3THE HOW AND WHY OF THE GERMAN VICTORY IN THE BATTLE OF FRANCE

"Success is not final, defeat is not fatal, it is the courage to go on that counts"
Winston Chrurchill

By Christopher C.L.Custer, MD

In World War ll the Germans defeated France quickly, in the Battle of France- only 7 weeks, but is was not as easy a victory as some historians portray. The victory for Germany only came with significant cost (1). The german luftwaffe and armored forces suffered by losing 1/4 to 1/3 of their respective forces (2). Further evidence that their loses were significant was shown by the plea of the generals that Germany would not be ready to invade the USSR by November, 1940 ( Hitler's earliest date of Operation Barbarossa) (3). Now one may argue, alot of generals say they never have enough soldiers or equipment. Many people say the generals use this plea as a stalling tactic, but what general wants a fair fight? They want to have overwhelming force. They don't want a fair fight-they want to win.

That being said, how did Germany defeat France in the Battle of France? There are at least three reasons for this. These three reasons were the differences between the opposing views in war philosophy, plan, and combat tactics. First of all were the different attitudes and goals of the respective commands. While France had the biggest army in western europe, its attitude was purely defensive. The pieces of evidence are too numerous to count, but I want to mention them later in connection with why the french were defeated. Secondly, another factor was the sheer audacity of the german battle plan compared to the timidity of most of the french generals consistent with a defensive posture. De Gaulle was the exception. The german generals realized it was a sound plan in theory but played right into the Allied battle plan Dyle of the Allies moving into Belgium to meet the german attack. It lacked originality an important trait for a successful plan. Additionally, the Schlieffen plan had ultimately failed- Paris was not taken, not due to the plan but because of important alterations by the field commanders of weakening the strong right hook so it could not envelope Paris. The german forces bogged down in the Low Countries and got only as far as occupying several northern departements of France. So the germans needed a new plan perhaps because made more important because a german reconnaissance plane had crashed in an Allied occupied area with the complete battle plans of the germans.

Field Marshal Manstein, one of the greatest german field marshal ever, came up with alternative plan-the Sichelsnitt- sickle cut. His goal was to defeat the french using the schwerpunkt tactic, and encircle the french and british armies drawn into the low countries. Schwerpunkt is now defined by the U.S. miltary as “sector of main effort sector of attack term (4) and is a form bewegundskrieg ( war of maneuver)(5). The german schwerpunkt tactic using concentrated forces with massed armored formations acting as the spearhead of these forces and "flying artillery"- the Luftwaffe, broke through the thinly defended french lines of the Meuse river at Sedan. The Sickle Cut plan used the war of maneuver-bewegungskrieg, by utilizing Blitzkrieg and its shock value and speed. Speed was key to Blitzkrieg. The only difference in the past battles of maneuver and the germans defeating France was using combined arms and the increased speed utilized by the germans in executing Blitzkrieg. They achieved this with the mechanized forces-2mph for the past armies compared to 20mph of a modern mechanized force. It should be noted that the Wehrmacht was still largely dependent on the feet of its infantry and horse drawn artillery( over 2 million horses were employed by the Wehrmacht during the war). However, the Luftwaffe and armored forces were highly mechanized. In addition Army Group A, the german armies performing the sickle cut maneuver, was given priority, being allocated the majority of mechanized forces.

While the audacious plan of von Manstein was key, difference between the french and german armies in tactics was an important of part of the plan. The germans were taught Auftragstactiks- mission oriented tactics. How that mission was to be accomplished was the responsibility of the subordinate officers on the ground looking at the situation directly. This took away the risk stated by von Molkte the Elder, "no war plans survived the first contact with the enemy". While the french generals were not all of the armchair type, their tactical communications were outdated using land based telephones and even couriers on motorcycles. The french fighting the last war were presented with and situations and could only respond with attritional tactics-the same tactics of the last war. The french tanks were much better than german tanks at the time having thicker armor and bigger guns, the main difference was how their tank formations were used. The french used the tanks as infantry support and distributed them thinly "in penny packets" thought out the infanty divisions. The largest tank unit in the French army was a brigade.The germans on the otherhand used the tanks concentrated into divisions to use their full potential in leading the "schwerpunkt", meaning center of gravity or attack (4).These two different ways of using tanks led to catastrophe for the french. Adding to their disadvantage the french supplied radios to only their command tanks and the tankers had to communicate with each other by using flag signals. On the otherhand each german tank was supplied with an FM radio to communicate instantaneouly and accurately with their fellow tanks.

Fall Gelb (Plan Yellow) as the Sickle Cut Plan was to be known as, was a very risky plan for several reasons. First was the possibility of the armored forces outrunning the infantry, and losing the synergy of the infantry and armor combining.This was minimalized largely by using mechanized infantry. The second reason was that the sickle cut maneuver had large exposed flanks, perfect for a counterattacks. Hitler, a risk taker loved Manstein’s plan.

