of the missing details by considering
what Plato has to say on the same topic in the 'Philebus'." (p. 168)
278.
Pappas, Nickolas. 2013. "Introduction." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology
and Phenomenological Philosophy:277-282.
Abstract: "Plato’s Sophist is part of the most striking change that occurs within the
chronology of his dialogues. Their dramatic presentation changes, the main speaker
Socrates replaced by the Eleatic stranger. The dialogues still seek to define terms,
but now use the method of division and collection and succeed where earlier
attempts used to fail. They transform Platonic metaphysics to include the great kind
heteron “other,” which points the way to a new enterprise of understanding the
reality of appearance rather than opposing appearance to reality. The seven papers
collected in this part explore metaphysical, methodological, and pedagogical topics
explored in or arising from the Sophist. Their subjects include the other, number
(arithmos), power (dunamis), mixture, appearance, and myth."
279.
———. 2013. "The Story that Philosophers Will Be Telling of the Sophist." The
New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:338352.
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Abstract: "Plato’s stranger exemplifies the impulse to move beyond myth into
logos, anticipating the later author Palaephatus. The stranger wishes earlier
philosophers had not mythologized being to their students; he works to define the
sophist so as to escape myths about that figure. Yet reading the Sophist alongside
Palaephatus illuminates how far myth continues to permeate this work. The
sophist’s moneymaking is mythologized into his wildness. The stranger’s closing
words about announcing the meaning of the sophist hark back to a dense mythic
passage from the Iliad. If philosophy begins by bidding good-bye to myth, it has not
left home yet."
280.
Partenie, Catalin. 2004. "Imprint: Heidegger Interpretation of Platonic Dialectic in
the Sophist lectures (1924-25)." In Heidegger and Plato: Toward Dialogue, edited
by Partenie, Catalin and Rockmore, Tom, 42-71. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press.
"My essay will follow one episode of this Platonico-Heideggerian interplay. The
episode has at its core four theses centered upon the Platonic dialectic that
Heidegger advances in his lectures on Plato’s Sophist. I shall argue that these
theses, although they reveal a biased reading of Plato, manage to draw our attention
to a genuine and important Platonic distinction, usually overlooked, between
authentic and inauthentic human existence, and that this distinction also lies at the
core of the fundamental ontology expounded in Being and Time. At the close of the
essay I shall address, but only in a preliminary way, the question of why Heidegger
did not acknowledge this Platonic imprint on his Being and Time.
The lectures on Plato’s Sophist were delivered at the University of Marburg during
the winter semester 1924–25. They contain a running commentary of the Sophist
completed by extensive analyses of book Z of the Nicomachean Ethics, book A
(chapters 1 and 2) of the Metaphysics, and the Phaedrus.
Of the many theses Heidegger advances in these lectures (whose published text
counts 653 pages), I shall focus here on four, centered upon the Platonic dialectic."
(pp. 42-43)
281.
———. 2016. "Heidegger: Sophist and Philosopher." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue
and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and
Fuchs, Marko J., 61-74. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars
Publishing.
"Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's Sophist are a long and complex affair. In their
opening section, entitled "Preliminary Considerations", Heidegger claims that a
double preparation is required for an interpretation of Plato's late dialogues: one
philosophical-phenomenological, the other historiographical-hermeneutical." (p. 61)
(...)
"Usually, scholars go "from Socrates and the Presocratics to Plato"; Heidegger,
however, will go from "Aristotle back to Plato" (11). Why? Because "what Aristotle
said is what Plato placed at his disposal, only it is said more radically and
developed more scientifically" (11-12)." (p. 62)
(...)
"So, we know how to grasp in the right way the past we encounter in Plato: through
Aristotle. But how are we to grasp in the right way the past we encounter in
Aristotle? In other words, if Aristotle is going to be the guiding line for our
interpretation of Plato, what will be our guiding line for the interpretation of
Aristotle? Who said more radically, and developed more scientifically, what
Aristotle placed at our disposal? Nobody, Heidegger claims. Aristotle "was not
followed by anyone greater", so "we are forced to leap into his own philosophical
work in order to gain an orientation" (12), or guiding line. In what follows I shall
argue that Heidegger's actual guiding line throughout the lectures was not Aristotle,
but his own thinking at the time, which he brought to its fullest development in the
fundamental ontology of Being and Time." (p. 62)
282.
Peck, Arthur Leslie. 1952. "Plato and the ΜΕΓΙΣΤΑ ΓΕΝΗ of the Sophist. A
Reinterpretation." The Classical Quarterly no. 2:32-56.
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"It is important to recognize that the problem dealt with by Plato in the central part
of the Sophist (232 b-264 d) is one which arises from the use of certain Greek
phrases, and has no necessary or direct connexion with metaphysics (although the
solution of it which Plato offers has an important bearing on the defence of his own
metaphysical theory against one particular kind of attack).
We tend to obscure this fact if we use English terms such as 'Being', 'Reality',
'Existence', etc., in discussing the dialogue, and indeed make it almost impossible to
understand what Plato is trying to do. It is the way in which the Greek terms ὄν and
μή ὄν and other such terms are used by the 'sophists' which gives rise to the
problem." (32)
(...)
"It is not easy to suppose that Plato thought the business of the true philosopher, as
described at Sophist 253 d-e, consisted in spending his time on such verbal futilities
as saying that Rest is not Motion, Motion is the same as itself, Motion is other than
Being, etc. (Indeed, even in the discussion in the Sophist, the Eleatic Visitor and
Theaetetus require no 'high art' to see that Rest and Motion cannot 'mix'.) The
difficulties caused by sophistic verbal conjuring must, of course, be overcome by
the philosopher; but once they are overcome, the philosopher can go forward with
his own proper work. It is indeed surprising that the view has ever been entertained
that the business of the true philosopher, as described in Sophist 253 d-e, is
illustrated by the argument about the μέγιστα γένη. The philosopher's work, as
epitomized in the phrases κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι (253 d) and διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος
ἐπίστασθαι (253 e), is surely much more closely represented by the making of
'Divisions', of which semi-serious examples are given in the earlier part of the
dialogue, than by the discussion about the μέγιστα γένη. It is, of course, true that
any such work of Division would be blocked at the outset so long as the τό μη όν
ουκ έστιν objection held the field; but once that objection is cleared away the course
is open for the true dialectical philosopher to proceed with his work." (p. 56)
283.
———. 1962. "Plato's "Sophist": The συμπλοϰὴ τῶν εἰδῶν." Phronesis.A Journal
for Ancient Philosophy no. 7:46-66.
In Plato's Sophist, at 259 E 4 ff., we read the following sentence:
τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων: διὰ γὰρ
τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν [The complete separation
of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse. For our power
of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one
another (translation added)].
A few pages later, at 263 A2 and 8, we find these examples of λόγος:
‘Θεαίτητος κάθηται, [Theaetetus sits] Θεαίτητος πέτεται [Theaetetus flies].
The difficulty which seems to present itself is that these examples of λόγος do not
illustrate what is said in the second part of the sentence quoted." (p. 46)
(...)
"The amount of effort expended by Plato in combating the activities of 'sophists'
and αντιλογικοι is itself an indication of the prevalence and (as he felt it) the danger
to philosophy of the kind of talk which was in vogue. The danger of this attitude, as
Plato saw it, was its superficiality, its undue preoccupation with words instead of
realities."
(...)
"Plato's attack, then, is against those who confine their attention to terminology,
who fail to consider whether their terminology is a correct representation of the
facts, or who believe it is a reliable index to truth and reality - or think they can
floor Plato by specious verbal manipulations.
It will, I believe, be found that μετέχειν and all the various verbs and nouns used to
denote 'combining' and 'mixing' in the Sophist imply no more than that two terms
can be used together in the same sentence without self-contradiction." (p. 66)
284.
Pelletier, Francis Jeffry. 1975. "'Incompatibility' in Plato's Sophist." Dialogue:
Canadian Philosophical Review no. 14:143-146.
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"I want to consider a much-disputed reading of a certain critical area of Plato's
Sophist. It is widely agreed by most commentators that in this text, between 255E
and 259E there occurs a refutation of Parmenides' dictum that "one cannot say that
which is not", and that this is followed by an application of the foregoing discussion
to the problems of sentential falsity. (For a partial list of commentators, see
bibliography.) It is also generally agreed that Plato uses the Form, The Different, for
this purpose. What is not generally agreed upon is how Plato uses The Different."
(p. 143)
Bibliography
Ackrill, J. L. (1955) "Symplokê eidôn", Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies
of the University of London (reprinted in Vlastos).
Frede, Michael ( 1967) Prädication und Existenzaussage, Hypomnemata 18.
Keyt, David ( 1973) "The Falsity of 'Theaetetus Flies' (Sophist 263B)" in Exegesis
and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos (ed.) E.
N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos. and R. Rorty; Phronesis Supplementary Volume I.
Lee, E, N. (1972) "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist" Phil. Rev.
Lorenz, K. and Mittelstrauss, J, (1966) "Theaitetos Fliegt", Archiv für Geschichte
der Philosophie.
Owen, G. E. L. (1970) "Plato on Not-Being" (in Vlastos).
Philip, J, A. (1968) "False Statement in the Sophist's", Transactions and
Proceedings of the American Philological Society.
Vlastos, Gregory (1970) Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays Vol. I.
Wiggins, David (1970) "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of NotBeing" (in Vlastos).
285.
———. 1983. "Plato on Not-Being: Some Interpretations of the συμπλοκή εἶδον
(259e) and Their Relation to Parmenides Problem." In Midwest Studies in
Philosophy VIII, edited by French, Peter A., Uehling Jr., Theodore E. and
Wettstein, Howard K., 35-65.
"We have witnessed," says Mourelatos (1979: p. 3), "in the 'sixties and 'seventies, in
English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient
philosophy, the emergence of a consensus." This interpretation is so agreed upon
that "one may even speak of a standard Anglo-American interpretation of
Parmenides." One of the presentations counted by Mourelatos as standard, indeed
one of the paradigms, is that of Furth (1968). According to this interpretation,
Parmenides' infamous ontological views follow as corollaries from his implicit
views about language and meaning. I will briefly present this Parmenidean view
about language, but I will not here try to justify the attribution (for these sorts of
arguments see Furth, 1968; Mourelatos, 1979; and Pelletier, forthcoming [1990]).
In this paper, I am interested in the Platonic response to Parmenides, especially the
response that occurs in the middle portion of the Sophist (249-265). Since I am
going to evaluate this as a response to the "standard interpretation" of Parmenides,
it is clear that I owe a justification for my belief that Plato understood his opponent
to be our "standard Parmenides." This issue, too, I will avoid here (further
discussion can be found in Pelletier [1990], which discusses the "Parmenidean"
arguments of Sophist 237-241, Theaetetus, 188-189, and Cratylus 429-430, with an
eye toward showing that Plato was aware of these types of argument.)" (p. 35)
"It seems that one way to clarify the details of the interpretation of Parmenides is to
investigate the symplokê eidôn of the Sophist. Unfortunately, Plato's position is also
open to a variety of interpretations and cannot be convincingly elucidated in the
absence of a precise account of what Parmenides' argument was. One, therefore,
wishes to set up all the possible interpretations of Parmenides and all the
interpretations of the symplokê eidôn and then to inspect these lists to discover
which pairs of Parmenidean/Platonic interpretations mesh the best. This, it seems to
me, would provide the best evidence possible that one had finally gotten both Plato
and Parmenides right. I will not attempt that Herculean task. Rather, I will state one
interpretation of Parmenides, Furth 's, and ask which of the many ways to
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understand Plato's position best accords with that interpretation of Parmenides. (p.
36)
References
Furth, Montgomery, “Elements of Eleatic Ontology.” Journal of the History of
Philosophy 6 (1968): 111-32.
Mourelatos, A. P. D., “Some Alternatives in Interpreting Parmenides,” The Monist
62 (1979):
Pelletier. Francis Jeffry, Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being
(forthcoming) [Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1990].
286.
———. 1990. Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction XI-XXI; 1. Methodological
preliminaries 1; 2. Parmenides' problem 8; 3. Plato's problems 22; 4. Some
interpretations of the symploke eidon 45; 5. The Philosopher's language 94, Works
cited 149; Index locorum 155; Name Index 159; Subject index 163-166.
287.
Peramatzis, Michail. 2020. "Conceptions of Truth in Plato’s Sophist." Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie no. 102:333-378.
Abstract: "The paper seeks to specify how, according to Plato’s Sophist, true
statements achieve their being about objects and their saying that ‘what is about
such objects is’. Drawing on the 6th definition of the sophist, I argue for a
normative-teleological conception of truth in which the best condition of our soul –
in its making statements or having mental states– consists in its seeking to attain the
telos of truth. Further, on the basis of Plato’s discussion of original and image, his
distinction between correct and incorrect image, and the 7th definition, I argue that
achieving the telos of truth involves preserving the original’s proportions and
appropriate features. The view that Plato’s conception of truth takes statements or
mental states to be certain types of image is not ground-breaking. The important
contribution of my argument is that it offers a plausible way to understand two
recalcitrant claims made by Plato: first, that falsity obtains not only in the region of
incorrect images (appearances) but also within correct images (likenesses); second,
that some incorrect images are based on knowledge and so could be true."
288.
Perl, Eric D. 2014. "The Motion of Intellect On the Neoplatonic Reading of Sophist
248e-249d." The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition no. 8:138-160.
Abstract: "This paper defends Plotinus’ reading of Sophist 248e-249d as an
expression of the togetherness or unity-in-duality of intellect and intelligible being.
Throughout the dialogues Plato consistently presents knowledge as a togetherness
of knower and known, expressing this through the myth of recollection and through
metaphors of grasping, eating, and sexual union. He indicates that an intelligible
paradigm is in the thought that apprehends it, and regularly regards the forms not as
extrinsic “objects” but as the contents of living intelligence. A meticulous reading
of Sophist 248e-249d shows that the “motion” attributed to intelligible being is not
temporal change but the activity of intellectual apprehension. Aristotle’s doctrines
of knowledge as identity of intellect and the intelligible, and of divine intellect as
thinking itself, are therefore in continuity with Plato, and Plotinus’ doctrine of
intellect and being is continuous with both Plato and Aristotle."
289.
Petterson, Olof. 2018. "The Science of Philosophy: Discourse and Deception in
Plato’s Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 22:221-237.
Abstract: "At 252e1 to 253c9 in Plato’s Sophist, the Eleatic Visitor explains why
philosophy is a science. Like the art of grammar, philosophical knowledge
corresponds to a generic structure of discrete kinds and is acquired by systematic
analysis of how these kinds intermingle. In the literature, the Visitor’s science is
either understood as an expression of a mature and authentic platonic metaphysics,
or as a sophisticated illusion staged to illustrate the seductive lure of sophistic
deception. By showing how the Visitor’s account of the science of philosophy is
just as comprehensive, phantasmatic and self-concealing as the art of sophistry
identified at the dialogue’s outset, this paper argues in favor of the latter view. "
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290.
Philip, James Allenby. 1961. "Mimesis in the Sophistes of Plato." Transactions and
Proceedings of the American Philological Association no. 92:453-468.
"If a generalized use of mimesis was current in Plato's time, it was current as an
extension of a more specific use. We shall find in Plato instances of both the
specific and the generalized use and instances in which, because Plato allowed them
to co-exist, the meaning and connotations of the one overlap those of the other, and
ambiguities arise. Already in the Republic these two senses of mimesis, the specific
or dramatic sense and the generalized or metaphysical sense, are both present. They
are exhibited again in the final division of the Sophistes as two classes related to
one another as genus to species. When we have delimited the two senses in the
Republic we will consider their relation in the Sophistes and its implications." (pp.
453-454)
(...)
"We must then ask ourselves: What enables us to know? and by what process of
knowing do we make ourselves like the object of our knowledge?
(...)
So we affirm that in the wide spectrum of meaning given to mimesis in the Platonic
dialogues we can distinguish two principal senses: a restricted or dramatic sense of
making oneself like another, and a wider sense describing the creative processes in
all the productive crafts; and further that in the final division of the Sophistes we
find the latter related to the former as genus to species." (p. 468)
291.
———. 1968. "False Statement in the Sophistes." Transactions and Proceedings of
the American Philological Association no. 99:315-327.
"I shall limit myself to showing what are the moves he makes, and how he reaches
the conclusion he does reach.
The question whether Plato's doctrine is tenable, in whole or in part, in terms of
modern logic is beyond the scope of this study.
The discussion of false statement falls into five parts, each part corresponding to a
move in the development of the thesis. It will be convenient to conduct our
discussion conforming to these divisions:
1. 256D11-258C7: Not-being and its two kinds.
2. 258C7-260A1: Summing up against Parmenides.
3. 260A1-261C6: The problem of statement (logos).
4. 261C7-263A1: Basic doctrine of meaning and statement.
5. 263A1-263D5 : Test case : "Theaetetus flies" etc.
It must be remembered throughout that Plato is single-mindedly pursuing his
purpose, which is to show that false statement as τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγειν is possible; and
further that this phrase means: (a) in the Parmenidean sense, (if anything) nothing
relevant to our inquiry, (b) in a modified sense, to say what is not as what is other
than (or different from) X, and (c) to make a false statement. This last sense is for
Plato's purpose the important one. He will use it to differentiate between the
activities of the sophist and the philosopher, and to justify his relegating the sophist
to the class of purveyors of false statement.
It must also be remembered that, here as elsewhere, Plato for all his frequent
prolixity excludes from his argument what he does not consider essential to it. In
the present instance he attempts no general logical doctrine." (pp. 315-316)
292.
———. 1968. "The apographa of Plato's Sophistes." Phoenix no. 22:289-298.
Since Burnet's edition of Plato it has been recognized that B, T, and W are primary
sources for the first half of the Platonic corpus, and for most of those dialogues,
including the Sophistes, the only primary sources. (In the Budé Sophistes, edited by
Diès, Y is cited in the apparatus as a primary source; though this has been shown to
be the case for other parts of Y it is not the case for the Sophistes, as will appear
below.) All other manuscripts are conceded to be apographa of these, and their
mutual relations have been in part explored. They have not been examined
systematically, on the basis of collations, to discover precisely how they depend on
one another and whether any of the manuscripts other than the principal three can
be primary sources for our tradition in whole or in part." (p. 289)
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Codices referred to by sigla are as follows: B = Clarkianus 39 of the Bodleian
Library, Oxford; T = Ven.app.cl. 4.1 (542 in the new numbering of Mioni's
catalogue) of the Marciana Library, Venice; W = Vind.supp.phil.gr.7,
Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna; Y = Vind.phil.gr.21, Oesterreichische
Nationalbibliothek, Vienna. All other codices are referred to by the abbreviation of
their library designations; a list is given in Post [L. A. Post, The Vatican Plato and
its Relations (Middletown 1934)];. I shall discuss the primary source manuscripts,
B, T, and W, in a separate study.
293.
———. 1969. "The Megista Gene of the Sophistes." Phoenix no. 23:89-103.
"Five common concepts or megista gene -- being, identity, difference, motion and
rest-play a key role in the Sophistes.(1) They are not an innovation. Allusion is
made to them, and to similar concepts, in earlier dialogues. Already in the Phaedo
(103E-105C) certain ideas having a mathematical character-equality, oddness,
evenness-are recognized not as a special category but as functioning in special ways
and having peculiar problems. It is in the Parmenides that we first encounter them
as a grouping.(2) There Parmenides introduces them as similar ideas specially
suited to the training of neophytes in dialectic. The ideas mentioned are (136A-B):
unity/plurality, similarity/dissimilarity, motion/rest, being/non-being, coming-tobe/passing away. To these are later added identity/difference (139B) and
equality/inequality (140B)." (pp. 89-90, note 1 partly omitted)
(...)
"Let us now turn to the Sophistes. If we are to understand the role of the megista
gene we must observe how and in what context they are introduced. The critical
issue of the whole dialogue is approached by an episode to which Plato has given
the name Gigantomachia, or Battle of the Giants. In this episode idealists and
empiricists are pitted against one another in bitter conflict. Their ideological quarrel
is about οὐσία.
The giants maintain that only what has physical body and is perceptible to touch or
contact may be said to be real, or to exist. The idealists maintain that the only
genuine reality/substance is to be found in incorporeal, intelligible kinds or ideas,
physical body being merely genesis or change and process.
In the thesis of the idealists we have in its most uncompromising form Plato's
chorismos of intelligibles and sensibles. But we find Plato not, as we might expect,
championing the cause of the Friends of the Ideas, as he calls his idealists. Instead
he attempts to mediate. Let us observe how he does so, remembering always that he
develops only such aspects of his metaphysical assumptions as seems to him
necessary for the theme he is treating." (p. 92)
(1) I use for megista gene "common concepts." That equivalent is suggested by Tht.
