What did the Americans figure out about the nuclear bomb that the Germans didn't?

Saphroneth said:

I'm sure they were working on a lot of things... but having a theoretical idea of how something might be done is by no means the same thing as having solved the problems. Huge chunks of the work that went into Manhattan was solving problems and scaling up; it's like how the US had a plan for a hand held laser rifle over a decade ago, but the implementation problems with cost (i.e. the total defence budget, for all the Americium required to run the weapons), and forseen and unforseen technical difficulties (massive radiation for the former, technical issues that would come up with trying to build the damn thing) mean they haven't actually done it.

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You can hear and view the evidence for yourself, straight from Dr. Rider himself, right here:

So here's the first question I have - if the Germans did have these weapons, why weren't they actually used? You did say "between 1 and 3 bombs already in existence" by late 1944, and of course a thermonuclear warhead is extremely powerful - and yet they weren't even used to try and destroy a bridge, let alone a Shock Army?

Saphroneth said:

So here's the first question I have - if the Germans did have these weapons, why weren't they actually used? You did say "between 1 and 3 bombs already in existence" by late 1944, and of course a thermonuclear warhead is extremely powerful - and yet they weren't even used to try and destroy a bridge, let alone a Shock Army?

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EVERYTHING presented here fits with the idea that the krauts had something "potential" in 41-42-ish and then Heisenberg et al "dogged it" and sandbagged their own program but kept stringing the Nazis along, "We'll have something next year". 18 months, tops. Dog-and-pony show from time to time to keep up the interest (and the paycheck).

Hell, I've done this MYSELF in the corporate world. Even for a German corporation.

Saphroneth said:

So here's the first question I have - if the Germans did have these weapons, why weren't they actually used? You did say "between 1 and 3 bombs already in existence" by late 1944, and of course a thermonuclear warhead is extremely powerful - and yet they weren't even used to try and destroy a bridge, let alone a Shock Army?

Click to expand...

Because Hitler was a big sucker for mega weapons, even those he had no proof left the drawing board. According to an account of Erwin Rommel detailed in Unexplained Mysteries of World War II, Hitler referenced the atom bomb in a conversation where he was bragging Germany would soon have a weapon that could knock a guy off his horse from several miles away and Rommel quietly thought to himself it was just another one of Hitler's BS stories.

Said conversation happened in 1942, when the Germans only had chalk on a blackboard while the US was way ahead of them.

Silesius Smithee said:

EVERYTHING presented here fits with the idea that the krauts had something "potential" in 41-42-ish and then Heisenberg et al "dogged it" and sandbagged their own program but kept stringing the Nazis along, "We'll have something next year". 18 months, tops. Dog-and-pony show from time to time to keep up the interest (and the paycheck).

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I think it's more likely that they were actually talking up what they thought was achievable, given that their recorded reaction to the US atomic bomb explosion was a mixture of protests that it was impossible and several incorrect guesses about how it could have been done.

But there would be a lot of value for German atomic physicists to claim that they could have had a super weapon, if they were just given another year or two, please don't make me try and hold back the Soviets.

Saphroneth said:

So here's the first question I have - if the Germans did have these weapons, why weren't they actually used? You did say "between 1 and 3 bombs already in existence" by late 1944, and of course a thermonuclear warhead is extremely powerful - and yet they weren't even used to try and destroy a bridge, let alone a Shock Army?

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The hydrogen bomb, which was an SS project conducted to a large extent by Austrian scientists and other personnel, was not finished prior to war's end so far as is known. The declassified Top Secret British intelligence document cited upthread provides names of some of the major figures involved in its development. For sure, the British got their hands on one of them when T-Force personnel literally knocked on the door of Wilhelm Groth's laboratory and quickly loaded him aboard a plane that flew him directly to the UK.

There is however considerable evidence that at least six (6) prototypes and three (3) operational nuclear weapons were completed by WWII Germany. There may or may not have been additional devices beyond these, but the best available evidence describes what appear to have been an undetermined but probably not large number of fissile cores aka "fission pits" rather than additional completed bombs.

Again by way of British intelligence, specifically German speaker Edmund Tilley:

Edmund Tilley. Brief Operational Report on [censored] and Other Germans and Italians Connected with Project Abstract. 19 August 1947. [NARA RG 319, Entry A1-134A, Box 29, Folder Operation Oberjoch]

1. On 11 August 1947 [censored] on the Italian phase of PROJECT ABSTRACT, which, in a few previous reports, was called Operation Arrival or Arrivederci, [censored] Headquarters, USAFE,by Captain R.R. SNEIDER of the CIC Detachment, BAD KISSINGEN. Major A J. LEOCHA[censored]

2. [Censored]

SANITIZED COPYSENSITIVE INFORMATION DELETED[...]

New Facts and Re-affirmation of Statements on PROJECT ABSTRACT.