We now know how Germany defeated France, but why was the German Army so strong? One factor was the fact that the german army had to start from scratch after the Treaty of Versailles gutted the german war machine. Thus they were not burdened by old surplus equipment and old tactics- they had to devise new tactics. The philosophies of the opposing forces could not be more different. France had a decidedly defensive philosophy. but there are four reasons for that I want to mention. They had lost almost a generation of fine young men in the "War to End All Wars" and they just couldn’t afford to loose any more lives and after all they had won the last war. They just didn’t want to lose this battle and thus adopted a less agressive form of battle-a passive defense. In short the french army lost its esprit de corp, they had lost the initiative. Additionally, in the same light, they invested heavily on the Maginot fortifications - fortifications -state of the art static fortifications, clearly obsolete in the war of maneuver. The French thought the fortifications would be heavy in concrete but light on casualties. Another supporting fact is that both british and french armies poured into Belgium to set a forward defensive line on the rivers Dyle and Meuse, to defend against a repeat Schieffen Plan-the germans using a wide right hook attacking through the lowland countries of Belgium and Holland. The allies forgot the phrase, "the best defense is a good offense", a concept concieved by SunZu in the 6th century B.C. The british were like minded, they wanted to avoid war if at all possible-hence Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement. A final example of France’s defensive posture was their half-hearted attack through the Saarland. It was more a show of solidarity with Poland, than an offensive action for they withdrew as soon as Poland surrendered.

The germans developed a completely different philosophy - one of attack - purely offensive tactics. This offensive spirit was due to two factors. The professionalism that Prussia emphasized the importance of the offence and incorporating new ideas into new tactics. This open mindedness may seem inconsistent with our picture of prussian military . This view of conservativeness was only true to prussian military social etiquette, not to military tactics or strategy. These new tactics, courtesy of the englishmen of Lidell Hart and Col. Fuller stressed the value of the offense by maneuver and the use of armored forces in order achieve victory. Both advocated the use of massed armor and to achieve a breakthrough. Additionally, the second reason was due to the work of General Hans von Seecht with the Riechswehr (germany’s army in the 1920’s). At the end of WWl he inherited a dispirited german that thought it was unfairly blamed for losing the war and was saddled with the bulk of punishment. He forged it into the best trained army in the world which was to become the Wehrmacht. He did this three ways. The Imperial German Army of WWl was dictated by the Treaty of Versailles to downsize from over 3 million men to 100,000 men.Thus von Seeckt could afford to have very high standards for entrance into the army. The standards measured many criteria such as intelligence, amount of education, aptitude tests and a slew of physical tests including endurance and strict heigh, age, and weight requiements. Officers were deprived of privledges that in earlier days were taken for granted. They ate the same food as their men. These measures were designed to form a very durable bond between officers and men, a bond that would serve the Wehrmacht well in combat. He raised educational standards for officers and increased the availability of getting the required education. He made available non military related courses and encouraged his officers to take these courses. Additionally, von Seecht prepared the Riechswehr to at some point be expanded rapidly. He did this by requiring the army to train each man to do the job of his immediate superior. He instilled a new sense of pride into the Riechswehr. Von Seecht gave leadership new importance, and he gave subordinate officers new responsiibilities to solve local combat situations without higher command’s influence. This way of managing tactical problems was called auftragstactiks or mission oriented tactics- still basic small unit tactics taught to cadets at West Point.

The Defeat of France can be broken down into two phases. The encirclement of the allied forces in Belgium and northern France- Fall Gelb and the second phase- Fall Rot when the germans turned south and captured Paris and the Maginot Line. Contrary to common myth, all of France was not occupied by the germans until 10th November 1942 with operation Anton in response to the Allied Torch landings. In opposing Fall Rot, frenchmen fought bravely and with new found spirit partly because of their realization this was their last chance to save France, their new found combat experience, and the knowledge that much of the french equipment was superior. They tenaciously defended many stratigically unimportant small french villages for the only reason of them being french and on french territory. So in the mind of frenchmen the memory of the history of the Battle of France should be bittersweet(5).

In the last analysis, the two opposing forces were fairly evenly matched, the french ahead in most forces. The germans came out ahead only with the strength of the Luftwaffe. In the beginning the outcome of the battle was up for grabs, a german victory was not assured. It came down to action vs inaction. The german took action in changing their tactics and battle plan- they learned from the first world war and adapted. The French choose, and and not entirely without reason, inaction. After all they had won WWl. They chose the attitude of why fix something that ain’t broke? The result students read in history books today.

REFERENCES
1) Murray, W., 1983, Strategy for Defeat; the Luftwaffe, p. 44

2) Hooton, E.R., 2007, Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West, pg. 47-48

3) retrieved 12/11/2019 from https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa

4) retrieved 12/17/2019 from https://_ Military Reviews_20070228__art014. Pdf

5) retrieved 12/18/2019 from https://mca-marines.org/gazette/maneuver-tactics-and-the-art-of-war/

6) Alexander, M.S.,(2007), After Dunkick: The French Army’s Performance Against Case Rot, May 25th to June 25th, War in History 14 (2):pg 219–264.