185c 4, and Ryle has pointed out in Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen
(London 1965) 146 that it is used also by Aristotle. So it may have had some
currency in the Academy. To translate by "greatest," "highest," "very important," is
to suggest that they occupy a place in some hierarchy of concepts or ideas, whereas
their importance derives from the fact that they are topic-neutral and of almost
universal application. Their logical importance has been pointed out by Ryle, loc.
cit., and in New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, ed. R. Bambrough (London 1965)
64-65. My debt to those discussions will be obvious.
(2) By "first" I mean first in the order Plato assigned to the dialogues -- Parmenides,
Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus. I shall treat the Timaeus as subsequent to these. I
shall not attempt to discuss again the actual date of writing of any dialogue or part
of a dialogue. Relative dating does not affect my thesis here. It ceases to be of
major importance if we accept even in part the Krämer/Gaiser theory of agrapha
dogmata.
294.
Pippin, Robert B. 1979. "Negation and Not-Being in Wittgenstein's Tractatus and
Plato's Sophist." Kant Studien no. 70:179-196.
"The origins of our contemporary fascination with language are, of course, quite
complex and go to the very heart of that persistent twentieth-century attempt to see
philosophy as a "critique of language". But, in investigating those origins, it does no
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one an injustice to insist upon the importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein and
especially his little book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in bringing the issue
to the prominence it enjoys today."
(...)
"In fact, [Wittgenstein] seems to return quite explicitly to Plato's account of
language as an eidolon in a dialogue like the Sophist. In a certain sense, one could
claim that the central problem of dialogues like the Theaetetus and the Sophist was
Wittgenstein's major concern in his early work."
(...)
"Further, in the opinion of some commentators, the Eleatic Stranger and
Wittgenstein not only begin with very similar problems, they seem to arrive at very
similar solutions.
The picture theory's representational model of language's relation to the world, the
ontology taken by some to be supported by the picture theory (Wittgenstein's
infamous "simples"), the doctrines of logical space and the "form" of objects, and
perhaps more than any other issue, Wittgenstein's "derivative" explanation of
negation (the claim that any not-X depends on X for its intension and the claim that
it has no negative extension, that there are no negative facts), all count as evidence
for Platonic shadows stretching across the Tractatus. This seems especially true
when we consider that Wittgenstein regarded as a major consequence of the picture
theory its ability to account for meaningful, false propositions, that it could explain
how "Thought can be of what is not the case".
Plato's discussion of images is clearly and directly concerned with much the same
problem in "capturing" the elusive sophist.
In the following, I will consider two such comparable issues- the general theory of
language involved in both accounts, and their specific solution to the problem of
negation and false propositions. What I hope to accomplish by this contrast is to
illuminate two very different kinds of analyses appropriate to the topic of "notbeing", differences one could roughly characterize as "semantic" versus
"ontological". Further, this difference in orientation and in emphasis will involve
differences within each mode; specifically it will involve a "picture" versus an
"image" theory of language, and atomistic versus nonatomistic ontologies." (pp.
179-180, notes omitted)
295.
Pirocacos, Elly. 1998. False Belief and the Meno Paradox. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Abstract: "The Sophist is a dialogue that may be addressed as a sequel to the
Theaetetus. It also finds Socrates suspended of his capacity as director of inquiry,
and replaced by an Eleatic Stranger. The difficulty of the task is located in the form
of refutative argumentation adopted by each, and therefore involves the evaluation
of the justifying epistemological systems supporting each. The stage setting of the
Sophist is even more involved than the three phased report of the dialogue in the
Theaetetus. The philosophical persuasion of the Stranger deserves special attention,
especially given that he has been assigned the role to designate the criteria of
philosophical inquiry by way of establishing the true relations between the tripartite
subjects of inquiry. Both Theaetetus and the Eleatic Stranger are agreed that being
and not-being are equally puzzling terms; but Theaetetus seems to have understood
the objective of the present dialogue in a slightly different way."
296.
Pitteloud, Luca. 2014. "Is the Sensible an Illusion? The Revisited Ontology of the
Sophist." Aufklärung no. 1:33-57.
"I want to argue in this paper that, in the Sophist, behind the discussion about the
nature of non-being, Plato provides the reader some elements about a revision of his
ontology. First, the analysis of the notion of image gives some indications
concerning the nature of the sensible, which is usually described as an image of the
intelligible (Republic 509a9 and 509e1-2, Timaeus 52c).
Second, since the dialogue seems to assume that not only Forms are part of the
realm of being, but what is in motion too, it will appear that sensible objects must
somehow belong to being. The focus of this paper is the revision of the nature of
the sensible." (p. 33)
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(...)
"Conclusion: A new realm of being
The Friends of the Forms have to admit that Forms are acted upon but not that they
change. In this way, they could easily defend the idea that for a Form, to be known,
does not imply any alteration or change. Nevertheless, they seem to accept another
different thesis, namely that some objects that are in motion belong to the realm of
being. The Eleatic Stranger asks the question of the pantelôs on (248e7): this does
not refer to what is really being (ontôs on), but to the total family of being. To this
realm of being belong motion (κίνησις), life (ψυχήν) and intelligence (φρόνησιν). In
this way, the Sophist does not only assert that an image cannot be reduced to nonbeing, but also that what is in motion is part of the realm of being. Those two
elements seem to plead for a revaluation of the nature of the sensible, which has to
be part of the set of being. We face an ontology with two degrees of being: the
intelligible and its image, namely the sensible. The sensible is not reducible to an
illusion or to falsehood (and nothingness), but is somehow a being. As the Timaeus
will explain it, it is the image of the intelligible appearing into a milieu (the
Receptacle), which guaranties to it some degree of existence (Timaeus, 52b3-d1)."
(pp. 52.53)
297.
Planinc, Zdravko. 2015. "Socrates and the Cyclops: Plato’s Critique of ‘Platonism’
in the Sophist and Statesman." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in
Ancient Philosophy no. 31:159-217.
Abstract: "The Eleatic Stranger plays a central role in all reconstructions of Plato’s
“Platonism.”
This paper is a study of the literary form of the Sophist and Statesman and its
significance for interpreting the Eleatic’s account of the nature of philosophy. I
argue that the Eleatic dialogues are best understood through a comparison with the
source-texts in the Odyssey that Plato used in their composition. I show that the
literary form of the Sophist is a straightforward reworking of the encounter of
Odysseus and his crewmen with Polyphemus the Cyclops; and that the form of the
Statesman is a somewhat more complex reworking of the narrative in which
Odysseus and those loyal to him oppose Antinoös, leader of the Ithacan suitors. The
comparison reveals that the Eleatic Stranger is no way Plato’s spokesman. On the
contrary: by casting the Stranger in the role of Polyphemus and the Cyclopean
Antinoös, Plato intends the Sophist and Statesman to be read as an explicit critique
of the metaphysical and political doctrines that have since come to be identified as
Platonism. In Plato’s characterization, the Eleatic Stranger is neither a philosopher
nor a sophist. He is an intellectual—the sort of person who professes to be a
philosopher and is often mistaken for one."
298.
Politis, Vasilis. 2006. "The Argument for the Reality of Change and Changelessness
in Plato's Sophist (248e7-249d5)." In New Essays on Plato: Language and Thought
in Fourth-Century Greek Philosophy, edited by Herrmann, Fritz-Gregor, 149-175.
Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.
"Plato’s metaphysics, from beginning to end, is tiered rather than tier-less.(1) This
is because Plato’s general account of reality is characterized by a fundamental
distinction between certain things, especially the changeless forms, which he argues
are perfect beings,(2) and certain other things, the changing objects of senseperception, which he argues are something, as opposed to being nothing at all, only
in virtue of being appropriately related to and dependent on those perfect beings.(3)
However, in a dialogue addressed to the very question, ‘What is there?’ – and to the
related question, ‘What is being?’ – he defends an answer which, so it appears,
makes no reference to two tiers of reality and indicates rather a tier-insensitive
ontology. This is the argument in the Sophist (248e7–249d5) which, together with
the arguments that precede it in the dialogue, is summed up in the conclusion that
any changing thing (κινούμενον), and likewise any changeless thing (ἀκίνητον,
στάσιμον), is something that is.(4) There can be no doubt that this conclusion is
about any changing thing and any changeless thing, and there is no suggestion,
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moreover, that the things referred to must occupy one or the other of two tiers of
reality.
Following Julius Moravcsik and Gwil Owen, Lesley Brown has recently defended a
tier-insensitive interpretation of this argument, such that the ‘upshot is an allinclusive ontology’.(5) On the other hand, a number of critics, including David
Ross, Harold Cherniss, and Michael Frede, have defended a tiered interpretation.(6)
It seems to me, however, that the choice between these two interpretations – which
evidently is of central importance for the understanding of Plato – has not been
properly characterized, much less settled. My aim in this paper is to show, first, that
the choice between these two fundamentally different and opposed interpretations
of this argument, the tier-insensitive and the tiered interpretation, depends on how
we read the single phrase, τὸ παντελῶς ὄν, at 248e8–249a1; and second, that the
correct reading of this phrase commits us to a tiered interpretation beyond
reasonable doubt, and that Plato’s formulation of the conclusion (249c10–d4),
which sums up both this and the previous arguments in the dialogue, does not state
a commitment to a tier-insensitive ontology." (pp. 149-150)
(1) See for example Phaedo 74 (esp. 74d5–8), 78–9 (esp. 79a6–7), 100b1–e7;
Republic 475e9 ff.; Symposium 210e6–211b5; Timaeus 27d6–28a4, 51d3–52a7 (I
am assuming that the Timaeus is a late dialogue); Philebus 58e4–59a9, 61d10–e3.
(2) παντελῶς ὄντα (Republic 477a3 and Sophist 248e8–249a1; see below). Also
εἰλικρινῶς ὄντα (e.g. Republic 477a7, 478d6), ἀληθινὴ οὐσία (e.g. Sophist 246b8),
ὄντως ὄν / οὐσία (e.g. Timaeus 28a3–4, 52c5 and Sophist 248a11), and sometimes
simply οὐσία (e.g. Phaedo 78d1 and Sophist 246c2). Plato’s terminology is not
fixed, indeed reconciling, or otherwise, his terms is an inquiry of long standing.
(3) i.e. the relation of one-way dependence which Plato sometimes refers to as
‘participation’ and ‘communion’ (μέθεξις, κοινωνία).
(4) The conclusion is stated at 249c10–d4. It is important to observe (as we will see
in section 6) that this conclusion sums up not only the immediately preceding
argument (248e7–249c9), i.e. the argument against the friends of the forms (which
is our present concern), but also the earlier argument against the materialists
(246e5–247c8, which is not our main concern at present).
(5) Brown 1998, 204. Moravcsik (1962, 31 and 35–41) argues that Plato defends an
‘all-inclusive’ and ‘tier-insensitive’ answer to the question ‘What exists?’ So too
Owen 1986b [originally 1966], 41–4 [336–40]. A tier-insensitive interpretation is
also defended by Teloh 1981, 194–5 and Bordt 1991, 514, 520, 528.
(6) see Ross 1951, 110–11; Cherniss 1965, 352; Frank 1986; Frede, 1996, 196; and
Silverman 2002.
References
Bordt, M. 1991 ‘Der Seinsbegriff in Platons “Sophistes” ’, Theologie und
Philosophie 66, 493–529.
Brown, L. 1998 ‘Innovation and continuity. The battle of gods and giants, Sophist
245–249’, in J. Gentzler (ed.) Method in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, 181–207.
Cherniss, H. 1965 ‘The relation of the Timaeus to Plato’s later dialogues’, in R.E.
Allen (ed.) Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics, London, 339–78.
Frank, D.H. 1986 ‘On what there is: Plato’s later thoughts’, Elenchos 6, 5–18.
Frede, M. 1996 ‘Die Frage nach dem Seienden: Sophistes’, in T. Kobusch und B.
Mojsisch (eds.) Platon. Seine Dialoge in der Sicht neuer Forschungen, Darmstadt,
181–99.
Keyt, D. 1969 ‘Plato’s paradox that the immutable is unknowable’, Philosophical
Quarterly 19, 1–14.
Moravcsik, J. 1962 ‘Being and meaning in the Sophist’, Acta Philosophica Fennica,
vol. 14, 23–78.
Owen, G.E.L. 1986b ‘Plato and Parmenides on the timeless present’, in Owen,
Logic, Science and Dialectic, London, 27–44.
Ross, D. 1951 Plato’s Theory of Ideas, Oxford.
Silverman, A. 2002 The Dialectic of Essence. A study of Plato’s metaphysics,
Princeton.
Teloh, H. 1981 The Development of Plato’s Metaphysics, Pennsylvania.
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299.
Prior, William J. 1980. "Plato's Analysis of Being and Not-Being in the Sophist."
Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 18:199-211.
"In this paper I offer an account of Plato’s analysis of Being and Not-Being in the
Sophist. This account differs from those current in several important respects. First,
although I take it that Plato distinguishes in the Sophist among existential
statements, statements that are predicative in grammatical structure, and statements
of identity, I do not believe that he distinguishes corresponding senses or uses of the
verb “to be.” Second, I do not take Plato’s analysis to be linguistic or logical in
nature, but rather metaphysical or ontological. In my view, the Greek verb “esti” is
analyzed in terms of a metaphysical theory, the Theory of Forms, and specifically in
terms of the metaphysical concept of participation. This indicates a third difference
between my view and that of commentators who believe that Plato’s late dialogues
show a trend away from transcendent metaphysics and toward a more neutral sort of
conceptual analysis. As I shall hold that the genuine conceptual breakthrough of the
Sophist is made with metaphysical apparatus not much changed from the Phaedo, I
deny that this passage, at least, can be taken as evidence for such a trend.
The passage in which Plato makes his analysis is Soph. 251a-257c. I shall examine
briefly the entire passage, but concentrate on 255e-256e, from which I draw the
bulk of the material for my account." (p. 199)
300.
———. 1985. Unity and Development in Plato's Metaphysics. London: Croom
Helm.
Contents: Acknowledgments; Introduction: The problem of Plato's development 1;
The metaphysics of the early and middle Platonic dialogues 9; 2. The challenge of
the Parmenides 51; 3. The response of the Timaeus 87; 4. The Sophist 127;
Appendix: The doctrinal maturity and chronological position of the Timaeus 168;
Bibliography 194; Index 199-201.
301.
Priou, Alex. 2013. "The Philosopher in Plato’s Sophist." Hermathena no. 195:5-29.
"The above observations suggest that only by situating the arc of the Sophist
between the Theaetetus and Statesman does the larger significance of its issues
emerge. Obvious though this may sound, scholars who treat the Sophist’s place in
the trilogy as a whole don't approach it from the perspective of Socrates’ failure to
define false opinion in the Theaetetus. As we have seen, Plato presents the
Stranger’s inquiry into being and non-being as a response to Socrates’ shortcomings
in the Theaetetus; and, as I hope to show, his response anticipates the specific
inquiry taken up in the Statesman. Toward this end, I will walk the arc of the
Sophist’s argument from the Theaetetus to the Statesman as follows. First, I will
consider how the initial definitions of the sophist frame the dialogue’s famous
digression on images, being, and non-being (Section II). I will then consider how
this frame necessitates the distinction of ‘spoken images’ (εἴδωλα λεγόμενα) into
φαντάσματα and εἰκόνες, i.e. those that respectively distort and preserve the
proportions of the beings, the very distinction that eventually allows the Stranger to
distinguish between true and false opinions (Section III).
Thereafter, I will discuss how this distinction in spoken images necessitates the
acquisition of a ‘dialectical science’ (διαλεκτική ἐπιστήμη), which very acquisition
appears intractably problematic (Section IV). I will then conclude with some
general reflections on the stance of the dialogue as a whole, the possibility of
defining false opinion, and how the interpretation advanced informs the search for
the statesman in the Statesman (Section V). My basic aim throughout will be to
show that, in so situating the Sophist between its prequel Theaetetus and sequel
Statesman, we come to see the place of the philosopher in Plato’s Sophist." (pp. 7-8,
noted omitted)
302.
Przelecki, Marian. 1981. "On What there Is Not." Dialectics and Humanism no.
8:123-129.
"It is my contention (which I shall try to defend in what follows) that the text of the
dialogue contains thoughts and ideas that closely correspond to those characteristic
of modern logical semantics. The difficulties which Plato is coping with and the
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solutions proposed by him find their explicit counterparts in the discussions of
contemporary logicians and semanticists.
This statement, however, needs some qualification. The text of the dialogue is
comprehensive and indefinite enough to allow for different readings and
interpretations. It is only some interpretation of some of its fragments that may be
said to yield that version of its problems which is suggested below. I would,
however, contend that the interpretation advanced is a warranted one and the
fragments so interpreted essential for the author's standpoint. One more point
should be explicitly stated beforehand. Referring to what I call modern logical
semantics, I mean by this a definite semantic theory: model theoretic semantics in
its standard version, which might be regarded as a "classical" form of contemporary
logical semantics. Some deviations from this use will be indicated in what follows.
The most important philosophical content of the dialogue is contained in its second
part (esp. in the paragraphs 237-264). The main problem concerns the semantic
characteristic of falsehood and, involved in it, notion of not-being." (p. 123)
303.
Quandahl, Ellen. 1989. "What is Plato? Inference and Allusion in Plato's Sophist."
Rhetoric Review no. 7:338-348.
"In this essay I will suggest that when rhetoricians consider the Sophist, they will
find the opposition of Plato to Sophists disturbed. My argument is not particularly
new; for several decades scholars like E. A. Havelock, Mario Untersteiner, and G.
B. Kerferd have been reevaluating, and indeed revaluing, Sophistic thought, and
noticing similarities, rather than contradictions, between the Sophists and Plato's
Socrates. And yet I think that for many rhetoricians "Plato" means Phaedrus,
Gorgias and perhaps portions of the Republic and Symposium, dialogues that are all
striking in their "literary" qualities and in their discussion of the "Forms," Plato's
version of the "foundations" around which the recurrent
foundational/antifoundational debate centers. But the Sophist, rather than
disproving sophistic relativism, provides philosophical underpinnings for the view
that meaning is contextual and not absolute. At the level of inference—and the
Sophist has often been seen as prototypically "logical"—we see in this dialogue
how logical categories are in fact metaphorical. And if we read it with "literary" or
"rhetorical" eyes, although it lacks the "poetic" quality of other dialogues, we find
an extended illustration of ways in which words are allusive, replete with covert
histories which, fully as much as "logical" inference, contribute to conclusions."
(pp. 338-339)
(...)
"Whether Plato abandoned the theory of Forms or loyalty to his character Socrates
in the late dialogues is not, at last, my concern. Rather, I want to question ways in
which Plato has been appropriated and summarized, and the tradition in which the
Plato of rhetoricians did not write the same texts as did the Plato of, say, logicians
or ethicists. When rhetoricians add the Sophist to their Plato, Plato is no longer
"Platonic," but a writer whose text acknowledges, both theoretically and by
example, the power of contextual and contingent elements in rhetoric." (p. 347)
304.
Ray, A. Chadwick. 1984. For Images. An Interpretation of Plato's Sophist. Lanham:
University Press of America.
"Our dialogue is apparently an inquiry into the nature of the sophist. Theaetetus and
Theodorus have kept their appointment with Socrates from the day before, when the
Theaetetus is supposed to have transpired, (1) and after which Socrates was to go to
the portico of the King Archon to meet the indictment of Meletus against him.
(Theaet. 210d) Socrates, the lover of wisdom, has been indicted by Meletus on
charges of "criminal meddling," inquiring into natural phenomena, making the
weaker argument defeat the stronger, (Apol. 19b-c) and embracing atheism (Apol.
26c). The philosopher seems to have been mistaken in the popular mind for a
sophist. His defense, the Apology, may be read largely as an attempt, adumbrated
from the first sentence, to distinguish between appearance and reality; Socrates is
not what his accusers make him appear to be. After Socrates has met the King
Archon, it should not be surprising in the dramatic context if he shows a keen
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interest in the difference between the Philosopher and the Sophist. Thus the nature
of the Sophist is to be today's topic.
A further reason for Socrates to bring the discussion to the nature of the Sophist is
that Theodorus and Theaetetus have brought with them a guest from Elea, a student
of the school of Parmenides and Zeno. Briefly, the "Eleatic School", as will become
clearer, affirms the reality of being and denies the reality of any non-being, the
upshot being (so the Stranger will suggest) that there could be no such thing as
mere appearance or any falsehood, such as might seem to be real without being so.
If the Apology presents a personal defense against false images propagated about
Socrates, the Sophist can be seen in large part as a philosophical defense of the
logical possibility of images at all. In fact, this will be the perspective of the present
interpretation. As Socrates at the end of his life must give an account of himself to
answer his critics, so perhaps must Plato toward the end of his career answer some
of his most astute critics.