4. Thorough cross-examination has not been effective in shaking [censored] on matters directlyconcerned with or related to PROJECT ABSTRACT.

a. Atomic research and development at TUCHELER HEIDE was coupled with research on guidedmissiles, in 1943 and 1944. (Note: In March 1947 Professor W. von BRAUN admitted that in thesummer of 1943 he had been interested in atomic energy for use in V-2. Von BRAUN claimed to have dropped the project for lack of available raw materials. It may be mere coincidence that [censored]also places the beginning of combined research and development in 1943.—In March and April 1945the undersigned heard rumors in Germany of such a combination. The most persistent rumors in I.G.FARBEN circles had it that this combination would be linked with Chemical Warfare, especially with the new nerve gases, i.e., the TABUN series. These rumors were repeated by responsible members of I.G. FARBEN, who added that this vague plan or hope had been abandoned. At the time no progress was made in the investigation of the atomic side of the problem because all effort was concentrated on a solution of the new Chemical Warfare problem. [Censored] now reveals that the ampullae (phials) he saw in four boxes in Italy had originated with I.G. FARBEN. (See b below).

b. Four boxes, probably originating in the Luftwaffe Ministry in Berlin, were sent in March 1945 bySD, POTSDAM, to ITALY in the care of a FELDWEBEL (Sergeant) HEINZ (surname forgotten!),[censored] and a Private (name forgotten!). The boxes contained (i) reports and research data onV-weapons and atomic research; (ii) 40–50 small ampullae (phials) "full of a whitish liquid", labeledU-234, U-235 and PLU, stamped "IG" (= IG Farbenindustrie); (iii) a new and not completely developed optical instrument probably intended for measuring speed and trajectory of guided missilesat the firing point; (iv) various small and delicate parts of guided missiles, fastened to cardboard by fine wires, with full description of each item attached to the cardboard.

c. The boxes were buried near VERONA by the FELDWEBEL, [censored] and a third soldier.(The site has been explored. Parts of wooden boxes or of a wooden box, fragments of paper and anampullae (phial) marked U234 or U235 were seen by Captain SNEIDER and [censored]. The rest had vanished). [...]BREE may be the same "person with a French name" (BOREU?) who worked spasmodically on "electric fuses for guided missiles" at TUCHELER HEIDE in 1943 and 1944. Thus he would know valuable details on the combined "guided missiles–atomic energy" research and development and would perhaps know where the missing documents were sent, whether they went first from TUCHELER HEIDE to BERLIN, as [censored] vaguely stated, and thence to SD, POTSDAM,and to Italy.

24. Ingenieur KRUEGER should be traced and brought at once to ECIC. He may give us valuable information on the combined "guided missiles–atomic energy" program at TUCHELER HEIDE in1943 and 1944 and may know exactly where documents and instruments have been sent. [Censored]obtained most of his information on activities at TUCHELER HEIDE from KRUEGER, in 1944.

25. Prof. Dr. NIELS [Walter Nielsch?], now said to be in the United States, was, according to [censored,] concerned with chemical and atomic problems at TUCHELER HEIDE and produced a number of atomic bombs, weighing from 1 to 5 kilograms. NIELS should be traced and questioned in detail.

26. Prof. Dr. HUETTEN. Present whereabouts unknown to [censored.] He should be located and brought to ALASKA for questioning. According to [censored] he was the originator of the combined project of research and development of atomic energy and guided missiles at TUCHELER HEIDE.This project was named "Aktion HUETTEN" after him. He was transferred elsewhere, probably in 1943 (see paragraph 7). (Wait, what? Not Heisenberg? Who was Huetten? The Tucheler Heide region is in Poland and there are additional documents that describe German work on atomic weapons being done in and around the area. -- WP)

27. Prof. Dr. HOFMANN, successor of HUETTEN as chief of the combined program at TUCHELERHEIDE, is now at "ALEXANDROWKA Kononien" near BAKU where he is continuing his formerwork. [...]

28. Prof W. Von BRAUN should be re-interrogated on the following: [...]

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The known prototypes appear to have consisted of at least three designs: 1) a fusion-boosted fission, implosion type strategic nuclear weapon with a maximum blast yield of 100 kilotons. Two of these were tested near Ohrdruf, Thuringia, Germany in early March 1945 but with minimal loads of HEU--just enough to achieve supercriticality in order to test the troublesome implosion bomb fuzing that had given German scientists many problems. 2) A more standard (by Allied measurements) basic fission bomb with a yield of around 40 kilotons. 3) A weapon of uncertain configuration that may or may not have been extremely heavy. There is conflicting information about this design, specifically by way of the Italian journalist Luigi Romersa. More on that later if you want additional detail.

Beyond these were the three nuclear weapons produced in an underground complex just inland and uphill from the Rhine River in an area known as the Luneberger Heide. The most likely configuration for these was that they were tactical or battlefield nukes with a yield of between 130 tons and 3 kilotons, per Himmler's adjutant, Werner Grothmann.

It is known that at least one (1) incomplete strategic nuclear weapon was captured by Patton's Third Army when that formation overran Ohrdruf in April, 1945. Grothmann described demands for an immediate nuclear strike against the United States by "hotheads from the political side" in the wake of 1) the successful detonations near Ohrdruf and 2) the test flight of a prototype ICBM that had sufficient range to strike the American East Coast. All of these occurred in early to mid-March, 1945. This would-be longshot would have been attempted with another prototype missile and a "hastily assembled warhead".

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Regarding why the (probably---) small number of German nuclear devices were not used in combat, Grothmann gave the following explanation:

Heinrich Himmler's chief adjutant Werner Grothmann on why nuclear weapons were not used in combat [Krotzky 2002]. For a discussion of the background and reliabilityof this source, see p. 3120. See also Grothmann's testimony on pp. 3120, 3642, and 3757.

"[p. 13] Himmler had in any case come up with a report, and a consultation took place regarding what we could make now. The one problem was the small quantity [of fuel] and always still the uncertainty of how it would work in action.The other was the question of the real political effect.

[p. 13] Some said that a direct hit on Moscow must be the first goal. But this has been countered by the argument that this would not change anything on the eastern front.[p. 14] If we were now to use such a weapon on Hitler's order, for example to employ it on London, a completely new situation would arise, but not in our favor. If the weapon's im[1]pact corresponds to the calculations, important parts of the political and military leadership will fall, but many other levels that have been relocated outside will be preserved. There are heavy casualties among the civilian population,and when the horror has subsided, it is clear that the supply of potential British troops in the Reich is still possible via their ports and is still under their control. Besides, the British are also on our territory. And the most important argument: with us, no one really believed that they would then withdraw. Quite the contrary! We could picture their reactions to our population. The other side, which must also be considered, is the Americans.

[p. 15] At the meetings I attended, or about which I learned in hints, no one was so crazy to use a weapon which could no longer help us, but would only make things even much worse.

[p. 16] So, the first point was that the decisionmakers had to know how they personally fared if a completely new, terrible mass-destruction weapon were deployed by our side and achieved its effect, but the war were nevertheless lost by us. What the victors would then read out of the Geneva Convention was clear. The second point was that: At that time, the demand for unconditional surrender had long been on the table. And that was the result of the normal war situation. What would have happened after the use of our atomic bomb? You are certainly familiar with the ideas of Morgenthau. Everything would be much worse."

williamjpellas said:

1) a fusion-boosted fission, implosion type strategic nuclear weapon with a maximum blast yield of 100 kilotons. Two of these were tested near Ohrdruf, Thuringia, Germany in early March 1945 but with minimal loads of HEU--just enough to achieve supercriticality in order to test the troublesome implosion bomb fuzing that had given German scientists many problems. 2) A more standard (by Allied measurements) basic fission bomb with a yield of around 40 kilotons.

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Blimey, you're not asking much, are you? Boosted fission in the US was invented between 1947 and 1949 and not tested until 1951 - which means that a large establishment of physicsts, in peacetime circumstances but with sizeable funding, took several years to come up with the idea and 2-4 more years to make it practical.

Quite an ask for a relatively few German physicists who are also having to come up with the basic fission bomb concept and troubleshoot enrichment in this time.

williamjpellas said:

More on that later if you want additional detail.

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Honestly I'm most impressed by how you've written such a long post and completely missed the meat of my actual question, but I'll restate it.


So here's the first question I have - if the Germans did have these weapons, why weren't they actually used? You did say "between 1 and 3 bombs already in existence" by late 1944 - and yet they weren't even used to try and destroy a bridge, let alone a Shock Army?

Saphroneth said:

Blimey, you're not asking much, are you? Boosted fission in the US was invented between 1947 and 1949 and not tested until 1951 - which means that a large establishment of physicsts, in peacetime circumstances but with sizeable funding, took several years to come up with the idea and 2-4 more years to make it practical.

Quite an ask for a relatively few German physicists who are also having to come up with the basic fission bomb concept and troubleshoot enrichment in this time.


Honestly I'm most impressed by how you've written such a long post and completely missed the meat of my actual question, but I'll restate it.


So here's the first question I have - if the Germans did have these weapons, why weren't they actually used? You did say "between 1 and 3 bombs already in existence" by late 1944 - and yet they weren't even used to try and destroy a bridge, let alone a Shock Army?

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Because the German high command believed, correctly, that only an all at once, overwhelming strike with nuclear weapons (and/or perhaps other WMDs) could overturn the strategic calculus then in effect and save the Third Reich from total defeat. The plain reason why the Germans did not attempt such attacks is that they were in mortal fear of what would certainly have been an overwhelming Allied counterstrike. Between them, the RAF and USAAF--- by that point operating with pronounced air superiority except for occasionally effective local counterattacks by the Luftwaffe --- could have hit Germany with around 130,000 tons of mustard gas and 5 million anthrax cakes. USAAF planners predicted the slaughter of between 5 and 6 million Germans, most of them civilians, in this operation, which they code named "G Day", the G standing for "gas". Note that this is leaving aside the British anthrax attack. Albert Kesselring, who with Karl Wulff was conducting secret talks with OSS official Allen Dulles, is known to have stated that he would resign his command rather than carry out an order (presumably from Hitler) to strike with a specific, last gasp weapon. Two captured German generals were caught on British microphones discussing the existence of German nuclear weapons and the fact, according to one of them, that they were not used because of German fear of the consequences (specifically a massive chemical bombardment).