The concept of an image is central to Plato's metaphysics because he explains how
many things may be called by one name by appeal to that concept. Where a number
of individuals are all called F, this is possible because of F-ness itself, a Form which
is different from the individuals but of which these are called images. The Form is
said to make the many things F (Phaedo 100d) as these come to mirror that Form, to
resemble it to one degree or another. The relationship of "the many" to the Form,
which accounts for their somehow having its character, is called participation or
sharing, but the nature of this relationship is somewhat problematic. Plato's
diffidence on the subject is evident in the middle dialogues both in his refusal to let
any explanatory terms harden into technical vocabulary and from his own explicit
tentativeness, as Socrates expresses it at Phaedo 100d. That the uncertainty remains
in Plato’s later thought, including the Sophist, will be evident in the present
discussion. But the reality of images cannot be open to question.
Now Plato in the Sophist will identify certain Eleatically inspired challenges to his
theory of participation and images, challenges which he will be able to answer in
part from the resources of his own "classical theory" as developed in middle
dialogues like the Phaedo and the Republic. To the extent that those resources are
sufficient, the Sophist is essentially a "conservative" dialogue upholding the
adequacy of the classical theory to handle particular objections. On the other hand,
new developments in Plato's thought are apparent in the dialogue, (the upgraded
status of sensible objects, for instance), developments for which Plato probably
would have found no need had he not taken seriously the problems of deceptive
appearance and falsehood." (pp. 1-2)
(1) Clearly Plato is using these details as a literary device. The historical Socrates
never addressed the issues treated here.
305.
Reagan, James T. 1965. "Being and nonbeing in Plato's Sophist." The Modern
Schoolman no. 42:305-314.
"I take it that the principal problem of the dialogue concerns the ontological status
of the Forms, or true being: to discern a real differentiated plurality in being which
will at once ground a true dialectic or science and repudiate the false dialectic of the
Sophist. Plato is wholly lacking in any conception of what will later be called
metaphysical analogy, which might permit an essentially differentiated plurality of
being. The famous Hypotheses of the latter part of the Parmenides have established
the controlling limits within which Plato must solve the problem of the
metaphysical status of the Forms. In fact, he concludes to a plurality which is
differentiated not in terms of essence but in terms of relations which remain outside
the essence of the Forms. This in turn will require that he posit a new metaphysical
factor, relative nonbeing. Finally, he will accept as the epitome of science or true
knowledge the true but nonessential dialectic which this view of being will
support." (p. 305)
306.
Reeve, C. D. C. . 1985. "Motion, Rest, and Dialectic in the Sophist." Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie no. 67:47-64.
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"If discourse is to be possible at all, some Kinds (γενε) (1) must blend (μετέχειν)
with one another (251d5ff.).(2) To follow the 'late learners' (251b5-6) in refusing to
allow one thing to share in another is 'to make short work of all theories' (252a5-6).
But nor can it be that all Kinds blend (252d2ff.), otherwise Motion itself would rest,
and Rest itself would move, and both are impossible (252d6-11).(3) We need some
science then 'to be our guide on the voyage of discourse' (253d10) and to tell us
'which Kinds are consonant, which incompatible' (253b10-c1). The science in
question is dialectic (253d1-3).
My present topic is one rather stormy section of that voyage, namely the Eleatic
Stranger's dialectical remarks about Rest and Motion and their proper interpretation.
However what I have to say bears directly on the larger issues of Dialectic and the
Theory of Forms." (p. 47)
(...)
Conclusion
If the foregoing discussion is cogent, the Sophist contains a cleverly constructed
trap, and many of the Eleatic Stranger's remarks about Rest and Motion cozen us
into it. If we take his bait, and fail to learn the lessons he teaches us in his
discussion of Not-being, the Sophist presents us with paradoxes and contradictions
of the sort I have been addressing. These lead us to believe that Plato was himself
confused and urge us to import solutions from elsewhere. (49) If, on the other hand,
we detect the trap, and learn the lesson the Stranger has to teach, we solve his
puzzles about Being and being known, and the paradoxes and contradictions
disappear.
Of course no analytic philosopher would play tricks of this sort - we like our
philosophy transparent not tricky. Thus we tend to mistrust, often rightly, readings
of the great philosophers which exhibit them as other than plain. We all know, of
course, that Plato was a great literary artist and a great teacher as well as a great
thinker. And we know that art is artful and that teachers often leave dangling
puzzles to test their pupils' acumen. But we often read Plato as if his art and
pedagogical purposes were extraneous to his thought. The result is that we often get
the thought wrong." (p. 62)
(1) 1 The Eleatic Stranger calls the five μεγιστα γενε, Being, Rest, Motion, Identity,
and Difference, both γενε (254d4) and ειδε (255c5). He applies both appellations to
λόγος and δόξα (260a5, 260d7-8). At 255c12-d7 τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό ανδ τὸ προς άλλο αρε
ψαλλεδ ειδε. 'The question is thus unavoidably raised, Are all of these to be
reckoned as Platonic Forms?', Peck (1962: 62). To postpone it for treatment on
another occasion I adopt the following convention: I call all the items referred to
either as γενε or as ειδε 'Kinds', and I leave open the question of whether or not
Kinds are Forms.
(2) 2 Line references are to Burnet (1900). References are fully explained in the
Bibliography.
(3) I have followed Vlastos (1970: 272n5) in using 'Motion' and 'Rest' as dummies
for the Greek words κινεσις and στασις (and their cognates). I remind you that
κινεσις covers all kinds of variation and that στασις stands for invariance in its most
general sense.
Bibliography
Burnet (1900). John Burnet, Platonis Opera: Recognovit Brevique Adnotatione
Critica Instruxit, Oxford.
Vlastos (1970). Gregory Vlastos, "An Ambiguity in the Sophist", in Vlastos (1973:
270-322).
Vlastos (1973). Gregory Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1973).
307.
Rickless, Samuel C. 2010. "Plato's Definition(s) of Sophistry." Ancient Philosophy
no. 30:289-298.
Abstract: "Plato’s Sophist is puzzling inasmuch as it presents us with seven
completely different definitions of sophistry. Though not all seven definitions could
be accurate, Plato never explicitly indicates which of the definitions is mistaken.
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Recently, Kenneth Sayre and Mary Louise Gill have proposed a clever solution to
this puzzle. In this paper I explain why the Sayre-Gill solution is mistaken, and
suggest a better solution."
"There is something about the Sophist that has always bothered me. Why are there
so many definitions of sophistry in the dialogue? Here is the problem: either all the
definitions are right, or all of them are wrong, or some of them are right and some
of them are wrong. But it can't be that all the definitions are right, because, after all,
they are all different.
(...)
In this paper, I want to consider one influential answer to what we might call “the
puzzle of the many definitions”, criticize it, and then provide an answer of my own.
The answer I am going to criticize appears most clearly in the work of Kenneth
Sayre, and also perhaps in the work of Mary Louise Gill. It is, I think, a very clever
and compelling answer, but, as I will argue, it is mistaken." (p. 289)
References
Gill, Mary Louise. 2006. “Models in Plato’s Sophist and Statesman.” Journal of the
International Plato Society 6.
Sayre, Kenneth M. 2007. Method and Metaphysics in Plato’s Statesman.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
308.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1981. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and
Metaphysics. Part V. Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Second part)."
Vivarium no. 19:81-125.
"In concluding the previous section I argued (1980: nr. 4.9, p. 62) that Aristotle's
Categories may be viewed as dealing with the several ways in which an individual
man can be named without destroying his concrete unity. A well-known passage of
Plato's Sophist (251 A 8ff.) was referred to in which Plato deals with the puzzle of
one man with many names. It is true, Plato labels the puzzle as just 'a magnificent
entertainment for the young and the late-learners' (251 B), and is more interested in
the related question of how 'things' like Rest and Change (presently called Kinds)
can also have several attributes (attributive names) and the general problem of
attribution as implying the 'Communion' of Kinds. But it is obvious at the same
time that in this shape too the puzzle is mainly concerned with the notions of
naming, asserting and predication. So Plato's Sophist unavoidably has to be part of
our discussion. A further argument for taking the Sophist into consideration may be
found in Ammonios' commentary to Aristotle's De interpretatione. He remarks {ad
17 a 26ff. : Comm. in Aristot. graeca IV 5, p. 83, 8-13, ed. Busse) that the analysis
of the apophantikos logos as given by Aristotle is to be found scattered all over
Plato's Sophist (261 Cff.) right after that master's excellent expositions about Nonbeing mixed with Being (peri tou synkekramenou toi onti mê ontos). For that
matter, on more than one item of Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione the
Ancient commentators refer to related questions and discussions in Plato's later
dialogues, especially the Sophist. I hope to show in sections (5) and (6) that the
views found in the Categories and De interpretatione are most profitably compared
with what Plato argues in the related discussions of the Sophist." (p. 81)
[* Parts (1), (2), (3) and( 4) are found in this Journal 15 (1977), 81-110; 16 (1978),
81-107, 18 (1980), 1-62; 19 (1981), 1-46.]
309.
———. 1982. "On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Part VI.
Plato's Semantics in His Critical Period (Third part)." Vivarium no. 20:97-127.
"5. 8 Conclusion. From our analysis of Soph., 216 A-259 D it may be concluded
that Plato did certainly not abandon his theory of Forms. We may try to answer,
now, the main questions scholarship is so sharply divided about (see Guthrie [A
History of Greek Philosophy] V, 143ff.). They are, in Guthrie's formulation: (1)
does Plato mean to attribute Change to the Forms themselves, or simply to enlarge
the realm of Being to include life and intelligence which are not Forms?, and (2) is
he going even further in dissent from the friends of Forms and admitting what they
called Becoming --changing and perishable objects of the physical world -- as part
of the realm of True Being?
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The first question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, Plato is defending a
certain Communion of Forms, but this regards their immanent status and,
accordingly, the physical world primarily, rather than the 'Forms themselves' (or: 'in
their exalted status' as Guthrie has it, p. 159). As to the second question, to Guthrie's
mind Plato's language makes it almost if not quite insoluble. I think that if one pays
Plato's expositions the patient attention he asks for 'at 259 C-D and follows his
analysis stage by stage, the exact sense and the precise respect in which he makes
his statements (cf. 259 D 1-2: ekeinêi kai kat' ekeino ho physi) about Being and
Not-being, Sameness and Otherness, and so on will appear. It will be easily seen,
then, that there is no recantation at all in Plato's development. He still maintains, as
he will maintain in his later works (e.g. Philebus, 14 D ff.) the Transcendent Forms
as what in the last analysis are the only True Being. But Plato succeeds in giving a
fuller sense to the old notions of 'sharing' and 'presence in' without detracting the
'paradigm' function of the Forms in any respect. Matter, Change and Becoming is
given a better position in the Theory of Forms in that their immanent status has
been brought into the focus of Plato's interest. From his Parmenides onwards Plato
has been searching for the solution of his metaphysical problems and has actually
found it in the Sophist in a new view of participation. Forms in their exalted status
are just a too eminent cause for the existence of the world of Becoming. But their
being shared in, i.e. their immanent status, make them so to speak 'operable' and yet
preserve their dignity of being paradeigmatic standards. What makes something to
be a horse is, no doubt, the Transcendent Form, HORSENESS, but it only can
partake of that Form and possess it as an immanent form. So the Highness of the
Form and the unworthy matter can come together as matter 'informed', that is,
affected by an immanent form.
Plato never was unfaithful to his original view about Forms as the only True Being.
In our dialogue, too, he brings the eminence of True Being (taken, of course, as a
Transcendent Form) into relief by saying (254 A) that the true philosopher, through
his devotion to the Form, 'What is' ('Being'), dwells in the brightness of the divine,
and the task of Dialectic, accordingly, is described from that very perspective (see
Part (5), 96ff.). Focussing on the immanence of the Forms does not detract anything
from their 'exalted status', since immanent forms are nothing else but the
Transcendent Forms as partaken of by particulars.
(...)
In his critical period Plato never ceased to believe in the Transcendent World. The
important development occurring there consists in his taking more seriously than
before their presence in matter and their activities as immanent forms. In the
Sophist he uses all his ingenuity to show that a correct understanding of the Forms
may safeguard us from all extremist views on being and not-being and zealous
exaggerations of the Friends of Forms as well." (pp. 125-127)
310.
———. 1986. Plato's Sophist. A Philosophical Commentary. Amsterdam: NorthHolland.
Contents. Preface 9; Preliminary: Plato's Sophist to be reconsidered? 11;
Introduction 13; Chapter 1. The dispute about interpreting Plato 22; Chapter 2. The
evolution of the doctrine of Eidos 30; Reconsidering Plato's Sophist 69; Chapter 3.
The dialogue's main theme and procedure 71; Chapter 4. On current views about
'what is not' 82; Chapter 5. On current views about 'what is' 93; Chapter 6. Plato's
novel metaphysical position 103; Chapter 7. The variety of names and the
communion of kinds 110; Chapter 8. An important digression on dialectic 126;
Chapter 9. The communion of kinds; Chapter 10. How the five kinds combine 159;
Chapter 11. The reinstatement of 'what is not' (256d-259d) 164; Chapter 12. On
philosophic and sophistic discourse 186; The framework: semantics and philosophy
in Plato; Chapter 13. Plato's semantics in the Cratylus 217; Chapter 14. Naming and
representing 254; Chapter 15. Language and knowing 277; Chapter 16. Semantics
and metaphysics 327; Bibliography 355; Index of passages quoted or referred to
365; Index of proper names 377; Index of terms and topics 383-394.
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"The way in which Plato announces (Sophist, 249C-D) his novel metaphysics has
been puzzling modern scholars for a long time: 'What is and the All consist of what
is changeless and what is in change, both together'. Did Plato really introduce
Change into the Transcendent World and thus abandon his theory of Unchangeable
Forms?
Many of Plato's commentators have claimed that the use of modern techniques of
logico-semantical analysis can be a valuable aid in unraveling this problem and
other difficulties Plato raised and attempted to solve. However, not all modern
distinctions and tools can be applied without reservation; for many of these are
entirely alien to Plato's thought. Interpreters of Plato must also resist the temptation
of applying methods as disjointing the dialogue and selecting specific passages
only, in their eagerness to prove that Plato was explicitly interested in (their own
favourite) problems of 'identity and predication' (not to mention such oddities as the
'self-predication of Forms'), or the distinctions between different senses (or
applications) of 'is'.
The present author has tried to understand Plato by a close reading of the complete
dialogue and to relate the doctrinal outcome of the Sophist to Plato's general
development. Close reading Plato involves following him in his own logicosemantical approach to the metaphysical problems, an approach which shows his
deep interest in the manifold ways to 'name' (or to 'introduce into the universe of
discourse') 'what is' (or the 'things there are').
The reader may be sure that my indebtedness to other authors on this subject is far
greater than it may appear from my text. Also many of those who have gone in
quite different directions than mine have been of great importance to me in
sharpening my own views and formulations. Two authors should be mentioned
nominatim: Gerold Prauss and the late Richard Bluck; two scholars, whose
invaluable works deserve far more attention than they have received so far.
I owe my translations of the Greek to predecessors. Where I have not followed
them, my rendering is no doubt often painfully (and perhaps barbariously) literal: I
do not wish to incur the suspicion of trying to improve Plato by modernising him."
(from the Preface)
311.
Ringbom, Sixten. 1965. "Plato on Images." Theoria no. 31:86-109.
The purpose of the present paper is to discuss Plato’s use of the concept of picture
in three different contexts. First, his use of the picture as a metaphysical model;
secondly, the picture-object relation as a semantic explanation; and, thirdly this
same relation as an argument of value.
(...)
In his metaphysical model Plato regards the objects of our experience as pictures of
the Ideas (1). But he also discusses the relationship between the visible things and
the pictures of these things-for instance, the relation between a bed and a painting of
a bed, or the name “bed”.
(...)
The obvious procedure in approaching Plato’s theory of pictures is to discuss each
aspect in turn. But this must not mean that we isolate the three functions from each
other; the purpose of the following discussion is, on the contrary, to show that
Plato’s line of thought in all three cases adheres to the same pattern, and that it is
actually based on an analogy between the three aspects." (pp. 86-87)
(1) D. Ross, Plato’s Theory of Ideas, Oxford 1953, p. 12 f.
312.
Roberts, Jean. 1986. "The Problem about Being in the Sophist." History of
Philosophy Quarterly no. 3:229-243.
Reprinted in: Nicholas D. Smith (ed.), Plato. Critical Assessments, Vol. IV: Plato's
Later Works, London: Routledge 1998, pp. 142-157.
"It is by now a matter of firmly entrenched orthodoxy that Plato's discussion of
being in the Sophist serves to distinguish different meanings or uses of "esti." This
claim has taken different forms in different hands.
Nevertheless, almost everyone seems agreed that a large part of what Plato needs
(and gets) in order to rescue negation and falsity from sophistic attacks is either a
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distinction between the existential "is" and one or more incomplete uses of "is," a
distinction between the so-called "is" of identity and the copula, or some more
subtle distinction between incomplete uses of the word which amounts to a
distinction in kinds of predication.
I shall argue that what Plato says about being in the Sophist is in no useful way
described as a distinguishing of different senses or uses of the word "is."(1) The
Eleatic puzzles Plato is out to solve here are solved, in large part, by demonstrating
that being is something distinct from any or all of the things that might normally be
described as being." (p. 229)
(...)
"There is, moreover, reason for suspicion of any interpretation which reduces the
discussions of being and not-being to discussions of positive and negative statement
in general. The commentators have failed to notice how careful Plato is to separate
questions about the nature of being and not-being and the bearing of alternative
answers on the status of negative and false statement. When he first sets out the
problem he begins by describing the Eleatic position on not-being (237b10-239a12)
and then showing, in a separate argument (240c7-241b3), that this makes false
statement and negative statement impossible. The pattern is repeated later. After he
has shown that not-being is he goes on (260a5-264b8) to explain how statements in
general are put together and how false statement is to be explicated. That the
blending of not-being and logos is still taken as, at least in principle, an open
question after the discussion of not-being is completed suggests that that discussion
could not have been intended as an account of negative statement. Nor is there any
reason to take the previous account of being as an account of positive statement.
They are, just what they claim to be, and all that they need to be, purely
metaphysical accounts of being and not-being." (p. 239)
(1) I do not mean to deny that there is something to be learned from looking at
Plato's use of esti, only that this is not his own object in the Sophist. For the record,
I think that there is a complete use of "is" to be found in the Sophist for reasons I
will not go into here. Much of what I would say in defense of this has been said by
Robert Heinaman in "Being in the Sophist," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie,
vol. 65 (1983), pp. 1-17.
313.
Robinson, David B. 1999. "Textual notes on Plato's « Sophist »." The Classical
Quarterly no. 49:139-160.
"In editing Plato's Sophist for the new OCT [Oxford Classical Texts] vol. I, ed. E.
A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan
(Oxford, 1995), there was less chance of giving novel information about W = Vind.
Supp. Gr. 7 for this dialogue than for others in the volume, since Apelt's edition of
1897 was used by Burnet in 1900 and was based on Apelt's own collation of W."
(...)
"A reviewer counts 66 changes in our text of the Sophist, which may perhaps be a
slight over-estimate. Classification of changes as substantive or as falling into
different groups is sometimes difficult, but I think plausible figures are as follows.
We (myself aided in the earlier sections by Nicoll) have in 25 places made a
different choice of readings from the primary mss. and testimonia. We have printed
conjectures where Burnet kept a ms. reading in 17 places, but conversely we have
reverted to a ms. reading where Burnet had a conjecture in 8 places. We have
printed alternative conjectures to conjectures adopted by Burnet in 6 places. So we
have actually departed from the primary sources on at most 9 more occasions
overall than Burnet. What must be noted is that Burnet had already printed
conjectures (including readings from secondary mss.) on something like 87
occasions (12 from secondary mss., 75 from modern conjectures from Stephanus
onwards), so our percentage addition to Burnet's departures from the primary
sources is modest. Moreover Burnet printed about 25 readings from testimonia; we
have followed him in 20 or so of these cases, and this in turn implies that the
primary mss. are in error at these further 20 places." (p. 139)
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314.
———. 2001. "The Phantom of the Sophist: τo oυκ oντως oυκ oν (240a–c)." The
Classical Quarterly no. 51:435-457.
"A spurious phantom, Platonistic but non-Platonic, a non-entity by the name of ουκ
όντως ουκ ον, made spectral appearances in manuscripts and printed texts of Plato’s
Sophist over a long period. It perhaps first manifested itself a little earlier than
Proclus and Damascius; but there seems to be no evidence of its appearing to
Plotinus. It was rather strongly present in the primary MSS (give or take a little
blurring). It still appeared in the Teubner edition by Hermann in 1852. But it was
attacked by Bonitz in 1864, and on most views was successfully exorcized when
Badham’s conjecture of 1865 was added to an earlier conjecture of Baiter’s, each
removing an unwanted ουκ. Campbell’s edition of 1867 shows no awareness of
Badham’s conjecture, but on an overall view, since then it might seem that the
phantom had been left for dead by most interpreters. Apelt in 1897 said ‘locus . . .
sanitati suae est redditus’. Burnet, as we have seen, banished the phantom from his
1900–5 OCT." (p. 436)
(...)