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that Hitler may have ordered both a nuclear strike on the western front and also a bombardment of New York City with nerve gas, but widespread mutinies in the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine sabotaged these (and perhaps additional) WMD missions. The New York City mission, which apparently involved one or two u-boats, may have been intended as revenge for the Allied firebombing of Dresden, which itself was one of the sites involved in the German nuclear weapons program. This was disclosed in a 1980s magazine interview by the wartime Soviet nuclear physicist, Georgy Flerov.

williamjpellas said:

. Two captured German generals were caught on British microphones discussing the existence of German nuclear weapons and the fact, according to one of them, that they were not used because of German fear of the consequences (specifically a massive chemical bombardment).

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Care to name them?

williamjpellas said:

Albert Kesselring, who with Karl Wulff was conducting secret talks with OSS official Allen Dulles, is known to have stated that he would resign his command rather than carry out an order (presumably from Hitler) to strike with a specific, last gasp weapon.

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"Is known to have stated" is a very oblique way of phrasing it.

williamjpellas said:

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that Hitler may have ordered both a nuclear strike on the western front and also a bombardment of New York City with nerve gas, but widespread mutinies in the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine sabotaged these (and perhaps additional) WMD missions. The New York City mission, which apparently involved one or two u-boats, may have been intended as revenge for the Allied firebombing of Dresden, which itself was one of the sites involved in the German nuclear weapons program.

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This... is a very difficult concept to achieve. Is the idea here that the U-boats try to bombard New York with nerve gas using their 2cm anti aircraft guns, or are these type IX using their deck guns?




Out of curiosity, if this relative handful of German physicists cracked boosted-fission, nearly cracked "super" (thermonuclear) and had all this in working physics packages by 1944, what on earth was the Manhattan Project doing from 1941 to 1951 with their vastly greater funding and much bigger talent pool?

LazyLemonLucas said:

So we know where nuclear fission was discovered-- Germany.

Once the war started, certain scientists became wary of Germany--which would've been controlled by a Nazi regime-- could harness the nuclear power. A certain somebody named Albert Einstein sent a message to Franklin Roosevelt about the potential danger of the Germans getting the physics, engineering, and math right to make the bomb.

And so my question is-- how did the Americans do it? What did the Americans get right about the nuclear bomb that the Germans didn't?

I remember reading a book about the nuclear arms race in WW2 but I don't remember the details about what the Americans beat the Germans to. I definitely know they figured out nuclear fission.

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The points of the other members are well explained. I'll add that many very smart and capable Jewish scientists, including Albert, made their way to the US to help with the studies, because without them, the US wouldn't even know Germany was inventing stuff.

Saphroneth said:

Care to name them?


"Is known to have stated" is a very oblique way of phrasing it.


This... is a very difficult concept to achieve. Is the idea here that the U-boats try to bombard New York with nerve gas using their 2cm anti aircraft guns, or are these type IX using their deck guns?




Out of curiosity, if this relative handful of German physicists cracked boosted-fission, nearly cracked "super" (thermonuclear) and had all this in working physics packages by 1944, what on earth was the Manhattan Project doing from 1941 to 1951 with their vastly greater funding and much bigger talent pool?

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Captured German generals known to have discussed the existence of German nuclear weapons include the following. Again these are declassified original wartime British reports:

C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) S.R.G.G. 1118. [Recorded conversation of two German prisoners of war held in the United Kingdom. AFHRA A5415 electronic pp. 284–285]

M 159—General der Panzertruppen Von THOMA (GOC German AFRIKORPS) Captd MIDDLE EAST 4 Nov 42
CS/981 Generalleutnant KITTEL (Comd. METZ and Comd. 462 Volksgren. Div.) Captd METZ 22 Nov 44

Information received: 10 Jan 1945

TRANSLATION

KITTEL: (Re atom bomb). It's a perfectly horrible thing.

THOMA: A technical man has written about it, saying the problem has been completely solved theoretically, but that the process can't be controlled(?).

KITTEL: That's the question. At the passing-out parade of an officer's course the FUHRER—I ¨sent for one of the officers personally, for they were the ones who were at METZ—

THOMA: He's lying. There's absolutely no such thing as the atom business.

KITTEL: Unfortunately there is.

THOMA: Then he would have used it long ago.

KITTEL: No; he isn't using it, because the others have promised to retaliate with chemical warfare.[...]

THOMA: But there's no such thing as an atom bomb.

KITTEL: The experiments with it are carried out on BORNHOLM; the island has been evacuated and no-one may enter or leave the place. (Certainly a reference to the immediate locale surrounding the German facilities on the island and not all of Bornholm -- WP)

THOMA: What do they do there?

KITTEL: They carry out their experiments there. Apparently they've got another ..... card up their sleeve..

--------------------------

Dr. Rider comments:

"Heinrich Kittel was a very high-ranking general in the German army and thus a valuable sourceof information, including some information on the German nuclear program. He was captured byAllied forces after being wounded at Metz, France, on 22 November 1944, so all of his knowledgeabout German activities was very up-to-date as of this recorded conversation.

In contrast, General Wilhelm von Thoma had been captured in 1942 while fighting in North Africa,so he had no firsthand knowledge of subsequent developments (and was skeptical of secondhand reports). Kittel's comments suggest that he was aware of one or more successful atomic bomb tests prior to his capture.The atomic bomb seemed to be much more than an abstract concept to him. For example, he said that:

• It was "a perfectly horrible thing."
• It "unfortunately" existed.
• The decision had already been made not to use it (implying it was available to use) due toAllied threats of retaliation by dropping mustard agent on German cities (see Section A.4.2).

If Kittel associated the atomic bomb most closely with Bornholm and seemed to believe that the bomb had been tested, that suggests that the test(s) occurred either on Bornholm or somewhere near Bornholm along the Baltic coast. That would be highly consistent with other information in Sections D.10–D.11."



German General Heinrich Kittel

German General Wilhelm von Thoma

British General Bernard Montgomery Meeting German General Wilhelm von Thoma Upon von Thoma's Capture During the North African Campaign, 1942.

----------------------------------------------

C.S.D.I.C. (U.K.) S.R.G.G. 1163(C). [Recorded conversation of two German prisoners of war held in the United Kingdom. AFHRA A5415 electronic pp. 84–85]

CS/1948—Generalleutnant BOINEBURG (Comd., BERGEN (HANNOVER)) Captd ALLSTADT 13 Apr 45 CS/1963—Generalmajor FRANZ (Comd., 256 V.G. Div.) Captured BIRNFELD 8 Apr 45 CS/1965—Generalmajor GOERBIG (Comd., SENNE, Captured BAD GRUND 10 Apr 45

Information received: 29 Apr 1945

TRANSLATION

FRANZ: I hope HIMMLER doesn't fire V-6 or V-7. (?)

GOERBIG: Do you really think we still have something up our sleeves? (?)

FRANZ: Yes, I believe so most definitely. I mean to say it wasn't ready; they hadn't advanced far enough to be brought into use. But I'm certain that a lot of experiments were in progress; it is a fact that some of those projectiles could be fired as far as NEW YORK or elsewhere. (?)

GOERBIG: Did you get that from a reliable source? (?)

FRANZ: I know that for certain. (?)

GOERBIG: With what effect? (?)

FRANZ: With a colossal explosive effect, a strong detonation which really would wipe out everything within a radius of 2 or 3 km. However, the thing isn't ready for immediate use yet. They couldn't make any progress, but next time they will and next time a thing like this starts it'll be ghastly. If HIMMLER and his faithful followers turn up one day with all the patents etc., with a sample, it will not be viewed with displeasure by STALIN. There is a risk of HIMMLER betraying the V-weapon preparations to the Russians: "Here are half-completed inventions which will give you great power. You can have them on such and such conditions."

---------------------------------------

Dr. Rider:

"All three prisoners being held together were very high-ranking generals in the German army who had been captured in mid-April 1945, and thus would have known the very latest wartime information that they had had access to. The British personnel who were secretly recording and translating the prisoners' conversation were somewhat uncertain which prisoner was speaking, but believed that the main speaker was General Gerhard Franz (German, 1902–1975).

On the basis of whatever high-level classified information Franz had seen or heard before he was captured on 8 April 1945, he was certain that:

• In addition to the well-known V-1 and V-2, there were at least five or so other new secret weapons systems that were sufficiently revolutionary to be dubbed V-weapons.

• Those weapon systems had definitely reached the point at which "a lot of experiments were in progress," and some were sufficiently mature that Franz thought they might be "fired" in actual combat at any time.

• Some of the new V-weapons could reach New York. Franz believed "it is a fact" they already existed. He also seemed to believe that there were multiple V-weapons that could reach New York and other U.S. cities ("some of those projectiles").

• There was a weapon "with a colossal explosive effect, a strong detonation which really wouldwipe out everything within a radius of 2 or 3 km." That sounds exactly like a fission bomb,and Franz's certainty implied that it had already been tested.

• The long-range V-weapons were intended to deliver such fission bombs to New York or other Allied targets. While Franz seemed to imply that the long-range delivery methods were ready to be fired and that the fission bomb had been tested, he apparently felt that the integrated systems of the nuclear-armed intercontinental weapons were still being perfected.

• All of these advanced weapons were completely controlled by "Himmler and his faithful followers," not other branches of the government or even Hitler."



German General Gerhard Franz

German General Gerhard Goerbig

LazyLemonLucas said:

And so my question is-- how did the Americans do it? What did the Americans get right about the nuclear bomb that the Germans didn't?

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That there were no short-cuts to an actually working device.

williamjpellas said:

TRANSLATION

FRANZ: I hope HIMMLER doesn't fire V-6 or V-7. (?)

GOERBIG: Do you really think we still have something up our sleeves? (?)

FRANZ: Yes, I believe so most definitely. I mean to say it wasn't ready; they hadn't advanced far enough to be brought into use. But I'm certain that a lot of experiments were in progress; it is a fact that some of those projectiles could be fired as far as NEW YORK or elsewhere. (?)