"The cruel deception practised by both phantoms turns upon readers making the
erroneous assumption that we have exposition of doctrine in this passage, where in
fact we have what is at least primarily intended as a reductio ad absurdum. This is
not a situation where the Visitor is stating a Platonic view of ειδωλα; what is
happening is that the supposed Sophist attempts to reduce the concept of ειδωλον to
absurdity.
The passage does not set out to show that Plato or his Visitor, or even his Sophist,
thought that ειδωλα have some degree of phantom being, but that an enterprising
Sophist could argue that they have no being at all. Plato will later refute his own
imaginary Sophist (not by introducing intermediates); but here the Sophist must be
allowed to make his challenging manoeuvre." (p. 437)
315.
Robinson, Jim. 1993. "A Change in Plato's Conception of the Good." Journal of
Philosophical Research no. 18:231-241.
Abstract: "One of the most interesting passages in the Republic is the comparison of
the Form of the Good with the Sun. Although this depiction of the Good was never
repeated, many hold that the Good retained its privileged place in Plato’s
metaphysics. I shall argue that there are good reasons for thinking that Plato, when
writing the Sophist, no longer held his earlier view of the Good. Specifically, I shall
contend that he ceased to believe that as the Sun makes its objects visible, so the
Good makes the Forms knowable. This being the case, it cannot also be said to
illuminate either the Forms or the order they exhibit. My procedure will be first to
consider briefly how, in the Republic, the Good can be said to iIluminate the Forms.
I shall then determine the extent to which, in the Sophist, this function can still be
credited to the Good. "
316.
Robinson, Thomas M. 2013. "Protagoras and the Definition of ‘Sophist’ in the
Sophist." In Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson,
Thomas M., 3-13. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"I should like to begin by setting out as clearly as I can what seem to be the main
things that can be said about Protagoras, and offer an evaluation of them. This will
be in large part without reference to the final definition of ‘sophist’ in the Sophist. I
shall then turn to the definition, and see where if anywhere it appears to fit into the
picture, and what can be said about the definition as a definition." (p. 3)
(...)
"As the dialogue draws to a close an intense, and uncompromisingly negative
definition of the sophist is finally offered, and this one undoubtedly excludes what
had earlier been called the sophist of noble lineage.
The sophist (268c) is now described as a mimetes who operates on the basis of
belief not knowledge, by contrast with mimetai who operate on the basis of
knowledge not belief. More precisely the mimesis characterizing a sophist is said to
be a) mimesis of that which is ‘insincere’, of that which is productive of
‘contradictions’, and of that which is non-knowing; b) mimesis of that specific form
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of copy–making that constitutes appearance-making; and c) mimesis of that species
of production which is marked off as human not divine." (pp. 10-11)
317.
Rodriguez, Evan. 2020. "‘Pushing Through’ in Plato’s Sophist: A New Reading of
the Parity Assumption." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 102:159-188.
Abstract: "At a crucial juncture in Plato’s Sophist, when the interlocutors have
reached their deepest confusion about being and not-being, the Eleatic Visitor
proclaims that there is yet hope. Insofar as they clarify one, he maintains, they will
equally clarify the other. But what justifies the Visitor’s seemingly oracular
prediction? A new interpretation explains how the Visitor’s hope is in fact
warranted by the peculiar aporia they find themselves in. The passage describes a
broader pattern of ‘exploring both sides’ that lends insight into Plato’s aporetic
method."
318.
Rosen, Stanley. 1983. Plato's Sophist: The Drama of the Original and Image. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
"I said previously that I prefer the dramatic to the ontological approach to the
Sophist. It should now be clear that this does not require a suppression of the
narrowly technical themes in the dialogue.
On the contrary, it requires their meticulous analysis, both in themselves and as
elements in a comprehensive dramatic structure.
In this section, I should like to clarify this view from a somewhat different angle
and to introduce a term to describe my reading of the Sophist. The term in question
is dramatic phenomenology.
Whereas a dialogue is not a "drama" in the sense of a poetic play written to be
performed in the theater, it has a manifestly dramatic form. A dialogue is a poetic
production in which mortals speak neither to gods nor to heroes, but to each other.
At the same time, there is a hierarchy of mortals within a Platonic dialogue that is
rooted, not in the contingencies of birth but in the natures of diverse human souls.
Similarly, a dialogue is not a phenomenological description, but an interpretation of
human life. As a poetic production, it so orders its scenes of human life as to
provide an indirect commentary on the significance of the speeches delivered within
those scenes.
Adapting a distinction of the Stranger's to our own purposes, we may say that a
dialogue is centrally concerned with the better and the worse, the noble and the
base." (p. 12)
319.
Roupa, Vichy. 2020. Articulations of Nature and Politics in Plato and Hegel. Cham
(Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan.
Chapter 3: Producing the Categories of Being: The Sophist
"The Cratylus’s aporetic ending inevitably raises the question whether this is Plato’s
last word on names or whether the issue is explored further in another dialogue
where a more positive outcome is reached. The aim of this chapter is to show that
the dialogue where Plato carries forward the programme of the Cratylus is the
Sophist.(1) Although it is sometimes argued that the Sophist breaks new ground
completely unanticipated in the Cratylus, there is an area of shared concern between
the two dialogues that warrants, I believe, reading the Sophist as a development of
the Cratylus.(2) This area is marked, in the first instance, by the methodological
approach adopted; the two interlocutors—it is set down early on in the dialogue—
will strive to reach agreement not only as regards the name but, first and foremost,
as regards the thing itself. Thus, the Eleatic Visitor, who leads the discussion in the
Sophist, claims in 218c to have only the name (‘sophist’) in common with his
discussant Theaetetus at this stage, but this is not enough because ‘in every case’
they ‘always’ need to be in agreement ‘about the thing itself [pragma auto] by
means of verbal explanation [dia logon̄], rather than doing without any such
explanation [choris logou] and merely agreeing about the name [tounoma]’. So, the
aim of the dialogue is to achieve an understanding of the sophist that goes beyond
the un-stated assumptions that each of the discussants has about the sophist. (p. 43)
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(1) I thus follow the interpretative approach of Fine and Barney both of whom
reject a sharp distinction between the analysis of the Cratylus (which is aimed at the
level of the name) and that of the Sophist (which is aimed at the level of the
statement or sentence). See Gail Fine, ‘Plato on Naming’, The Philosophical
Quarterly 27, no. 109 (1977): 289–294; Rachel Barney, Names and Nature in
Plato’s Cratylus (London: Routledge, 2001), 170–172. This view is reinforced by
Kahn: ‘The contents of the Cratylus on the theory of naming, the problems of flux,
Protagorean relativism and the paradox of false statement, all point ahead to
discussion of these topics in the Theaetetus and Sophist’. Charles Kahn, Plato and
the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 364. See also R.M. van den Berg, Proclus’
Commentary on the Cratylus in Context: Ancient Theories of Language and
Naming (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 8–13.
(2) The proponents of this view see in the Sophist a radical break in Plato’s thinking
because in it Plato offers an account of language at the level of the sentence or
statement rather than that of the name. The distinction between name and statement
is not made in the Cratylus, nor is there any recognition in the earlier dialogue of
the importance of syntax for the truth value of a proposition. See Barney’s summary
of this view (which she calls the ‘syntactical reading of the Sophist’) in Barney,
Names and Nature in Plato’s Cratylus, 170.
320.
Rowe, Christopher J. 1983. "Plato on the sophists as teachers of virtue." History of
Political Thought no. 4:409-427.
Abstract: "When he came to try to find a formal definition of the sophist, Plato
found him an elusive creature; and with good reason. But there are two features
which regularly recur in his references to them: the sophist is a professional teacher,
and what he professes to teach is ἀρετή. Sophists are people who claim παιδεύειν
ἀνθρώπους εἰς ἀρετήν;(1) they set themselves up as παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς
διδάσκαλον (2) The only apparent exception is Gorgias, who though classified as a
sophist in other dialogues, is represented in the Meno as laughing at other sophists
for claiming to teach ἀρετή;(3) and it may well be that Plato regarded this
disclaimer as disingenuous. (4) But there is a difficulty here, in that on the face of it
different sophists claimed to teach different things under the title of ἀρετή. Hippias,
for example, is portrayed in the Hippias Major as professing to encourage a
'devotion to honourable and beautiful practices', (5) whereas in the Euthydemus the
ἀρετή which the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus claim to impart is
apparently coextensive with skill in eristic debate.(6) In that case, 'teacher of ἀρετή
appears to be a highly ambiguous description, and therefore incapable of serving,
even informally, to define the class. In general, historians of philosophy tend to
suggest that behind the apparent differences between individual sophists in this
respect lies a single shared purpose: the teaching of 'the art of success'."
(1) Gorgias, 519e7.
(2) Protagoras, 349a2. Cf. also Meno, 95b; Apology, 20b; Euthydemus, 273d;
Hippias Major,
283c ff.
(3) Meno, 95c.
(4) cf. E.L. Harrison, 'Was Gorgias a Sophist?', Phoenix, 18 (1964) (hereafter
Harrison),
pp. 183-92.
5) Hippias Major, 286a f.
(6) See below, pp. 423-6; and Harrison, p. 189, note 34.
321.
———. 2015. "Plato, Socrates, and the genei gennaia sophistike of Sophist 231b."
In Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato, edited by Nails, Debra and
Tarrant, Harold, 149-167. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica.
322.
———. 2015. "Plato versus Protagoras: The Statesman, the Theaetetus, and the
Sophist." Diálogos no. 98:143-165.
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Abstract: "The Statesman is nowadays generally read either on its own, or with
Republic and Laws. But more attention needs to be given to the fact that it is
designed as part of a trilogy, alongside Theaetetus and Sophist. Reinstating the
dialogue in this context gives a fuller perspective on its purposes. The Statesman (1)
identifies existing so-called «statesmen», for whom the Protagoras of Theaetetus is
chief apologist, as the greatest exemplars of sophistry as defined in Sophist: mere
«imitators» and dealers in falsehood; (2) offers the Platonic alternative to the
Protagorean vision of human life and organization sketched in the first part of
Theaetetus; and (3), in common with Sophist, illustrates –after the apparent failures
of Theaetetus– both what knowledge is and how it can be acquired. Finally, and
controversially, the Statesman emerges, along with Theaetetus and Sophist, as part
of one and the same project as the Republic."
323.
Rudebusch, George. 1990. "Does Plato Think False Speech is Speech?" Noûs no.
24:599-609.
"Before Plato came along, there was no satisfactory account of the nature of false
speech. This is not to say that no one had yet figured out how to tell a lie; the
Greeks were notorious, even in their own literature, as skillful liars. What I mean is
that there was a pair of puzzles floating around unanswered. These puzzles were
expressed as arguments that false speech was impossible. One puzzle went like this:
to say what is false is to say what does not exist, but to say what does not exist is to
say nothing at all, and to say nothing at all is not to speak. Thus there can be no
such thing as false speech. The other puzzle went like this: to say what is false is to
say what is other than the things that are. Nonetheless (in view of the first puzzle),
to say what is other is to say something that is. But to say what is is to speak the
truth. Thus there can be no such thing as false speech.(1)" (p. 599)
(...)
"In what follows, I shall look at (I) the problem of false speech which Plato faces,
(II) the solution he gives in the Sophist, and (III) how that very solution is
undermined by the argument of the Theaetetus. It will then be clear (IV) what sort
of reconciliation is ruled out and what sort remains to be investigated, if we are to
avoid paradox." (p. 600)
(1) The distinction between these two puzzles is not always recognized. But the
puzzles are two, and Plato presents them as a pair: Eud. 283e7-284a8 and 284bl-b7;
Crat. 429d4-6 and 429e3-9; and Tht. 167a7-8 and 167a8-b1.
324.
———. 1991. "Sophist 237-239." Southern Journal of Philosophy no. 29:521-531.
"The text of the Sophist at 237-239 is aporetic: it leads any talk of non-being into
perplexity. This passage shares with many other of Plato’s dialogues the following
structure. A question is asked and an answer, given in a single sentence, is reached
and accepted by the interlocutor. Then the interlocutor is examined further, his
assent to that answer is undermined, and the interchange ends. After giving the
details of this passage (in section I), I shall argue (section 11) that the Stranger does
not share Theaetetus’s perplexity and continues to hold the rejected answer. Such an
interpretation needs an explanation: why should the Stranger behave this way?
Sufficient reasons can be found in the Stranger’s pedagogy. What those pedagogical
reasons are, and how good they are, I consider in section 111." (p. 521)
325.
Runciman, Walter. 1962. Plato's Later Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Contents: Preface VII-VIII; 1. Introduction 1; 2. The 'Theaetetus': logic and
knowledge 6; 3. The 'Sophist': ontology and logic 59; 4. Conclusion 127; Selected
bibliography 134; Index 137.
326.
Ryle, Gilbert. 1939. "Plato's Parmenides." Mind no. 48:129-151.
Second part: Mind, 48, PP. 302-325.
Reprinted in: R. E. Allen, Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, London, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1965 pp. 97-147; G. Ryle, Collected Papers. Volume I. Critical Essays,
London: Hutchinson 1971 (reprint: New York, Routledge, 2009), Essay I pp. 1-44.
On The Sophist see in particular pp. 42-46.
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"However, there is a pair of concepts which are forced upon our notice in the course
of the operations which turn out to require a very different sort of elucidation,
namely those of non-existence and existence. For a Sophist is a pretender who
either thinks or says that what is not so is so.
The puzzle which arose in the Theaetetus arises again here. How can what does not
exist be named, described or thought of? And if it cannot, how can we or Sophists
talk or think of it, falsely, as existing? So the question is squarely put: What does it
mean to assert or deny existence of something?
(...)
"Now the interesting thing is that it is true that existence and nonexistence are what
we should call ‘formal concepts’, and further that if modern logicians were asked to
describe the way in which formal concepts differ from proper or material or
content-concepts, their method of exhibiting the role of formal concepts would be
similar to that adopted here by Plato. But we need not go further than to say that
Plato was becoming aware of some important differences of type between concepts.
There is no evidence of his anticipating Aristotle’s enquiry into the principles of
inference, which enquiry it is which first renders the antithesis of formal and other
concepts the dominant consideration.
There is, consequently, in Plato, no essay at abstracting the formal from the
contentual features of propositions, and so no code-symbolisation for the formal in
abstraction from the material features of propositions." (pp. 44-46 of the reprint)
327.
———. 1960. "Letters and Syllables in Plato." The Philosophical Review no.
69:431-451.
Reprinted in G. Ryle, Collected Papers. Volume I. Critical Essays, London:
Hutchinson 1971 (reprint: New York, Routledge, 2009), Essay III pp. 57-75.
"In his later dialogues Plato makes a lot of use of the notions of letters of the
alphabet and the spelling of syllables out of these letters. He frequently uses these
notions for the sake of analogies which help him to expound some more abstract
matters.
There is one of his uses of the letter-syllable model which is not of special interest
to me, namely, for the exposition of some merely chemical theories about the
combinations of a few material elements into multifarious compounds.
Plato employs this model in this way in the Timaeus (48B–C), though he says that
the analogy is not a good one. Here he is stating what is essentially an Empedoclean
theory. Sextus Empiricus says that stoicheion, used thus to denote an ultimate
material element, was a Pythagorean term.
My interest is in Plato’s use of the alphabet model in expounding his logical or
semantic views, namely his views about the composition of the thoughts, that is, the
truths and falsehoods that we express or can express in sentences (logoi)." (p. 57 of
the reprint)
(...)
"Conclusion. Plato in his late dialogues was concerned with some of the same
cardinal problems as those which exercised Frege and the young Russell, problems,
namely, about the relations between naming and saying; between the meanings of
words and the sense of sentences; about the composition of truths and falsehoods;
about the role of ‘not’; about the difference between contradictories and opposites;
and in the end, I think, about what is expressed by ‘if ’ and ‘therefore’. His
admirable model, which Frege lacked, of the phonetic elements in syllables enabled
Plato to explain more lucidly than Frege the notion of the independent-variabilitywithout separability of the meanings of the parts of sentences. On the other hand,
lacking the apparatus of algebra, he was nowhere near abreast of Frege’s and
Russell’s symbolisation of substitution-places. Plato could not extract implications
from their particular contexts or therefore codify implication patterns. A blackboard
would have been of no use to him.
Plato says nothing about the bearings of the alphabet model on the Theory of
Forms, or of the Theory of Forms on the alphabet model. So I shall not say much. If
the Theory of Forms had maintained or entailed that Forms are just subject-terms of
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a superior sort, that is, just eminent namables, then this theory could contribute
nothing to Plato’s new question, What does a sentence convey besides what its
subject name mentions?
But if the theory of Forms had been meant or half-meant to explain the
contributions of live predicates, including tensed verbs, to truths and falsehoods
about mentioned subjects, then in his operations with the model of letters and
syllables, Plato has raised to maturity things which, in his Theory of Forms, had
been only embryonic. To his terminal questions about the composition of logoi and,
therewith, about the roles of live, tensed verbs, the Theory of Forms was either
quite irrelevant or else quite inadequate." (pp. 74-75 of the reprint)
328.
Saati, Alireza. 2015. "Plato’s Theory of the Intercommunion of Forms (Συμπλοκή
Εἰδῶν): the Sophist 259, e4-6." Philosophy Study no. 5:35-43.
"Plato’s lifelong confrontation with Parmenides and his metaphysical mire of
believing that nothing (το μὴ ὂν) does not actually exist, gradually in the Sophist
comes into finish, insofar as the philosopher after facing the foe and having the last
laugh simmers down. In this paper after giving an interpretation of what
Parmenides says, I shall present an analysis of Plato’s drastic answer to him
(Sophist, 259 e4-6) to see how Plato opens the impasse way created by the Eleatic
philosopher. Here the intercommunion of Forms is regarded as the final answer by
which Plato devastates Parmenides infamous thesis. Since hitherto no in-depth
analysis is given by the scholars who are puzzled with the subject, I have tried to
analyze the intercommunion of Forms philosophically. Plato’s Eleatic challenge has
always been crucial in Plato himself and philosophical development after him. As
while as Parmenides thesis (Sph., 238 a8-9) provides the sophists opportunity to
reject the falsehood, Plato’s theory of Forms in contrast in order to cross off the
extremely sly sophists tries to make Parmenides come down. In my opinion, the
intercommunion of Forms, as the last step of the theory of Forms, basically
determines Plato’s late ontology tightly knitted with logic. Vindicating this proposal
depends on true understanding of the intercommunion of Forms. Since Plato’s late
ontology, in my opinion, is closed to Frege’s ontology and discussion of language,
we are armed to interpret the intercommunion of Forms with recent recent logicophilosophicus achievements, I think.
In this respect, this is what I have done in my paper: analyzing sentence from
Plato’s logico-metaphysical point of view. Ultimately, I have tried to show how the
aim of the intercommunion of Forms, which Plato himself states, is demonstrating
the possibility of dialogue and discourse. This statement explicitly sets forward that
the discussion is bound up with several logical approaches, according to which
finally full bright light is shed on different implications of the subject such as
universals." (p. 35)
329.
Sabrier, Pauline. 2019. "Parts, Forms, and Participation in the Parmenides and
Sophist: A Comparison." Etudes platoniciennes no. 15:1-9.
Abstract: "This paper addresses the vexed question of the outcome of the second
horn of the dilemma of participation in Plato’s Parmenides bringing in Sophist
257c7-d5 where the Eleatic Stranger accepts what he seems to reject in the
Parmenides, namely that a Form can have parts and nevertheless remain one.
Comparing Plato’s treatment of parts of Forms in both passages, and in particular
the relation among Being, Change and Rest at Sophist 250a8-c8, I argue that unlike
in the Parmenides, in the Sophist, parts and wholes are seen as offering a structure
that can explain how things that may, at first, appear unrelated nevertheless belong
together."
330.
———. 2020. "Plato’s Master Argument for a Two-Kind Ontology in the Sophist:
A New Reading of the Final Argument of the Gigantomachia Passage (249b5–
249c9)." Apeiron:1-20.
Abstract: "In this paper I defend a new reading of the final argument of the
Gigantomachia passage of Plato’s Sophist (249b5–249c9), according to which it is
an argument for a two-kind ontology, based on the distinction between the changing
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beings and the unchanging beings. This argument, I urge, is addressed not only to
Platonists but to all philosophers – with one exception. My reading is based on the
claim that this argument does not rely on the view that nous requires unchangeable
objects – what I call the traditional reading – but on the view that nous itself is
unchanging. The difference between the traditional reading and my reading is that
on the former, Plato’s argument relies on a distinctive epistemological assumption,
whereas on the latter, Plato’s argument is free from any such commitments. If the
argument of this paper is along the right lines, then this implies that this argument
has a much more far-reaching scope than critics have usually assumed. It also
invites us to reconsider Plato’s
approach to the question of being in the Sophist."