GOERBIG: Did you get that from a reliable source? (?)

FRANZ: I know that for certain. (?)

GOERBIG: With what effect? (?)

FRANZ: With a colossal explosive effect, a strong detonation which really would wipe out everything within a radius of 2 or 3 km. However, the thing isn't ready for immediate use yet. They couldn't make any progress, but next time they will and next time a thing like this starts it'll be ghastly. If HIMMLER and his faithful followers turn up one day with all the patents etc., with a sample, it will not be viewed with displeasure by STALIN. There is a risk of HIMMLER betraying the V-weapon preparations to the Russians: "Here are half-completed inventions which will give you great power. You can have them on such and such conditions."

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The fact that you're viewing this as good evidence of a plan for an attack on New York instead of the Germans having vaporwave propoganda projects planned to make their own people feel like they just need to fight for a bit longer and Total Destruction Will Rain From The Sky And We Will Win suggests a certain extent of, dare I say it, confirmation bias.

Notice that the excuses used here are exactly the kind of excuses one would use to explain why the new weapon is nearly ready (so keep fighting) but has not been used just yet (so that's why we haven't won yet).

williamjpellas said:

• Some of the new V-weapons could reach New York. Franz believed "it is a fact" they already existed. He also seemed to believe that there were multiple V-weapons that could reach New York and other U.S. cities ("some of those projectiles").

• There was a weapon "with a colossal explosive effect, a strong detonation which really wouldwipe out everything within a radius of 2 or 3 km." That sounds exactly like a fission bomb,and Franz's certainty implied that it had already been tested.

• The long-range V-weapons were intended to deliver such fission bombs to New York or other Allied targets. While Franz seemed to imply that the long-range delivery methods were ready to be fired and that the fission bomb had been tested, he apparently felt that the integrated systems of the nuclear-armed intercontinental weapons were still being perfected.

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I should point out, for example, that these in combination are simply not credible. Note that here they're not talking about a nerve gas attack on New York (your previous claim) but an explosive projectile that could reach New York.


No Nazi weapons system had the capability to deliver a projectile to New York. We know what it would take to deliver a nuclear bomb to New York from that distance, and it is basically a late-model B-36 style aircraft - and the Germans did not have such an aircraft with that range.
Alternatively you have the Aggregat-10 combined with the A-9, and the closest thing to a successful A-9 launch was a modified A-4 rocket with wings launched in early 1945 to test the concept of a winged A-4 (the wing snapped off). No A-10 was ever built.

The claim that you're making based on the assumed veracity of these interrogations (i.e. treating rumours as fact) is that there are multiple independent ways that the Germans could deliver one of these weapons to New York.

You need to actually eliminate the possibility of these being rumours. Remember there were rumours of US cities having been destroyed with atomic bombs after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

"No Nazi weapons system had the capability to deliver a projectile to New York. We know what it would take to deliver a nuclear bomb to New York from that distance, and it is basically a late-model B-36 style aircraft - and the Germans did not have such an aircraft with that range.

Alternatively you have the Aggregat-10 combined with the A-9, and the closest thing to a successful A-9 launch was a modified A-4 rocket with wings launched in early 1945 to test the concept of a winged A-4 (the wing snapped off). No A-10 was ever built."

-----------------------------------------------

That's not what these Germans said. It really would help if you would, you know, bother to actually read Todd Rider's book. That way you can actually know what you are purportedly talking about when you make sweepingly dismissive statements.

Heinrich Himmler's chief adjutant Werner Grothmann on advanced rockets [Krotzky2002]. For a discussion of the background and reliability of this source, see p. 3120.

"I found it amusing, however, that our best piece, the giant rocket, which was to fly to America, had just been built in a plant that was not big at all. Well, those were the prototypes for the flight tests. The mass production would then be closer to the military training base [Ohrdruf], where there was a good possibility to camouflage the enormous things in a depression up to the launch. So the rocket would have been built in a very large plant, which was also supposed to produce one [kind] of the nuclear bombs. This would have happened on two different floors, but then there would have been a common path for both components. Why Gerlach was involved there, is still not clear to me today. It may be that Himmler was correct in his estimation that Gerlach would have avoided too much proximity to us because he would pursue his own plans. Because that was clear: the rocket production, especially for the America rocket, was our own thing, we would not have given it away. It was all under our control. If now one of the two kinds of atomic bombs was built and assembled in the same complex, we would have been able to ensure the protection of the system much more efficiently.

[p. 11] Gerlach did not go to Bormann until we got the first successful launch of our big rocket or the big rocket for the distance from Thuringia to London, which was also a new development. That was on March 16th. I willnever forget that, when Himmler's staff got phone calls from people, whom I had neverheard of before and who acted as if we had nowwon the war.[p. 10] One arrived at the designation V 4because of the mental proximity to the A4, or the V 2. This was the real long-range rocket for America. From Thuringia it would have reached only the east coast, but there lay the cities that were important to us. V4 had been chosen because it was basically a further development of the V2, albeit with two stages and more than double the height, but not with a higher payload. The first attack with full cargo was actually scheduled for October 45. After the test of the test bomb in March 45 and when one could see that the front was no longer held anywhere, hotheads from the political side had demanded an attack with the prototype [America rocket] and a hastily assembled uranium bomb. But that was none of us, and it was quite opposed, as I said before. In addition, it would have been a ridiculous attempt because there was not enough [fissionable] material and the rocket had never been tested.