331.
Sallis, John. 1975. Being and Logos. The Way of Platonic Dialogue. Atlantic
Highlands: Humanities Press International.
Second edition with a new preface 1986; Third edition titled: Being and Logos.
Reading the Platonic dialogues, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
Chapter VI. The Way of Logos: Sophist, pp. 456-532.
332.
———. 2013. "Plato’s Sophist: A Different Look." The New Yearbook for
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:283-291.
Reprinted in: Hallvard Fossheim, Vigdis Songe-Møller, Knut Ågotnes, Knut (eds.),
Philosophy as Drama: Plato’s Thinking through Dialogue, New York: Bloomsbury
Academic 2019, pp. 231-240.
Abstract: "This paper deals with the question of difference in the Sophist. It begins
with the difference that sets this dialogue apart from its dramatic predecessor, the
Theaetetus, and with the task posed at the outset of determining the difference
between the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher. An account is then given of
the critical engagements through which the question of being and of its intertwining
with nonbeing is taken up. Outlining the discussion of the five kinds, it concludes
with a close examination of the genos difference as “chopped into bits” and hence
as a different “look”."
333.
Sampson, Kristin. 2013. "A Third Possibility: Mixture and Musicality." The New
Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:328-338.
Abstract: "This paper considers two small textual places within Plato’s Sophist,
namely 252d–253c and 259d–260b. First it turns to what is called a third possibility
and looks at how this is described by examples related to the letters of the alphabet
and the notes of music. Three words that are used to describe the mixing that these
two examples display are συμμίγνυμι, κοινωνία, and μίξις. What is common for
these three words is that they are shrouded in a similar kind of ambiguity of
meaning, related to sexuality.
This paper argues the relevance of taking this ambiguity seriously, something which
has not, to my knowledge, previously been done. Next it considers how the
exposition of this third possibility results in the emergence of the philosopher. At
this point also a view of language and thinking (logos) related to the philosopher is
developed, and used in order to distinguish between the philosopher and the sophist.
At the end of the paper, in the last textual fragment mentioned (259d–260b), it is
indicated how this is a place where an echo of the musical and the philosophical
resound, where these two elements are linked to each other, to logos, and to the
necessity of mixture."
334.
Sayre, Kenneth M. 1970. "Falsehood, Forms and Participation in the Sophist." Noûs
no. 4:81-91.
"The Sophist is one of Plato's most constructive dialogues, and one of the most
cleverly constructed. Feigning pursuit of the essential sophist, Plato analyzes in turn
(a) δύναμις as the mark of what is, (b) collection and division as the source of "the
free man's knowledge," (c) the modes of combination among the forms, (d)
Difference as the nature of "that which is not" and, in culmination, (e) the
distinction between false and true judgment which separates the sophist from the
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philosopher. These results surpass in their solidity any positive contribution of the
Phaedo or the Republic.
Yet they are achieved with a more austere conception of the forms than any found
in these earlier dialogues. The structure of this more mature conception, I believe, is
best illustrated in Plato's analysis of true and false discourse. My purpose in this
paper is (1) to recapitulate what I take to be Plato's analysis of truth and falsehood
in the Sophist, (2) to contrast the theory of forms presupposed by this analysis with
the theory of the Phaedo and the Republic, and (3) to sketch against this
background the theory of participation which seems to be implicit in the Sophist
and other late dialogues. My contention, in preview, is that a form in this later
context is a kind definable in terms of criteria for membership, and that
participation is the relationship by which individuals qualify for membership in a
kind." (pp. 81-82)
335.
———. 1976. "Sophist 263b Revisited." Mind no. 85:581-586.
"This passage [Sophist 263b: "Theaetetus sits' and 'Theaetetus flies'] has posed
problems for sympathetic commentators. One is the problem of mere intelligibility.
(1) A more basic problem has been that of reconstructing from the passage a
credible account of true and false judgment. In Plato's Analytic Method (Chicago,
1969) I offered an interpretation which, although I believe accurately directed, is
potentially flawed in an important respect.(2) The difficulty with this interpretation
stems from a mistaken assumption, which most commentators share, about the
nature of not-Being in the Sophist account. Correcting this mistake yields an
interpretation which is more fully Platonic both in content and elegance, and which
is considerably more faithful to the text of the dialogue."
(1) A sensitive discussion of syntactical ambiguities in these sentences may be
found in David Keyt's 'Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B,' in E. N. Lee, A. P. D.
Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (eds.), Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek
Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos (Humanities Press, New York: 1973), to
which I am indebted in the translation above.
Robert Vacca also is to be thanked for advice on Plato's use of ὄν ἔστῐν .
(2) I say 'potentially flawed' because, although the interpretation in the book is
literally compatible with what I now believe to be the correct account, its further
elucidation in my 'Falsehood, Forms and Participation in the Sophist,' Noûs, iv
(1970), 81-91, brought the flaw to the surface. I am indebted to Alvin Plantinga for
drawing the problem to my attention.
This interpretation was developed originally in response to difficulties with other
accounts of false judgment in the Sophist, which need not be reviewed for present
purposes.
336.
———. 1983. Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Second edition: Parmenides Publishing, 2005 with a new introduction and the essay
"Excess and Deficiency at Statesman 283C-285C".
337.
———. 1992. "A maieutic view of five late dialogues. Methods of interpreting
Plato." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. Supplementary volume:221-243.
"There are five dialogues of Plato's late period, each consisting of a conversation
with a master philosopher, in which the conversation is organized by
methodological principles explicitly proposed by the philosopher himself. In the
case of the Theaetetus, the method was stated by Socrates in earlier dialogues,
notably the Phaedo and book 6 of the Republic. In each of the remaining four,
however, the method is expounded and applied within the same conversation-by the
Stranger from Elea in the Sophist and the Statesman, by Parmenides himself in his
namesake dialogue, and by a renovated Socrates in the late Philebus. I shall refer to
these five as the methodological dialogues." (p. 221)
(...)
"I have made two claims concerning the methodological dialogues.
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The first is that the conversational format of these dialogues is intended to serve the
maieutic function described by Socrates in the Theaetetus, and characterized in the
Seventh Letter as the only path to the flame-like revelation of philosophic
knowledge. The second is that the respective methods of these conversations
provide the structure by which they are enabled to lead the reader to that state of
fulfilment.
The first claim is supported by the texts involved, the second by the experience of
the attentive reader. Neither claim by itself, perhaps, is particularly adventuresome.
I have suggested further, however, that together these claims answer the question
posed at the beginning of this discussion: namely, how the conversational format of
these five late dialogues relates to the methods they severally illustrate. The answer,
in summary, is that the method in each case provides the discipline by which the
reader is enabled to follow the path of the conversation, to the state of wisdom that
can be found at its end." (p. 243)
338.
———. 2006. Metaphysics and Method in Plato’s Statesman. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 2. Collection in the Phaedrus and the Sophist 36; Chapter 3. Division in the
Phaedrus and the Sophist 52-72.
"The Statesman is third in a sequence of dialogues employing the method of
dialectical division. In both the Phaedrus and the Sophist, division is paired with a
companion procedure of collection. To evaluate the absence of collection in the
Statesman, it is helpful to look carefully at how it functions in these two previous
dialogues. This is the purpose of Chapter 2. Also discussed in this chapter is the
language of collection that appears in the Philebus, despite the absence of the
corresponding methodological procedure.
In similar fashion, Chapter 3 addresses the use of division in those two earlier
dialogues. A notable feature of division in the Phaedrus is its use of
nondichotomous distinctions, a feature which is absent in the Sophist but reappears
in the Statesman. The Sophist contains eight fully developed lines of division in all,
each of which is examined in the course of this chapter." (p. 5)
339.
———. 2008. "Dialectic by Negation in Three Late Dialogues." In Reading
Ancient Texts: Vol. I: Presocratics and Plato. Essays in Honour of Denis O'Brien,
edited by Suzanne, Stern-Gillet and Corrigan, Kevin, 189-212. Leiden: Brill.
"While little is beyond dispute in Platonic commentary, it seems clear that there are
three distinct methods of dialectical inquiry to be found in the middle and late
dialogues. One is the method of hypothesis featured in the final arguments of the
Phaedo and implicated in the Divided Line of the Republic. Another is the method
of collection and division, introduced in the Phaedrus and employed extensively in
the Sophist before collection is phased out in the course of the Statesman. And third
is the method introduced by Parmenides in his namesake dialogue and meticulously
illustrated in the ensuing arguments on Unity.(1) I shall refer to this latter as
“Parmenides’ method.” (p. 189)
(...)
But what are we to say in this regard about Parmenides’ method?
Unlike the other two, the dialectical procedure employed by Parmenides is confined
to a single dialogue. On initial consideration, at least, it appears that we lack
evidence for earlier versions in Plato’s thought.(4)
While the dialectical approach in question is said (at Parmenides 135D) to be
essential for achieving the truth, and while it produces some of the most substantial
results in the entire Platonic corpus, (5) we encounter it here in full-blown form
with no indication of prior development. Or so at least it appears.
The purpose of the present paper is to dispel this appearance. Parmenides’ method
is distinguished from the other two primarily by its use of negative hypotheses. As
we shall see, there are sections of both the Sophist and the Statesman where
negation figures in the explication of important topics. While these passages are
familiar in their own right, I am not aware of any previous attempt to connect them
with the distinctive method of the Parmenides. If the attempt of the present paper is
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successful, we will have reason to believe that Parmenides’ method was anticipated
in dialectical manoeuvers employed (appropriately enough) by the Eleatic
Stranger." (p. 190)
(1) While any of these three methods might be accompanied by elenchus in a
particular rhetorical setting, it should be noted that Socratic refutation by itself is
not a dialectical method.
(4) Although one part of the procedure is said at 135D8 to trace back to Zeno, there
is no reason to think that the method overall is not due to Plato himself.
(5) This claim is supported in K. Sayre, Parmenides’ Lesson: Translation and
Explication of Plato’s Parmenides (University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).
340.
Schipper, Edith Watson. 1964. "The Meaning of Existence in Plato's Sophist."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 9:38-44.
"In this paper, I should like to give arguments for the following points: (1) that, for
the later Plato, what exists must be defined by forms interrelated in logos; (2) that
the particular things of experience exist, and also are defined by the interrelated
forms. Their existence is not that of substantial subjects beyond their predicative
forms, but is comprised by the forms, which formulate them and bring them out of
the matrix of experience. Thus, Plato is sketching a profoundly original approach to
the perennial problems of philosophy." (p. 38)
341.
———. 1965. "Souls, Forms, and False Statements in the Sophist." The
Philosophical Quarterly no. 15:240-242.
"In a provocative and ingeniously worked out article, Robert Turnbull has presented
his view of the Sophist's account of false statements.(1) I should like to bring out
some passages which raise questions about his position, and briefly suggest an
alternative view to which I think they point.
The argument, as I understand it, rests upon Mr. Turnbull's interpretation of the
Platonic ontology as consisting of " forms, souls, and immanent characters "(2)
Immanent characters or actions, " the stuff of Becoming ", exist in the souls, and
participate in the forms for which the souls strive.
A false statement about a soul ascribes to it a possible action participating in a form
which is not (is different from or contrary to) the form for which the soul strives.
For " the contrariety of forms is reflected in references to actions "(3) Thus, a false
statement rests on the difference of some forms from others, though it is about the
possible actions which illustrate the contrary forms and are somehow in the souls."
(p. 240)
(1) "The Argument of the Sophist", The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, Jan. 1964,
pp. 23-34.
(2) op. cit., p. 24.
(3) op. cit., p. 34.
342.
———. 1965. Forms in Plato's Later Dialogues. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Chapter IV: Forms in the Sophist, pp. 31-42.
"This little book is concerned with one problem, that of whether and in what
respects Plato continued to hold his earlier theory of forms of the Phaedo and
Republic in his later dialogues. The earlier theory is first considered; since those
who deny that Plato continued to hold his theory base their contention on an
interpretation of it which is inadequate to explain even the arguments of the earlier
dialogues. The later dialogues are then examined, in an attempt to show that the
earlier theory is continually assumed, in all its essentials; although it is developed
and modified to make it more consistent and adequate to experience.
Special attention is given to Plato's treatment of the problem of the relation of the
forms to the perceived things, left unexplained in the earlier dialogues, but clearly
recognized and wrestled with in the later ones. This problem is the perennial one of
how the objects of intellectual argument and explanation are related to the things of
experience. A solution to that problem is brought out in Plato's reconsideration of
his theory of forms." (Preface, P. VII)
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"The Sophist by common consensus, is placed sometime after the Parmenides and
Theaetetus, and before the Politicus. Its place in the dialogues is thought to follow
their literary order; and it starts with an appointment made at the end of the
Theaetetus, while the Politicus refers to the immediately preceding discussion of the
Sophist.
The Sophist could be subtitled: On Being and Not Being.
Ostensibly, it is a laboriously worked out definition of the sophist by means of
diaeresis, carried on by the Eleatic Stranger. Again, Theaetetus responds. Yet the
defining of the sophist seems to serve primarily as a means of introducing
discussions of the nature of existence and as an illustration of the interconnecting of
the forms, the συμπλοκη ειδων, the central conception of the dialogue and the most
important addition to Plato's later metaphysics." (p. 31)
343.
Schoener, Abraham. 2000. "Not the Sophist." In Retracing the Platonic Text, edited
by Russon, John Edward and Sallis, John, 41-54. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press.
"We must pause for a moment to recall just what Penelope is weaving. It is a burial
shroud for Laertes, the father of Odysseus-the father of the image of the
philosopher-who is not yet dead. This is a sign that, for Plato, the writing of the
dialogues is not a supplement or marker for the dead, defunct Philosopher, but that
the writing precedes and even announces his death. Plato's Socratic dialogues are
Socrates' Penelopean burial shroud, tolling the death of conversational, "living,"
philosophy.
This brings us to our last question. This is a very vexed one and seems to be
addressed with the greatest seriousness in all of the literature on the Sophist. The
question is: Who is the (real) Philosopher?
Our answer must now be "Nobody in particular." Stop worrying about the question.
It is a question left over from the pretextual era of philosophy. Once philosophy
becomes and recognizes itself to be textual, the question for now and all time is:
What is being? This displacement is the deepest form of the patricide of Socrates by
Plato." (p. 53)
344.
Sedley, David. 2019. "Etymology in Plato’s Sophist." Hyperboreus. Studia Classica
no. 25:290-301.
Abstract: "The etymological method displayed at considerable length in the
Cratylus is widely assumed to be intended by Plato as an object of ridicule. In my
2003 monograph Plato’s Cratylus I resisted this assumption. In the present paper I
seek to strengthen my case by arguing that in Plato’s major work on philosophical
logic, the Sophist, the same method is re-employed twice, at 221 a–c and 228 b–e,
for entirely serious purposes."
345.
Seligman, Paul. 1974. Being and Not-Being. An Introduction to Plato's Sophist. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
"The present study has been undertaken with the ontological perspective in mind. In
addition the historical roots of Plato's thinking will be emphasized. His struggle
with the Eleatic legacy permeates this dialogue in a deeper sense and to a greater
degree than has generally been admitted. On the other hand, the value of logically
and linguistically oriented exegeses of the Sophist, such as have appeared during
the last thirty years, is readily acknowledged. Still, they have not given us the whole
story; they have neglected a significant dimension of Plato's thinking, and therefore
need supplementing, and it only speaks for the richness of his work that it can be
approached in more than one way.
My discussion will concentrate on the middle sections of the dialogue and follow
the order of its argument, which develops organically and with greater cohesion
than its dramatic form and artistic presentation might suggest. There can be no
doubt about the seriousness of Plato's concern (contra Peck, 1952, cp. Runciman,
1962, p. 59), but there is also present a tinge of poetic playfulness which can have a
baffling effect on readers seeking straightforward, unequivocal answers. At times it
looks as though Plato lived up to the Heraclitean word that nature likes to conceal
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itself. It seems though that on some issues raised in the Sophist Plato himself was
wavering, that there are others on which he had not made up his mind. In any case,
he was never prone to produce a closed and final system, and each dialogue right to
the end of his life meant a fresh start. But certain positions he never surrendered,
and some of these permeate the Sophist as well. One of them is his belief in a
rational and intrinsically knowable order of reality. That order is apprehended by
the intuitive intellect and capable of being set out, indeed needing to be set out, in
reasoned discourse; i.e., it is apprehended by noesis, accompanied by logoi. As
Plato matured, the emphasis shifted from the former to the latter mode. And while
the latter takes the stage in the Sophist, there is no evidence that the former was
abandoned by him even then." (pp. 2-3)
References
Peck, A. L. (1962). "Plato's Sophist: The Symploke ton Eidon," Phronesis, VII, I.
Runciman, W. G. (1962). Plato's Later Epistemology. Cambridge, U.P.
346.
Sellars, John. 2010. "Stoic Ontology and Plato’s Sophist." Bulletin of the Institute
of Classical Studies:185-203.
"It has been suggested that Stoic ontology should be conceived as a reaction against
Platonism thus understood. It has also been suggested that Stoic ontology be
conceived as a ‘reversal’ of Platonism,(4) inverting the order of priority between
bodies and incorporeals, or particulars and universals, depending how one views it.
The most significant attempt to analyse the relationship between Stoic ontology and
the work of Plato, however, must be Jacques Brunschwig’s article ‘The Stoic theory
of the supreme genus and Platonic ontology" in which he argues that Stoic ontology
was in effect a philosophical response to material the early Stoics found in Plato’s
Sophist.(5) It was through reading Plato, Brunschwig claims, that the early Stoics
developed their own distinctive position.
The aim of what follows is to assess this claim and to ask whether Stoic ontology
can be read as the product of a critical engagement with Plato’s Sophist. I shall
begin in the first section with a brief overview of Stoic ontology along with a closer
look at some of the differences between the principal recent interpretations. I shall
focus my attention not only on Brunschwig’s account of Stoic ontology but also
those of David Sedley (which came before) and Victor Caston (which came after).
(6) In the second section I shall move on to consider the Sophist, giving a brief
overview of those sections of the dialogue that Brunschwig claims already contain
the central features of Stoic ontology. In the third and final section I shall consider
to what extent, if any, Stoic ontology can be said to be the product of a critical
reading of the Sophist." (pp. 183-184)
(4) This is a claim made by G. Deleuze, Logique du sens (Paris 1969), where he
says that the Stoics were the first to reverse Platonism. However he doesn’t specify
how he thinks they achieved this and his account of Stoic ontology is eccentric to
say the least (on which see J. Sellars, ‘Aiôn and Chronos: Deleuze and the Stoic
theory of time’, Collapse 3 (2007) 177-205 (178 n. 4)). Elsewhere, in Différence et
répétition (Paris 1968), he claims that Plato himself was the first to reverse
Platonism.
(5) First published as J. Brunschwig, ‘La théorie stoïcienne du genre suprême et
l’ontologie platonicienne’, in Matter and metaphysics, ed. J. Barnes and M.
Mignucci (Naples 1988) 19-127 and translated in Brunschwig’s Papers in
Hellenistic philosophy (Cambridge 1994) 92-157. All subsequent references are to
the English version.
(6) It goes without saying that I have learned an enormous amount from the work of
each of these authors and what I offer here is merely by way of a footnote to their
contributions to our understanding of Stoic ontology. I shall not discuss directly
earlier accounts of Stoic ontology as they are dealt with and taken into
consideration in the works I shall consider, but I note the earlier discussion in J. M.
Rist, Stoic philosophy (Cambridge 1969) 152-72.
347.
Shorey, Paul. 1930. "Plato Sophist 255c and το δισσόν." Classical Philology no.
88:80.
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348.
———. 1931. "Plato Sophist 236 C and Laws 668 A ff." Classical Philology no.
81:323-324.
"To sum up the common sense of the matter, in the Sophist and in order to
disparage the sophist, Plato says that we may distinguish two kinds of imitation in
all the mimetic arts, that which produces a likeness and that which produces an
illusion. He employs a similar if not precisely identical distinction in Republic 380
D for another purpose. Elsewhere, when he has no such purpose in mind and is
merely speaking of the general theory of art, he amplifies "imitation" by the
addition of the virtual synonym "representation," and says art is imitation and
representation. This, as the passage of Aristotle quoted shows [*], is a perfectly
natural mode of expression, and it is the height of hypercriticism to read into it a
contradiction or withdrawal of the special point that there are tricky arts for which
illusion is a better name than representation or the production of an objective
likeness." (p. 324)
[*] Aristotle, Poetics, 11447 a 19: πολλὰ μιμοῦνταί τινες ἀπεικάζοντες.
349.