[p. 18] In February or early March, the goal of the first attack on America in October was reaffirmed internally. In the consultation there were papers that (SS commando leader Otto) Skorzeny had put together for the rocket technicians, or he certainly had not written them himself, rather someone from his people, and explanations were also discussed by the scientists. It looked like we could do it. The large rocket had already been under construction for a long time, and those who saw it, or the parts for it, were impressed. We were certainly convinced of the technical preparation for the weapon and the carrier, that it would then work. In any case, we were convinced of the technical preparations for the weapon and the launch vehicle, that they would work out. It could not have happened sooner. I know some of the literature, which makes it such exaggerated claims. The authors just overlook the fact that a comprehensive attack on cities in America can only be done with strategic weapons, not with tactical ones. (A reference to the German high command's analysis that only a massive, all at once nuclear bombardment could possibly reverse the course of the war. -- WP) Then also the technology had to work safely. Imagine if you throw the 'egg' over New York and it does not detonate! In the end, the Americans would deliver it four weeks later on their own. One difficulty was also to reduce the total weight for the large bomb. It had been asked by the engineers again and again to reduce the diameter and the weight, which I believe involved a certain type of bomb, because when I finally heard and saw something, it was quite clear that the diameter of the thing probably could not have been the problem. In any case, it was about the space requirements and the accommodation possibilities in the rocket nose and of course also the payload [mass]. This was an important factor, because it affected the range. By the way, thiswas also a topic for the aviation engineers at Messerschmitt and Heinkel."

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SS-Obersturmbannf¨uhrer Otto Skorzeny. [Skorzeny 1995, pp. 161, 169]

"In October 1944, after the Budapest operation, I flew once again to Fuhrer Headquarters in East Prussia. Preparations were just being made for the Ardennes offensive and Hitler wanted to give me his instructions for Operation Greif.[...]

He assured me that the German Army would triumph in the end in spite of treason and mistakes. This offensive would be successful. Apart from that, "new, truly revolutionary weaponswould take the enemy completely by surprise."

There was much talk about German "secret weapons" at this time, and Dr. Goebbels' propagandadid its best to nourish these rumors. [...] However most talk was about another, terrible weapon that was supposed to be based on artificially produced radioactivity.[...] Included in the V-weapons program was the construction of a rocket capable of bombarding New York or Moscow. This rocket was practically finished at the end of March 1945 and could have gone into series production beginning in July.[...] I could go on and list a whole series of other new weapons which were designed and built by us during the war."

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Alfred Grundler. 22 July 1962 SED Arnstadt transcript. Jonastalverein Archive, Arnstadt. For a discussion of the background and reliability of this document, see p. 3848.

[...] On July 1, 1938, Siemens & Halske AGBerlin started production in Arnstadt. FromSeptember 1, 1938, the Wernerwerk and theSiemens-Schuckert-Werk were located here atthe same time. [...]

They dealt with the development of guidance systems, which could be installed in aircraft and rockets. The first device was about 20 kilograms heavy, then they were only twelve kilograms heavy. In the first tests in November 1944 in Luisental, Neustadt-Glewe, there were some accidents, but then they were fine. In March 1945 (I can no longer say which day) an A-4 and then even an A-9/A-10 were fired off from Polte in Rudisleben. The large rocket was so good, it went to northern Norway with a deviation of only six meters from the target.

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There's also this:

In his 1956 autobiography, Ernst Heinkel did not mention the 40 giant Heinkel intercontinental bombers found in Norway, perhaps due to Cold-War censorship or to avoid self-incrimination. However, he did mention that he had long been a strong proponent of jet bombers that he believed could be built quickly, that his company participated in a late-war push to build new jet aircraft that nearly came to fruition, that those aircraft were found by the Allies, that his top designer Siegried Gunter had been engrossed with flying wing bomber designs, and that Gunter had submitted his information on the flying wings to U.S. Army Air Forces Major Robert L. Cardenas by the end of September 1945 (p. 4229).

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And this:

Albert Ducrocq. 1947. Les Armes Secr`etes Allemandes. Paris: Berger-Levrault. pp.163–164.

Heinkel intercontinental heavy bombers Germany was probably thinking of attacking American territory beginning in June 1945. It should be noted that while the use of other secret weapons, such as flying bombs and new rocket planes, was literally imminent, thi sthreat to the United States must be located six weeks or two months after the date of the collapse of the Reich. We are allowed to consider it almost as dangerous, especially since the amphibious V-2s, too, could very well have carried atomic bombs. But the Germans were also planning bombing raids on America from their European bases.They had, in fact, built giant Heinkel-type bombers on a fairly large scale, capable of covering non-stop 11,000 to 12,000 kilometers,i.e. a round trip from Europe to America!