Shukhoshvili, Maia. 2016. "Tékhnē in Plato's Sophist (Discussing Heidegger's
Opinion)." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg
(1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs, Marko J., 131-142. Newcastle
upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"The aim of this chapter is a discussion of the concept of tékhnē in Plato's Sophist,
since this dialogue distinguishes and defines many different tékhnai. But what is
tékhnē for Plato? Very often tékhnē is translated by 'art', but this is not the case for
Plato and especially not in the Sophist.
The chapter is divided into four main parts. First of all I would like to propose
Heidegger's definition and interpretation of tékhnē. Then I will examine the
etymology and precise meaning of tékhnē in Ancient Greek.
The third part is concerned with the meaning and use of tékhnē in Plato's dialogues,
and finally, in the last part of the chapter I will try to reach the meaning of tékhnē in
Plato's Sophist." (p. 131)
350.
Silverman, Allan. 2002. The Dialectic of Essence. A Study of Plato's Metaphysics.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
See in particular Chapter Five: Forms and Language, pp. 137-181 and Chapter Six:
Not-Beings, pp. 182-217.
351.
Smith, Colin C. 2019. "Dialectical Methods and the Stoicheia Paradigm in Plato’s
Trilogy and Philebus." Plato Journal no. 19:7-23.
Abstract. "Plato’s Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman exhibit several related
dialectical methods relevant to Platonic education: maieutic in Theaetetus,
bifurcatory division in Sophist and Statesman, and non-bifurcatory division in
Statesman, related to the ‘god-given’ method in Philebus. I consider the nature of
each method through the letter or element (στοιχεῖον) paradigm, used to reflect on
each method. At issue are the element’s appearances in given contexts, its fitness
for communing with other elements like it in kind, and its own nature defined
through its relations to others. These represent stages of inquiry for the Platonic
student inquiring into the sources of knowledge."
352.
———. 2020. "Diairesis and Koinonia in Sophist 253d1-e3." History of Philosophy
Quarterly no. 378:1-20.
Abstract: "Here I interpret a central passage in Plato’s Sophist by focusing on
understudied elements that provide insight into the fit of the dialogue’s parts and of
the Sophist–Statesman diptych as a whole. I argue that the Eleatic Stranger’s
account of what the dialectician “adequately views” at Sophist 253d1–e3 involves
both division and the communion of ontological kinds—not just one or the other as
has usually been argued. I also consider other key passages and the turn throughout
the dialogue from imagistic opining toward noetic understanding."
353.
———. 2021. "The Method of Bifurcatory Division in Plato’s Sophist."
Elenchos.Rivista di Studi sul Pensiero Antico no. 42:229-260.
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Abstract: "The strange and challenging stretch of dialectic with which Plato’s
Sophist begins and ends has confused and frustrated readers for generations, and
despite receiving a fair amount of attention, there is no consensus regarding even
basic issues concerning this method. Here I offer a new account of bifurcatory
division as neither joke nor naïve method, but instead a valuable, propaedeutic
method that Plato offers to us readers as a means of embarking upon the kind of
mental gymnastics that will stretch us properly in preparation for further, more
challenging dialectical work. Considering several interpretive issues, I argue that
bifurcatory division is a process of collective inquiry into the common through
which an account, both definitional and taxonomical, is discovered. Depending on
the level of understanding exhibited by the inquirers, this account may or may not
allow for noetic understanding of the object in the deepest sense."
354.
Solana, José. 2013. "Socrates and «Noble» Sophistry (Sophist 226b-231c)." In
Plato's Sophist Revisited, edited by Bossi, Beatriz and Robinson, Thomas M., 7185. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"The sixth division of the Sophist has caused and continues to cause notable
perplexity for several reasons.
1. It is introduced into the dialogue in an anomalous way. The Stranger speaks
about two kinds of art: acquisitive (κτητική) and productive (ποιντική). However,
later on he introduces a third kind: separative (διακριτική) art, whose relationship
with the earlier types remains unexplained.
2. The role of this new art in relation to the overall objective of the dialogue, which
is to reach a strict definition of the nature of the sophist, is also not explained.
3. Apart from not contributing to the main objective, it creates great difficulties,
since, on the one hand, the Stranger speaks of a “noble Sophistry” and, on the other
hand, the sophist is defined as a negative figure: one who is in possession of a
knowledge which is merely apparent (233c10). Thus the paradox occurs that noble
Sophistry is entrusted with the task of destroying the apparent knowledge (231b5)
produced by Sophistry.
In view of these difficulties, it is relevant to question, with Cornford ([1935)] 182),
why in that case this division stands here." (pp. 71-72, notes omitted)
(...)
"So Plato would have faced two options: either to discard the αντιλογική τεκνηέ
which would have seriously affected the ἔλεγχος, or to preserve it in the form of
γενναια σοφιστική. This second option, chosen by Plato in the Sophist, is proof that
Plato’s position against the sophists has to do with axiological and normative
postulates rather than with theoretical questions and arguments." (p. 85)
355.
Speliotis, Evantha. 2013. "Sophist and Philosopher in Plato's Sophist." In Socratic
Philosophy and Its Others, edited by Dustin, Christopher and Schaeffer, Denise,
197-215. Lanham: Lexington Books.
"Having completed the search for the sophist and having identified the nature of his
activity (see 218b-c), we may now reflect back and "calculate before ourselves"
(dialogisometha, 231d) how he has appeared and what we have learned. From the
beginning, the sophist has been particularly associated with appearances, and he
may be said to dwell in, even to be a master of, appearances.
(...)
And yet the philosopher, too, appears. Just as the sophist faces a threat because of
his overweening attention to the appearances and, the Stranger has argued,
insufficient attention to knowledge, being, and truth; the philosophr also faces a
challenge and a threat if, in his devotion to and pursuit of knowledge and truth, he
does not care sufficiently for the appearances.
(...)
The Stranger, therefore, concludes the Sophist with both an affirmation and a
criticism of Socrates. Socrates is in his being, his intention, and his activity a
philosopher. But Socrates is also, in a sense "poor in speeches" (phaulos en logois).
As masterful as he is at phantastic imitation, he is not masterful enough. For all his
knowledge and his skill, his devotion to truth and being to the exclusion of
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appearance is a weakness, not a strength. The philosopher need not be a victim of
others' opinions. Being masterful as he is at phantastike, he should also give some
care and attention not only to what he does, but how he appears to others when he
does it. As Plato seems to suggest also in the Phaedrus, the philosopher must
embrace, not eschew, the true art of rhetoric, the art of making both true and
beautiful speeches (see Phaedrus 277b-d)." (pp. 212-213)
356.
Starr, David E. 1974. "The Sixth Sophist: Comments on Frederick S. Oscanyan's
"On Six Definitions of the Sophist: Sophist 221e-231e"." Philosophical Forum no.
5:486-492.
357.
Stenzel, Julius. 1940. Plato's Method of Dialectic. Oxfordf: Clarendon Press.
Translated and edited by D. J. Allan.
358.
Stough, Charlotte. 1990. "Two Kinds of Naming in the Sophist." Canadian Journal
of Philosophy no. 20:355-381.
"Those who hold the view that Plato is committed to self-predication by his theory
of Forms are forced to consider whether he ever came to terms with the problem
and, if he did not, why he did not, in view of the apparently damaging effects of the
Third Man Argument. Their opponents in the tradition, on the other hand, insist that
Plato would not have agreed that a Form can be predicated of itself and that his
theory does not imply it. But they in turn have been hard put to explain the import
of the Third Man Argument, which appears to trade so heavily on that assumption,
as well as the unmistakably self-predicative language of the dialogues.
I believe that this line of thinking focuses too narrowly on what we have come to
understand as the 'problem of self-predication'. To begin with, no winner in the
debate is anywhere in view. Plato's language, overtly self-predicative though it is,
gives no purchase to either party in the dispute, and the textual evidence on both
sides is notoriously inconclusive. Much of the debate has centered on several
controversial passages in the Sophist. In this paper I shall argue that the Sophist
offers no unambiguous interpretation of grammatically self-predicative statements
because it does not, either by design or in effect, distinguish between predication
and identity. Instead of attacking certain troublesome puzzles connected with Being
by directly analyzing that concept (esti), Plato offers a solution to those problems
by distinguishing between two kinds of names." (pp. 355-356)
359.
Strawser, Bradley Jay. 2012. "Those Frightening Men: A New Interpretation of
Plato’s Battle of Gods and Giants." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy
no. 16:217-232.
Abstract: "In Plato’s Sophist (245e–247e) an argument against metaphysical
materialism in the “battle of gods and giants” is presented which is oft the cause of
consternation, primarily because it appears the characters are unfair to the
materialist position. Attempts to explain it usually resort to restructuring the
argument while others rearrange the Sophist entirely to rebuild the argument in a
more satisfying form. I propose a different account of the argument that does not
rely on a disservice to the materialist nor restructuring Plato’s argument. I contend,
instead, that the argument is enthymematic in nature, allowing the definitions
employed to flow out of the reasoning as originally presented. Moreover, it suggests
that Plato’s idealism was so deeply ingrained that modern defenses of materialism
were not even live options."
360.
Sweeney, Leo. 1988. "Participation in Plato's dialogues: Phaedo, Parmenides,
Sophist, Timaeus." The New Scholasticism no. 62:125-149.
"Having witnessed Plato's upgrading intelligence (and thereupon the efficient
causality it exercises) and his disclosing the efficient causality it exercises) and his
disclosing the extent and nature of divine artistry, let us now, before moving to the
Timaeus. bring the Sophist into focus with the Phaedo and Parmenides." (p. 125)
(...)
"In order to succeed, the three-factor theory of the Phaedo (the Form itself, the
participated perfections, participants) needed further causes to explain how the
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participated perfections themselves were produced in the participants without the
Form itself being changed, multiplied, divided. His answer can be found in the
Parmenides and Sophist, where he joined participation explicitly with exemplarity
and efficiency. More adequately, then, participation consists in things being madeas-images of the Forms (Parm. 132D3-4), which thereby are present in their
participants through the participated perfections they cause by paradigmatically
directing the artistic activity of cognitive agents (Sophist. 248E sgg. and 264 sgg.).
The advantages of this more adequate conception are obvious. By their activity
agents are genuine causes that sensible existents are what they are. By their indirect
presence through participated perfections the Forms are genuine causes of what
things are. Yet they are not divided or multiplied or changed or lessened by their
causality. Simply by being what it is, a Form can constantly direct as model
whatever artistic activity the cognitive agent wishes to engage in. Sensible existents
themselves are actually produced and yet they remain imperfect: they are only
images of the Forms, upon which they depend constantly for being what they are.
Plato's procedure in formulating his philosophy was, then, to start with participation
and end with efficient and exemplary causalities. But these latter do not replace the
former: they complement and enrich it. à thing's participation in Forms results from
the divine agent producing it while acting under their paradigmatic guidance." (p.
134)
361.
Swindler, James Kenneth. 1980. "Parmenides' Paradox: Negative Reference and
Negative Existentials." The Review of Metaphysics no. 33:727-744.
"In this section I hope to show that Plato offers in the Sophist an alternative
conception of being and irreferential language which avoids commitment to forms
without instances.
Although I believe the Sophist contains a general semantics of reference, including
the germ of a solution to the paradoxes of intensionality, I will confine myself here
to Plato's solution of Parmenides' Paradox. Whereas the modern accounts I have
been discussing begin with language and take some settled ontology for granted,
Plato insists that a real solution requires a reconsideration of being itself. Only
when we understand the nature of being can we begin to fathom reference to
nonbeings.
There are at least three statements by the Eleatic Stranger defining being. At 238a
he says, "To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is. . . .
But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?"
(24) An object exists if and only if it is possible for it to possess some real property
besides existence. This principle is said to be violated in all attempts to refer to or
describe what does not exist. At 247a, in refutation of materialists, the Stranger,
alluding to virtues and vices, says, "But surely they will say that that which is
capable of becoming present or absent exists." If it is possible for anything to
possess or not to possess some property, then that property exists. These two
principles give us existential conditions for objects and properties.
(...)
"Being'' means "possible relatedness"; being is exactly identical to possibility
(dunamis ); being is the possible possession of properties. At Plato's hands
Parmenides' ontology falls prey to his own logic. They agree that nonbeings can
have no properties, but Plato adds that beings must have properties besides their
being. There can be no simple, either Parmenidean or Russellian." (p. 738)
(24) All passages from the Sophist are in H. N. Fowler's translation, Theaetetus and
Sophist (New York: Loeb, 1921)
362.
Tabak, Mehmet. 2015. Plato's Parmenides Reconsidered. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Chapter 4: Parmenides in Theaetetus and Sophist: Introduction 127; Plato’s Critique
of Protagoras in Theaetetus 128; Parmenides and Parmenides in Sophist 141;
Conclusion 163-165.
"The eight arguments of the Parmenides are governed by eight hypotheses, or
“suppositions” (henceforth, H1, H2, H3, etc.)." (p. 59)
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(...)
"There is a noteworthy suggestion in Sophist to the effect that Parmenides’s
principle is self-contradictory. On the one hand, (1) Parmenides claims that only the
one is (as in H1) or that it is not many in any way. On the other hand, (2) his
description of the one suggests that it has being and thus is a whole with parts (as in
H2). What we have here is akin to setting argument 2 against argument 1. Relatedly,
Sophist does not take up (1) directly as an object of refutation except when the
Stranger mentions briefly, but critically, that Parmenides denies any combination
and any conception of the real as a plurality.
However, the Stranger’s refutation of (2) makes it rather evident that H2 is
attributable to the historical Parmenides and that Plato thinks it creates a
“measureless perplexity” for Parmenides’s doctrine.
Sophist also briefly, but strongly, suggests that Plato supports H3.
This is implied in the Stranger’s definition of Unity itself." (p. 163)
363.
Tegos, Michalis. 2019. "How does the Sophist reply to the Parmenides? Or, Why
the One is not among the Megista Gene." Platonic Investigations no. 10:42-73.
Abstract: "This paper explores the relation of the Sophist to the Parmenides: in what
ways the Sophist responds to the questions, aporias and demands raised in the
Parmenides.
It aims to show how the problems encountered in the first part and the categories
used in the second part of the Parmenides, relate to the solutions proposed in the
Sophist. The Parmenides has been interpreted in various ways: as a logical exercise
and as a theory about gods, even as an example of perfect symmetry in
impossibility.
It has been acclaimed as the best collection of antinomies ever produced, but also,
as an impossible map sketching how the theory of forms should not be thought. Its
purpose, a parody, or training, a pedagogic exercise necessary for the proper way to
truth.
Not, however, in order to discard forms, but, on the contrary, to affirm their
necessity and to refine them, lest we end up abandoning forms and, with them, the
possibility of dialectic and Philosophy. Throughout the Parmenides, the Theaetetus
and the Sophist, we are led through a complex argumentative and dramatic strategy
to the refutation of the Eleatic doctrine and the mature ontology of the Timaeus. We
shall seek to show that the sections on dunamis, the megista gene and the
community of forms that follow the Gigantomachia episode about ousia in the
Sophist, propose a way out of the aporias of participation and the ‘greatest
difficulty’ of the Parmenides, a way to salvage the theory of forms, and, with them,
the possibility of knowledge, logos and Philosophy altogether."
364.
Thomas, Christine Jan. 2008. "Speaking of Something: Plato's Sophist and Plato's
Beard." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. 38:631-668.
"After close examination of the Eleatic Visitor's arguments, I shall defend the view
that Plato intends the something requirement articulated in the Sophist to be a
metaphysical condition on significant discourse and contentful thought. For Plato,
whatever is something is some one thing that is. In other words, whatever is
something exists as a well-individuated, countable entity. Being and number 'belong
to' whatever is something. Moreover, whatever is something is self-identical (by
sharing in sameness) and different from everything else (by sharing in difference).
One of the central aims of the Sophist is to articulate and to develop Plato's
metaphysics of somethings. We learn in the dialogue that, strictly speaking, speech
and thought must be of existing, countable beings that are self-identical and
different from everything else.
Some qualifications are, of course, in order. There is reason to believe that not
simply any apparently contentful piece of speech commits Plato to the
somethinghood and existence of the purported subject. For example, the apparent
meaningfulness of the sentences 'Pegasus does not exist' and 'Pegasus is winged'
does not commit Plato to the somethinghood or existence or being of Pegasus. Or
so I argue. (pp. 632-633 a note omitted)
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365.
Thorp, John. 1984. "Forms, Concepts and TO MH ON." Revue de Philosophie
Ancienne no. 2:77-92.
Note 1: "This paper is a reply to Y. Lafrance "Sur une lecture analytique du
Sophiste 237 b 10 - 239 a 12" [Revue de Philosophie Ancienne, 2, 1984, pp. 41-76].
His paper and my reply continue a discussion which began when we gave a seminar
together in 1982 - 83 at the University of Ottawa on 'The analytic and continental
traditions in the exegesis of Plato's Sophist'. I wish to thank him both for his
vigorous curiosity and also his friendly tolerance throughout the seminar and since."
(p. 77)
(...)
"Conclusion
In conclusion let me simply restate the principal thesis which I have argued. Plato's
Forms and analysts' concepts are fundamentally the same things. Once we see this a
good deal of Plato's philosophical work becomes remarkably alive.
And given that Plato is thus sufficiently on our wavelength that we can take him out
of the museum and treat him seriously as a philosopher, why should we not do so? I
am sure it is what he would have wanted." (p. 92)
366.
Tilgham, B. R. 1969. "Parmenides, Plato and logical atomism." Southern Journal of
Philosophy no. 7:151-160.
"In the Sophist Plato does not give us a theory of proper names although there is no
reason to suppose he is not committed to thinking of names as meaning their
bearers and likely enough he thinks of the names of the forms as logically proper
names. Whether he would consider the name of a sensible object, e.g.,
“Theaetetus,” as a logically proper name, there is no evidence to suggest. At any
rate, it doesn't make any difference. Whatever he takes to be logically proper
names, it would, I think, be easy enough to impose the theory of descriptions upon
him to take care of the other words that we use to refer and, besides, what is
important and original is not a theory of names, but a theory of sentence meaning."
(p. 157)
367.
Trevaskis, J.R. 1955. "The Sophistry of Noble Lineage (Plato, Sophistes 230a5232b9)." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 2:36-49.
"This passage has recently been examined by Mr G. B. Kerferd in the Classical
Quarterly.(1) He reaches interesting and novel conclusions.
The following article questions the results of his investigations and attempts to
support the usual view of the passage.
It may be best to begin with a recapitulation of the dialogue up to 231 e6. An
Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus attempt to define the sophist.
Five divisions are pursued under the generic starting-point κτητική. The sixth is
preceded by a Collection which yields the term διαλεκτική. The τέχνη διαλεκτική is
successively divided until a cathartic method of education is isolated. The question
is then raised whether its practitioners are sophists. The Eleatic is doubtful about
this, but is prepared to accept the qualified title." (p. 36)
(...)
"The reason for the sixth division appearing where it does in the Sophist must
surely be that the method of Socrates portrayed in it was often confused with
sophistry. After five divisions which characterize sophistry as Plato saw it and are
plainly hostile, the sixth is "serious and sympathetic; towards the close it becomes
eloquent.(2)" (p. 48)
(1) N.S. IV I, 2 (Jan.-Apr. 1954) pp. 84-90.
(2) i.e. Plato to his reader: "Continue to call it sophistry, if you insist; but if you do
you are talking of a 'sophistry' of a very different order."
368.
———. 1966. "The μέγιστα γένη and the Vowel Analogy of Plato, Sophist 253."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 11:99-116.
"I wish to discuss the μέγιστα γένη section of the Sophist (251a5-259d8) and in
particular some difficulties in the passage 253a1-c3.
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Let us begin by considering a couple of general points about the Sophist: 1. What is
the Sophist about? Answers commonly given are that it is concerned with the
relations of Ideas to one another, or with the elucidation of significant negative and
of false statement, or with a development in Plato's ontology, or with the practical
illustration of the method of Collection and Division, or with a number of these
topics.
Even on the assumption (which I do not share) that all these topics are to be found
treated in the dialogue, it does not seem to me that their treatment is other than
incidental to a more fundamental theme: philosophy. The dialogue is an exercise in
doing philosophy, which is distinct from its counterfeit, sophistry or casuistry. Of
course all the dialogues are in a sense exercises in doing philosophy: the reader's
mind is exercised by them in philosophical questions. But the Sophist is a dialogue
which is itself pre-eminently a demonstration of philosophy in action. The passages
concerned with significant negative and with false statement, for instance, are
practical examples of casuistical positions refuted. No-one strongly interested in
philosophy is likely to find the dialogue dry or technical. These adjectives may be
applied to it by those more interested in literature than philosophy.
2. The discussion is led by a visitor from Elea' who, it is emphasized at the
beginning of the dialogue and elsewhere, is a philosopher and no mere logicchopper. He is, in fact, indistinguishable from Plato's Socrates in some traits: for
example, his use of the aporematic method, and his penchant for the method of
diaeresis.
The dialogue, then, shows us philosophy in action, and is conducted by a serious
philosopher." (p. 99)
(1) I call him an 'Elean' rather than an 'Eleatic' since, although he is described at the
opening of the dialogue as ἑταῖρον... τῶν ἀμφὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα, it becomes
clear in the course of the dialogue that he does not adopt the Eleatic position.
369.
———. 1967. "Division and its Relation to Dialectic and Ontology in Plato."
Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 12:118-129.
"The formal divisional exercises which we meet above all in the Sophist may strike
the reader as tedious. Yet it is usually said that Plato lays great store by Division as
a method of philosophy, one, moreover, to which he gives the title of 'dialectic' and
which reveals the real structure of Ideas.
I wish to discuss how far the method is to be identified with dialectic, what relation,
if any, it bears to Plato's ontology, and what Plato hopes for from it. I shall be
mainly concerned with Phaedrus, Sophist and Statesman, having discussed the
Philebus on a previous occasion (Phronesis 5,1 [1960], 39-44)." (p. 118)
370.
Trindade Santos, José. 2013. "For a Non-Predicative Reading of esti in Parmenides,
the Sophists and Plato." Méthexis no. 26:39-50.
Abstract: "The absence of grammatical subject and object in Parmenides' "it is/it is
not" allows the reading of the verbal forms not as copulas but as names, with no
implicit subject nor elided predicate. Once there are two only alternatives, contrary
and excluding each other, sustaining that a 'no-name' does not grant knowledge
implies identifying its opposite – "it is" – as the only name conducive to knowledge
in itself, denouncing the 'inconceivability of a knowledge that does not know. If "it
is" is the only [name] "which can be thought/known", and "what is" is the way in
which 'thought/knowledge' can be accomplished, there is no need to postulate the
existence of 'anything' that is, nor of anything that can be said of "what is". Being
the only name which "can be thought of/known", the unifying synthesis of
"knowledge, knowing and known" in one infallible cognitive state, it is unthinkable
that "what is" does not exist."
371.
———. 2016. "Reading Plato’s Sophist." In Plato’s Styles and Characters. Between
Literature and Philosophy, edited by Cornelli, Gabriele, 89-99. Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter.
"Plato’s Sophist explores a cluster of philosophical interconnected problems,
namely those of truth/falsity and being/not-being. Highlighting some key passages
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in Plato’s dialogues in which these problems are approached I come to the Sophist
where they are brought together and solved." (p. 89)
(...)
"The greatest innovation contained in this conception of dialectics consists in the
previous separation and subsequent combination of the ontological and
epistemological perspectives on reality(14). While the three first Greatest Kinds –
Being, Movement and Rest – refer to what exists, the Same and the Other provide
the dialectician with the ability to relate them using different kinds of statements:
existential, identitative and predicative ones (this last one exploring the
participation of Forms in one another: 255a–b, 256a).
Plato’s theory of Being shows how this kind includes all the others granting them
‘existence’ (Being is everything that is, seen in itself). In his conception of NotBeing he starts by making manifest the function played by the Other as ‘difference’
(Not-Being is Being seen from the perspective of any other kind: 255d, 256d–e). He
then proceeds to condense in the idea of ‘contraposition’ (257d–258c) the role
played by Not-Being in the generation of ontological hierarchies.
In these each grade is what it is, in contraposition to all the others it is not, but in
relation to which it is and is said by discourse (258d–259b)." (p. 97)
(14) In the Phaedo or the Republic Epistemology and Ontology are tied together, for
each one of the two cognitive competences “is related to” its own content – “being”
or “opinion” – and “effects” its product: “knowledge” or “belief” (R. [Republic] V
477d ff.).
372.
Turnbull, Robert G. 1964. "The Argument of the Sophist." Philosophical Quarterly
no. 14:23-34.
"The aim of this paper is to present and defend an explanation of the connections
between the most noteworthy parts of Sophist. That explanation ties together the
battle of gods and giants, the section on non-being and the section on speaking and
thinking falsely. As always in Platonic interpretation, however, my explanation
accords with a more comprehensive interpretation of Platonic ontology and has
ramifications for the explanation of other dialogues.
Baldly stated, my claim is as follows. In the battle of gods and giants section the
Stranger insists that both forms and souls are, both being dynameis (powers). In the
section on non-being a distinction is drawn between forms which, as it were, run
through all the other forms as principles of their division and contrariety and forms
which might be called " illustrable " forms (cf. the " illustrability " of mathematical
forms in Republic in that the mathematician may draw diagrams). The former are
Being, Same, and Different, the latter, Motion and Rest. Motion and Rest are among
the " most important ", for every other illustrable form may be regarded as a kind
(or sub-kind) of one of them. They are, moreover, contraries, that is, they mingle
with Different with respect to each other. The section on speaking and thinking
falsely requires that souls are, for " names " refer always to souls. It also requires
contrariety, for " verbs " refer to immanent characters (i.e., to what, strictly,
participate in forms) or, better, to " possible " immanent characters. And immanent
characters, sharing contrariety with the forms in which they participate, provide the
possibility of speaking or thinking what is not. To speak or think what is not (i.e., to
make a false " statement ") is to refer to a soul and a " possible " immanent
character, the " possibility " of which is assured by the diversity and contrariety of "
illustrable " forms. The " discourse " principle which parallels the contrariety
principle among the forms is : No soul may have in it at the same time (and in the
same respect) contrary immanent characters.
And discourse here, of course, consists of juxtaposition of " names " and " verbs ".
In what follows, Part I will develop the intellectual considerations upon which my
interpretation rests, providing a more general framework for it.
Part II will deal directly and briefly with the text of Sophist." (p. 23)
373.
Turner, E. G. 1955. "A Ptolemaic scrap of Plato, Sophistes." Rheinisches Museum
für Philologie no. 98:97-98.
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"Shortly before the publication in May 1955 of The Hibeh Papyri Part II, I
identified the contents of two small scraps printed therein as No. 228 as from Plato,
Sophistes. I had time to insert a slip stating the identification, but not to revise or
assess the value of the text, and I attempt that revision and evaluation here." (p. 97)
374.
Van Eck, Job. 1995. "Falsity without Negative Predication: On Sophistes 255e263d." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 40:20-47.
"The dramatic aim of the Sophistes is to characterise the sophist and capture him in
a definition. He is to be described as an illusionist who creates false beliefs.
Therefore, an analysis of falsity is needed, which is provided in 263.
Now, three of the main problems the Sophistes has raised among interpreters are:
'What is the preparation Plato made before he could arrive at his analysis of
falsehood?', 'What is the nature of the problem about falsity Plato gets to grips
with?' and 'What account of negative predication, if any, can we derive from the
dialogue?' In the following I want to deal with these questions." (p. 20)
(...)
"To conclude: there is no treatment of what we usually call negative predication
(that is, nonpredication) in 255e-258e, nor any reference to it, nor any use made of
it in 258e-263d; further, the analysis of a sentence of the type 'x is not F' we can
derive from 240e-241a and 263b-d, shows that it does not imply negative
predication in the strict meaning of the phrase, viz. that a negative predicate is
attributed to x. Thus, in a double sense we can say that there is no negative
predication in the Sophistes. What we do find is falsity without negative
predication. In consequence, it is wrong to speak of the 'crucial inadequacy of [the]
Sophist account of negation to sustain Plato's theory of false judgement (50); the
Platonic account of negation we can derive from the Sophist is an immediate result
of the theory of false judgement we find there, and an adequate one indeed." (p. 40)
(50) Wiggins (1971), 268.
References
G. Vlastos ed. 1971. Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology. New York.
Wiggins, D. 1971. 'Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of NonBeing'. 268-303 in G. Vlastos ed. 1971.
375.
———. 1997. "A Note on Sophist 257b9-c3." Mnemosyne no. 50:75-77.
"In the literature we find two kinds of translations of Sophist 25 7b9-c3, but, strange
enough, no discussion among the commentators of the point of difference at issue.
In my opinion, both versions are unsatisfactory. I will try to prove this claim and
offer an alternative. The question behind the difference between the translations is:
on what part of the sentence do the genitives τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων (c1-2) and
τῶν πραγμάτων (c2) depend?" (p. 75)
376.
———. 1999. "Plato's Analysis of Falsity. A Landmark in the History of Logical
Analysis." In JFAK — Essays Dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the Occasion of
his 50th Birthday, edited by Gerbrandy, Jelle, Maarten, Marx., de Rijk, Maarten and
Venema, Yde. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Abstract: "Plato's theory of falsity and its preliminaries, as presented in Sophistes
254d-263d, has evoked many grave criticisms: it is said to be fundamentally flawed
in several respects. Yet it appears that the main origin of this view is an incorrect
reading of the section on negation, which precedes the analysis of falsity. This
section is interpreted as treating negative predication; in fact it treats higher order
(non-)identity propositions (F is [not] G). And it is on the basis of these
(non)identity propositions that the falsity of atomic first order sentences is
explained. The resulting analysis turns out to be impeccable and fully adequate to
the problems at issue."
377.
———. 2000. "Plato's logical insights: On Sophist 254d-257a." Ancient Philosophy
no. 20:53-79.
"Plato has often been censured for a serious lack of important logical insights.
Especially his theory of not being and falsity and its preliminaries, as presented in
the middle part of the Sophist, particularly 254d-263d, has evoked many grave
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criticisms." (p. 53)
(...)
"I shall discuss those parts of the text that have given rise to these criticisms, which
I show to be all mistaken: Plato is not guilty of any of the fallacies or failures
mentioned. On all points at issue here Plato's logical insights are perfectly sound."
(p. 54)
(...)
"On the basis of the criticisms dealt with above, the section 254d-263d of the
Sophist, containing Plato's theory of not-being and falsity, has been called 'one great
logical mistake' (Bostock 1984, 90). Now that we have seen all these criticisms are
false, how should we evaluate the theory? We found that it is not faultless either, as
it contains the idea that (a) rest does not participate of movement and movement not
of rest, because (b) this would turn their-opposite-natures into each other. Actually,
only the first part of (a) is true and the reason given for it is not sound. In fact, this
makes the system inconsistent: it follows from the text
that every form is at rest (contra a), and also that resting is not part of the physis of
any form (except for rest, of course), and so will not interfere with the form of
movement either (contra b). How serious is this and what is the position of the
inconsistency within the theory as a whole?" (p. 77)
(...)
"Thus, within the theory as a whole the idea that movement would not partake of
rest and vice versa because this would turn their natures into each other, is merely a
marginal slip. In fact it is the only fault in an otherwise impeccable series of
arguments, leading, as our outline in the introduction can only adumbrate, to a
highly adequate analysis of not being and falsity. Far from being the logical mess
the criticisms would make us believe it is, the theory of falsity and negation we find
in the Sophist is a masterpiece of logical analysis, to be reckoned among the great
achievements in the history of the discipline." (p.78)
References
Bostock, D. 1984. 'Plato on "Is not' " Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2: 89119.
378.
———. 2002. "Non-Being and Difference: on Plato's Sophist 256d5-258e3."
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 23:63-84.
"Plato's analysis of falsity at Sophist 263 is given in terms of notbeing and
difference. 'Theaetetus flies' is false because what is different is stated as the same,
and what is not as what is, θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, (263 D 1-2),
things that are different from what is the case concerning him (viz. flying) are
described as the same (as what is the case about him). That there are indeed many
μὴ ὄντα, 'not-beings' in the sense of things different from the things that are, the
Eleatic Stranger (ES) and Theaetetus remarked some lines above, 'for we said there
are many things that are with regard to each thing and many things that are not' (263
B 11-12), referring to 256 E 6-7, 'so, with regard to each of the forms, being is
many and not-being is indefinite in quantity' . In this way they had been disobedient
to Parmenides, who had stated, 'Never shall it force itself on us that things that arenot are [είναι μη έόντα].' But they had gone even further in their disobedience: 'but
we have not merely shown that the things that are-not are, but also brought to light
the form not-being happens to have' (258 o 5-7).
The context of both points has caused commentators a lot of problems. The main
question is, how is it that something (i.e. a form) is called an ουκ όν in 256 o 8-257
A 6? Is it because it is different from the form of being; or is it because it is
different from any thing (i.e. any form) it is not identical with? And on which of the
two lines is the form of not-being defined as it is introduced in the section that
follows, in 258 A 11-B 8 and 258 D 7-E 3? Only a few commentators have tackled
the problems systematically, and as far as I know no interpretation has been reached
that is both coherent and sound. Nevertheless, such an interpretation is possible, as I
shall argue in the following. I shall discuss the passages at issue, criticize
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commentaries that have been given, and present the interpretation intended." (pp.
63-64)
379.
———. 2008. "Self-predication and Being the Aitia of Things." Ancient
Philosophy no. 28:105-124.
"In recent times sentences of self-predication in Plato, that is, sentences in which it
is said that a certain form F-ness, is itself F. have been explained by referring to the
causal role of forms. The form F-ness is F because it is the aitia of any particular x
being F. This is taken in different senses. Some commentators are of the opinion
that to say that F-ness, also called ' the F'. is itself F is to say that it is the ultimate
source (explanation) of why anything is F (Fine 1992, 26 and 2003, 36, 314-315).
For others, sometimes the form of F is itself F because as a cause of other things'
being F, it must itself have the quality F (Malcolm 1991, 154-158 and Devereux
2003, 79).
I examine the evidence put forward for these interpretations and look at some
passages pertinent to the issue of self-predication from the Phaedo and the Sophist.
The Sophist features a context in which there is no question of the role of forms as
aitiai; the Phaedo passage is explicitly about the causal role of the forms concerned.
From both dialogues we can learn why a form F-ness cannot be not F, and what it
means that it is F, without referring to the F as the aitia of F-things being F. Yet
there is a very interesting connection between the causal role of the forms and a
certain type of self-predication. Surprisingly. however, it is not self-predication of
forms that is at issue, but self-predication with relation to the F-ness 'in us'." (p.
105)
References
Devereux, D. 2003. 'Plato: Metaphysics' 75-99 in C. Shields ed. The Blackwell
Guide to Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Fine, G. 1992. 'Aristotle's Criticisms of Plato' 13-41 in J. Klagge and N. Smith edd.
Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues. Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy, supplementary volume.
Fine, G. 2003. Plato on Knovledge and Forms, Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Malcolm, J. 1991. Plato on the Self-Predication of Forms. Early and Middle
Dialogues. Oxford: Oxford University.
380.
———. 2014. "Plato’s Theory of Negation and Falsity in Sophist 257 and 263: A
New Defense of the Oxford Interpretation." Ancient Philosophy no. 34:275-288.
"There are two main rival interpretations of the text, the so-called Oxford
interpretation and the incompatibility range interpretation.(1) On the Oxford
interpretation, the sentence ‘Theaetetus flies’ is false, because flying is different
from everything that applies to Theaetetus. So it reads a universal quantifier implied
in the text: ‘other things than all the things that are’. The incompatibility range
interpretation, however, says that ‘Theaetetus flies’ is false, because flying is
different from something taken from the range of attributes incompatible with
flying (viz., sitting) that applies to Theaetetus. Thus it reads an existential quantifier
in the text: ‘other things than some things that are’. This reading finds its inspiration
in an earlier passage, 257b1-c3, on negative expressions, where the idea of a range
of incompatible attributes is introduced indeed, and where it is said that ‘the
prefixed “not” indicates some of the other things than… the things the words
uttered after the negative stand for’. On this interpretation ‘not big’, for instance,
would signify middle-sized, or small, because it means ‘something other than big’.
What is at issue here, namely, to which interpretation we should subscribe, concerns
an important point: whether the Sophist offers an adequate theory of falsity or not.
On the Oxford interpretation it does, on the incompatibility range interpretation it
does not.
Now, the incompatibility range interpretation is winning more and more support.2
Brown 2008, 453-458 argues against the Oxford interpretation. As her criticisms are
incisive and forceful indeed, adherers to this interpretation cannot ignore them. In
the following, I will oppose the incompatibility range interpretation and point out
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that it involves a remarkable inconsistency in the treatment of negative terms in
256-257. Then I will show that a natural reading of 263 justifies the Oxford
interpretation." (pp. 275-276)
(1) The name ‘Oxford interpretation’ was introduced by Keyt 1973.
(2) Szaif 2004; Brown 2008; Gill 2009. Crivelli 2012 adheres to the Oxford
interpretation.
References
Brown, L. 2008. ‘The Sophist on Statements, Predication, and Falsehood’ 437-462
in G. Fine ed. 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Plato. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Crivelli, P. 2012. Plato’s Account of Falsehood. A Study of the Sophist. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Gill, M.L. 2009. ‘Method and Metaphysics in Plato’s Sophist and Stateman’ 1-34 in
E.N. Zalta ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Keyt, D. 1973. ‘Plato on Falsity: Sophist 263B’. 285-305 in E.N. Lee, A.P.D.
Mourelatos, R. Rorty edd. Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy
Presented to Gregory Vlastos. Assen: Van Gorcum.
Szaif, J. 2004. Platons Begriff der Wahrheit. Munich: Alber.
381.
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1969. "Logical Structure in Plato's Sophist." The Review of
Metaphysics no. 22:482-498.
"In view of much recent discussion of the passage in the Sophist in which Plato
discusses the relations among the forms, (*) it may not be inappropriate to examine
this passage from the point of view of modern logical theory. There is indeed
already one such study by Karl Dürr, (**) who attempts to represent the relations
among the forms within the framework of classes in Principia Mathematica. Since
we consider some of these relations to be modal in character, we cannot accept the
adequacy of this framework for this purpose.
In what follows we shall examine the connection between relations among the
forms and the relation of participation between forms and individuals (section 2) ,
the peculiar character of forms corresponding to relative terms (section 3), and
finally the formal representation of the described logical structures (section 4). The
main point which emerges is that the problems discussed by Plato are closely
related to difficult problems in current logical theory." (p. 482)
(*) 251A-259D. See for example J. B. Trevaskis, "The megista genê and the vowel
analogy of Plato, Sophist 253," Phronesis 11 (1966), pp. 99-116, and the references
therein.
(**) "Moderne Darstellung der platonischen Logik. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung des
Dialoges Sophistes," Museum Helveticum 2 (1945), pp. 166-194.
382.
Vázquez, Daniel. 2018. "Argumentation and Reflection in Plato’s Gigantomachia
(Sophist 245e6–249d5)." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 100:241-285.
Abstract: "This paper argues that Plato’s gigantomachia is simultaneously
concerned with first-order arguments about metaphysics and epistemology and with
second-order arguments that reflect on the impact of ethical components,
argumentative strategies and theoretical assumptions in the conversation. This
complex argumentative structure reveals, I suggest, an organic and systematic
conception of philosophy where all the elements are interdependent. This
interpretation has four consequences, two at the second-order level, and two
concerning the first-order arguments. First, it shows that there are methodological
and ethical requirements without which philosophy is impossible. Second, it shows
that the text does not refute materialism but tries to reflect the necessary conditions
to consider possible the existence of incorporeal beings. Third, it argues that the text
assumes a conception of knowledge where knowing something is a complex
activity composed of two causal relations. Finally, it offers a new interpretation of
the overall conclusion of the passage."
383.
Vigdis, Songe-Møller. 2013. "Socrates, the Stranger, and Parmenides in Plato’s
Sophist: Two Troubled Relationships." The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and
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Phenomenological Philosophy no. 13:292-305.
Abstract: "Who is the xenos, the Eleatic stranger, in the Sophist? Or rather: who is
he not? In this paper, I try to shed light on this (latter) question by discussing
Socrates’ relationship toward the stranger as well as the stranger’s relationship
toward Parmenides. I argue that in the opening of the dialogue, Socrates creates an
aura of disinterest, distance, and alienation toward the visitor and thus indicates that
the stranger is a philosopher of another kind than himself. Through an analysis of
the stranger’s treatment of Parmenides’ notions of non-being and being I come to
the conclusion that the stranger also diverges from his spiritual father Parmenides:
while both Socrates and Parmenides never lose the divine ideal out of sight, the
stranger confines himself to a purely human perspective, in total isolation from the
divine ideal."
384.
Vlasits, Justin. 2021. "The Puzzle of the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie:1-29.
Published first online.
Abstract: "The many definitions of sophistry at the beginning of Plato’s Sophist
have puzzled scholars just as much as they puzzled the dialogue’s main speakers:
the Visitor from Elea and Theaetetus. The aim of this paper is to give an account of
that puzzlement. This puzzlement, it is argued, stems not from a logical or
epistemological problem, but from the metaphysical problem that, given the
multiplicity of accounts, the interlocutors do not know what the sophist essentially
is.