Norway had been chosen as a concentration point for these intercontinental bombers.The Germans had set up near Oslo the largest airfield of the Luftwaffe. And it is not without interest to note that, on April 27, 1945—three days before the end of the battle of Berlin and the demise of Hitler—400 [sic: 40] of these bombers were indeed gathered on the airfield in question, ready to take off for America. It was the 21st American [sic: actually British] Army Group that was to discover them two weeks later...

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And this:

Rudolf Lusar. 1956. Die deutschen Waffen und Geheimwaffen des 2. Weltkrieges undihre Weiterentwicklung. 1st ed., Munich: J. F. Lehmanns. p. 49

Just before the end of the war, Professor Heinkel came out with a heavy four-jet engine bomber,apparently He-343 (?), which was supposed to have a range of 11,000 to 12,000 km. This bomber was destined to attack America. According to American reports, on April 27, 1945, a number of these machines were massed at an airfield near Oslo, Norway, where they were to fall into the hands of the American [sic: actually British] 21st Army. They were supposed to be flying to New York in May.

williamjpellas said:

Just before the end of the war, Professor Heinkel came out with a heavy four-jet engine bomber,apparently He-343 (?), which was supposed to have a range of 11,000 to 12,000 km. This bomber was destined to attack America. According to American reports, on April 27, 1945, a number of these machines were massed at an airfield near Oslo, Norway, where they were to fall into the hands of the American [sic: actually British] 21st Army. They were supposed to be flying to New York in May.

Click to expand...

It's rather my understanding that the He-343 project was terminated prior to first flight.

A jet bomber with a 12,000 km range would be absolutely insane in 1945. The B-47E (Stratojet) had a ferry range of just under 7,500 km with underwing fuel tanks; the B-52 can hit that kind of range on internal fuel, but that's a design that entered service ten years after the end of WW2 and after a period when jet thrust amplified by a massive amount; the B-52's engines (of which where were eight) had a thrust of about 45-50 kN each, about five times the Jumo 004B.

Note that the reason I'm quoting jets, not piston engines, is that pistons have an advantage for long range at this time.


This rather seems to be descending into the Luft '46 pit of nonsense...

Saphroneth said:

It's rather my understanding that the He-343 project was terminated prior to first flight.

A jet bomber with a 12,000 km range would be absolutely insane in 1945. The B-47E (Stratojet) had a ferry range of just under 7,500 km with underwing fuel tanks; the B-52 can hit that kind of range on internal fuel, but that's a design that entered service ten years after the end of WW2 and after a period when jet thrust amplified by a massive amount; the B-52's engines (of which where were eight) had a thrust of about 45-50 kN each, about five times the Jumo 004B.

Note that the reason I'm quoting jets, not piston engines, is that pistons have an advantage for long range at this time.


This rather seems to be descending into the Luft '46 pit of nonsense...

Click to expand...

Alright, then.

You asked for my sources, and I provided them. Where are yours?

Even if we discount the persistent and consistent story about forty (40) very large and very long ranged German intercontinental jet bombers at one or more massive airfields in Norway (and I included a photo of one of these), what about all of these sources that speak of German ICBM's being readied for launch when the war ended in Europe? PS There was also the Silbervogel suborbital bomber and the massive launching ramp built for its use in occupied France.

But as for the bombers, there are these writings from just past the end of the war in Europe. The sense here is that we are probably talking about prototypes in existence in early to mid 1945 but nevertheless. Now, these are not technical or engineering documents nor are they written by people with expertise in those and similar fields as far as I know, so appropriate skepticism is warranted. However, there are many other similar documents along the same lines, some technical intelligence reports do exist (see esp. USAAF Paperclip officer Donald Putt) and in many cases they echo specific details or provide more information touched upon by other reports. In my view this ought to get the attention of any honest scholar of the conflict simply from the standpoint of the "Preponderance of Evidence" legal criterion.

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Before we forget about Smiling Albert Kesselring and his secret talks with Allen Dulles of the American OSS:

Allen Dulles. 1 April 1945. Cable IN 9061 from Bern, Switzerland to Office of StrategicServices. [NARA RG 226, Entry UD-90, Box 6, Folder 64 SUNRISE]

"[...] 8. In his conversation with Emperor [Kesselring], latter said to Critic [Wolff] our situationis desperate, nobody dares tell truth to Fuehrer who surrounded by small group of advisers who still believe in a last specific secret weapon which they call "Verzweiflunge" weapon [die Verzweiflungswaffe or the "desperation weapon"]. Emperor believed this weapon can prolong war but not decide it, but might cause terrible blood bath on both sides. Emperor said if Fuehrer gave him order to use weapon he would surrender his command. [...]"
"Wolff" was SS staff and liaison officer Karl Wulff. He was the point man who negotiated with Dulles to arrange the surrender of German forces still fighting in northern Italy in the closing weeks of the war. Kesselring apparently was not a major figure in this effort and thus is apparently mentioned here mostly for the subject matter of his conversation with Wulff. What was the "Verzweiflunge" weapon?


SS Functionary Karl Wulff


Luftwaffe General Albert Kesselring