It transpires that, in order to properly account for this puzzle, one must jettison the
traditional view of Plato’s method of division, on which divisions must be exclusive
and mark out relations of essential predication. It is then shown on independent
grounds that, although Platonic division in the Sophist must express predication
relations and be transitive, it need not be dichotomous, exclusive, or express
relations of essential predication. Once the requirements of exclusivity and essential
predication are dropped, it is possible to make sense of the reasons that the Visitor
from Elea and Theaetetus are puzzled. Moreover, with this in hand, it is possible to
see Plato making an important methodological point in the dialogue: division on its
own without any norms does not necessarily lead to the discovery of essences."
385.
Vlastos, Gregory. 1969. "Self-predication and self-participation in Plato's later
period." The Philosophical Review no. 78:74-78.
Reprinted in G. Vlastos, Platonic Studies, Princeton. Princeton University Press
1973, pp. 335-341.
386.
———. 1973. "An Ambiguity in the Sophist." In Platonic Studies, 270-322.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Appendix I: On the interpretation of Sph. 248D4E4 pp. 309-317; Appendix II:
More on Pauline predication in Plato pp. 318-322
387.
Webb, David. 2000. "Continuity and Difference in Heidegger's Sophist." Southern
Journal of Philosophy no. 38:145-169.
"My argument in this paper comprises four claims. First, Heidegger’s interpretation
of nous and logos can only be fully understood in conjunction with his reading of
phronesis and sophia. Second, the way in which the two pairs of terms bear upon
each other turns at a series of levels on the question of relation. Third, for
Heidegger the question of relation is articulated in terms of movement, and
moreover Heidegger wishes movement, and thereby relation, to show itself as itself
without being reduced either to a thing or to a subsequent relation between
preexisting things. Fourth, while Heidegger’s reception of the Aristotelian
conception of movement as “continuous” (squelches) assists in holding open the
possibility of a more fundamentally ontological discourse than is possible within
the dialectical form of inquiry as presented in Plato’s Sophist, it is paradoxically
Heidegger’s deployment of continuity that leads to the movement by which
philosophy relates to truth being revealed as aporetic and even discontinuous. As a
result, we shall see that Heidegger’s attempt to secure a more “fundamental”
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philosophical relation to truth in fact draws philosophy back into the concreteness
of human existence." (p. 146)
388.
Wedin, Michael V. 1981. "Plato on What "Being" is Not." Philosophia no. 1011:265-295.
"Three puzzles are raised at "Sophist" 243b-245e concerning theories that make
claims about the number of things that are. I argue that they are preliminary to and
reflect Plato's positive theory of being, in particular they indicate that it is a mistake
to regard being as a standard first-order predicate and so support the thesis that for
Plato being is a second-order or formal concept."
389.
Wiggins, David. 1971. "Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of NonBeing." In Plato. A Collection of Critical Essays. I: Metaphysics and Epistemology,
edited by Vlastos, Gregory, 268-303. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press.
Synopsis: "I. An analysis of Sophist 236E ff. The sentential variant of the problem
of non-being in dialogues earlier than Theaetetus and Sophist. II. The display theory
of sentence meaning as an escape from Plato's problem of false judgement. The
theory's inability to accommodate negation. III. Plato's analytical approach to the
problem of sentence-sense in Sophist, and anticipations of this in Cratylus and
Theaetetus. IV. Relevant points from the discussion of Being in Sophist. V. The
Sophist explanation of negation. Preliminary criticism and a suggested amendment
of the explanation. VI. The analysis of true and false judgement at Sophist 263B4
ff. and Plato's return from negation to falsity. VII. Crucial inadequacy of Sophist
account of negation to sustain Plato's theory of false judgement. VIII. Positive
achievements of the analysis."
"For these reasons I do not myself believe that Plato came near to solving the
problem of negation, or that he reached any satisfactory understanding of what
problem this problem really is. The little clarity we now have about the nature of
the problem of negation does not lead me to think that Plato's notion of the notion
of Other is of fundamental importance in solving it. A theory of speech acts is a
more likely focus for a satisfying answer. On the other hand we are not in a position
to condescend to him on the subject. As J. L. Austin complained, we ourselves are
all too apt to define negation in terms of falsehood and falsehood in terms of
negation, and to fend off the charge of circularity by keeping the occasions of such
interdefinition apart (rather than by getting really clear about what exactly is to be
expected from an analysis of negation).
As for falsity, Plato's objective was as much to find room for falsity as to define it
by means of his account of negation; and in the former project I believe he has more
success. Admittedly he mistakes the gravity of some of the obstacles which he
thinks he sees in the way of admitting the existence of falsity, and he does not
always take the best or the shortest way round them. As a result his eventual theory
is a more primitive theory than it otherwise might have been. But in the course of it
he puts logic and philosophy onto the subject of parts of speech and the
asymmetrical roles of names and other parts in the completed sentence." (p. 302)
390.
Wiitala, Michael. 2015. "Non-Being and the Structure of Privative Forms in Plato’s
Sophist." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 19:277-286.
Abstract: "In Plato’s Statesman, the Eleatic Stranger explains that the division of all
human beings into Greek and barbarian is mistaken in that it fails to divide reality
into genuine classes or forms (eide). The division fails because “barbarian” names a
privative form, that is, a form properly indicated via negation: non-Greek. This
paper examines how the Stranger characterizes privative forms in the Sophist. I
argue that although the Stranger is careful to define privative forms as fully
determinate, he nevertheless characterizes them as having a structure unlike that of
their non-privative counterparts. A privative form, in contrast to a non-privative
form, is indifferent to the specificity of its members."
391.
———. 2018. "The Argument against the Friends of the Forms Revisited: Sophist
248a4-249d5." Apeiron no. 51:171-200.
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Abstract: "There are only two places in which Plato explicitly offers a critique of
the sort of theory of forms presented in the Phaedo and Republic: at the beginning
of the Parmenides and in the argument against the Friends of the Forms in the
Sophist. An accurate account of the argument against the Friends, therefore, is
crucial to a proper understanding of Plato’s metaphysics. How the argument against
the Friends ought to be construed and what it aims to accomplish, however, are
matters of considerable controversy. My aim in this article is twofold. First, I show
that the two readings of the argument against the Friends that dominate the
contemporary literature – the “Cambridge Change” reading and the “Becoming-isBeing” reading – lack sufficient textual support.
Second, I offer an alternative reading of the argument against the Friends that better
explains both the text of 248a4-249d5 and the role the argument plays within the
Stranger’s wider project of demonstrating that non-being is. My thesis is that the
Stranger’s argument against the Friends seeks to demonstrate that the forms must be
both at rest and moved, where “moved” (kineisthai) has the sense of “affected.” To
participate in a form is to be affected by that form. I argue that since, according to
the Stranger, every form participates in some other forms (see 251d5-253a2), every
form is “moved” in the sense that it is affected by the forms in which it participates.
Likewise, I argue that every form is at rest in the sense that its unique nature
remains unaffected by the other forms in which it participates."
392.
Wiles, Anne M. 1999. "Forms and Predication in the Later Dialogies." In Plato and
Platonism, edited by van Ophuijsen, Johannes M., 179-197. Washington: Catholic
University of America Press.
393.
Wolfe, C. J. 2012. "Plato's and Aristotle's Answers to the Parmenides Problem."
The Review of Metaphysics no. 65:747-764.
"The question raised by the great pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides were
perhaps the main challenge for Plato and Aristotle, two of the greatest post-Socratic
philosophers. To summarize the challenge briefly: Parmenides denied that there was
any change in the world.
(...)
If Parmenides' argument seems tricky, it ought to. It has seemed tricky to all
thinkers who have followed Parmenides. There were even a few unscrupulous
thinkers who took advantage of this trickiness and used it as a justification for
moral relativism. These thinkers were the sophists, and the most brilliant of them
was Protagoras.
Protagoras claimed that each individual man was "the measure of all things," so the
same thing that was good for one man might not be good for another based on
perspective.(1) Ultimately, Protagoras claimed there was no measure of goodness
based on human nature because human nature as a separate individual form did not
exist. Only being exists, as Parmenides argued; Protagoras said the rest of what we
take to be reality is an illusion and subjective. Protagoras' argument is a stronger
version of the sophist arguments about convention and nature (nomos and phusis).
As Plato and Aristotle both recognized, the Parmenides problem had implications
for politics as well as for philosophy.
No philosopher was able to accurately interpret and refute the Parmenides problem
until Plato and Aristotle. Plato answered it in an important way in his dialogue the
Sophist, and Aristotle followed this up with the complete answer in Physics book 1,
chapter 8. My thesis is that Plato's answer would have been good enough to defeat
Protagoras in extended argument, thereby remedying the political aspects of the
Parmenides problem. However, Aristotle's answer is required to answer some
additional philosophical and scientific aspects.
The first section of this paper will summarize the history of presocratic philosophy
and explain why Parmenides was a turning-point.
The second section will explain the sophist Protagoras' relation to the Parmenides
problem. The third part will present Aristotle's complete answer to the Parmenides
problem, and in the fourth part I will compare that approach with Plato's solution in
the Sophist. Lastly, I will sum up by characterizing how I think Plato and Aristotle
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would have responded to Protagoras' Parmenidean sophistry in political life." (pp.
747-748)
(1) See Joe Sachs' footnote 10 on page 214 in his translation of Aristotle's
Metaphysics (Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2002).
394.
Wood, James L. 2009. "Is There an "Archê Kakou" in Plato?" The Review of
Metaphysics no. 63:349-384.
"Does Plato admit an archê kakou, a source or principle of evil? One or more than
one? If he does, is the principle of evil matter, soul, a god or gods, some
combination of these, or something else entirely? Or, is evil merely a human
phenomenon? Just what does Plato understand by evil anyway? These questions
have been repeatedly addressed by Plato's commentators, but by no means has a
consensus been reached on any of them. (p. 349)
(...)
"In what follows I intend to defend this stance by an analysis of key metaphysical
passages in several Platonic dialogues, and in the process I will address the central
disputes in the scholarship on the present topic. I begin with the idea of the good in
the Republic in order to elicit, by contrast, the concept of an arche kakou, and the
negativity of this notion will be developed through the discussion of me on
(nonbeing) and thateron (difference) in the Sophist. I turn then to the Philebus,
where negativity is conceived as the unlimited or indeterminate (apeiron), and evil
is realized in the embrace of the unlimited in hedonism, the pursuit of pleasure, and
particularly the pleasure of the body. In the next section I show with reference to
key passages in the Statesman and Timaeus that what seems to be a competing
principle of evil, the bodily element (to somatoeides), in fact is a metaphysically
derivative notion referring back to the generative cosmic order and specifically to
the relative negativity, thateron, that makes genesis possible. Finally, I consider the
possibility of psychic evil on the cosmic level in the discussion of an evil cosmic
soul in the Laws. Throughout I will show that positive evil lies only in the defection
of the intellect from its responsibility to generate our being as good." (p. 350)
395.
Xenakis, Jason. 1957. "Plato on Statement and Truth-Value." Mind no. 66:165-172.
"Plato discusses the notions of false, true and statement in a number of places, but
Sophist 261e-3b stands out. I propose to analyse, and not merely to reproduce in
other words, this passage because I expect to make it evident that it has been unduly
if not regretfully neglected by those who concern themselves with such matters. I
am almost tempted to retrodict, for example, that the Theory of Descriptions would
not have been born had this passage been paid the attention it deserves. In any case,
'the present King of France is bald' would not have perplexed anybody because it
would not have been even seriously considered, let alone chosen as a legitimate
specimen of a false statement, or indeed of a statement." (p. 165)
(...)
"That Plato's analysis applies to 'there is '-statements of the form 'there is (isn't) a
mouse in here 'is evident from what has already transpired before the preceding
paragraph; the subject (in the by now familiar sense of 'subject') of this statement is
not of course 'a mouse'—a substance expression—but 'in here', a place expression.
Relational statements too can be accommodated in Plato's analysis, only that the
elucidation of the truth-value of these is, perhaps, more complicated.
I am not necessarily maintaining, with Russell and others, that the higher-order use
or elucidation of 'to exist' is the only one; nor that Plato did successfully cope with
existential, as against attributive, statements, but rather that his present analysis can
accommodate the former without postulating a Meinongian Realm of Being. If so,
Quine's 'Plato's beard' need not be Plato's." (p. 172)
396.
———. 1959. "Plato's Sophist: A Defense of Negative Expressions and a Doctrine
of Sense and of Truth." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 4:29-43.
"The Sophist anyhow may be said to surmount the difficulty about knowledge and
logos appearing toward the end of the Theaetetus: logos, not being a name, can after
all enter into the definition of knowledge; and it can do so, of course, as true not as
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false logos. You have knowledge not because you are "apprehending" an object if
an ethereal one - for apprehension according to the Sophist is not thought and hence
knowledge - but because you have a true logos.
This does not conflict with the Theaetetus thesis that perception is not knowledge;
on the contrary it agrees with it, since perception is a form of apprehension - I
should say the only form, but let that be as it may.
Nor would it conflict with that dialogue had Plato maintained in it, as perhaps he at
bottom at does, that knowledge is not of particulars but of principles; for principles
demand logoi.(1) However, the Theaetetus is not my present concern. In fact, I am
rather uneasy over the way certain concepts are managed in the "commons" passage
(185a ff.), some of which might correspond to some of the "highest concepts" of the
Sophist: they seem to be treated as though they were first-order or attributive
concepts, like "red" and "sound," only not perceptual.
Perhaps this is a slip. Anyhow Plato's stand against perceptionism does not require
anything of the kind. Indeed, that passage could be said to amount to the following
valid argument: Knowledge entails reality or truth (right: "illusory or false
knowledge" is a contradiction in terms); neither truth nor reality is a perceptual
concept (right; cf. " 'existence' is not a predicate"); therefore knowledge cannot be
identical with perception." (pp. 42-43)
(1) It is worth adding that the Wax Tablet metaphor in the Theaetetus goes against
'innate ideas" of course, but also against the "Theory of Recollection" and, to that
extent, against Formism.
397.
Zaks, Nicolas. 2016. "Is the ‘In-Itself’ Relational? Heidegger and Contemporary
Scholarship on Plato’s Sophist 255c–e." In Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and
Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25), edited by De Brasi, Diego and Fuchs,
Marko J., 95-112. Newcastle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
"For some scholars, the proof offered by the Eleatic Stranger in Plato's Sophist
255c9-e2 of the fact that otherness and being are not two names for one kind is
"probably the most crucial text in the dialogue", since "it contains two lines
(255c13-14) that seem to speak directly about being and how the form being is
spoken of'." (p 95, a note omitted)
(...)
"I will proceed as follows. After presenting the difficult text, accompanied by
preliminary remarks making explicit how Heidegger's interpretation both aligns
with and yet remains very different from contemporary scholarship, I start with two
versions of what one might call the 'standard reading' of the proof. I claim that
Heidegger would have endorsed this standard reading. But Heidegger goes further
by adding a sharp remark concerning the relational character of the 'in-itself. To
clarify his argument, I dig into the conception of 'understanding' and temporality
developed in Being and Time. Then, I argue that Heidegger's remark concerning the
relational character of the 'in-itself in some sense foresees Michael Frede's objection
to the standard reading.(3) Finally, I present and discuss two different kinds of
reactions to this objection. The first kind is a defence of the standard reading; the
second regards the 'in-itself as relative. In my conclusion, I argue that even if the
standard reading is right concerning the proof of 255c9-e2, the fact remains that
Plato, at strategic points of the Sophist, speaks of forms relatively to themselves."
(p. 96)
(3) Frede (1967), 17; 19, and 22. Cited and described by Heinaman (1983), 14-15.
References
Frede, Michael. Prädikation und Existenzaussage. Platons Gebrauch von '...ist' und
'...ist nicht...' in Sophistes. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967.
Heinaman, Robert. "Being in the Sophist." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
65, no. 1 (1983): 1-17.
398.
———. 2018. "Socratic Elenchus in the Sophist." Apeiron no. 51:371-390.
Abstract: "This paper demonstrates the central role of the Socratic elenchus in the
Sophist. In the first part, I defend the position that the Stranger describes the
Socratic elenchus in the sixth division of the Sophist. In the second part, I show that
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the Socratic elenchus is actually used when the Stranger scrutinizes the accounts of
being put forward by his predecessors. In the final part, I explain the function of the
Socratic elenchus in the argument of the dialogue. By contrast with standard
scholarly interpretations, this way of reading the text provides all the puzzles about
being (241c4-251a4) with a definite function in the dialogue. It also reveals that
Plato’s methodology includes a plurality of method and is more continuous than
what is often believed."
399.
———. 2020. " Διακριτικὴ as a ποιητικὴ τέχνη in the Sophist." The Classical
Quarterly:1-3.
Abstract: "The διακριτικὴ τέχνη (the art of separating or discriminating), from
which the sixth definition of the Sophist starts (226b1–231b9), is puzzling. Prima
facie the art of separating does not fit the initial division of art between ποιητικὴ
τέχνη (production) and κτητικὴ τέχνη (acquisition) at 219a8–c9. Therefore, scholars
generally agree that, although mutually exclusive, ποιητική and κτητική are not
exhaustive and leave room for a third species of art, διακριτικὴ τέχνη, on a par with
ποιητική and κτητική. However, I argue that textual evidence suggests otherwise."
400.
Zistakis, Alexandar H. 2006. "Difference, συμπλοκή and the hierarchy of ideas in
Plato's Sophist." Phronimon no. 7:29-45.
Abstract: "Starting from the dialectic of intertwinement, the weaving together
(συμπλοκή) of ideas in the Sophist, this paper tries to determine the place, function
and significance of Difference and Hierarchy among platonic ideas. To that effect, it
is first established that and how the notion of difference becomes the fundamental
and even substantial structural principle of the dialectic of being and non-being,
motion and rest, and finally of the notions of unity and identity themselves. In the
second instance, the question of the hierarchy among ideas is interpreted and
understood as the question of liberty. Namely, that very hierarchy is understood as
an intrinsic and an innate one, i.e. as the set of dialectical relationships between
ideas that follow from their own essence and being, which therefore is not nor
cannot be externally imposed or forced upon them. Such a character of hierarchy is,
then, recognized and exemplified in the case of the individual and the collective,
where it turns out not only that there exists a clear idea of individuality in Plato, but
also that every individual necessarily belongs to some collective and indeed seeks
to unite with the collective in the same way and for the same reasons everything or
idea tends towards its form, or its own proper good."
401.
Zucchetti, Nicholas. 2020. "An unexplained overlap between Sophist 232b1 236d4
and Republic X. The case of the sophist as a painter." Archai no. 30:1-27.
Abstract: "Although most scholars agree that the lexicon of Sophist 232b1-236d4 is
similar to that of Republic X, they leave undetermined whether they are
theoretically compatible. Notably, both dialogues elucidate the art of imitation
through the metaphor of the painter who deceives his pupils through φαντάσματα. I
argue that Plato’s conception of imitation of the Republic is not only consistent with
that presented in the Sophist, but also importantly integrates it."
402.
Zuckert, Catherine H. 2000. "Who's a Philosopher? Who's a Sophist? The Stranger
v. Socrates." The Review of Metaphysics no. 54:65-97.
"Many readers have taken the Eleatic Stranger to represent a later stage of Plato's
philosophical development because the arguments or doctrines the Stranger presents
in the Sophist appear to be better than those Socrates articulates in earlier dialogues.
(1) In particular, in the Sophist Plato shows the Stranger answering two questions
Socrates proved unable to resolve in two of his conversations the day before. In the
Theaetetus Socrates admitted that he had long been perplexed by the fact of false
opinion; he was not able to explain how it was possible. Likewise, in the Cratylus
Socrates and his interlocutors were not able to determine satisfactorily the relation
between names and the things to which they refer. Through his teaching about the
idea of the other, the Stranger shows not only how false opinion is possible but also
why names do not always correspond to the kinds or ideas of things. More
generally, in the course of his account of previous thought the Stranger presents a
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fundamental critique of the teaching of "friends of the forms" like Socrates. When
we examine the definition of the sophist to which the Stranger comes at the end of
the dialogue, however, we find reasons to question the adequacy of his teaching
and, consequently, his superiority to Socrates.
If philosophy consists in knowledge - of the whole or merely of self - we are forced
to conclude, neither the Stranger nor Socrates is a philosopher.
Each or even both might appear, therefore, to be a pretender - or sophist. If, on the
other hand, philosophy consists in the search for knowledge by means of a
dialectical sorting of things according to kinds, Socrates and the Stranger represent
two different, although related types." (pp. 65-66, a note omitted)
(1) For example, Paul Friedlaender, Plato, trans. Hans Meyerhoff (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1958-69); Kenneth M. Sayre, Plato's Late Ontology
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Statesman, trans. Joseph Bright
Skemp (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), 96 n. 48.
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Related pages
On the website "Theory and History of Ontology" (www.ontology.co)
Pages on the Philosophy of Plato:
Plato: Bibliographical Resources
Plato's Parmenides and the Dilemma of Participation
Annotated bibliography on Plato's Parmenides
Index of the Section: Ancient Philosophy from the Presocratics to the Hellenistic Period
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